
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MODERN GERMANY

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MODERN GERMANY

IN RELATION TO THE GREAT WAR

BY VARIOUS GERMAN WRITERS

TRANSLATED BY

WILLIAM WALLACE WHITELOCK

A.B., Johns Hopkins University
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CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 3

BOOK I—GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD

CHAPTER

I. GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS, BY PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 9

II. THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN *KULTUR*, BY PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 56

III. GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION, BY PROFESSOR HERMANN SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 89

IV. GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY, BY DR. WILHELM SOLF, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES 141

V. THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM, BY PROFESSOR HANS DELBRÜCK, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 169

VI. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN INSTITUTIONS, BY PROFESSOR GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 184

VII. THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY, BY DR. HANS LUTHER, CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN 218

BOOK II—GERMANY'S ALLIES

I. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

A. THE INNER STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY, BY PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 237

B. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S FOREIGN POLICY, BY PROFESSOR OTTOCAR WEBER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE 246

II. TURKEY, BY PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 265

BOOK III—OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE

I. ENGLAND'S POLICY OF FORCE, BY PROFESSOR ERICH MARCKS, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 293

II. FRANCE'S POLICY OF FORCE, BY PROFESSOR PAUL DARMSTÄDTER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN 318

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
III.	BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS, BY PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG	340
IV.	RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM, BY PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA	381
V.	SERBIA'S RÔLE, BY PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA	410
VI.	THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA, BY PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE OF HAMBURG	420

BOOK IV—THE CAUSES AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

I.	THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR, BY PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG	443
II.	THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG	508
III.	BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY, BY PROFESSOR WALTER SCHOENBORN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG	531

BOOK V—THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR

I.	*KULTUR*, THE POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM, BY PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN	559
II.	THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, BY PROFESSOR ERNST ZITELMANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN	584
III.	THE MEANING OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN	615
	MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK	625

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This book is a translation of *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg,* which was published in Germany in 1915. It is a collection of essays by a number of leaders of thought in modern Germany, and in each case the man is a master of the subject he is chosen to discuss. The writers are, in nearly every instance, professors in German and Austrian Universities, many of them past or present servants of the state in certain capacities in their university work; the exceptional instances are government officials who are in charge of the state activities about which they write.

The various chapters, which go to make up the book as a whole, were completed, for the most part, in March of 1915. At that time Italy had not seceded from the Triple Alliance, and entered into the war on the side of the Allies; and for that reason Italy has not been included in the discussion of the war, except in references in footnotes. The effect, therefore, has been that Italy is treated as a neutral state.

A literal rendering of the title of the book, of course, would be *Germany and the World War.* The book, however, is very much more than a discussion of Germany and the world war. It is a presentation of the civilization or *Kultur* of Germany and Austria-Hungary in our modern civilization; of Germany's position in the world-order, and of what Germany is striving toward today. It reveals, as does no other book available, the historical, cultural and social foundations of modern Germany—the mind of Germany at work. It shows us the things Germany is doing and anticipating, in the fields of science, industry, and social and state functions, the significant and important things that are implied in German *Kultur,* and how this great urge arose out of the very springs of the life of the Teutonic peoples and was determined by the necessities of a growing nation in a circumscribed territory.

While the title of the book is *Germany and the World War,* and while of course the war in most of its varying phases is dealt with in many of the chapters, it is perhaps well to call attention to the fact that the war is of secondary importance to the general purpose of the book, which is to reveal and express Germany to the world in terms of German civilization and German social vision.

The book is an outgrowth of the conclusion reached by the highest intellects in Germany that Germany and Germany's aims ought to be interpreted to the world with honesty and understanding. The leaders of German thought were agreed that Germany owed it to herself as a duty to interpret herself to the world, and they undertook the task in that spirit. This book, therefore, growing out of such an agreement and determination, represents the best expression of German thought to-day.

There are certain details to which attention must be called in which this translation varies from the original German book.

First, the little foreword to the German book, addressed to the German public, and possessing no value to American readers, has been omitted, and, in its place, has been substituted this introductory note endeavoring briefly to indicate the spirit of the book, and its importance and value to American readers.

Secondly, the chapter in the German edition of the book entitled *Krieg und Menschlichkeit Bearbeitet auf Grund amtlichen Materials* ("War and Humanity, Prepared From Official Papers") has been omitted. It is a record and an interpretation of official papers which are already sufficiently known to American readers; and in effect a restatement of the attitude of Germany on questions of international law which are thoroughly discussed in the chapter included herein entitled "The War and International Law." The value of this book does not lie in official papers so much as it does in the fact that it is an expression of the view taken, by German philosophers, of Germany in relation to our world of to-day.

Thirdly, a great many footnotes in the original book have been omitted from this American edition. It is a habit of the very learned, especially of the German philosopher, in his desire to be comprehensive and even encyclopedic, to use footnotes to a greater extent than is customary in America, except perhaps in scientific, legal and technical publications. In some instances the matter in the footnotes has been incorporated in the text. For the most part, however, all footnotes that give authority for statements of fact or that give the source of quotations, have been included. In cases where the subject of the footnote, or the publication quoted, is already known in America, the footnotes have been omitted. The rule has been merely to use footnotes to give sources of information and authority not readily available to the American reader, and in many cases explications of the book or publication cited are given.

In one instance the variation from the original is in new matter included in this edition. The chapter entitled "Ger-

many's International Economic Position," by Professor Hermann Schumacher, was written, in common with the rest of the book, at the beginning of 1915; but at the time this translation was in preparation there was available much more complete, as well as later, information in relation to loans and other details of finance and economics, and this later information has been gathered and incorporated in this chapter under direct authority of Professor Schumacher.

Another matter to which it is perhaps well that attention be called is the use of one or two German terms in the translation. The chief instance of this is in the retention of the German word *Kultur*. This word, in its German significance, in its inclusiveness, expressing as it does the German attitude toward race development, is essentially untranslatable. It would have been necessary to use an entire phrase to render its meaning in English. In its German form, however, the word *Kultur* has come to have for Americans something of its true German significance.

In certain instances the word *Kultur* has been used in relation to the civilization and racial progression of other peoples, such as those of France, England and Belgium. In these cases the word has been adopted in the English version because it is used in the German sense, embracing so many things in these civilizations, and thus seemed to express the meaning more satisfactorily than an English equivalent.

Kultur—the true significance of that misinterpreted word, and all that it means to the German people, is thoroughly revealed in the second chapter in the book entitled "The Spirit of German *Kultur*," by Professor Ernst Troeltsch.

The word *Dreibund* is used in this English version to provide against the possible and quite easy confusion of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.

In these remarks it has been kept in mind that the chief purpose of this book is to interpret Germany, but it is perhaps well to remember that the book also seeks to interpret Germany's allies, and especially Austria-Hungary, to the world, and, in this translation, to America.

BOOK I

GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD

MODERN GERMANY

CHAPTER I

GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS

PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

I

Germany's Historical-Political Growth

THE political character of Germany is frequently misunderstood in foreign countries, and Germany falsely judged in consequence. In America, especially, there is an inclination to adopt the English viewpoint, and to measure Germany according to the standards of a state existing under diametrically opposed conditions. The statement is scarcely open to challenge that the spirit and character of a nation depend not alone upon its internal social structure, but in even greater degree upon the political necessities that spring from its geographical position and its relation to other states and Powers; but, in judging Germany, this truth has generally been lost sight of.

The bases for a secure national existence are quite other on the European Continent than in England or America. In the latter countries the nation pursues its course in relative seclusion, protected by the sea and undisturbed by the immediate neighborhood of equally powerful states whose enmity may, under given conditions, become a serious menace; on the European Continent, on the other hand, in a space approximately equal to the territory of the United States, are crowded together five Great Powers, besides a dozen smaller states, most of them saturated with ancient traditions and civilization, all armed to the teeth, and all filled with an intense longing for national independence and power, that finds expression in jealously guarded borders and in uncompromising agricultural and politico-military competition. The very spirit of international relations in the different countries is to a great degree influenced by these differing life conditions. Neither Englishmen nor

Americans have ever been forced to keep so watchful an eye on their neighbors or to observe so carefully as we the change of pressure in the gauge of international politics, caused by military preparations and diplomatic moves. In the feeling of relative security, instead of having to protect their borders, they have been free to devote themselves to the advancement of their welfare, and to make their commercial interests the pivot of their political activity. The Continental states of Europe, on the other hand, are filled with a spirit of suspicion and rivalry, that leads them to regard a strong military organization as the absolute prerequisite to their national safety, and hence to their prosperity and civilization. Germany in especial is subject to so relentless a politico-military pressure on her borders that, before all things, she is forced, through the imperative law of self-preservation, so to strengthen herself in a military sense as to be able, in case of necessity, to maintain herself in the face of a world of enemies.

France is free from danger on the Pyrenean border, while to the west she is protected by the sea. Russia enjoys on the Asiatic side, as well as toward the north and south, not alone perfect security, but more or less favorable opportunity for expansion. Each of these states has but one border to protect. Germany must protect herself on two borders, east and west, and were it not for the alliance with Austria-Hungary, she would be imperiled on still a third side. This position of our country, in the centre of Europe, without other natural boundaries than those furnished by the sea-coast on the north and by the Alps and the border mountains of Bohemia on the south, is the decisive factor in our political geography; nor would it be difficult to trace much of our peculiar political character to this source: not alone the monarchic-military basis in the structure of the state and the framework of our national life, but likewise the indisputable but often misunderstood and distorted fact that our potential military strength can be called forth in its entirety only for defense, not for attack.

Our intellectual life, also, is plainly under the influence of this central geographical position. Many good points as well as many weaknesses of our national character result from it: our open mind for foreign art and foreign ideas; our receptiveness to the good and beautiful, without regard to its national source; a cosmopolitan spirit ever ready to hearken to the call of other nations and whose dream is of a republic of letters; a frequently exaggerated recognition of, and admiration for, the characteristics and accomplishments of other peoples; a facility in the adoption of their customs and manners; an extreme, one might almost

say, unworthy, delight in foreign words and things, which mars the noble simplicity of a truly national style in speech and life. In the last analysis, this results from the fact that ours is the central European country and nation, open in all directions to the outside world, at no point thrown back upon itself through the existence of natural boundaries, as, for example, is England in her insular position. The latter country, with its immoderately developed individuality, is not alone incapable of sympathetic and deep study of foreign character, but is all too prompt, without other than superficial understanding, to criticize and besmirch the character of other nations, as at the present moment that of the Germans, when political and commercial advantage is to be gained thereby. And here again our peculiar geographical position leads to a manifold echoing of this malevolent censure.

Let us be under no misapprehension: the number of Germany's friends is small, the number of her enemies, even in neutral countries, is large. Foreign observers have sought to explain this widespread and regrettable dislike of us by the fact that in intercourse with representatives of other nations Germans often exhibit an exaggerated self-consciousness, accompanied by bad manners, that betrays the *parvenu*. As opposed to this view, may be cited the not uncommon experience that our fellow-countrymen are only too inclined, when abroad, to adopt the foreign manner of life, as though it were superior to their own. On the other hand, we have no desire to deny the fact that the German, ever absorbed with the essence of things, rather than with the form, not infrequently neglects to present his own personality in a favorable manner; as a result, his ofttimes more or less unconventional exterior makes a less pleasing impression than that resulting from the polished courtesy of the Frenchman—which, however, promptly ceases with the stirring of chauvinism—or than that made by the firm though somewhat tiresome manners of the Englishman. There may, therefore, be some truth in this reproach, although the spitefully exaggerated form in which it is generally presented renders it as untrue as are other sweeping judgments of the character of entire nations numbering millions. But only grudging ill-will can be satisfied with this explanation. More important is the justification for aversion which the advocates of democratic principles, whose influence is dominant in the majority of countries, discover in our institutions. They fail to find their personal ideal of political freedom realized in Germany, especially in Prussia, owing to the fact that with us the monarchic military authority has not yet surrendered to the civil or social-democratic majority. This consideration, to be sure,

has in no wise prevented our enemies from sympathizing with Russian despotism. I would recommend for their perusal certain passages in Sir Robert Seeley's political lectures. The tendency there is to show that conceptions of political freedom differ and that the outward form of a government must be adapted to the vital political requirements of the state. A nation which, like the German, is surrounded on all sides by the strongest military powers, without natural protective boundaries, cannot have the same institutions as England in her insular security. The degree of political freedom permissible in the forms of government must evidently be inversely proportional to the political and military pressure exerted against the boundaries of the state. Disregard of this rule entails upon a country the fate of Poland in the eighteenth century, when that state paid for undue freedom from political restrictions with its national existence. We Germans, on the other hand, enjoy an intellectual and personal freedom by no means inferior to that of Englishmen or Americans, but which, in some respects, is superior. And the fact that our form of government is neither parliamentary nor republican should awaken in the breasts of members of those nations who are capable of political judgment merely the perception that the national requirements under which we live are different from their own; it should not be a cause either for dislike or contempt. Tolerance, not only in religious but also in political life, is a virtue that is generally the result of a higher capacity for discrimination and the lack of which gives proof only of vulgar narrow-mindedness and mental limitations.

The fact that we Germans are less favorably criticized in the press and by public opinion in foreign lands than either the English or French is in great part to be explained, furthermore, by the circumstance that we are in a lesser degree the creditors of other nations than they, and that we have lacked their skill in purchasing the venal press of the various countries. Even in regard to Russia, mental and verbal criticism is less severe where the power of the ruble is felt than where it is absent. Within the Empire we are in the habit of devoting our money to our own undertakings, and our education in conceptions of honor and incorruptibility has been too uncompromising for us to understand, in the manner of Englishmen, Frenchmen and Russians, the art of influencing public opinion in our favor. Democratic parliamentarism is in this respect as greatly our superior as is Russian bureaucracy.

The principal cause, however, of the dislike of Germans, is

generally overlooked. It lies in the simple circumstance that we live at the centre of Europe and have more neighbors than any other nation. Propinquity, in view of the tension in international relations, is generally synonymous with rivalry or enmity. So deep a feeling of distrust, of fear, of covetousness, of race-antagonism, and of a perhaps even sharper enmity of kindred peoples and races, are bound up in our thousand-year-old history with this sense of nearness, so many motives of envy, jealousy, of implacable desire for revenge, that such an excess of malevolence must, in the end, inevitably pass beyond our neighbors and exert its influence also upon distant peoples. The fact that Englishmen in this respect are more fortunate is due neither to their greater amiability nor to their superior manners—the latter, we believe, are open to a good deal of criticism—nor is it due to their old and established reputation as a European Power, nor to the respect paid to their political institutions, that have served as models for so many nations. In great part it results simply from the aristocratic exclusiveness of their position in Europe, like that of some dweller in a private manor, whereby they are removed from the countless frictions and misunderstandings to which Germans, living as it were in the midst of an overcrowded tenement, are exposed a thousand times daily.

This fact cannot be sufficiently emphasized: *Our historico-political destiny lies in our geographical position.* Living at the centre of the Continent, surrounded by Slav and Romance peoples, as well as by remnants of Germanic races, we find ourselves forced to maintain an attitude of self-reliance calculated to inspire respect, if we wish to escape being trodden down and crushed in the struggle of nations—as unfortunately was our fate for so many centuries.

In former times, before the crystallization of effective national consciousness and while the sense of religious unity formed a strong political bond among the undeveloped peoples of Christian Europe, this central position, together with the lack of strong natural boundaries, may possibly have operated as a factor favorable to the spread of the German race and to its influence in the world. In the south, the gentle approaches to the Alps lured ever onward across the mountains, in contrast to their abrupt descent on the Italian side. During the Middle Ages the German emperors were the standard-bearers of the idea of a universal Christian Empire, which for centuries furnished the basis for European civilization. This was the real imperial epoch of our history. It lies buried in the distant past; but we may be permitted to recall it, to recall its heroic

splendor and its contribution to civilization, when other nations are disposed to see in Germany the upstart among the European congeries of states. Our emperors marched at the head of their German legions toward Rome, whence they directed the destinies of the Christian world, at a time when the tottering Anglo-Saxon monarchy was about to fall a victim to a handful of Norman raiders, when the Capetians were but beginning to conquer for themselves a modest local authority in the *Isle de France,* and when Russia still lay shrouded in the obscurity of pre-historical barbarism. The German nation was at that time the exponent of the great ideas which controlled the world; but for its own national future it failed to provide. The necessity of maintaining a firm grasp on Italy, and if possible on Burgundy, the great struggle between emperor and pope that resulted therefrom—all these were factors which prevented Germany from laying a firm *national* foundation, such as England and France were preparing for themselves during this long period of strife. The princes of the Empire gained an unduly powerful, semi-independent position, the empire itself fell to pieces, and with the coming of the Reformation—that drew its best strength from Germany and found its greatest protagonist in the person of a German—the political powers in the Empire were too weak either to smother the movement or to carry it to complete triumph. The religious dispute split the nation permanently and completed its political disintegration. While religious freedom and tolerance gradually, and as the fruit of bitter strife, gained the upper hand, political power was lost, precisely at the moment when the European system of states was in process of formation. Two remnants only of the German people, Austria and Prussia, achieved or maintained the position of Great Powers. But Austria was too heavily handicapped with non-German territory and clung too tenaciously to an all-embracing Catholicism permanently to retain the leadership of the German people. The future of Germany depended rather on Prussia, even at a time when the Hohenzollern rulers had not yet begun to dream of a universal German polity.

But only through unexampled energy and economy of its military and financial resources was Prussia able, in the midst of the European states, to raise itself to independence and power. It was compelled to assume a political structure consonant with the conditions under which it had arisen, and to adapt itself to general political conditions and to the resulting requirements. Hence the origin of so-called Prussian militarism. It is a form

of government which does not seek primarily the comfort and happiness of the individual, but rather the power and greatness of the state, since without the latter, general prosperity cannot be regarded as secure. This system has made the relatively large standing army the backbone of a central administration that takes cognizance of every man and every penny, that teaches self-denial, order and conscientiousness in civil as well as military life, and that has accustomed its citizens rather to fulfill their political duties than to aim at the increase of their political rights. It safeguarded the intellectual freedom of the individual at an earlier period than any other European government. The "Common Law" of the Prussian state, which came into being during the period of the promulgation of the American constitution and of the French Revolution, contains the fundamental guarantee of the most important personal rights, such as religious freedom, personal liberty and security of property against unlawful administrative encroachment. The difference is that there was no question here of the promulgation of the universal rights of man—it was simply a codification of limitations which the state had voluntarily imposed upon itself in its relations with its subjects during the "age of enlightenment." Public education and enlightenment have been so successfully advanced under the system of Prussian militarism that to-day the state is practically without illiterates, and like the other German states in this respect it leads all other great countries of the world, notably France and England, not to speak of Russia. This system of government, which has by no means been inimical to the conceptions of true freedom, despite its compulsion to order and the fulfilment of duty, has proved itself highly adaptable to the transition from enlightened absolutism to the modern constitutional state, with parliamentary control, freedom of the press, the right of assemblage and a healthy form of local self-government. It has developed the fundamental conception of the equality of citizens before the law; in a much higher degree than usually assumed, it has made a reality of Chancellor Hardenberg's demand of 1807: "Democratic institutions under a monarchical form of government." But it opposes a transformation that would place the government in the hands of changing majorities and subject the army to corrupt parliamentary influences—a statement true not alone of Prussia, but of entire Germany. France may indulge in such experiments; our position is too precarious to admit of the attempt.

Since the time of Frederick the Great, the Prussian name has enjoyed respect and consideration throughout Germany. Goethe

speaks approvingly of the "worth, dignity and perseverance of the Prussians." Since the enthusiastic revolt against Napoleon in 1813, since the impressive sacrifices and achievements of the Wars of Liberation from 1813 to 1815, in the eyes of German patriots Prussia has stood as the future leader in the struggle for German unity. Unfortunately, this unity could be achieved only through separation from the kindred German races of Austria; but the painful operation that severed the Hapsburg Dual Monarchy from the German Empire was nevertheless in the final analysis salutary. It rendered possible a permanent international union of the two powers, much closer and freer from misunderstandings and rivalries than would have been the case had the old political bond been renewed by means of a loose and artificial federation. Even without such a formal union, Germany and Austria-Hungary are united for better or for worse. Mutually they uphold and support each other in their positions as great World Powers. But Prussia is, in its relations to the outside world, an absolute unit with the rest of Germany.

Foreigners find difficulty in grasping the political peculiarities of the German Empire, since this is possible only when seen against the background of the country's complicated history. Even such distorted views are encountered as that the other German states have been conquered by Prussia and forced into the union. The only force exercised in this connection was that which existed in the will of the people and in the historico-political necessity of the moment driving them toward unity. There is between Prussia and the other federal states no greater opposition than, for example, between Massachusetts and Virginia. To speak of "Prussia" and "Germany" in antithesis is misleading. This mode of expression dates from the period of the Confederation of the Rhine, when the German states other than Prussia and Austria which were under the immediate protection of Napoleon, were pleased to call themselves "the real Germany." It is rooted in the thoroughly mistaken conception of a fundamental difference between Prussia and Saxony or Bavaria or Württemberg, in regard to race and civilization. There are, to be sure, racial differences within the boundaries of Prussia, as within those of the rest of Germany, but they serve to enrich rather than to impoverish the national life, and retard in no wise the fusing of all into a unified whole. In the eighteenth century, at the time of Goethe and Nicolai, it may still have been possible to speak of an antithesis in the intellectual life and culture of Weimar and Berlin; but since the days of Humboldt, Fichte and Schleiermacher this antithesis has been

eliminated. The various currents of German life have united and merged to form a fuller and stronger stream. The thought and culture of the German people is to-day quite the same in Berlin as in Weimar, Munich, or Heidelberg. The endless variety of provincial peculiarities are reconciled to form one great whole through the bond of a common national interest. The industrial west and the agrarian east, despite their difference in customs and social structure, long since perceived their mutual interdependence and realized that only in union could they hope to survive. Great civic republics and centres of trade, like Hamburg and Bremen, feel themselves to be integral parts of this national civic and economic federation, in the same manner as the agricultural territories of Bavaria, Hanover and Oldenburg. The inhabitants of the southern and central mountain districts, whence our rivers find their way to the sea, look with precisely the same pride upon the flag at the masthead of our ships of war and commerce as do the North-Germans of the plains and sea-coast. Everywhere, together with self-conscious pride in characteristic local peculiarities, is to be found in the same bosoms the realization and conviction that only in a firm and harmonious union of all the racial stems and provinces are freedom, prosperity and power to be secured for the German people. The significance of Prussia for the German Empire lies in the fact that her firm political structure, welded upon the anvil of necessity, has furnished the strong backbone for the new national organism. Prussia's political spirit has become the spirit of the new German Empire. Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony fight for the same national possessions with the same patriotic devotion as the men from Brandenburg, Pomerania and East Prussia.

The unifying of Germany and the formation of the Empire was not possible by peaceful means. These blessings had to be gained upon the field of battle against the opposition of powerful European states; for, in view of our central geographical position, a fundamental change in international relationships was thereby brought about. The new order, therefore, was not to be achieved merely as the result of a national movement, through patriotic gatherings and manifestoes—what was required to realize it, was a bold and far-sighted policy, under monarchical guidance and with military emphasis. This fundamental consideration gives the key to the whole form of our national existence. Conditions being thus, Prussia, as the strongest German state, was called upon to assume and retain the leadership; and the Prussian government found itself forced in secret to gather mili-

tary strength for this great task, in the face of the keenest opposition by the democratic parties. From this fact arose the necessity of emphasizing strongly the monarchic-military factor in Prussian life, and of making it secure for the future against parliamentary majorities. The leadership of the Empire could be given into the keeping of no other hands than those which ruled Prussia. Therefore the Kaiser, invested with the uncurtailed power of a genuinely ruling Prussian king, stands to-day at the head of the federated governments of the Empire. The importance of the *Bundesrat,* or Federal Council, is frequently underestimated abroad, as its activity does not force itself on the public; but since the founding of the Empire its federative character has remained intact. Germany is a federal state, with strongly marked characteristics and self-consciousness in its individual members. The tendency toward unity is perhaps less strong than in the North American Union. The far-reaching administrative decentralization in this form of constitution needs as a counter-balance a strong and uniform direction in the conduct of its foreign policy, and this must of necessity be placed in the keeping of the Emperor, acting under the advice of the Imperial Chancellor.

The Empire is thus provided with a strong monarchic head; nor is the power of the Emperor or that of the King of Prussia the impersonal shadowy prerogative of a parliamentary ruler—it is a real, living, directing force. In the minds of foreigners the conception of a personal government is generally bound up with the picture of arbitrary power, lawlessness and despotism. They are too unfamiliar with our history and the spirit of our institutions to understand that a free constitution and a strong monarchic power are by no means irreconcilable. The English constitution is based upon the fact that the various classes of society, under the leadership of the aristocracy, succeeded in reducing the royal power to a state of impotence. Conversely, our constitution has crystallized about the monarchy as a centre, around which the various classes of society—nobles, burghers and peasants, and in addition already a considerable percentage of workingmen—have formed themselves in a body, the whole permeated and held together by the different elements of the civil service and the officers and the army in general. This inner growth of our organic political life is still in process of development, and is now, under the influence of the present great events, approaching a happy consummation. Our rulers declare themselves to be such "by the grace of God," but not in the sense in which Englishmen understand the notorious *jure divino*

of the Stuart kings. The meaning of this characterization from the viewpoint of political law is simply that the royal power was not granted by the people, but that it rests upon ancient, historical right that has grown and ripened coincident with our history, thus proceeding from a combination of factors which piety may be inclined to ascribe to a higher dispensation. Exalted, mystic conceptions, such, for example, as those indulged in by Frederick William IV, are of a purely subjective, individual nature and without the faintest constitutional significance. The monarch is not, in our eyes, the representative of God upon earth, but merely, as Frederick the Great expressed it, the first servant of the state. And when William II takes pleasure in acknowledging himself to be the instrument of the Most High, this is intended in no other sense than might be employed in the religious conception of any other calling. It intensifies moral elevation and the sense of responsibility, but does not in any manner touch constitutional prerogatives.

By the side of the Emperor and the federated governments stands the Reichstag, a representative body of the German people, resting upon the broadest democratic basis, with whom the former powers must agree on such matters as the appropriations for army and navy and the levy of indirect taxes and customs duties. But universal, direct, equal suffrage, with secret ballot, which is the basis of this parliamentary body, could not with equal justice be claimed for the Prussian legislature. In the Empire equal suffrage rights may be regarded as the corresponding equivalent of the universal duty to bear arms and of the burden of universal indirect taxation. In Prussia, on the contrary, where the Landtag, or legislature, decides on questions of direct taxation, from which a large part of the electors are exempt, such equal rights might, at times, lead to serious injustice. It must, nevertheless, be admitted that the present arrangement, which rests upon the principle of a suffrage graduated according to tax liability, has with the passage of time degenerated in favor of plutocracy and is in need of a thorough revision. Absolute universal suffrage, however—which, by the way, has not yet been realized even in England—is not practicable in Prussia, for the reason that parliamentary friction could not be still further increased without seriously disturbing the smooth working of our already highly complicated governmental machine. Government with us is more difficult than in parliamentary states, or than in such states as recognize the separation of the various powers, as in America. Our German governments are forced to resort to compromises with the various political parties, in order to gain a majority to

support them in the main outlines of their policy. Transcendental government (above parties) presupposes a much higher degree of knowledge, application and skill on the part of responsible circles than government by means of party rule. In Prussia it is, nevertheless, necessary to have a government that stands above parties, not alone for the reasons already given, which spring from our peculiar political position, but owing to the nature of the parties themselves. The division of the various factions has been carried much further with us than in England or America; the divergence of principles is sharper, the spirit of criticism is much more highly developed than is the actual administrative ability. *It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the German parliamentary parties represent rather the various interests of civil society than real political ideas or principles.* With these social interests, however, are bound up opposing views of religion, of cosmic conceptions and of nationality in so complicated a manner as scarcely to be understood by a foreigner.

Closer examination of the various sections of the Conservatives and Liberals need not be entered upon here; but some observations seem appropriate in regard to parties like the Centre and the Social Democrats, which may be characterized as international and which in fact form the complement to the pronounced nationalistic side of our public life. One may be permitted to characterize the ideals which they represent as "supernational." These two political parties are a palpable manifestation of the ineradicable cosmopolitan idealism that is inherent in German blood. The ideal of the Centre Party is the unity of the Catholic Church with the Pope as leader. The ideal of Social Democracy is the brotherhood of the working classes of all countries, the triumph of labor over capital, of the coöperative system of organization over that of a master class—in the last analysis, the metamorphosis of the world into one great coöperatively governed commonwealth of producers and consumers. That such ideals, despite doctrinaire exaggerations, are nevertheless quite reconcilable with stanch national convictions was demonstrated long since by the Centre Party, through its practical coöperation in parliamentary work; while the patriotic attitude of the Social Democrats at the outbreak of the war justified the opinion of those who had claimed that members of this party were from every point of view worthy to be considered a valuable and indispensable part of the nation. It is the party of radical opposition in all questions of domestic policy, a natural phenomenon of reaction called forth by the strongly

developed, yet politically necessary, monarchic-military principle in our form of government. The intensity of opposition is greater than in any other state, but it is unavoidable; and, although the conduct of government is thereby rendered extremely difficult, nevertheless in many respects it has proved a beneficial incentive to the whole body politic. Without the Social Democratic Party, social conscience could scarcely have been awakened as has been the case. The idea of social justice has gained a power in our legislation and administration that permits the Government to take up the fight on any question of social politics with a good conscience, while it has, on the other hand, not been without beneficial influence on the working classes. Our legislation for the insurance of workingmen, the state-socialistic spirit of which was at first the subject of foreign derision, is now generally imitated, even in England, which originally seemed furthest from such ideas. Our legislation for the protection of workingmen, for which England may be said to have furnished the model, has gone further than the original. English labor commissions have been astounded by the general condition and the high standard of living of our workers, which is unmistakably and continually improving. The hopeless doctrine of the "iron law of wages" has long since been thrown onto the scrap heap.

In no other country, taken by and large, is the system of taxation more just than in Germany. Especially Prussia, with its progressive income and supplementary property tax, in this respect towers high over the French Republic. We cannot, of course, avoid social conflicts in the future, but they will be fought out, we hope, along the lines of common national interests, even though the international sympathies of the leaders of labor may not entirely disappear. The workers will perceive more and more the significance of the state for them as for others; casting aside prejudice, they will learn to acknowledge and appreciate more and more the Government's spirit of justice, and the readiness of self-sacrifice of the prosperous classes, who in 1913 without a murmur assumed the burden of a defense contribution of a billion marks. And, although our Social Democrats reject militarism on principle, nevertheless in practice they are excellent soldiers. The stern discipline of the army has raised the political and unionist organizations of our workers to an exceedingly high plane.

Less significant than the social and religious divergencies in our party life are those of a national character, which are bound up with certain abnormal aspects of our history. The

German Empire is a national state of a peculiar kind: its boundaries are not identical with those of the German race and of the German language. At many points they fall considerably short of these; at others they extend somewhat beyond them. As early as the sixteenth century certain important outlying portions seceded from the great German territory, coherent ethnologically and linguistically as it existed in the Middle Ages at the time of the old empire, but as yet without the bond of a common written language. This secession was due to the fact that the centrifugal tendencies resulting from international conditions were stronger than the unifying power of the weakened and disrupted empire. Toward the southwest the Swiss fell away in order to form, with certain Romance elements, a separate state of strongly marked individuality; but numbering as they do to-day more than two and a half millions, they continue to use, in addition to their Allemanic dialect, the German literary language, and have remained in close and uninterrupted touch with German thought. In the northwest descendants of the Frisians and Franconians have attained not alone an independent political existence, but have developed also an individual language, and regard themselves as a separate people. In addition to the six million and odd inhabitants of the Protestant Netherlands, under this classification are to be reckoned nearly four millions of Flemish residents in Belgium. Besides the above loss through segregation of boundary districts, many millions of Germans have been lost to the Fatherland by the extensive colonization of former times, and especially through the prodigious emigration of the last century. They are to be found in Transylvania and Hungary, in Russia, and above all in the United States, all of which received during the nineteenth century an influx reckoned by millions, that brought to them a valuable Teutonic element in the upbuilding of their national life.

The formation of the German Empire and the resulting economic prosperity has gradually served to check this feverish movement toward foreign countries. But the political rebirth of Germany was not accomplished without an extremely serious and significant loss of Teutonic national territory: the Germans of Austria, living in immediate contact with their brothers of the neighboring land, were excluded from the boundaries of the Empire. They number to-day approximately ten millions, and belong to us through language and education. Their sympathies strengthen the bond that unites us to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

These kindred German elements on foreign territory, however, have never served as an excuse for a policy of "irredentism" on our part. Political considerations and also, to an extent, the emphatic disinclination of these disrupted border remnants of our nation, have always precluded such plans from being entertained by serious and responsible politicians in Germany. Our sympathies naturally extend to our fellow-countrymen in other lands, especially to those who, surrounded by foreign elements, are in danger of losing their national characteristics. We strive to aid them to maintain the German language, customs and education. This absolutely non-political cultural design has been pursued for many years by the Association for German Ideals in Foreign Countries (*Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande*), previously known as the German School Association, in view of the nature of its chief activities. The results of such an educational movement have naturally been favorable to the standing and interests of the German nation abroad. Valuable influence may in this manner be exerted, especially upon commercial interests, for trade follows not alone the flag, but the language as well. When on occasion, however, nationalistic jingoes and hotspurs have overstepped these boundaries, they have promptly not only met with an emphatic rebuff in responsible governmental quarters, but in addition have learned that the great majority of the leaders of public thought will have nothing to do with such plans.

On the other hand, in the course of history the inclusion into the German state of certain border territory with foreign elements has proved unavoidable, as in North Schleswig, in Alsace-Lorraine, and especially in Poland and Upper Silesia. Such elements, however, form together only about seven per cent of our entire population, which, according to the last census (1910), numbered approximately sixty-five millions, and which to-day must have reached nearly the seventy million mark. This element, therefore, cannot be regarded as exercising any seriously adverse influence on the national character of the German Empire. An absolute separation of nationalities at the frontiers is quite impracticable, since Germanic and foreign elements are in many cases inextricably mixed; and the political necessity for the inclusion of such elements is dictated by the need of a boundary, not favorable, perhaps, but tenable from a military point of view. In Alsace-Lorraine, where approximately two hundred thousand of the inhabitants speak French, the national question is complicated by the still continuing protest against the annexation of the provinces—although this step was the

result not alone of an irresistible nationalistic demand, but was dictated by military necessity for the protection of our boundaries against France. It must never be forgotten that it is here a question of former Germany territory that was illegally torn from us at the time of our greatest weakness. Metz and Strassburg in French control represent sally ports against Germany, whereas under German dominance they are a bulwark for the protection of our borders. Many observers are of the opinion that the placing of these territories upon a footing of approximate equality with other Federal States of the Empire has proved a detriment rather than an advantage; but other impartial critics declare that the process of amalgamation, constrained by its very nature to be slow, is progressing normally. At all events, we are justified in the hope that the experience of this war and the resulting elimination of the most embittered nationalistic propagandists may pave the way to permanent improvement and final settlement of the conditions.

The one important national problem of Prussian and German politics is Poland. As a state Poland could not live, as a nation it cannot die. At the time of the various divisions national sentiment did not yet exist. As regards the dismemberment of the land, Prussia found herself on the horns of a dilemma. She faced the alternative either of becoming a partner in it or of surrendering the entire booty to Russia, and thereby of permitting this dangerously strengthened neighbor to advance her boundaries close to Berlin. The territory taken by Frederick the Great had previously been the home of German civilization; that added by his successors transformed Prussia temporarily into a half-Slavic state. In our opinion it is fortunate that the main portion of these Polish provinces did not remain in Prussian possession. It is a fact, however, that the Prussian Government was desirous of retaining a larger share of these former Polish possessions than Russia was willing to grant. The motive for this desire was the need of a more or less satisfactory boundary in that great plain which possesses but few natural lines of defence. One must admit that the portion finally awarded to Prussia, and which to-day forms the province of Posen, was for this reason the very least that could be demanded. Even so, the boundary, with the deeply encroaching Russian salient between Silesia and East Prussia, is so unfavorable, from the military point of view, as to admit of defence only through great superiority in numbers or in generalship. Together with this boundary line, Prussia acquired a Polish population, whose Germanizing, at that period of growing nationalistic tendencies, was

from the start practically out of the question. It numbers to-day, with the inclusion of other elements, notably those of the more ancient Upper-Silesian stock, four millions of people, who form a kind of separate community within the German state. The position of Prussia is different from that of Austria in regard to the Poles of Galicia. Prussia is and must remain a strongly centralized and uniform state; it cannot grant to the Poles a separate political existence, but on the contrary must see to it that the youth of the country, who of course are subject to the universal duty of bearing arms, do not constitute a useless foreign element in the German army. They must understand the German language, and the German school and German administration are the sole means to this end. It is mainly this necessity that has constantly brought about fresh conflicts. There is room for discussion as to the possible extent of concessions to be made to nationalist feeling, but the problem is how to satisfy in a just manner the national demands of our Polish citizens, without at the same time losing sight of Prussian and governmental exigencies. That problem up to the present no one has succeeded in solving. The present crisis bears with especial weight upon this sensitive point in our national and political life. The Polish question, in view of the changes which the war has rendered possible, must in the future be earnestly and sympathetically considered. As a factor in the outbreak of hostilities it was of no moment, and in the struggle itself our Polish-speaking citizens have done their full duty.

The German nation, despite its long history, is nevertheless not an ancient race. In point of age it lies midway between France and Russia, as do likewise Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, although these two countries may be said to approach the French rather than the Russian extreme. France, with an increase of population of but 1.8 per thousand, shows unmistakable signs of degenerative age; Russia, with an increase of 21 per thousand, those of effervescent youth; while Germany, whose increase is 13.6 per thousand, represents what may be described as the prime of life. Perhaps we have already passed the highest point of our increase in population—until 1910 it stood at 14.5 per thousand, recently it has fallen slightly—but in any event we stand well above the United Kingdom, which shows only an increase of 8.7, about the same as that of Austria-Hungary. Our increase, therefore, is about 900,000 yearly; and only a far-seeing and unrelaxing economic policy can solve the problem of feeding this ever-rising population on a fixed territory. That we have been successful is proved by the fact that emigration has

steadily decreased since the eighties, until in 1913 but 25,800 persons left the country—that is to say, less than accretions through immigration. The constantly increasing capacity to support our growing population has been gained not alone through mechanical and industrial advance, but also through the progress of agriculture. German economic life is characterized by the union of agriculture and manufacturing industry, not by their opposition. But it lies in the nature of things that the results of progress and industry are more perceptible in the manufacturing field. In this, German energy, mature yet still youthful, manifests itself very clearly. France has long since passed the zenith of her industrial development; she is the typical capitalistic nation, retired from business, as it were, and living on her savings. Russia is, in this respect also, still in youthful immaturity. England in recent years has seemed likewise on the point of passing into the class represented by France. We are in the ascending scale; commercially also we are about to become a World Power.

II

Character of Germany's World Policy Contrasted with the Imperialism of Her Enemies

At the time of the founding of the German Empire, Europe was still the political world beyond which the eyes of its statesmen scarcely strayed. The new state became a member of the European system, assuming the position among the Great Powers which Prussia had hitherto held. With the resurrection of the imperial dignity no thought was given to a revival of the old ideas of the earlier imperialism. On the contrary, the new Empire was created in conscious opposition to this ideal of the Middle Ages. The German people and its leaders had not failed to profit by the history of a thousand years. They were fully aware that a policy aiming at world dominion easily carries the nation which represents it into paths of degeneration and deformity, economically as well as politically. The German Empire aimed to be nothing but an equal among the other Great Powers of the world. The paramount prestige which it temporarily enjoyed among the European states was only the natural effect of the deep moral and political impression made by its remarkable achievements and successes, and especially by the impressive personality of its great statesman. But an actual dominance, threat-

ening the interests of other states, was not the corollary of this prestige.

The European system has been based, from its inception, upon the principle that the component states recognize each other's entire independence, and that a certain number of these powers—previously five, since the advent of Italy, six—preserve among themselves a species of balance, so that no one of them can exercise exclusive or excessive power.

This system of Great Powers, enjoying equal rights and mutually respecting each other, this international commonwealth upon which rests the European civilization of the last four hundred years, is a new phenomenon in the history of mankind which developed only during the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Neither the history of ancient times nor that of the great Oriental states knows this principle of equality and of mutual recognition in an international community of powers. It came into existence as a result of the community of religious and cultural interests among the states of the Christian Occident, following the shipwreck of the imperial and papal dreams of universal power. But this idea did not develop spontaneously and in peaceful harmony; it was born rather of the struggles of rivalling interests in the uninterrupted continuance of which reminiscences of the imperialistic idea of the Middle Ages played a considerable part. The clashing of the tendency towards a universal monarchy with the conception of the autonomy of the nations is what has called into being the European idea of the balance of power. This has proved, it is true, an uncertain balance, but the many disturbances which it has suffered have at no time led to a permanent dominance of any one single state. This relationship of the Powers was previously confined to the Continent of Europe. The colonial world, as well as commercial and maritime interests, were excluded from its purview. In this field England, the outlying member of the European system, had in the course of the eighteenth century gained an almost exclusive ascendency. But this condition, which had resulted concomitant with the great development of states since the sixteenth century, though considered unwelcome was not keenly or universally felt to be a disturbance or menace to the balance of power, so long as the maritime interests of the Great Powers remained too unimportant seriously to influence the general political situation. Not until recently did a change take place in this respect.

England's conception of the European balance of power was to the effect that it should be the means of increasing and maintaining her maritime ascendency. It meant that the Continental

Powers should destroy each other by constant warfare, in order that England might have a free hand at sea and in the colonies. Throughout the centuries of modern history it has been the relentless principle of British policy to fight the strongest Power of the Continent by means of the others.

The mutual rivalry of the Continental states at all times furnished England with a convenient handle for such a policy. Moreover, this political maxim of hers helped to prevent the Continent from ever finding peace and to perpetuate and intensify the differences of the various Powers. In this connection, however, it cannot be denied that at the time of Louis XIV and Napoleon I, Europe's balance of power and her freedom were seriously threatened, or even almost destroyed, and that it was due to the assistance of England that they were maintained and restored. Especially in the person of Napoleon was there a decided recrudescence of the old imperial conception, of the dream of universal monarchy. Not alone the political exigencies resulting from the struggle with England endowed his plans with an all-embracing scope looking to the subjection of the entire European Continent; but bound up with these personal aims we find ambitions which were an inheritance from the past of France and Europe in general, and which through the personal lust for power of the Corsican assumed gigantic proportions. But the moment which, through the coöperation of the rest of Europe with England, saw the thwarting of this mighty attempt to found a Continental despotism, brought with it the consummation of England's undisputed sway over the seas, commerce and colonies. The European balance of power was, and remained, for England primarily a means to this end; it became more and more a deceptive catch-word intended to mislead public opinion by the fetich of European freedom and to conceal the fact that it was the discord of the Continental Powers that smoothed England's way to world-dominion.

The European system is to-day an obsolete notion. The surface of the earth, through the vast increase in international intercourse, has assumed a unified aspect from the economic and political standpoint. A new system of World Powers is coming into being. All the Great Powers to-day have interests across the seas much the same as England, with whom they have come into more or less keen competition, unless content to shape their course according to the latter's dictates. To the six European Great Powers have been added the United States and Japan. In the same manner as the medieval states, those of to-day are beginning to group themselves and to delimit the spheres of

their influence and interests. As in the period of mercantilism, an important rôle is again being played by the commercial seclusion of the various states and by the endeavor to gain for themselves greater and self-sufficing trade territory. Not without justice has this been spoken of as the New Mercantilism. The spirit of commercial competition and political rivalry has arisen anew, with a strength long unknown. A struggle identical with that which, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, resulted in the creation of the European Great Powers, is to-day being waged to determine the World Powers in the future system of states. In this connection the fact of England's command of the seas stands forth with new significance. In former times England, through her maritime interests and colonial possessions, reached far beyond the confines of the European system of states of which she formed in a measure an extraneous part; her existence was dual: she was at the same time a European and a World Power. Now, to the full extent of her possessions and interests, she has become an integral part of the new and greater system of states, and in this new setting the successful maintenance of her claim to the sole rulership of the seas would mean nothing less than world-domination. Sir Walter Raleigh's saying: "Who rules the seas, rules the world," has gained a new significance to-day. The ocean, which in this age of extended steamship traffic, of cables and wireless telegraphy, forms one vast unit, has in truth become to-day, as Friedrich List foresaw, "the highway of international intercourse." To seek to control this element is as though one were to say to the inhabitants of a city: "In your houses you may do as you will, but when you step into the street you must act according to my rules and interests."

Here is the great problem of the future: Will the principle of the equality of the various states govern the new world system as it did the old European system; or will a single Power, namely England, finally succeed in founding upon the basis of her predominance at sea a world dominion that will seriously limit the independence of the other Powers, that may prevent them under certain circumstances from pursuing their vital interests, and that will grant them only so much space and freedom of movement as seems consonant with her own interest and convenience?

In the answer to this question all the Powers are interested, but none so vitally as Germany.

With the new era of imperialism Germany finds herself placed in an extremely difficult position. No sooner had we

succeeded in gaining for ourselves a normal national existence, such as France and England had enjoyed for centuries, than the foundations upon which it rested, namely the European state system, with its old inherited standards and relationships, changed and expanded into the system of world states. In this latter system a continuous rise in the scale of national and international life again threatens our painfully won commercial and political position. We are surrounded by states, many of which have grown to gigantic stature, while we, confined at the centre of the civilized and overcrowded Continent, were cut off from free access to the seas by the barricade of the British Isles. We were, therefore, unable to gain, or even to aspire to, such expansion of our territory as would have corresponded to the example of other nations or to our increase in population. This we could have done only by exposing ourselves to the dangers of a world war, in which, presumably, the surrounding Powers, unhampered in their expansion, would have leagued themselves against us. Such is, approximately, the situation to-day; and not alone our enemies, the English, but even the Americans, influenced by them, have disseminated the view that in the last analysis it was the impulse of the German people toward expansion that brought about the war. As disproof of this legend, the fact must be emphasized that for many years the German Emperor and his advisers have systematically and unswervingly pursued the policy of avoiding all attempts at an expansion which could have been bought only at the price of a world war. Conditions were unfavorable to us owing to the fact that the most valuable colonial territory was already in firm possession at the time when we appeared upon the scene. Germany's advent was too long delayed for her to profit in the division of the world as her interests demanded. That was not our fault, but our destiny. Even after 1871, for more than ten years Germany's interior as well as exterior condition was not such as to permit her to undertake far-reaching plans of expansion, without serious danger to herself and with the prospect of success. The contemptuous charge which English writers now bring against Bismarck that, in the blind passion of war against the opposing Clericals and Social-Democrats, he missed the favorable moment to found a great colonial empire for Germany, betrays entire misapprehension of the difficulties of our foreign policy at that time. Not until the formation of the *Dreibund,* and the signing of the treaty of 1884 with Russia, was Bismarck free to take up the question of a colonial policy. And if he undertook this only with the greatest caution, with the guiding principle of

allowing the flag to follow commerce, so to speak, his policy was based upon the clear perception of Germany's peculiar position in the world, which has not changed materially since then and which may be summed up in two sentences. First, we lack the natural basis for the up-building and control of a great colonial empire, such as France and Russia possess, thanks to the propinquity of the territory which they are colonizing, or such as England enjoys through her maritime position and her long mastery of the seas; second, colonial and foreign complications in which the interests of the various Powers are involved, react with especial force and in a dangerous manner on Germany, in view of her central position, which subjects her to a concentric pressure from the other states and thereby threatens her very existence. This circumstance has not ceased to be of importance to-day, when through the increase of our transoceanic interests, we find ourselves face to face with the necessity of changing from a European Power into a World Power. It is this difficult position of Germany at home that imparts to her foreign policy a peculiar character, frequently misunderstood and falsely judged, not alone in other countries, but even among ourselves. It becomes thereby, in a degree, experimental, uncertain, and calls for extreme caution. There is no other course than to determine by experiment what gains are possible without precipitating armed conflict. The unchanging principle which has guided German policy has been the avoidance of a world war for the sake of colonial expansion; it has sought, instead, to advance the interest of the nation by peaceful means.

This fact has impressed upon Germany's world policy its special character, which is strikingly different from the imperialism of England, France, Russia and the other Powers.

French imperialism resulted rather from the desire to recover through great and successful colonial enterprises the prestige lost in the war of 1870 than from the natural impulse toward expansion of a healthy, sturdy race. It created a great colonial empire in Southwestern Asia, in Madagascar, in Senegambia, and especially in Northwest Africa in conjunction with Algeria, without being driven thereto through increase of population or by the needs of export. The aim of this policy was political rather than commercial, an important consideration in the expansion and development of the northwest African territory being the hope of finding in the Moorish soldiers a substitute for the numerically insufficient recruits at home.

Russian imperialism is of a healthier and sturdier nature. But in her case it is even more apparent that aims of political power,

not commercial considerations, are the dominant factor. The question is here not of founding a distant colonial empire, but of advancing the country's boundaries in all directions. It is Russia's destiny, one may say, to be forced to seek expansion to the proportions of a continent, thereby becoming a menace to all its neighbors. Vital interests urge this vast continental power in every direction toward the sea. Peter the Great opened a window on the Baltic for the ancient Muscovite empire; Catherine II succeeded in reaching the coasts of the Black Sea. But these confined, inland seas fail to satisfy the greater commercial and political needs of the present. For a long time Russia's chief aim has been the straits upon which stands Constantinople, and which by the treaty of 1841 are closed to her ships of war, as to those of all other nations. She regards the Dardanelles as the key to her house, and would fain transform the Black Sea into a Russian Mediterranean, in order to bring the coasts of Asia Minor and Europe under her mediate or immediate authority. This political desire for expansion has a religious background, which renders it holy in the eyes of the orthodox Russian nation: namely, the expulsion of the Mohammedans from the Cathedral of St. Sophia. But bound up with this is an extremely important commercial consideration. Two-thirds of Russia's grain export, which represents billions of rubles and which is of the most vital importance in the preservation of her domestic economic welfare, must pass through the Dardanelles; therefore the closure of this passageway, a thing which may happen in every Balkan war, has the most serious results for her domestic and foreign trade. Hence Russia's claim for the political control of these straits. This consideration determines her attitude toward the Eastern question.

Free access to the Mediterranean would, however, not permanently satisfy Russia; she would seek also to open a way past Gibraltar and through the Suez Canal, in order to be enabled to dispatch her fleet to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Toward the north, likewise, she feels the need of gaining a free passage from the Baltic into the ocean. Since the control of the Danish straits would be difficult to acquire and retain, Russia has of late years turned her eyes toward Sweden and Norway, which, owing to the Gulf Stream, possess ports free from ice throughout the year. Her strategic railways in Finland—one near the coast, the other somewhat inland—could easily transport troops and munitions in either direction. The possession of Narwik would be of great value to Russia. Her fleets would then be able to coöperate in the Atlantic, from south and north. But this is

only one side of Russia's efforts at expansion. More important, perhaps, even than the European field is the Asiatic. The entire history of Russia consists of a gradual extension into the vast territory of forests, moors and steppes beyond the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. This is at one and the same time a process of agricultural and military settlement, very different from the colonizing of the West-European maritime nations. The Russians are fond of emphasizing the fact that their advance into Asia brings them into contact with peoples who neither in customs nor feelings are foreign to the simple Russian peasants and Cossacks, as they are to the West-European colonists and pioneers of civilization; they say that they are able to understand the soul of the Orient and are therefore its natural leaders. The only limit to this advance is the sea; but the ocean itself holds an invitation to further expansion. A gateway to the sea was gained in Siberia and in the Province of Amur. But the harbor of Vladivostok, which is closed to shipping part of the year, could not satisfy the desire for an open port on the Pacific Ocean; therefore Port Arthur was seized—and then lost. The war with Japan temporarily checked the advance in this direction and produced a fundamental change in the situation. Likewise the movement toward India and along the Persian Gulf, as a result of these events, has come to a temporary standstill. Russian imperialism has again turned toward Europe. Nevertheless, its Asiatic aspect is sure to assume prominence anew; its aim is to bring under the rule of the "White Czar" the entire European-Asiatic territory that has not yet assumed the established form of a modern state and to whose Oriental inhabitants this yoke may not appear oppressive.

The maritime imperialism of England is not less far-reaching than that of Russia. The world domination that she has built up and that she still seeks to extend and strengthen, rests upon the basis of her mastery of the seas. An English historian has characterized his country as "Oceana"; another calls it a "world-wide Venice," in which colonies are city districts and oceans are canals. In a double ring the colonies are grouped around the motherland. From the constitutional point of view, an inner ring may be said to be formed by the great dominions with representative government, which are autonomous states within the boundaries of the Empire. The endeavor which the Imperial Federation League has sought to realize is to weld them into a commercial and military union under common direction; but this ambition seems likely to encounter insurmountable obstacles. The remaining colonies, with the Indian Empire, constitute the

outer ring. It is the duty of certain of them to render secure for England the great ocean lanes, upon which depend both her commerce and her safety. From Gibraltar stretches such a chain of stations, by way of Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and the Suez Canal, thence from Aden and Koweit to the confines of India, and then through the Straits' Settlements to Singapore and East Asia. Egypt plays a special rôle in the scheme of the British Empire: it is the point at which England's African and Indian interests unite. Cecil Rhodes' gigantic conception of giving a firm central support to British influence in Africa by means of a Cape-to-Cairo railroad fits into this scheme, as does also the recently exposed desire of England to bring the Persian and Arabian coasts under her control and to turn the Indian Ocean, together with the Persian Gulf, into a British lake, guarded by her possessions in East Africa, Southern Asia and Australia.

Such is the imperialism of our enemies. How modest in comparison seems that which Germany has striven for and achieved! There is not only a difference of degree, but likewise of kind. That which we call "world policy" is something quite different from the imperialism of the other Powers, despite a certain superficial similarity. It has not been our chief aim, in the manner of these states, to build up a great colonial empire by which to increase our power among the nations of the world; rather has our endeavor been, in keeping with our peculiar geographical and political position, before all things to secure and advance our industrial and export interests. As Bismarck desired, our colonial undertakings have been the organic result of our commercial needs. The main incentive has been furnished by the increase in our population and the necessity of providing them with food. One may endeavor to provide for a growing population in two ways: either through the acquisition of new territory into which it can overflow, or through an increase in industrial activity, which brings a greater volume of food into the country in exchange for exports and which renders it possible for the nation to increase within its limited territory. We were forced to choose the second way, since the first seemed to us impracticable. It led us, however, to the goal which we had set ourselves: emigration has ceased, and our people are content and prosperous. Though not underestimating our colonial possessions, we cannot say that they form an empire of political importance like those of France, Russia or England. The territory which they offer our people is neither suitable nor sufficient for purposes of settlement; they provide but a fraction of our need in tropical food products and in raw material for manu-

factures; nor do they furnish a market worth mentioning for our exports. The hopes which are entertained as to the possibility of future development do not materially alter this opinion. Despite this fact, we have made no effort to secure by force great or more valuable colonies. The misfortune of a world war has always seemed greater to us than the possible resulting gain. We were content to have obtained a footing at different points throughout the world and to possess a training-school for colonial administration. Our main object has always been the establishment of the principle of the open door in the great commercial districts of East Asia, South America and Morocco. In these places we desired to be able to trade under the same conditions as the French and English, in order to advance our export interests. In this connection we have consistently championed the independence and integrity of the exotic countries, whenever their measure of civilization seemed to hold out a promise of well regulated and secure relations. We opposed in general the proposition that it is necessary to control such countries politically in order to enjoy advantageous commercial intercourse with them. According to English imperialism, "peaceful penetration" of a country means nothing less than the preliminary step to its political subjugation. Hence the readiness in Anglo-American circles to interpret our relation to Turkey as in the nature of England's to Egypt, or of France's to Morocco. At the time of the granting of the concession to Germany for the building of the Bagdad railway, in 1903, Sir Harry Johnston, an English colonial expert, conceived the fantastic plan of encouraging Germany in the founding of a great eastern empire, embracing the districts traversed by the railway, namely Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey. They were all to be brought under German suzerainty. The basis for this plan was the expectation that Germany's ambition and desire for expansion would in this manner be diverted into channels innocuous to England. Doubtless, also, there existed the generous intention of arousing distrust among Germany's threatened friends and of involving her in deadly conflict with Russia.

This scheme, which at the time was most severely criticized even by the Pan-Germanists and rejected as a "gift of the Greeks," still haunts the brains of Englishmen and Americans, and has given birth to such grotesque imaginings as Usher's book on "Pan-Germanism." It is self-evident that neither the German Bank nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs ever indulged in such fantastic dreams. Our interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia were limited to gaining for ourselves at these points an important

market, capable of great development, and a source from which raw material might be obtained for our manufactures—there was no question of German colonization or of political domination. The Bagdad railway was a purely commercial undertaking, and if it possessed any political significance it was solely that Turkey might by its construction be strengthened along commercial and military lines and placed in a position to be better able to resist possible imperialistic encroachment by Russia or England. It was not fear of Germany's imperialistic plans that inspired England's relentless opposition to this undertaking; rather was it her disinclination to see Turkey strengthened, and in addition the dread lest this shorter rail route to the Persian Gulf might prove a successful competitor with the waterway through the Suez Canal. To this was added the general apprehension of seeing England's absolute and exclusive preeminence challenged on these coasts, which serve as a connecting link between India and Egypt. Germany's readiness to make concessions in this affair is a matter of general knowledge. We met England's desires in regard to the last section of the road, from Bagdad to Koweit, and agreed to place it under international control. Further, we agreed with Russia to take steps for connecting the Bagdad railway with the branch planned for Persia.

Germany's foreign or world policy is thus seen to be quite different from that of England, Russia or France. It was not given to us to create a great colonial empire comparable to those of our enemies; but neither has that been our endeavor, since the conditions to such an end were from the start too unfavorable, owing to our geographical and political position and to the previous distribution of colonial territory. We have in the main contented ourselves with striving to advance our vital interests in the economic sphere by trying to secure "a place in the sun" with the other World Powers, in order to increase and maintain the export trade necessary to provide the nation's food supply. An unfriendly observer might perhaps say that the grapes were too sour. And why should we not admit having made a virtue of necessity in proceeding along moderate lines in our foreign policy? Did we not wish voluntarily to be excluded from the list of World Powers, there was no other course for us on the occasion of the last act in the division of the world but to raise our voice and now and again to demand our portion. But in doing this we have on principle avoided war with other Colonial Powers, and even the most unfriendly judge

must admit that the preservation of peace has been the golden thread in our world policy.

Si vis pacem, para bellum. He who desires peace must prepare for war. The German government has made this approved saying its guiding principle. The caution with which it avoided dangerous disputes went hand in hand with the thorough-going preparation for the eventuality of an unavoidable conflict, which it did not wish for, but faced without fear. A policy of peace without preparation is a sign of weakness and impotence. Thorough preparation creates quiet self-confidence and that degree of respect in the eyes of the world requisite for sober self-restraint in the interest of peace, without the danger of exposing the state to the loss of its dignity and power. Our aim has been so to strengthen ourselves in a military way that any possible desire of our enemies to attack us might thereby be held in check. In this attempt we could not limit ourselves to our army; it was necessary for us to possess a fleet in keeping with our position, our maritime interests and our place as a World Power. Unobstructed access to the sea is for us, as for every World Power, an absolute necessity. The way to the ocean lies through the English Channel, unless our ships are to follow the long and costly course around the Shetland Islands, which is by no means devoid of danger during the stormy months of winter. The English, and even the French fleet, in certain circumstances, might block this course for us. In the Baltic Sea we are threatened by the third great navy, that of Russia. In distant lands and seas the German merchant and sailor, the settler and missionary need the protection of German cruisers. In the present condition of the world only that state which possesses a strong high-seas' fleet can maintain its position in the foremost rank. Our Emperor was the first to perceive this simple truth and to draw the logical conclusion from it. In Admiral Tirpitz he found the discriminating aid who has created a German fleet capable of inspiring respect. In the naval program of 1900 our aim is plainly stated. Our fleet was to be sufficiently strong to cause even the greatest naval Power to hesitate to attack us or to attempt injury to our vital interests, since the probable loss which it would sustain in case of war would threaten its own superiority. It was the least with which we could be content; the present state of affairs furnishes the proof of this. The defensive aim of our naval preparations could not have been more clearly expressed. In our threatened position we could not feel even measurably safe unless able on land and water to offer adequate resistance to the political and

military pressure exerted by our enemies against our borders. In order to secure peace we had to make them respect us. In this sense we have always regarded the high cost of our military preparedness in the light of an insurance premium against the danger of war. This preparedness and the prudent circumspection of our policy has resulted in the preservation of peace during forty-three years.

This circumspect and restrained foreign policy, content to renounce great and brilliant successes for the sake of preserving peace, and limiting itself to the minimum of development of German influence in foreign lands consonant with the nation's welfare, has encountered much public opposition. Especially has the Pan-German Society, since its founding in 1890, with varying emphasis but unceasingly, opposed the Foreign Office. It complained that this policy showed a lack of boldness, of "the will to power," of decisive success. The Imperial Chancellor von Bülow on one occasion reproached this doubtlessly patriotic group of political critics with acting rather under the influence of a warm heart than of a clear head, and with allowing themselves, freed from any shackles of responsibility, to be carried away on the wings of their fancy. To decide whether a political move was wise or the reverse is always an extremely difficult matter for an uninitiated observer. Such a one lacks, at any given moment, the ability to take in at a glance the entire political chess-board and hence fails to grasp the general situation, especially as the facts known to the public are always capable of divergent interpretation and explanation. Notably in criticising Germany's world policy are the dangers frequently lost sight of which every single step is apt to entail upon our European position, that lays us open to joint pressure from without. Had we acted according to the desires of the Pan-Germanists, peace could scarcely have been preserved so long. Nor should we have felt, as to-day, so strongly and unanimously that we have drawn the sword in justifiable self-defence, that we have been attacked by our enemies and are forced to fight for our existence.

As a general proposition, it is undoubtedly laudable to accustom the public, with disregard of domestic party questions, to independent discussion of the great problems of our foreign policy from a broad national basis. For we Germans have hitherto been only too prone in the press and in the forum to thresh out party questions, leaving the responsibility for the power and greatness of the Fatherland in the experienced hands of the Government. Our history under Bismarck's guidance showed us

the frequent folly of the criticism of the great problems of statesmanship by uninitiated publicists and parliamentarians, who were slaves to party doctrines. On the other hand, the successes of his policy accustomed us in international questions to trust blindly in the guidance of the Government. The successors of the great chancellor have not enjoyed the confidence of the public to the same degree. It is easy to understand their sensitiveness under the spirit of criticism that awoke among uninitiated and irresponsible fault-finders. No one desires to see in public discussions a cessation of interest in international questions; but with the growth of political training and understanding, there comes a corresponding discretion in the expression of opinion and in the award of praise and blame. The difficulties of a country's foreign policy increase in direct proportion with the possibilities for embarrassing complications and with the resulting need for the exercise of prudence. It is less difficult for an Englishman or American, even for a Frenchman or Russian, to discuss the problems of his country's foreign policy than for a German, since ours is the most difficult international position. The politicians of the Pan-German Society cannot be said in such discussions to have displayed on the whole a perception of the attainable or to have been sufficiently careful to avoid fantastic excesses; but in other national patriotic circles, also, displeasure over the apparent failures of the Government and the decrease of German influence in the world has expressed itself in noisy emphasis of the "will to power," at times even with threats and rattlings of the sword.

In the famous book of General von Bernhardi the necessity of a "war of prevention" is urged with a frankness that does credit rather to the soldier than to the statesman. Torn from their connection and more or less distorted, his statements are quoted in numberless pamphlets and newspaper articles, especially in those from English and American sources. Such books as Bernhardi's are made use of by our enemies to convince neutral countries that Germany not only desired the war but wantonly brought it about in order to escape from an untenable position. It is impossible to over-emphasize the fact that such writings are in no sense the expression of our official policy and that they had nothing to do with the outbreak of the war. They are, on the contrary, in direct contrast with the peaceful and restrained policy of the Emperor and his government. Whoever knows Kaiser Wilhelm II realizes that he uttered the absolute truth in solemnly declaring that he was forced by his enemies to draw the sword. The history of his reign of twenty-five years gives proof of his

steadfast desire to preserve peace as long as it was compatible with the honor of the German name and the interests of the Empire. This is an indisputable fact, which rises to confute our enemies in their attempt to throw the responsibility for the war upon us. They have sought to avoid this difficulty by inventing and spreading the fiction that the peace-loving Emperor was forced into the war by a military clique. The English inventors of this fable, in their absolute and characteristic ignorance of German conditions, must have confused Berlin and Petrograd. But the fertile political imagination of the English is not satisfied with a single version. The author of one of the Oxford pamphlets thinks himself better informed. It was not the work of the military clique of Potsdam (whose existence seemed a trifle too misty), but that of the "Pan-German League." An anonymous writer, under the cloak of "Daniel Frymann," had offered the suggestion in a pamphlet, "If I were the Kaiser," that Germany would do well, if her foreign office could not be better managed, to introduce parliamentary rule like that of England and France. From this suggestion promptly and with easy facility, the English writer draws the conclusion that the Pan-German League had threatened the Emperor with dethronement and thereby forced him to renounce his peace desires. And the same author claims to have discovered still another reason for Germany's eagerness for war, and this the strangest of all. The country, he declares, was on the verge of a great economic collapse, owing to the lack of markets for its accumulated and unsalable wares, and it began the war in order to relieve its desperate plight. These arguments are pure inventions, absolutely without foundation, and give evidence of such childlike ignorance of conditions in Germany that they serve only to amuse us, despite the seriousness of the subject and of the present moment. The motive for such inventions is a wicked desire to libel us and the author betrays unmistakably his attitude of mind when at one point he represents as highly plausible, in view of the Archduke's friendliness for the Slavs, the assumption that the murders at Serajevo were planned in Berlin rather than in Belgrade! How desperate must be our enemies' case if they must needs have recourse to such weapons.

But even in apparently unbiassed American writings—which are, however, really governed by English ideas—we encounter the widespread and evidently generally accepted explanation that Germany found herself forced into the war by reason of her restricted position and the paralyzing pressure exerted by England and her allies upon the country's commercial and political

freedom of movement. Whatever may have been the immediate occasion for hostilities, Germany, it is claimed, was the actual aggressor, in the effort to escape from her untenable position and to improve her position in the world through the defeat of England and France. The genesis of this explanation is quite evident. Germany's constricted position and the pressure exerted for many years by England and her allies upon the country's vital activities are well-known facts; nor will any one be convinced by the English attempts at denying the invidiousness of Great Britain's policy towards Germany when it is so apparent as in the Morocco question. Support for the above-mentioned explanation may have been found in the fact that writings such as General Bernhardi's seemed to expound the same ideas.

Yet, such a construction is absolutely false. The weak point is the assumption of Germany's untenable and desperate position. A political extremist who measures his demands by the unprecedented successes of Bismarck's times and who entertains the naive belief that things can continue indefinitely in the same manner, may, perhaps, regard as unfavorable the political position of the German Empire, in view of the lack of similar successes and achievements in this vastly more difficult period of "world politics." But he who limits his demands to a normal and sensible standard must admit that we have by no means fared badly considering our extremely difficult position. It is impossible to deny that we had entered upon a period of remarkable economic advance. The problem of adequately employing and feeding our growing population within the boundaries of the Empire itself, since we possess no colonies fit for settlers, much less a great colonial empire, had been solved for a long time to come. Agriculture and industry had been brought into harmony, and so close an approach made to Aristotle's ideal of "autarchy," or national self-sufficiency, that its complete realization in the future scarcely seems unlikely. We had taken measures for the welfare of our workers as no other country in the world has done; the national wealth showed most satisfactory improvement. And yet, in addition to all this, we did not omit to complete our military preparations on land and sea. The balance of our debit and credit which was taken in 1913, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Kaiser's reign, showed satisfactory progress in all departments. Despite the jealousy and ill-will of our neighbors we had become richer and stronger from year to year.

Our development into a World Power by the side of our more favorably situated neighbors had continued slowly but steadily. It was our hope through industry to maintain the "place in the sun" which we had won with such difficulty. We hoped likewise that increasing strength would inevitably bring with it freedom of commercial activity. Our position was far from untenable; least of all could we look forward to its improvement through a world war on the result of which would depend the very existence of our race and its position in the world. None of the Great Powers in a general war would have as much to lose as we, even with Austria-Hungary as our ally. The situation was unmistakable—war was to be thought of for us only in the event of compulsion. With anxiety we saw this compulsion ripening in the growing enmity of the Powers which opposed us. Therein alone lay our danger, and despite the moderation and caution of years, we were not able to avoid it. As an obstacle in the path of England's and Russia's imperialistic ambition our strength as a World Power had to be crushed. Although naturally opposed to each other, these two Powers, through the great changes in international relations and through their mutual understanding with France, our old irreconcilable enemy, had been gradually brought to form the fatal alliance, which from the start was aimed at us. Finally, following the bloody tragedy at Serajevo, the critical moment arrived when, after frequent increase and relief of the tension and after repeated strengthening of military preparations, Russia, the strongest military power among the allies, hurled the fire-brand from its hand and precipitated the world conflagration.

III

Germany's Foreign Relations Since 1871

France had never unreservedly accepted the conditions of the Peace of Frankfort. Her statesmen and patriots had remained true to Gambetta's watchword: Never to abandon the thought of revenge, even though they did not speak of it. The recovery of Alsace-Lorraine appeared to them as a kind of national duty; and even during the period before the disputes with England in colonial matters had been adjusted, their eyes remained fixed threateningly on Germany. After 1871 Bismarck was never without the fear of the forming of a coalition against the Empire, the natural centre of which was France.

In order to weaken pressure from this direction, he left no stone unturned to promote the consolidation of the Republic, which he assumed would be less militaristic than a restored Bourbon monarchy. For the same reason, he welcomed and embraced the opportunity to divert the ambition and energy of the country, which had shown such astounding powers of recovery, into colonial undertakings on a great scale. But the Republic adopted the militarism of the empire, and developed it to a higher degree than would have been possible to a monarchical government. Further, colonial imperialism by no means forced the hopes of revenge permanently into the background; on the contrary, in the end it served to vitalize them anew. The deep hatred for the conqueror of 1870, which smouldered in the hearts of most Frenchmen, kept alive the legend nourished by the country's conscienceless jingoes that Germany was constantly on the point of attacking France. We can state with absolute sincerity that this has never been the case since 1871, not even in 1875, despite diplomatic gossip to that effect. Especially in recent years has Germany's strongest desire been to enter into an understanding with France on the basis of neighborly confidence and security from hostilities, which would have enabled her with a free and undisturbed mind to promote the development of her commercial interests in the world. The courteous attentions and attempts at *rapprochement* of our "Peace Emperor" seemed excessive to the national pride of many Germans. He succeeded thereby in elevating the tone of international intercourse, but failed to change French sentiment. Blood revenge, which has been eliminated in personal relations in civilized countries, seems to be irrepressible in the relations of states to each other. France thus became the country in which Europe's hatred against Germany was nursed. New hatred displaced the old. In order to strengthen herself against Germany, France finally abandoned her colonial rivalry with England. The humiliation in the Fashoda Affair (1898-99), resulting in the renunciation of all claim to the territory of the sources of the Nile and therewith the abandonment of her former Egyptian ambitions, paved the way for the later understanding with the mistress of the seas. The real pivot, however, on which the policy of France turned was the alliance with Russia. It was an old political conception of the days of Napoleon and Alexander I, that had never quite been lost sight of but which, since the eighties, had become the chief support of the hope for revenge. So greatly had the patriotic imagination of French speculators and money-savers been excited and blinded by this idea that in the course of twenty years they invested

at least seventeen billion francs in Russian bonds. Without this sum, Russia's recent development of her agriculture, manufactures and railways would have been quite impossible.

During the critical years from 1863-70 Russia served as the protector of Prussia's rear. The traditional union of the two ruling houses was further strengthened by the personal confidence which Bismarck enjoyed at the court of Alexander II and which the jealous intrigues of Gortschakow failed to undermine. Prussia's attitude toward the Polish insurrection of 1863 had shown Russia that it possessed a trustworthy friend in the former state. But in Russia they seemed unable to forget the rôle which Nicholas I had once played in Germany, and believed themselves justified in claiming Germany's aid in Russia's policy of expansion and desire for power, the recognition and satisfaction of which would gradually have brought Germany into a position of dependence, in fact, of servitude. Austria's attitude during the Crimean War and the ancient rivalry of the two states regarding influence in the Balkans, which had been intensified by Austria's elimination from Germany and Italy, had made Russia more determined in her hostile feeling toward the Hapsburg monarchy. The result of this since 1876 had been a gradual troubling of Germany's relations with Russia. Bismarck was firm in the conviction that a strong Austro-Hungarian state was a vital necessity for Germany, in the face of the growing Russian power. From his "Memoires" we know that in 1876 he opposed the Russian plan of a war of extermination against Austria, and that the Russian government thereupon came to an understanding with Austria, with the result that the storm-centre shifted from the Carpathians to the Balkans. Again at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck's attitude was not such as his Russian friends believed they had a right to expect. Bismarck likens Russia to an exacting woman who expects her suitor to divine and execute her unexpressed wishes. What Russia expected was that Germany should throw the full weight of her authority into the scale, in order to obtain for her neighbor a predominance in the Balkan Peninsula. But this would have increased Russia's power in a very dangerous manner, while at the same time it would have rendered Germany's relations to the other Powers extremely unpleasant. As is well known, Bismarck contented himself with the rôle of the honest broker, and it was with his indulgence that, owing to England's protest, the peace treaty of San Stefano was not carried out but was revised in favor of Turkey. As in the Crimean War, Russia had once more been checked in her vic-

torious march toward Constantinople. Her opposition to England, about which international politics turned in the nineteenth century, as they had turned about the enmity of France and England in the eighteenth, had been dangerously increased. This found expression in Russia's advance into Asia toward the borders of India. At the same time the friendship between Russia and Germany had suffered a severe strain, which, it is true, was temporarily concealed but which did not admit of real cure. In view of France's irreconcilable attitude, Bismarck realized the necessity, as a safeguard against the resentment of Russia, of a union with the state which the Czar has just threatened with annihilation.

In 1879 the alliance was entered into with Austria-Hungary, whereby each of the contracting parties pledged itself to come to the aid of the other in the case of an unexpected attack by Russia, which they hoped to avoid. Nothing was further from Bismarck's desire than thereby to render the break with Russia complete. On the contrary, he took great pains to bring about a renewal of friendly relations with that Power, so as to preclude the danger of an armed conflict. And following Italy's entrance into the German-Austrian alliance in 1882, as a result of her resentment at France's occupation of Tunis, he succeeded in realizing the treaty with Russia, in which the latter country promised, in the event of war between Germany and any other Power, to maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality. Russia's motive for entering into this agreement was her desire to gain protection against England on the Continent. Bismarck had won through the friendly understanding with Russia the opportunity for freedom of action in the Balkans. Conditions at that time still justified his guiding principle that the Balkan question did not concern Germany and that it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. Bismarck's chief gain, however, was that through the agreement he held Russia back from responding to the friendly advances of the French Republic. He had succeeded in isolating England and France, while drawing the three eastern empires more closely together. Upon this basis, also, rested the possibility of Germany's assuming an active part in international politics and of entering upon a course of colonial acquisition, at first in Africa. The Berlin Congo Congress of 1884 is an event which demonstrates the new aspect of affairs.

The march of events in Bulgaria from the year 1885 on soon brought Russia again into sharp opposition with Austria, and this reacted also upon her relations with the German Empire.

The suspicion that Germany was attempting to play a part in the Balkan question was fostered and strengthened by forged letters which reached the Czar from French sources. Even without this, Alexander III, who had had no personal experience of dynastic relations with the Prussian rulers and who had been guided into other channels by his Danish wife, was easily inclined to distrust Germany and much more susceptible to Russian nationalistic and Pan-Slavic influences than his predecessor. Bismarck, however, was able, in the course of a personal interview in 1887, to demonstrate that the documents in question had been forged and thereby remove a pregnant source of distrust from the Russian side. The crisis of 1887 was safely passed, but the state of mind which had rendered it possible remained as a continuing danger. It was a characteristic sign of the times that at this moment the high tide of the Boulanger movement coincided with the Russian anti-German press campaign. From both camps came the demand for an alliance of the two countries against Germany, and in Russian nationalistic and Pan-Slavic circles the saying began to be heard that the road to Constantinople led by way of Berlin and that the settlement of differences in the Eastern question was to be sought on the Rhine and the Oder.

Yet Russia's main interest lay in her expansion in Central and East Asia. The consequent danger of a conflict with England caused the Russian government, despite the growing unfriendliness toward Germany of nationalistically influenced public opinion, to consider the renewal of the agreement with this country for three years valuable enough to prefer it to an understanding with France. Kaiser Wilhelm II likewise has taken all possible pains to cultivate and maintain the traditional relations with Russia which his grandfather urged upon him on his death-bed. Bismarck's retirement, however, introduced a change in the political program in as much as his successor, Caprivi, did not attribute the same importance to the formal signing of a treaty as the originator of the Russo-German Treaty had done. The machinery seemed to him too complicated; he feared, above all, to arouse Austria's distrust in case the secret agreement should become known. It was thus chiefly out of consideration for the Austrian alliance that the renewal of the Russian convention in 1890 was abandoned. It was thought that friendly relations with Russia might be maintained and cultivated even without such a formal basis, which, furthermore, had had no value as a counterbalance against the anti-German sentiment of the public.

It is a question of opinion whether this view did not underestimate the importance of the treaty. At all events, there now became manifest in Russia an increasing desire to welcome French advances, in order not to face England and the *Dreibund* quite isolated. The naval visits to Kronstadt and Toulon followed. The Franco-Russian treaty, that Bismarck had consistently striven to prevent, became a reality, though this dual alliance did not yet assume precisely the aspect of a threat to Germany. It appeared, like the *Dreibund,* to be of a defensive character, and could be regarded as a means for preserving the European balance of power. It was directed against England as well as against the Continental Powers.

England betrayed the fact that in France and Russia she recognized her probable future antagonists, not alone on the occasion of the vast increase of her naval armament in 1888, which was based upon the "two-power standard" and which ushered in a new epoch in modern naval history, but likewise during the period of the succeeding ten years. She welcomed, therefore, the lapsing of the close alliance between Germany and Russia, a development which she had striven in all ways to bring about; she now sought to bring Germany's policy into line with British interests. Harmonious coöperation of the greatest naval power and the greatest military power for the preservation of peace was proclaimed as the program of the future. The so-called Zanzibar Treaty was entered into, whereby Germany surrendered important coast possessions and territorial claims in East Africa, in exchange for Heligoland, whose future maritime importance no Englishman at that time suspected (1890).

England's idea in arranging her relations with Germany in this manner was to bind the latter country's hands in colonial matters. Relations, therefore, became increasingly strained as Germany in 1894 (in conjunction with France) successfully opposed a violation of the Congo Act by England, and later in connection with the events in South Africa from the time of the Jameson Raid to the annexation of the Boer Republics. The long accumulated displeasure at German competition, the jealousy caused by the thriving of our manufactures and trade, the hatred of the successful rival, found at this time astoundingly strong and undisguised expression in the English press; especially noteworthy was this in an article in the *Saturday Review,* which with a warped but ominous variation of Cato's warning, uttered the watchword: *Germaniam esse delendam!*

This indiscreet revelation of England's true feelings was an important factor in causing the German people to give friendly

and intelligent support to the first great naval programme of 1898. At this time, however, England still regarded Russia, not Germany, as her most dangerous enemy. The agreement of 1899 had laid the basis for a future understanding with France. But Russia, with its designs on the Persian Gulf, with its ambition to become the dominant Power in East Asia and in the Pacific Ocean, aroused the most serious apprehension in England. Especially was this so during the Boer War, which for years taxed the country's powers. Hence the endeavor of the British government to gain Germany, which had preserved absolute neutrality during this war, as an ally against Russia. It was at this time that Chamberlain uttered the rally cry for a Teutonic union, comprising England, America and Germany (1899). Germany, however, was far removed from unfriendly intentions against Russia, with which, as a matter of fact, it had just reestablished better relations. An alliance with England, under the conditions then existing, would have implied an abandonment of the development of the navy and of an independent position in world politics. An additional factor was the unwillingness of the parliamentary government of England to bind the country by definite treaties for definite eventualities. So these negotiations came to naught. The year 1900 witnessed the unanimous action against China of the World Powers, including the United States and Japan. But the Imperial Chancellor, von Bülow, did not allow himself to be swept by England beyond the provisions of the Yangtse agreement into opposition against Russia in the Manchurian question. This attitude of the German government finally convinced England that in no event would Germany permit herself to be used against Russia. The British government now took a most unusual step by forming, in 1902, an alliance with Japan, aimed primarily against Russia. This treaty from its inception bore the germs of war, which broke out in 1904 and which resulted in freeing England for a long period from the fear of Russia's growing power. Japan had undertaken the rôle intended for Germany. The unfortunate outcome of this war, however, and the resulting revolution prepared Russia for becoming an ally of England just as the humiliation of Fashoda had done in the case of France.

The period when Germany finally freed herself from the enticements of English diplomacy coincides, approximately, with the time when the results of the two naval programmes of 1898 and 1900 began to be evident in the beginnings of a powerful sea fleet. Since that time the policy of England, protected by Japan against Russia, took a decidedly anti-German turn. King

Edward VII, who had ascended the throne shortly before, was the originator of the "encircling policy" against Germany, which began with the *entente cordiale* with France in 1904 and was extended by Russia's admission to the group in 1907. The full development of this policy followed a few years later through the agreements arranged by Sir Edward Grey with the two governments in question and which transformed the *entente* into an actual war alliance against Germany. The development and manifestations of this "encircling policy," the attempts at decreasing the political tension, the effects of the last Balkan Wars, the outbreak of the present great world war—all these will be treated in later chapters of this book, and are therefore not discussed here. It will be proper at this place only to add a few general remarks on the nature of the relations between the Powers in question and the aspects of the conflict of interests. This will be done in order to indicate the guiding principles of Germany's policy in the years immediately preceding the catastrophe. The question mainly concerns Russia and England.

In the direct relations between Germany and Russia no points of serious friction existed; the aim of Germany's policy, especially since 1894, has unmistakably been to renew the former pleasant relations between the two neighboring states. In her attitude toward Russia during the bitter experience of the Japanese War and the resulting internal disturbances Germany was as friendly as is possible for a neutral power to be. Witness the generous utterance of Kaiser Wilhelm: "Russian sorrow is German sorrow." Russian publicists have recently brought the emphatic accusation against Germany that the latter country took advantage of Russia's necessity in 1904 to obtain more favorable conditions in the commercial treaty renewed at that time than were consonant with Russia's real interest. It is a fact that these conditions were more favorable for us than those of the treaty of 1894. But at that time Germany had found herself in an extremely unfavorable position, which Russia had utilized to the full; and it was only right and proper that when this condition had changed, Germany should take thought for her own commercial interests to the best of her ability. But no unfriendly pressure of any kind was exercised by her. The complaints of the injustice done Russia by these treaties have, moreover, been greatly and deliberately exaggerated by Russian writers. This was done in order to prepare sentiment effectively for the negotiations for a renewal of the treaty in 1917. In this the pressure which the "encircling policy" had for years

exerted upon Germany from all sides was to be used for the promotion of the commercial ambitions of the Russian government and Russian society. But the conflict of commercial interests existing at this time was, despite the threatening speech indulged in by Russian writers, not of a nature to carry with it the danger of war. Doubtless, a mutual attitude of fairness and restraint in the negotiations would have smoothed out any existing difficulties. German designs on Russian territory did not exist; nor can it properly be assumed that before the war Russia had cast covetous eyes on the East Prussian provinces. The conflict of political interests was limited, in the main, to the Balkan question and to the relation of Germany to Austria. Nor did the differences seem insurmountable if Russia and Austria but held to the convention of Mürzsteg of 1903, which had declared the principle of the *status quo* for the Balkan Peninsula—that is to say, if Russia would temporarily restrain her desire for expansion and limit herself to a policy of internal commercial, social and political reforms, in order to strengthen her position, which nobody was threatening. But as a consequence of the Franco-Russian alliance, shipwreck overtook the efforts of the German government to bring about a closer understanding after the Japanese War, and thereby to lay a foundation for an understanding of the three empires, at which Bismarck had aimed as the best guarantee for permanent peace.

After the Algeciras Conference (1906) the French alliance exercised greater powers of attraction, and eventually brought Russia together with France into the agreement with England (1907). The German government having been unable to prevent this agreement, naturally drew from that fact the conclusion that it would be wise to maintain its close relations with Austria. This all the more because the union of Russia and England, the two former opponents in Oriental affairs, had emphasized and sharpened anew the differences between Russia and Austria, which had been only temporarily adjusted by the agreement of Mürzsteg. Russia, bound in East Asia by Japan, in Persia by England, turned anew with a changed front toward the Near East. And it appears that England, without explicitly withdrawing her opposition to the complete exclusion of Turkey from Europe and to Russian occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, nevertheless understood the art of awaking hopes and expectations in the breasts of Russian statesmen which rendered them useful tools for English designs against Germany. Had Russia limited herself to the demand that under certain restrictions passage through the Dardanelles be granted to her

ships of war, it is probable that neither Turkey nor Austria would have offered serious opposition. But Russia's desire went much further. She planned to extend her rule over Constantinople, the Straits, the Balkan countries, the Black Sea and Asia Minor, and to these plans the German-Austrian combination formed a serious obstacle. Repeated attempts were made at various times, by Russia in Berlin, by the English in Vienna, to bring about in one way or another a rupture of the close alliance of the two Central European Powers. All these efforts failed. It would be less in place to-day than ever to speculate whether Germany stands in greater need of Austria, or Austria of Germany, to maintain their position as World Powers—the important fact is that, in the European constellation of states as then existing, the two Powers were mutually interdependent and that the realization of this community of interests has manifested itself far beyond the actual terms of their written treaty.

The effects of the Russian-British understanding in the Balkan question became more apparent after the meeting of Reval (1908), beginning with an increased agitation of the Greater Servian movement, which was directly aimed against the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, and indirectly against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in general. The resulting tension became still more intense through the Young Turk Revolution, which gave a dangerous impetus to the nationalistic aims of the Balkan nations and of the Ottoman Empire, and increased the delicacy of Austria's position in Bosnia. Austria's decision to annex Bosnia was the result of this situation (Oct. 5, 1908). Formally, it was a breach of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, but it was dictated by an imperative, vital interest of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, this act made no real change in conditions in the Balkan Peninsula, and all fears of more ambitious designs on Austria's part were rendered idle by the fact that at the same time Novi Bazar, in which Austria had treaty rights, was given back to Turkey. Nevertheless, as the result of England's activity, a storm of protest was heard on all sides against this one-sided action of Austria; and for Germany the fateful question arose: What position was she to take in the matter? Treaty obligations did not enter into consideration, only the political situation; but as this was conceived by the German government there was no course but to support Austria unreservedly and emphatically in this act so unmistakably dictated by vital interests. Cold practical considerations were the determining factor in this decision, not the romantic sentiment

of "nibelungen" fidelity. The Imperial Chancellor, Bülow, recalled at that time (March 9, 1909) in the Reichstag, Bismarck's words: "A state like Austria-Hungary, when abandoned by its ally, will become alienated and inclined to grasp the hand of the enemy of its faithless friend." (Speech of February 6, 1888.) To be sure, as a member of the *entente,* Austria would gradually have sunk from her former position of power; but Germany likewise would have found herself in a future international crisis in a position of dangerous isolation.

The immediate and decisive support which Austria received from Germany was an important factor in quieting the attacks of the Powers against the Dual Monarchy and in preserving peace, but, under cover, the clash of interests continued. The Greater Serbian agitation, encouraged by Russia, continued despite the agreement of 1909, and was still further strengthened by the final outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The danger which this involved for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy became more and more manifest; it was, therefore, a matter of course that Germany should continue to stand firmly and decisively on Austria's side in the resulting conflicts.

Naturally, Turkey was threatened even more by Russia's plans of expansion; but this consideration played no part in the outbreak of the present war, not becoming a factor until later on. The German instructors in the Turkish army were just as little an indication of a control of Turkey by Germany as the English instructors in the navy were an indication of such a control on the part of England. The only difference is that the German military commission, with the earnestness and zeal characteristic of German officers, took a real and active interest in the strengthening and military education of the Moslems. Our commercial interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia justify to-day without doubt a keener participation in Balkan affairs than at the time of Bismarck, but they were not a decisive factor in the outbreak of the war. We as little desired to make the Mesopotamian affair a cause for war as the Moroccan. With the moderation and restraint which characterize our international policy, we had come to an understanding with England and Russia on the question of the Bagdad Railway. The construction put upon these facts by an American author is as ridiculous as it is arbitrary and unfounded. He argues thus: "Following Bulgaria's understanding with Austria, only the conquest of Serbia was needed to bring about the realization of the Levantine Empire of the Pan-Germanists—hence the Austro-Serbian conflict and the war." It is astounding that such figments of the

imagination can find a place in serious American magazines. Germany's policy in regard to Russia may be thus summarized: We are determined to oppose every effort by Russia and her agents aimed at the destruction or degradation of Austria, even at the risk of war. It is permissible in this connection to recall another remark of Bismarck: "The preservation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as a strong, independent Power, is for Germany a requisite of the European balance of power, for the accomplishment of which, if necessary, the peace of the country may be sacrificed with good conscience."

The German Empire is an obstacle in the path of the British efforts to attain world-rule in the same manner as Austria is an obstacle in the path of Russian Pan-Slavism. For almost twenty years the successful competition of German industry in the commerce of the world has aroused the jealousy, the envy and the hatred of British business men and of the government which they control. To be sure, the competition in no wise endangered the growth of England's export trade and appropriated for Germany only a part of the riches created by the increase in international commerce; but German export trade was increasing more rapidly than England's and this rapid upward tendency, which marked the entire economic activity of the German people, was considered a source of danger to the preservation of England's commercial supremacy.

An additional consideration was the growth of our fleet to the size of a respectable sea power; in actual number of ships, it is true, it was scarcely half that of the British fleet, but by its absolute size it nevertheless awakened respect. It was due to this fact that the British Admiralty drew together in home waters the chief units of its fighting forces, which had hitherto been scattered over the Seven Seas, and even left the protection of the Mediterranean in great part in the hands of the allied French fleet. There was no suspicion that our naval preparations were of an aggressive character; sensible English people have never expected an attack of the German fleet on England; but England did not intend to permit any strong sea power whatsoever to exist which, in certain contingencies, she might have to take into account. Her aim was to maintain undiminished the immense advantage she possessed over every other fleet in the world. Politicians who gave thought to the conditions necessary to maintaining England's naval supremacy were alarmed by the tendency to growth shown not alone by the German fleet but likewise by the trade and commerce of this Continental rival. For the greater the absolute strength of the German

fleet, the more difficult it became for England to maintain permanently the proportion of superiority over her rival which she then still possessed. What would the result be if Germany should raise the number of her dreadnoughts to sixty? How would England then be in a position to maintain twice that number? Whence would come the men and money for this purpose? From the article of Archibald Hurd in the *Fortnightly Review* of October, 1912, or the report of the British Admiralty on Canada for the same year, the conclusion is easily reached that these apprehensions were calculated to lead to a decision to check the further development of the German sea-power by a preventive war. Even the modest basis of our world policy and of our defensive maritime preparations seemed intolerable to Englishmen, because, with intuitive correctness, they realized that Germany's economic strength and naval power might one day, without war, through gradual, uninterrupted development, challenge England's world supremacy. That, in fact, was the aim of Germany's policy; we desired to develop slowly in peaceful competition with England, until one day the older World Power would recognize Germany as possessing equal rights in determining the politics of the world. This development England sought to preclude by the war, following the failure of her efforts to induce Germany to limit her naval armament without corresponding political concessions and to accept a position incompatible with political independence.

The aim of these endeavors was, of course, to perpetuate the great superiority which England at that time possessed in naval strength and to place this superiority upon a basis of international law. The principle of British rule, it was intended, should in this manner gain treaty recognition for all time. Germany was to be forced, although she had to reckon not only with the English but also with the French and Russian fleets, to limit her naval strength to suit the interests and convenience of the nation which rules the seas. In order that England might be absolutely safeguarded in her naval supremacy, and relieved from undue exertions in maintaining her superiority, Germany was expected to renounce the policy of providing as generously for her own safety at sea as political considerations required and her internal strength justified. The method underlying this naive request would, if applied to Continental conditions, justify Germany in demanding of France and Russia a limitation of their military strength to a point where it would seem innocuous to Germany. What would England say to such a request? There is in that country evidently quite another standard for the rela-

tions of the Continental Powers among themselves and for their relation to England. England is far from granting to the Continental Powers a position of equality in international questions. France and Russia may submit to such a relationship, if they consider it compatible with their dignity and independence. Germany demands a position of equality with England, and refuses to recognize in principle and for all time her dominance of the seas. This was the principal cause which drove England into the war against Germany.

CHAPTER II

THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN *KULTUR*

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THE Homeric heroes, according to legend, were wont to go into battle hurling imprecations at their foes, and it would seem that fighters always have experienced the desire to stigmatize their opponents as morally inferior. A change came with the knights of the Middle Ages, when the consciousness of representing a privileged class and the desire to illustrate Christian mansuetude, even in battle, gave birth to practices exhibiting a certain esteem and courtesy. The rules of warfare and the code of honor of that time have remained operative in the maxims of our modern armies, and above all in the standards of the modern officer; but the great mobilized masses of to-day, and especially the nations themselves, counting millions of souls, once more experience the emotions of Homeric heroes and accompany the battle of their armies with primitive and violent race-hatred.

This seems to be a psychological law and applies, with temperamental differences, to all the belligerents. But that which we are experiencing to-day is something that transcends the sphere of emotions. It is a new weapon which is wielded by the modern press. It is in the nature of a crusade against Germany, of a *"Kulturkrieg,"* which takes advantage of existing predispositions or adverse sentiments in order to create and propagate to the greatest possible extent a decided and unconquerable antipathy. This vituperative literature strives to justify the war as the carrying out, so to speak, of a verdict of international proscription. [1]

This *Kultur* war is primarily the work of England, in whose

[1] See the London *Times*, December 22, 1914, statement of Professor Sayce: "The Germans are still what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barbarians who raided our ancestors and destroyed the civilization of the Roman Empire. For a thousand years the blight of German conquest hung over Western Europe, until at last the conquerors perished in internecine conflict or were absorbed into the older populations, and the Dark Ages came to an end.

"We must trust that they will not return with a new avalanche of Teutonic barbarism, but that the Germans may resume their old vocation as the intellectual 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for Western Europe. Germany has no ancient culture to fall back upon, and what that means may be best understood from the contrast between German savagery in the present war and the chivalry of the civilized Japanese in their war with Russia."

political intrigues against Germany it has long been clearly perceptible. The inciting of the whole world against Germany and the attempt to starve her out would appear indefensible unless it were shown that the destruction of Germany is really in the interest of humanity and that the moral inferiority of the Germans demands it. A colossal campaign of suggestion is therefore undertaken in order to justify and uphold this manner of warfare. Expressions of just appreciation, once so general, are now suppressed, and from Capetown to Edinburgh, from Rome to Bordeaux, the censorship does its brutal work.

From a purely political standpoint such a policy is cleverly calculated. The unscrupulous determination to make use of every weapon, combined with the art of rendering this policy morally popular, are old traits of Britain's political skill, and the idea is as clever as is its execution. The latter may be divided into two closely connected and yet different processes. The first of these consists in influencing the daily press and incidental literature, in which the most grotesque and crude statements find a place, and the reader is made to shudder by tales of Huns, barbarians, child-murderers and cannibals. The *hoi polloi* demand such coarse pabulum, which is rendered more palatable by pictures and films, made to order in case of necessity. The other phase of the undertaking is left to scholars and celebrated authors, who in more dignified language and with scientific evidence, exhaustively picture the inferior or at any rate the dangerous qualities of the German mind, at least in its regrettable modern development. These products of their pens are distributed in countless copies, and furnish the catchwords and theories which are the weapons of the daily press when they feel that, in connection with tales of horror, they must offer their readers something more positive. In this endeavor English publicists are, of course, generously supported by their French colleagues—indeed, the latter frequently provide their brethren across the Channel with the most telling points and most damaging charges, either revived or manufactured on the spur of the moment. Russian writers naturally lack such far-reaching influence.[1]

[1] See *Germany and Europe*, by J. W. Allen, London, 1914. "The existence in Europe of a great state specialized for military purposes and directed by people dominated by such views—this is the immediate cause of the war" (p. 56). . . . "These deficiencies account for the old stupidity which marks almost all German work. The German mind is at once powerful and dull" (p. 46). Mr. Allen instances, as proof of their mentality, the works of Treitschke, Nietzsche and Bernhardi, and the pan-German publicists; but he knows, and indeed expressly states, that these writers do not agree, and do not dominate German thought. He remarks further that the great groups, such as the Catholics, the Social Democrats and the Liberals, do not countenance the publications of the small pan-German group; but he calls on them to bear witness to German

The former of these two phases of the *Kultur war* must be regarded from the psychologic, or rather, from the psychopathologic standpoint, and falls under the chapter of "Truth and Falsehood." The other, respectable portion of the anti-German literary output is of a different nature. In this group we find discussions of German character written from varied standpoints—some more conservative, some more radical—but all tending to present the war under the aspect of a *Kultur* war and to disguise the physical struggle as a moral and spiritual one. Despite this, however, they present earnest and exhaustive studies of things German. Analysis frequently takes the place of polemics. For it is here a question of the spirit of German *Kultur,* which is presented either directly as the cause of the war, or as something inimical that must be fought, but which, by force of its inherent weight, often compels to purely scientific

mentality and *Kultur*. Sometimes, however, he retracts his statements: "This mental condition seems to have amounted to what may roughly be described as a will to war, and may be regarded as the real cause of the war. But this mental state was not, of course, a simple thing, all of a piece. It might even be argued that it did not really exist at all" (p. 30); and later he says, "Germany has meant the war, partly unconsciously, these twenty years" (p. 58). Finally the conclusion of his argument suggests the moderate terms of peace offered to Germany because of her value to Europe, the terms of peace including the condition that Free Trade be established throughout Europe and that everywhere—except in the British Empire—the various nationalities are to be permitted to determine their own political future.

See also *Germany and England,* by the late Professor J. A. Cramb, London, 1914. It is an honest, chivalrous and thoughtful work, but it is of course one-sided, and in one important point it is strangely in error. His book was written before the war, but it has had a large circulation. Professor Cramb pleads for the establishment of conscription; and he describes the threatening German danger. It is not German inhumanity that he considers the danger; it is the great political and intellectual development of the modern German Empire, driven by fate towards the hope of world-dominion, and thus into an inevitable struggle with England—an England determined to maintain her universal power. He bases his arguments chiefly on the works of Treitschke, and interprets England politics in the light of Treitschke's ideas. The final motive of Germany as well as of England, according to Professor Cramb, is not material, but spiritual, world-dominion; it is Germany's purpose to destroy Christianity, and to set in its place a German religion of worldly ideals, of the power of will, of heroism, the ideal of which is Napoleon, the prophet of which is Nietzsche. He holds that modern German development means the annihilation of exotic Christianity and creation of a new national religion which derives from Odin and the old Teutonic heroes; that the Germans, with their ideas of world-dominion, are experimenting at the same time with a new universal religion: "Corsica, in a word, has conquered Galilee" (p. 133). The English spirit, on the contrary, holds similar ideals of heroism, a religion of freedom, with reverence as well as fearlessness in its attitude toward the Riddle of the Universe. Because of these differences, Professor Cramb foresees an inevitable struggle between these rivals: "And one can imagine the ancient mighty deity of all the Teutonic kindred, looking serenely down upon that conflict, upon his favorite children, the English and the Germans, locked in a death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of the children of Odin, the War-God!" (p. 152).

See also *The War and Democracy,* by R. W. Seton-Watson, J. Dover Wilson, Alfred Zimmern and Arthur Greenwood, London, 1914: *Germany and the German Emperor,* by G. H. Perris, London, 1914 (Fourth Edition); and *Britain's Case against Germany,* by Ramsay Muir, Manchester, 1914. The last publication discusses the variation between the old Germany and the new Prussian Germany, and upholds England's claim for world-dominion because she stands for the maintenance of the present world order, which the German principle of force aims to destroy.

or historico-philosophical discussion. Much misunderstanding and caricature are mixed with all this, as is also much that shows distinct bias. But in the main we meet here the scientific method, which was developed by Germans precisely for such purposes and which is now turned by our enemies against us. Alongside of this is our own war literature, which is already of considerable volume. It shows us as we see ourselves. It is on the whole drawn with German honesty, and may be studied with profit by friend and foe, though of course the picture is only a rapid sketch of what is seen by the flashlight illumination of the war. But this is all that can be expected, as on both sides the cultural contrasts of Europe are revealed by such momentary flashes, now that the hazy conception of the "respectable European" has practically been eliminated by the conflict.

Let us endeavor, then, as calmly as may be in the face of the perils surrounding us, and with reference to the war literature that has come into existence, to characterize these great contrasts and the position occupied by German civilization within this framework. We may then draw our conclusions without having to descend into the degrading arena of war polemics, with its increasingly disgusting abuse.

So-called European *Kultur,* or, more properly expressed, the *Kultur* of the white Christian races, is not, as a matter of fact, so uniform as appearances would indicate, or as each fraction assumes it to be when it naively identifies its own particular *Kultur* with that of Europe. Likewise, the view that modern science had produced a uniform type of *Kultur,* consonant to the demands of reason, is as erroneous as is the view that Christianity implies and guarantees a homogeneous *Kultur.* The dispute is by no means a product of this war. England and France have long carried on the *Kultur* war by means of the press, lectures and festivals. England, in addition, has done this through Christian missions in order to prepare against the day of political reckoning, or merely to emphasize the existence of a moral contrast.

The various civilized states differ even in the material bases of their existence. The two Americas are independent, unassailable colonial states, self-sufficing commercially, destined in the future to undergo the social developments through which Europe has already passed. The British Isles are the centre of a world empire comparable only to the old Roman Empire; as in the latter, the citizens of the home state have grown into a proud master caste, versed in all the arts of ruling the most

heterogeneous territories and nations. The states of the European Continent are military states, whose populations continue to outgrow their natural boundaries and who consequently come into serious conflict with each other, not only on the Continent itself, but also beyond its borders, over the division of the colonial territory which they require. These conflicts are of ancient date, and in the course of more than a thousand years the outcome has varied, so that to-day the purely political causes of disagreement are complicated by questions of honor and national traditions. Finally, the Russian Empire belongs to the type of bureaucratic predatory states which, like ancient Assyria, have no natural boundaries, and devote their excess of vitality to territorial conquests, instead of to inner development.

These multifarious conditions cause great differences among the various states as regards their *Kultur*. But there are, in addition, differences of feeling, of thought, of the entire character resulting from the racial individuality of the various nationalities. They spring in part from the peculiar historical development of the chief individual groups, but are not to be explained entirely in this manner. There is in each case a peculiar mixture of elemental tendencies and historical destiny, of social-political and moral-intellectual development, acting and reacting upon each other, yet each with its own individual cause of being. It is clear from this that one can comprehend no single one of these types of *Kultur* without considering it in its entirety, as resulting from the intermingling of its various elements and tendencies; especially must it be studied under the mutually interdependent phases of its external and internal life, of its material and spiritual properties, of the historical fortune it has met with and its inner qualities of character. The result is, therefore, that one must not seek the *Kultur* of a nation only in its science and art, its religion and morality, its culture and schooling, as the English, with their *penchant* for simplifying everything, are especially prone to do; rather must it be sought in the manifestations of the nation's life as a whole, in the more or less uniform national spirit created and revealed by the mutual interplay of these manifestations. It is, therefore, quite futile to quote statistics of renowned poets, scholars, artists, inventions and machines, as unfriendly second-rate newspapers are so fond of doing, taking as their standard only the accidental celebrity of the press or the encyclopædia. This is one of the childish things which will automatically disappear with the war. The system of treating certain authors selected at random as typical of the German spirit is equally futile. We need do

no more than mention the ridiculous trinity Treitschke-Nietzsche-Bernhardi, which to many controversialists is holier than the Christian trinity, but which in the better class of writings even among our enemies is recognized and condemned as an arbitrary and stupid selection.[1]

Nothing is to be gained by such crude methods. The real question is to grasp, in the broadest manner possible, the manifold and paradoxical manifestations of the life of a nation and, viewing them from a single or from as few central standpoints as possible, to fathom and understand them as a uniform whole. These central points, as our modern historical and historico-philosophical teaching shows, are primarily to be found in the political and social development of a nation, which determines its spirit, if not exclusively, at least in the main. [2]

We can understand England if we keep in mind her insular character, her national union under the Tudors, her absolutely unique position as regards the church, her Puritan Revolution and the contemporary turning to trade and manufacture, her fortunate position during the great European conflicts, which enabled her to appropriate a fifth of the globe and transformed her into an extra-European Power, dependent only upon herself. From this point of vantage one grasps the significance of the middle class, which is the pillar of English trade, with its combination of strong law-abiding religiousness and keen business

[1] See *Germany and Europe*, by J. W. Allen, p. 4 et seq. He refutes the statements of the authors of *The War and Democracy* (p. 350 et seq.) that the philosophy of force is common to all nations: "What is true and what is more serious, is that men like Harnack, Eucken and Wilamowitz, who should repudiate all intellectual kinship with Machiavelli and Nietzsche—men who are leaders of European thought—publicly support and encourage the policy and standpoint of a Government which, according to British ideas, has acted with criminal wickedness."

[2] It is perhaps well to pause here to say that the term *Kultur* is not only peculiar to German scientific language, but particularly to German thought and feeling. It is ceaselessly mocked at by the second-rate press as "*Kultur* with a K." It conforms to German History and manner of thought, in which the unity of the nation has been brought about by a spiritual development that has become one with her politico-social being. At the same time, *Kultur* harks back to Lutherism and the national church, in which the state and highest intellectual interest have become completely one. The Anglo-Saxon democratic language speaks only of civilization, by which is meant the natural right of the individual, and through it the control of the state, the freedom of religion and the church, the recognition of the private character of personal belief and conviction, and the influence of public opinion on government and private life. See *The War and Democracy*, Chap. IX, p. 348 et seq. In France, too, the ideas of state, society, philosophy and æstheticism are closely connected. But they do not call this *Kultur* as the Germans do, but *civilization, progrès, humanité*, in order to express the logically necessary and rational character; implied in the German *Kultur*, however, there is something romantically, individualistically irrational, the idea of self-education and the improvement of the individual and the nation. For an English view of German *Kultur*, see Viscount Haldane's address, "Germany and Great Britain," delivered at Oxford at the time of the Agadir crisis; and note that he says the mutual study of the national mind of the two countries is indispensable, and note also that he calls attention to the fact that education (*Bildung*), which is general in Germany, in England leads to the establishment of class distinctions.

sense, its leanings toward the Free Church and toward an individualism that resents governmental tutelage and that expresses itself through control of the government, through individual independence, and above all through public opinion. Again, from this point of view, may be understood the development of that class of pioneers and conquerors who seized, organized and exploited the colonies and who called into being that firm, masterful Englishman who regards the world as belonging to him, and looks upon himself and his customs and habits as the only possible ones anywhere. The national armies and universal duty to bear arms, as seen on the Continent, are inconceivable in such a colonial empire. Its activity is divided between business and voluntary military and pioneer service, that shifts from point to point throughout the world. Above this middle class stands a monarchy and aristocracy, who are treated with conservative respect by the English democracy, owing to the latter's character, which chiefly aims at independence; nevertheless, owing to the pronounced commercial and industrial interests of monarchy and aristocracy, they do not form a social type as different from the rest of the population as that of the Prussian landed aristocracy. Further, above this middle class is a social stratum of cultivated individuals, who, by virtue of their wealth and the opportunities thus offered to them, may be said to belong to the noblest and most cultured specimens of intellectualism.

But this class is much smaller than the corresponding class in Germany, and much less the result of universal popular education. That, on the other hand, beneath the "Hebrew Philistine middle classes," as Matthew Arnold calls them, there exists a substratum of the most abject poverty and helpless misery, has been shown plainly enough by English sociological work, the Salvation Army, and the most recent British social legislation. These were the conditions from which arose what Cramb, with natural emphasis on all that is great and striking in them, characterizes as the general tendencies of English imperialism during the last century and a half: "To give all men within its bounds an English mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the standpoint of an Englishman; to diffuse within its bounds that high tolerance in religion which has marked this empire from its foundation; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness of life and death characteristic of our great poets and our great thinkers; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever-higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly, we associate with the temper and character of our race wher-

ever it is dominant and secure."[1] The Conservative is recognizable in these words; nevertheless, in his ideal he includes liberal English civilization as a world principle. The differences are, in fact, not very great from a world-political point of view: some Englishmen regard world dominion as the execution of a bold, imperialistic conception of power, others as safeguarding the moral world system of freedom against chaos. England's world dominance is to some the promotion of the masculine spirit of rule; to others it appears a right and duty imposed by God; but to both it seems a matter of course.

The foundations of French *Kultur* were laid much further in the past. It is the prototype of national culture in Europe, gradually evolved through the consolidating influences of kings, court, administration, Gallicanism, and centralization of intellect in Paris. Thoroughly aristocratic, it was determined in the paths of its modern spiritual development by the acceptance of the Renaissance and the Counter Reformation. The aristocratic culture of this classic period was then passed on to the middle classes, which secularized and rationalized it, separated it from church and monarch, and placed it upon the foundation of a purely scientific conception of state and society. Basing their claims on this theory of the state, the middle classes took the power into their own hands and set up a rule of the people which they declared to be demanded by reason, human progress, freedom and social equity. This is the ideal of the bourgeois republic, erected upon the foundation of clear and relentless science, constantly calculating anew, in ingenious constitutional concepts, the proper share of the will of the individual in the power of the state, conceiving itself as the expression of reason (otherwise expressed, of individual rationalism), and hence as the principle of humanity, progress and anti-clericalism. The new republic connects itself to the glorious old political aspirations of the French military state by means of its propaganda for democracy, science and humanity, at one moment with the material weapons that liberate nations, at another with the magic of an elegant and lucid literature of suggestion. The intellectual element, however, of this democratic humanity consists *au fond* even to-day in the old aristocratic ideal of the *esprit classique,* in the cult of form and lucidity, in elegant ease and mathematical keenness, in the alternation of scepticism and dogmatism—all of this inspired by that specifically French quality of imagination and feeling, the charm of which is felt in every line of French literature. By this means

[1] *Germany and England,* Cramb, p. 139 et seq.

French genius has succeeded in presenting itself to that portion of the world which is not under the sway of English civilization, as the standard of humanity, democracy and progress, producing at the same time the impression of a firm, established, but nevertheless impressionable and artistic protean power. Yet the French peasantry and small capitalists continue to be ruled by the *bourgeoisie,* although under democratic forms, much in the same manner as at the time of the *ancien régime* and the Napoleonic prefects.

Freedom and equality are postulates of individual reason, on which society is built up, rational and lucid. But this individual reason is really only the spirit and taste of the old aristocracy, leveled to the plane of the *bourgeoisie.* The French Republic is a democracy in the form of its constitution and parliament, a democracy of high-sounding phrases, but it is not a real democracy of feeling, spirit and *Kultur.* The efforts of Socialism to create such a democracy are always wrecked by the omnipotence of the *bourgeoisie,* or else they end in violent temperamental outbreaks. He who has no share in the *bourgeois* mentality does not count, and is thrust back into the arms of clericalism, the enemy of all culture. The breach with the national religion and the national past, and the resulting adoption of science as the creator of the new, progressive and universally valid order of society, is the most characteristic trait of the French mind, which, through all these breaks with the past, has maintained only the artistic spirit of the Renaissance. That enables France to act as leader to all nations which have experienced or desire a similar breach and it creates a feeling of affinity with all Romance peoples who are equally under the influence of the Renaissance. The world-wide influence of suggestion of the French is to be understood in this manner; truly, it is one of the most important results of European development. It can, however, scarcely be ascribed to hate or prejudice, if we Germans believe that we recognize, not the strength of progress, but the aging of a great civilization, in this disturbed spirit, that has broken with the national religion and that is therefore so entirely rationalistic. This is likewise the opinion of many Frenchmen, in view of the fact that all attempts at innovation and rejuvenation merely lead back into clericalism. Whoever recalls the brilliant essays of Melchior de Voguë in the *Revue des deux Mondes* of former years is reminded of strange, haunting autumn moods; whoever has read the social novels, *le Mannequin d'Osier* or *l'Anneau d'Améthiste,* by the modern Voltaire, now

so ferocious,[1] knows that the inevitable, logical consequence of such pure rationalism—namely, scepticism—is already manifesting itself in France in a high degree. For the moment, to be sure, a violent nationalism and the religion of revenge for the Franco-Prussian War has arisen as a "new idealism" to check this tendency, and has decked itself with all the splendor of the French claims to culture inherited from the eighteenth century. But in the long run this is likely to prove a futile and unproductive idea.

In respect to our third great enemy, there can be up to the present no question of a pronounced contrast of kindred civilizations. It is true that the highly gifted masses of Russia hold within themselves possibilities and probabilities of an important new and essentially Russian *Kultur*. Were such a civilization really to materialize, it would undoubtedly be the most religious in Europe, and would result in an entirely new type, which would combine the specific orthodox religiousness with the peculiarities of an agricultural people still free from West-European capitalism and rationalism. Every one familiar with Dostoyevsky, Soloviev, and Tolstoi will look forward to such future possibilities with great expectation—if, indeed, we may regard them as possibilities. But the unorthodox West-Slavic elements, which are under European cultural influences, would not be a factor, since they lack all prerequisites for participation in the manifestations of a specifically Russian spirit. Pan-Slavism is not a *Kultur* conception but a political weapon and a means of agitation. But that with which we are concerned at present is precisely *not* Russian *Kultur* in any spiritual sense. It is rather Czarism, with its traditional policy of force and conquest, which is meant to divert attention from the inner questions of Russian civilization to external politics. When Russian liberals and revolutionists seek to gain profit for Russian liberalism through an alliance with the Western Powers, and at the same time to indulge their hatred against reactionary Prussia, formerly the ally of Nicholas I, this has nothing to do with the conception of independent Russian *Kultur;* nor, on the other hand, has it anything to do with such a conception when the feelings of the orthodox mass are aroused against the impious Catholic and Protestant West and directed toward the conquest of Constantinople. The inclusion of Russia in this *Kultur* war against the German spirit is, therefore, meaningless, hypocritical bombast, which is not without its difficulties for the liberals in England and France.

[1] This refers to Anatole France and his anti-German attitude since the war.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

The coöperation of Russia is of purely military and political importance. From the point of view of *Kultur,* the victory of autocratic Russia, with her Peter and Paul prison, her system of Siberian exile, her pogroms and her pseudo-constitutionalism, would mean nothing else than the advancement of the most violent and senseless reaction. There is no need, therefore, to consider what Russian civilization will be in the future.

The pictures that we have before us, in contrast with our own, are those of the English and French civilizations, whose influence, in each case, extends far beyond the boundaries of the country in question. The English spirit is dominant in North America, despite that country's manifold peculiarities; while the French spirit controls anti-clerical Italy and the Romance countries in general. Only by utterly disregarding the deep-lying differences in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin conceptions of democracy and of the strong esthetic and temperamental differences between the Anglo-Saxon and Romance peoples, can one conceive of Western civilization as identical with the democratic ideal of freedom, progress and humanity; only then can one, with a wealth of illuminating demagogic rhetoric and with all the ardor of the sincere doctrinaire, contrast it with the German class-state and the German philosophy of force. Connected with this, as a rule, is the doctrine of nationalities, looking to the emancipation of all those groups that consider themselves to be separate nationalities, and that would fain set themselves up as independent democratic states, by means of a plebiscite and under international guarantee. It is easy to picture the horoscope which, from this standpoint, the opponents of Germany and Austria cast for those countries: disintegration into small democracies, with a minimum of military equipment, under the control of the liberal Great Powers. England herself would, of course, remain unchanged by the operation of this principle, since, as we are constantly assured, she consists only of willingly incorporated nationalities and is now, or is in process of becoming, a model commonwealth of democratic, self-governing units, similar to that of North America. This democratic rhetoric furnishes the main basis of the attacks against Germany. Judged by this standard, German-Prussian imperialism is indeed a thing to be condemned in the interest of humanity and the future of the human race. Nor is there anywhere the least hesitancy shown in so doing. Material is thereby furnished for the press campaign, while at the same time the moral ideal is proclaimed with which the most heterogeneous elements make a war of extermination against Germany seem justifiable to themselves and others, in

order to avoid admitting that the whole situation is merely the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial world supremacy.

The real nature and tendency of German *Kultur* is not to be learned from such international rhetorical phrases or from superficial moralizing, but only from an analysis of Germany's development and of the German spirit.

The decisive factor in this connection is to be found in the fact that the German Empire is a very recently created state, with complex and insecure boundaries, situated in the middle of Europe, and unwelcome to all the previous Great Powers, for whom this politically free space in their midst formed the natural battlefield and the natural source of territorial compensation. One needs only to recall the dismay which so humane a statesman as Gladstone experienced at the disturbance of the then existing political balance through the birth of the German Empire, and simultaneously through the formation of the Italian Kingdom, the latter event being rendered possible only by the former. This disturbance, and its continual augmentation by the economic and political growth of Central Europe, is the true reason for all the dislike and antagonism. In the youthfulness of this late-comer and trouble-brewer in the European system of states is to be found, moreover, the reason for its lack of finish, its sanguine vitality, its passionate self-consciousness, and the mass of still unsolved administrative problems. In the minds of outsiders this may be a ground for criticism, in our own it indicates merely the striving for an ever-growing unity and increasing stability of the Empire, as well as the hope of a prosperous and great future. These are hopes that befit a vigorous adolescence, but which, under the relentless pressure of reality, will doubtless adjust themselves to the outside world. They indicate no more and no less than does the boundless optimism of the Americans—namely, the vitality and self-confidence of a youthful state.

But the decisive factor in determining the spirit of German *Kultur* is the manner in which the German state was founded and the peculiar compound of plastic forces which moulded the nation. The Thirty Years' War left in its train chaos, religious disunion, poverty and a motley of small states. Austria, whose attention was concentrated on the Orient, could not undertake the reconstruction of the German Empire—her interests, in fact, lay in the perpetuation of the prevailing state of chaos. The memories of a former German Empire had faded, and seemed like those of a foreign world. But the vitality of the nation was

not extinct: it crystallized gradually around the new military power, the Prussia of Frederick the Great, which, through a series of well-known events extending over two hundred years, finally became the backbone of a new, if narrower, empire. That this was the only road open for reuniting the nation into a state every child in Germany knows to-day. The prerequisite for the development of Prussia into the German Empire was the development of a spiritually united and homogeneous German nation, which justified its demand for a firm state-edifice. This has been the work of German literature, poetry, philosophy and science, that since the eighteenth century have disseminated a new spirit of unity throughout Germany, torn as it was by religious differences and sunk into philistinism. The result was Wilhelm von Humboldt's great school and university reform, which has been copied in all the German states and which has enabled the spirit of German *Kultur* to become the unifying principle and the binding force. The great educated middle class adopted the cause of Liberalism, which took upon itself in the remarkably peaceful Revolution of 1848 the establishment of German union. In this effort it was forced to turn to Prussia to obtain the necessary military support, though at that time in vain. In the year 1870 Liberalism in all non-Austrian states finally succeeded, with the aid of Prussia, in the formation of the Empire; to-day, in spite of all frictions, it has become incorporated in the politico-military edifice. Since the recuperation of German economic life and the founding of the Customs Union a new creative factor has been added. This is the combined industrial activity of the whole nation; as a result of the foundation of the Empire, this industrial development began to bring forth all the latent energies of the people, and in the *entrepreneur* and working classes produced a third important element of the body-politic. Not without friction has this element hitherto adjusted itself to the other two; nevertheless, it is bound to them by innumerable ties, resting as it does mainly upon the basis of discipline and order and upon the achievements of mechanical art and science, of school and education. It was this third factor that made possible the tremendous growth in population, which since 1870 has increased by twenty-four million, the feeding of whom is the chief problem of the Empire to-day.

In the interplay, friction and adjustment of these three forces is represented the German Empire of to-day. Here, and not in the alleged antithesis between un-German, power-seeking Prussia and the other, idealistic but politically weak states, lie the problems and contending factors of the new Empire; in Prussia

herself these are not less real than in the other parts of the Empire. The only difficulties that arise from Prussianism today are those resulting from the peculiar social structure of the class of great land-owners in Prussia, and especially from their intimate relationship with the Prussian administration. The military organization, the energy and system of this administration, its spirit of discipline and responsibility have been willingly adopted by the whole country, which competes with the Prussians along these lines. For the nation is convinced that no independent German civilization is possible without the protection of a great powerful state, and that the sustenance of our millions is not feasible without a firmly united Empire, capable of a strong commercial and economic policy.

Finally, one must not forget the great substratum of the peasantry and lower middle class, from which large groups with clearly realized aims are continually making their way upward. In these classes are stored the nerve power, the natural instincts, the elementary spiritual forces, which reach self-realization only with the level of self-conscious culture. The tremendous importance of this fount of national strength and the close connection of essential characteristics of the nation with this popular stratum and its peculiarities of mind and sentiment, so difficult of explanation, is made instantly clear at a time of war, like the present, when its importance becomes decisive.

Like all great nations, Germany is rich in contrasts and complexities; as compared to its two great opponents, it is much further from a state of final development. In times of peace, therefore, it presents an aspect capable of widely divergent interpretations; but it is the result of great fateful moments like the present to bring about what otherwise years could not accomplish—not alone the union of the different parts and groups, which in face of the deadly danger naturally think only of the preservation of the state—but above all the revelation of the hidden or obscured unity of spirit. Inward coherence reveals itself and spiritual unity flashes forth.[1]

[1] The theory of the Prussianization of Germany is not accepted by the authors of *The War and Democracy*. They recognize that Germany was, at the outbreak of the war, and is still, an inner spiritual whole. Thus, on page 120, it is said that the German war literature shows: "First, a great consolidation of the German national unity, and secondly, a tendency . . . to hark back . . . to the wars of Liberation. . . . No one can read recent articles by the leaders of German thought without feeling that the Germans are still, before all things, and incurably, the people of poets and philosophers, and that, by a tragic irony, it is the best and most characteristic qualities of the race which are sustaining, and will continue to sustain it, in the conflict in which its dreams have involved it." Also (p. 230): "Here we have to learn from Germany, for German statesmen, strangely enough, have taken an immense trouble to make their policy a democratic one. The whole German nation is behind them, because for years and years they have taught the nation through the

The picture as it presents itself may be sketched in the following outlines:

The Germans are preeminently a monarchic people. To this they are bound not alone by ancient inherited sentiments of fealty, loyalty and trust (which to-day manifest themselves chiefly in relation to the person of the Kaiser as the upholder and symbol of German unity), but even more by national necessity. Only under monarchical leadership can the work of unity and development of a nation encompassed by danger be accomplished. That has always been the case and is still so to-day. All European nations have achieved their unity by means of monarchy. The exceptional case of the United States proves nothing to the contrary, since in this instance the question was one of development without the presence of neighboring states. The French Republic is only a translation into republican form of that which the Bourbon and Napoleonic monarchies had created, and it has often enough suffered from friction between the Army, desirous of monarchic leadership, and the elements of democracy. Unity and coherence and a corporate military force demand a consistent and independent leadership which cannot be shaken; and this can be attained only in a monarchy, to whatever degree dependent upon the popular will and the free support of the people. Moreover, united Germany shows the most pronounced diversity in her social structure, embracing all classes from the old Prussian landed nobility down to the factory worker and peasant. It is in a period of transition from an agrarian to an industrial state, and is in need, therefore, in an especial degree, of a leadership unfettered by social distinctions, which has nothing to gain for itself and which in its own interest must be as just to all as lies within its power. No parliamentary majority can fulfil these demands. Great as may be the advantages of a parliamentary form of government for the discovery and training of political talent, as well as for the political education of a people in general, it is a menace to the unity of the military and political leadership of a youthful state. Hence the desire for parliamentary rule is not widespread in Germany, quite apart from the legal and historical difficulties of such a form of government in a confederation of states.

No plutocracy, no committee of "intellectuals," no syndicate

schools, the universities, the press, their own reading of history and their own idea of what true civilization is. . . . The real strength and danger of Germany is not what her statesmen and soldiers *do*, but what Germans themselves *believe*. We are fighting not an army but a false idea." It is quite true that the unity of spirit in Germany is the work of the nation itself within the last twenty years. The outbreak of the war did not create, it revealed it.

of workmen's unions could provide us with what we need. That can be given only by a monarchy, and for that reason—whether through sentiment or understanding—we are monarchically inclined. And it accords with a strong monarchy, such as we require, that its hand should be felt everywhere, both in great and little things. Personal freedom and human dignity do not suffer thereby in the least. While public servants are placed in a safer and more independent position, owing to the rights guaranteed to them by the laws, than in democracies, the average citizen experiences absolutely no repression through the monarchy. It is, of course, natural that a monarchic ruler, with his plenitude of power, should exercise great influence; but this is the case with every form of government, even with parliamentary majorities. We, at any rate, consider ourselves in many respects freer and more independent than the citizens of the great democracies.

Closely connected with this is the military character of the German state and people. It is rooted in the old Teutonic warlike character which no esthetic cult, no puritanism and no commercial philosophy has succeeded in breaking, and which is a matter of course to our peasants. Even more, however, is it due to our geographical and political position, which can be secured against our neighbors only by superior strength. For this reason the last century has been conducive in the highest degree to the development of this military character. It has injected the conception of honor and the *esprit de corps* of the officers of Frederick the Great into Scharnhorst's Army of the Nation, and has so intimately united the Prussian ability for organization and rule with the ethical idealism of German education that they have thoroughly coalesced. The result of this is the remarkable efficiency of the professional officer and of the popular army. In the last analysis, national unity rests upon the army in the same manner as does the monarchy. All the ideal forces of education, science and technical training have been absorbed into the organism of the army; conversely, the military system furnishes the model and the requisite strength for the remarkable organization which prevails throughout the German nation and in which initiative of the individual and discipline of the whole are successfully united. All this is imposed upon us by fate, which has placed us in the centre of Europe; of this necessity we have made a virtue, which, despite undeniable difficulties and frictions, has stamped the whole national character with masculine clearness and lucidity. But the most important consequence of this universal bearing of arms is

the fact that an effective war can be waged only with the real and enthusiastic approval of the people; it must thus always be a war of defence. There can be no thought of world domination with a popular army nor with a fleet which, based on conscription, can be used only for the protection of the country and of its trade and industry. The bitterness against German militarism—the hardships of which we alone have to bear—is really based only on the fact that the German army is so difficult to defeat, and that those who would like to dislodge Germany from her place, or prevent her from rising into prominence, find themselves forced to imitate this institution, which is psychologically much less adapted to many other nations.[1]

The school organization parallels that of the army, the public school corresponds to the popular army. The latter as well as the former was called into being during the first great rise of the coming German state in opposition to Napoleon. When Fichte, while the country was groaning under the Napoleonic yoke, considered the ways and means of resurrecting the German state, he advised the infusion of German culture into the mass of the people, through the creation of national primary schools along the lines laid down by Pestalozzi, which were to educate the children, according to well-established methods, to mental independence, moral self-control and intellectual self-development. This program was actually adopted by the different German states, and developed during the last century into a comprehensive school system of elementary, secondary and university education. This has become the real formative factor of the German spirit. There is in this school system a

[1] See *Germany and the German Emperor*, by G. H. Perris, London, 1914. A characteristic expression of the average English opinion. The question, How can such a superior nation come under the sway of a military despotism, and virility, originality, liberty, and individualism be so completely lost? is answered by an analysis of the whole of German history. After the Reformation, Germany was so drained of all vital energy that she could express herself only in romantic verses and abstruse metaphysics. Thus completely weakened, she succumbed to Bismarck's despotism. At the same time the modern economic revolution, while it deprived her of the remainder of her originality, on the other hand certainly supplied the necessary means for unity. It is Germany's tragedy, therefore, to have reached no sane democratic and progressive unity, but to be disintegrated again by Prussian brutality and its consequences. The contrasting picture of England is interesting and instructive: "If England became the mother of Parliaments, the exponent of evolution in political and social life, as well as in science and philosophy, it is ultimately not because of any innate superiority of the British nature, but because her insular position has, since 1745, protected her from internal warfare, and for a much longer period has set her full in the current of modern forces, so that feudalism and clericalism withered early, and no speculation could get far away from the bracing winds of practical interest" (p. 115).

See *War and Democracy*. The German outlook on life is called a "confused and patchwork philosophy" (p. 108), and it is explained by attempting to show that it originated in her long and debilitating political misery. Prussianized Germany, it declares, is sick, and, because it is undemocratic, it furnishes a case of morbid nationality-development.

Democratic and State-Socialistic element such as Fichte intended. On the other hand, it is closely connected with the achievements of the army and of German industry and technical science, which have become famous throughout the world for the quality of their results and for their scientifically enlightened methods.

This system also naturally involves certain dangers—conventionalizing to type, a pedagogic spirit and, as it were, a casting of minds in the administrative mould. Our system is most unpopular with the English, who prefer a vastly looser school organization which makes for firmness of character and good fellowship rather than for education and general intellectual development. But the dangers referred to are neutralized by careful individualizing, by fostering the Kantian spirit of independence and self-government, and by the teaching of ancient classics for purposes of moral character-building. This is particularly the case in a great number of secondary schools, whereas the dangers are met in the universities by the spirit of free and pure science, that serves no utilitarian purposes. The English, on the other hand, prefer material utility and routine to our university education, leaving free, pure science to private scholars or holders of fellowships. Their secondary schools reflect class and social distinctions much more than ours, while their free national schools are under a complicated administration of the church, the government or the local bodies. It is extremely difficult to determine the greater or lesser advantage of the two systems. They correspond to the general character of each nation, and considering our character and our tasks, we have every reason to be thankful for our system. We are certain that our present accomplishments and successes would not have been possible but for it, and we are confident of being able to overcome all its dangers by our almost excessive spirit of individualism, originality and personal freedom. A spontaneous movement to this end has already begun to manifest itself among our present-day youth.[1]

The touch of State Socialism which the army and the school are thus shown to exhibit is even more pronounced and comprehensive in the general system of German administration. This system is the outgrowth of the patriarchal state of the seventeenth century, and also of the enlightened "police state," which,

[1] See *Universities and National Life*, by Viscount Haldane, London, 1912 (Second Edition), the chapter on "German Organization," p. 77 et seq., which discusses the German school system in relation to England.

See also *The War and Democracy*, pp. 356-363, on the English dislike of the German educational system: "We have hardly yet begun in England to realize the possibilities of educational development along the lines of the British ideal, both as regards young people and adults" (p. 361).

by its thorough-going work, rescued the German people from the economic desolation left in the wake of the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic conflicts. But this administrative system has passed through new phases and has acquired new characteristics since the great period of Stein; it has developed from a patriarchal bureaucracy into a rational and far-seeing guardian of all the interests of the State and the people. It has joined hands with the great system of self-government in the cities and districts, with the various forms of insurance, and finally with the supervising and advisory parliaments, thus developing an enormous activity the effects of which are seen in the prosperity and security of present-day Germany. Unfettered work and free competition of industry and agriculture would never have accomplished this unaided, as they have failed to accomplish it, as a matter of fact, in England and America.

In this connection, we must above all refer to the great work of social insurance, which is gradually being copied by the whole world, and also to the housing, land and labor legislation of our cities—in which there are no ill-famed slums and which, with the general increase of population, are on the high road to a marvellous prosperity. Nor must we forget the rational land policy, the encouragements to prosperity, and the protection of homesteads in the country. It is true that these things have their dark side. Criticism is heard of the predominance and number of the official class, of bureaucratic "enforcement of felicity," exaggerated respect for position and title, the habit of depending upon the police for help and a certain tendency to groveling subordination. Englishmen, who in this respect prefer freedom from state intervention, are generally averse to this form of administration and are accustomed to speak contemptuously of the character which it has imparted to the Germans. But these are dangers which we ourselves strive to counteract within the system, not in opposition to it. He who knows our administration from its inner working, not merely from the outside, and especially he who has made a study of the great system of municipal self-government, with its bold experiments in far-reaching social legislation, will have no fears of bureaucratic ossification as a final result. He will, on the contrary, see in it the growth of an established vigorous State-Socialism, which is the inevitable development of modern society, and which even England has been compelled to inaugurate in her latest legislation. Our own love of freedom and the character of our great administrators guarantee that flexibility and life

will be preserved in the system, which has stood the test so brilliantly in the present war and which has yet many great problems to solve in the future.

Only on the foundations here described was the development of German economic life possible; it synchronized in its growth with the development of our political unity and strength. The Germans, to be sure, are by nature an extremely diligent people, trained to careful and conscientious toil since the days of the boroughs of the late Middle Ages, and inured to hard work and thrift by the misery and poverty of the period of petty states. They are still to-day more industrious than the English, who are accustomed to growing rich with less labor and who consider this as their proper privilege. But only since the birth of the new state have the Germans successfully entered the current of the modern economic movement and raised themselves to the plane of their present extraordinary economic achievements, under careful state guidance and with the spur of capitalism and mechanical art. This primarily has increased the population, and this increase was again an incitement to more extensive labor. The result has been gradually to change us from a purely continental and preponderantly agrarian state into an empire in which industry and agriculture are combined and whose interests extend far beyond the seas. Great internal difficulties are inherent in this dual tendency, but at the same time there are great advantages of an economic and psychological nature, as we are realizing most keenly at the present moment. German agriculture feeds the nation in time of war, the German peasantry furnishes the best soldiers, and the large land-holder, accustomed to command, supplies the officer corps with the major part of its members. We are not a nation of *rentiers,* like the French, not a rural military and bureaucratic state bent on conquest, like the Russians, not a purely industrial and commercial nation, like the English, whose fleet is the bulwark of their luxury and who provide for their younger sons by giving them posts in the colonies. We are still a nation working at high tension, that must employ all its arts of organization, of order and calculation, as well as its whole political strength and unity to feed its increasing millions. To this very fact the war was chiefly due, since our industry and increase in population gave birth to our maritime policy, resulting in clashes with England, the exclusive ruler of the seas. To these circumstances, far more than to German ideas and theories, are we also indebted for our great unpopularity. Our middle-class population, in pursuit of a livelihood, is forced out into the world to

take places abroad as clerks, barbers, mechanics, teachers, superintendents and foremen, and they are naturally regarded as unwelcome competitors. A still more important factor is that our industry is compelled to concentrate itself chiefly on finished high-class products, not necessities, and that these products are not welcomed like those of dealers in raw stuffs and partly made-up goods, but must often struggle for a market against native finished goods. In addition, our business methods are frequently unwelcome to the established mercantile intercourse of older commercial countries. This is the result, to be sure, not of German character, but of Germany's commercial position; but it is easy to generalize from such a basis and to stir up sentiment against the German spirit, as is being systematically done at present.

All the things here mentioned—monarchy, army, school, administration and economy—rest upon an extraordinary instinct for order, combined with stern discipline and an earnest sense of duty. With this we penetrate more into the inner being of the German. Whence comes this trait, whether from natural endowment or from historical training, it is difficult to say. Nor does it matter. It is enough that things are as they are. It is in this sense that our ruler designates himself as the "First servant of the State," and that the great German thinker exclaims: "Duty, thou sublime word!"—the same thinker whose chief merit it is to have established philosophy on clear and classified logical principles. Order and duty, solidarity and discipline are the watchwords of our officialdom, of associations and corporations, of large and small business concerns, of our labor unions, and of the great social insurance undertakings. Method and system are the principles of scientific work and the technical arts, of education and social legislation. Even free artistic temperament and imagination do not move only in the sphere of inspiration and mood, but seek, precisely in the case of our greatest men, to take their place in the general psychic development, in the cosmic conception and in the scheme of moral achievement. No examples need be mentioned, for this is the characteristic trait of the German which strikes strangers first of all. Many regard it with unfriendly eyes. Englishmen are fond of designating it as pedantic and doctrinaire. A Russian newspaper says: "The German has but one aim throughout his whole life. To be German, therefore, is identical with infinite boredom." An Italian recently expressed the opinion that in Germany method is so highly developed that it renders genius superfluous. It is difficult to argue about a matter in which the decision rests on purely subjective standards, and in regard to

which it is true that, in our case, as in others, virtues have their drawbacks. At all events, there is no plethora of geniuses in other countries, and we may well be satisfied with so universal and widespread a substitute.

But the dangers in this connection are after all not so great. For as one-sided development inevitably calls forth counterbalancing qualities in the human soul, so this sense of order finds its balance in extremely gentle and tender traits of heart and mind, in family instinct and love of home—the most beautiful expression of which is the German Christmas festival. It is further counteracted by the tender depth and primitive sincerity of feeling as expressed in our folk-songs, and by the stern sense of justice and self-assertive tenacity as shown in the ethics of our peasantry. Under the surface of the metropolitan journalistic writings this is the genuine German character, which finds its way through a hundred channels, even into the highest classes, and which is now manifesting itself on all sides in our national army and touching our hearts with song and comradeship. Naturally, these elemental popular traits are as a rule completely lost upon the foreigner; just as we, in the case of other nations, can only divine these undercurrents by means of their anecdotal literature. At all events this is the point of contact with the Englishman, who is otherwise so different from us in spirit, but who feels also the need of a similar counterbalance to his commercial and utilitarian sense. But we limit this world of sentiment less to home and family; we let it extend into every phase of life and cosmic conception; it finds expression in our art and poetry, our social attitude and our judgment of our fellowmen. This fact is revealed by those poets whom one may characterize not as our greatest, but as the most essentially German: Jean Paul, Adalbert Stifter, Wilhelm Raabe, Willibald Alexis, Fritz Reuter, and above all Jeremias Gotthelf, who is not characteristic of Switzerland alone.

Comparing them with Dickens and George Eliot, or Zola, we gain at least a dim conception of the difference in national spirit. But even where German poetry and character-delineation rise to the heights of universal humanity and spiritual greatness, we still meet this basic element, operating on the whole man with the force of a certain childlike heartfelt directness, as demonstrated by Goethe, Bach or Beethoven. Nay, this difference extends even into the field of religion. Luther, who dominates German Protestantism, is distinguished by his childlike, popular traits and primitive strength of feeling from the sober, logically precise, and morally correct Calvin, whose spirit still

lives in Calvinism and non-conformity, although much externalized, formalized and deteriorated along utilitarian lines. The keen observer would herein likewise discover the chief difference between German and French or Italian Catholicism.

But as a matter of fact this entire antithesis in the sense of order and sentiment does not exist to such a pronounced degree as is apparently the case when viewed from without. For these two tendencies have a common source from which they flow and in which their inner unity is to be sought—namely, the German metaphysical and religious spirit. Our sense of order is not founded on its usefulness for material and social ends, but emanates, together with the sense of duty, from an ideal conception of the spirit which is the rule and law of human life and of the universe. Nor is this feeling identical with a sentimentality that clothes, covers and seeks to compensate the asperities of life. It is rather the child of an elemental cosmic conception which realizes that this feeling is basic in the universe. The German is by nature a metaphysician who ponders and strives, from the spiritual inwardness of the universe, to grasp the inner meaning of the world and of things, of man and destiny. It will always be idle to explain the origin and development of this predominant, though by no means universal, characteristic. It remains the final German life secret, much discussed among the Germans themselves, the cause of sacrifice and suffering, the motive power of wonderful achievements—the problem of an ever-new compromise with practical life and its realistic demands.

It is seen above all in the significance of religious life, as revealed by German history. The life of the burghers of the late Middle Ages was the first complete realization of Christianity within the limits possible for an active people. From this class came the Reformation and the division of the Church, which has decided the fate of modern Europe, disrupted the unified German state, and lastingly bound up the general life of the single states with their religious organizations. At the period of national spiritual renascence of the eighteenth century, the great problem of life was the reconciliation of the modern spirit with Christianity, the creation of a scientific, critical theology, the adaptation of the Christian idea to a religiously deepened conception of humanity. This problem has remained until to-day the chief point of German interest. But at the same time the old traditional churches have displayed vital activity, and they are regarded by many intellectuals as the natural means of maintaining a moral idealism among the people. This has resulted, it is true, in very confused conditions. To remove

this confusion, whether in the manner of French anti-clerical legislation or in that of the Anglo-Saxon freedom of conscience and disestablishment of the churches, encounters difficulties, not alone in historical, political and legal conditions, but likewise in the depths of the German spirit itself, to which the Puritanic separation of politico-social institutions and purely individual culture is foreign. We regard state and spirit as belonging together, and an old inherited instinct makes us avoid a separation in the interest of both, despite the difficulties created by the modern spiritual cleavage. We suffer the confusion of this situation rather than resign ourselves to the Anglo-Saxon division of politico-social civilization and private individual spiritual training. In such a separation, experience teaches, the latter suffers grievously. The whole system in England presumes the general domination of an inviolable orthodoxy, while on the other hand the French *bourgeoisie* has made anti-clerical enlightenment a state question. This point shows with particular clearness the fundamental dissimilarities of the nations.

A similar metaphysical tendency, though naturally less closely connected with the state, holds sway in German art. For that very reason, its real centre is music, since in it is voiced, in a manner most appealing to us, all that is unutterable and inexpressible in the German character, simplicity and heroism, mirth and melancholy, faith and doubt, empirical knowledge and intuition. From Bach, Gluck and Händel down to the present day there is an unbroken series of the sublimest creations. Through its music the essence of the German spirit is usually most easily revealed to foreigners, as is shown in Romain Rolland's great novel, "Jean Christophe," to choose but one illustration. It is true that this metaphysically inspired, impulsive and stirring art, is in sharp contrast with the artistic conception of the Latin races, with their sense of clearness, form, grace and transparency, which is an inheritance from the Renaissance. Herein the great national contrasts are clearly revealed, contrasts which simply cannot be overcome and eradicated, and in the expression of which each people must live out its own life. For this reason German music cannot be torn from its organic connection with the entire national life, from national religious faith and war-like heroism, from national self-consciousness and the hopes bound up therewith. How closely all these things are connected may be seen in the "Meistersinger," that most German creation of a master who in other respects may be said to be modern rather than purely German. Precisely for this reason, the protest of Rolland against German

Kultur and the severance of modern realistic Germany from old idealistic Germany proceeds from a false basis. For our enemies such a separation may doubtless be highly desirable, for us it lies neither in the realm of the desirable nor of the possible.

It is much more difficult to apply the same line of thought to German plastic art. For in this field, in Germany as elsewhere, influences are many and varied. Moreover, our situation is here very complicated. The great German tradition of the Middle Ages was interrupted, and in the period of desolation it was foreign art and literature that helped us find ourselves again. Especially in the plastic arts are the various influences highly involved; it is impossible, not alone owing to the limitations of space, to draw here one clearly defined line of specifically German development. But that which is not possible from the point of view of the history of art, may, nevertheless, be indicated from the point of view of the history of civilization. Despite the German's yearning for the sunny south, the northern Gothic germ is in his blood, while the French have completely broken with the great France of the Middle Ages and turned sympathetically toward the Renaissance and the Counter-Reformation. The German's thought is always chiefly occupied with substance, expression, movement, not with line, form, symmetry and delicacy. This explains fundamental dissimilarities between the Germans and the Latin races, for the latter of whom, moreover, art stands in much closer connection with the immediate forms and instincts of life. This finds ample expression in the present *Kultur* war, and in the minds of many forms the basis for the charges of barbarism, just as the classical Frenchman saw only the untamed drunkard even in Shakespeare, the poet of the Renaissance, and as the Italian regarded, and probably still regards, northern Gothic art as barbaric art. This has been the source of a mass of international criticism, scattered throughout the world as commonplaces on the wings of elegant French journalism and eagerly accepted, especially by Anglo-Saxons, whose Puritanism and commercialism have deprived them of a definite artistic tradition. Further discussion on this point is without object. We Germans find the great symbols of our mode of artistic conception in Dürer, Holbein, Grünwald and Rembrandt; and we let the real artistic creative power of the present follow its own path, knowing that it cannot be fettered by theories and that it is certain to return to those old symbols.

It is easier to characterize German philosophy in a uniform

manner. It has, to be sure, naturally shared in all the movements of European thought; but in the main it is precisely this philosophy which is the expression and the cradle of the metaphysical German spirit, and its central position in German spiritual life is of the greatest importance. The reader is already familiar with the main outlines, and a few words must suffice for this great subject.

German philosophy was created by Leibnitz and Kant. Their spirit has acted on classical German literature and poetry, and in conjunction with these it laid the foundation of German idealism, which once more to-day, after many fluctuations, dominates German philosophy and has done more inwardly to form and strengthen the youth of Germany than anything else within the last twenty years. If in truth it is the task of modern philosophy, as distinguished from the ancient and medieval, to seize hold upon and philosophically digest and apply modern natural science and its all-permeating mechanical concept of nature, German idealism up to the present may be said to have set itself the task of combining with the mechanical concept of nature, the full appreciation of the moral, religious and artistic spirit, and the assertion of freedom with the mechanical principle. In this effort, German idealism has hitherto undertaken its most abstract and elemental investigations, but never more ardently than at the present moment. By this means German philosophy has remained in closer touch with the religious life of the people than has the French scientific dogma of atheism. On the other hand, it has penetrated much deeper into the general spirit of religion than can be the case with the essentially practical and conventional religion of England and her not less practical and utilitarian philosophy.

German philosophy is free, autonomous idealism. There can, in truth, be no question here of that so-called philosophy of force, nor of nationalism or chauvinism. The only question is that of the fundamental relation of nature and spirit, and within the bounds of spirit the question of the individual to the body politic. It is chiefly the spirit of Kant and Fichte which has inspired these investigations up to the present day. Their spirit, only calmer, more realistic and cosmopolitan, permeates the national uprising of 1914, as it permeated that of 1813. Foreigners, it is true, are inclined to criticize this philosophy as abstruse metaphysics, or as semi-theology, and many contemptuous references to it are to be found in the literature of the war. But those who judge thus are in no case the leaders of thought. They are the average anti-clericals and the equally average Eng-

lish utilitarians and "matter-of-fact" men. The leaders of thought, even in those countries, have turned their efforts to-day towards a similar idealism, and are in many cases indebted (as for example, Bergson and Boutroux) to German philosophy. The basic difference is that in Germany philosophical idealism possesses a much stronger national tradition and has a much wider influence in educated circles, but in the main the European leaders of thought converge in a truly remarkable manner. There was no need of going to war for the sake of our divergent philosophies.[1]

Such a concentration on the spiritual elements of culture as a whole, which unmistakably characterizes the historical development of Germany since the Reformation, indicates a pronounced talent for scientific work in general. Thus, together with the increasing realistic tasks of the nation, we observe an increasing development of its powers in the field of empiric science. No mention is needed of what the nation has achieved in the line of natural science and mechanical art. It has in all branches fully attained to the science of the older and more advanced nations, and perhaps in some lines even surpassed them. But for purposes of our discussion, this is unimportant. English scientists, who in their war fury will at best but credit their German colleagues with the discovery of the spectrum analysis as an independent piece of research, may receive their answer from the German scientists, if these should think it worth their while.

On the other hand, a word in regard to German historical science may not be out of place. At its inception it was strongly inspired by philosophy, and embraces, in thoroughly cosmopolitan fashion, the development of languages, art, religion, politics, as well as the economics of the whole world open to our knowledge. In this effort it was emphatically supported by the investigations of travelers and geographers. But among other

[1] See *German Philosophy and the Present Crisis,* by G. Dawes Hicks, *Hibbert Journal,* October, 1914, Vol. XIII, No. 1. In this sober-minded article the writer claims that this entire system of philosophy has been superseded by "Bismarckism." It is perhaps sufficient, in reply to this, to say that, despite our gratitude to the founder of the Empire, there has developed in Germany a reaction against "Bismarckism" as a system. The maxims and the deeds of a statesman who was called upon to overcome almost superhuman difficulties cannot be regarded as an ethical system for eternity. It is a strange fact that foreigners do not recognize German idealism—which they are always so ready to call "political immaturity"—when it treats political and social problems according to German history and not according to those French and English traditions which they accept almost as natural rights. It is impossible, of course, under our state and educational system, for German social philosophy to be what the English and French democratic systems demand; which proves that our social philosophy is idealistic. For further testimony on this point, see *The War and Democracy,* referred to in footnote, p. 69. German philosophy and the "potato-bread spirit," of which Mr. Lloyd-George speaks, of course, have as much in common as have English philosophy and miners' strikes.

numerous problems with which the science of the newly created and growing state found itself face to face was the particular problem of the state. Hegel, continuing the thought of antiquity as represented by Plato and Aristotle, had already recognized this as a quite peculiar problem, absolutely distinct and different from those of merely private morals and of social science. In Ranke's cosmopolitan investigations it was stated in its purely historical sense as the distinction between the incarnation of political power and all other historical creations. The historical school of jurisprudence has effectually supported these apperceptions. Herein, it is true, German historical science, as emphatically as Plato had done in his day, opposed the democratic fiction that the state is an institution created by the individuals for their own security and happiness. This antithesis naturally became intensified in the days of the fierce struggles for national unity, during which the great historical investigators, von Sybel and von Treitschke, seemed to be developing into political publicists rather than historians. But anyone versed in such matters is aware that these political thinkers in no way intended to deny the existence of political ethics, but merely to distinguish them from the rules of private morality.

It is precisely this distinction which English democrats, whether of Christian or anti-Christian stripe, fail to recognize. They measure all foreign states by their private moral rules, but leave the politically so advantageous immoralities of English politics to the responsibility of the Government. We are in this respect more honest, and penetrate further below the surface. The saying that "might makes right" has never been the motto of German thinkers, despite the fact that for them the conception of right and morality was more difficult and involved than for those who, in the manner of Puritanism, proclaim a universal democratic natural right, which they reconcile with their own political aspirations by declaring their own state to be the guarantor and controller of natural rights throughout the world.

German historical science, however, has by no means remained at the standpoint of the seventies. Without abandoning its conception of the nature of the state, it has again extended its view to include the entire cosmopolitan horizon, and has elevated purely political interests to the historico-cultural plane. It is, however, not possible at this point to enter further into this subject. It suffices to mention Mommsen, von Wilamowitz

and Eduard Meyer, or to recall the names of Harnack, Dilthey and Schmoller.

To all this must be added German literature and poetry, as the most important revelation of the German spirit. It may seem surprising that they should be mentioned last in this connection. But that is due precisely to the universal function which they exercise among us. German life and feeling in the eighteenth century had been forced back into a literary existence, and the entire vital energy and force of the nation was compressed into its literature. Literature, therefore, was the centre of all philosophical, scientific and cultural interests, and drew within its sphere social and finally state problems as well. Not without significance is it that Goethe, the typical representative of this literature, found the solution of his problem in universal, but at the same time thoroughly individual, self-culture. This determined the character of modern German literature. It absorbed into itself the essence of German life, and in this way operated like a philosophy. It formed, deepened and transfigured the life of the nation in all fields of activity. In this connection the classical and romantic schools were, in truth, not in such marked opposition; they were united in the ideal of self-culture, differing only in the means to be employed for its achievement. Indeed, in carrying out this thought and in implanting it in the soul of the people, the romantic school was perhaps more efficacious even than Goethe.

In the course of the nineteenth century, German literature, it is true, fell from the heights attained (of which further discussion is superfluous), but with fresh energy, it is now recovering from this decline. The literary revolution of the eighties prepared the way for a deep inner change and revival, which, at present, we feel within us only as a shadowy desire and impulse, but which is surely an indication of vitality and unexhausted power. This is, therefore, the place for a word about Nietzsche, whose name has been so misused in this *Kultur* war.

Nietzsche is rather a poet than a thinker. German philosophy is concerned with him but slightly, German politics not at all. He preached against the triteness, shallowness and self-complacency of German culture of the eighties, deepened vastly the conception of personality, strengthened the longing for sincere living and originality, and thereby blazed the way for a new romantic movement; in its development this movement has become much more German than would have accorded with Nietzsche's Latin and Slavic sympathies. Even before the war, the morbid, irritable and egoistic quality of his teaching

was in process of elimination, and doubtless in the spiritual elevation resulting from the war it will be permanently overcome. But only trivial Pharisees and narrow-minded sectarians can deny the incentive to new aims and inner searchings that owe their origin to him.

How deeply this spiritual and scientific interest is rooted in Germany is shown by the remarkably broad classes which are permeated by it. All officials, teachers and preachers have enjoyed this education. The centres of scientific work are remarkably numerous and well equipped. In this respect Germany is perhaps unique. But even more important is the fact that an army of publishers, associations, institutions and enterprises uninterruptedly provides the people with this intellectual pabulum. Music and philosophy, science and education are continually popularized. A kind of democratization of all education is under way which strives to render the very best and deepest universally accessible. He who is familiar with the systematic activity of the *Kunstwart* and of the *Dürerbund* with their remarkably cheap dissemination of genuine art and serious thought, knows with what earnestness this work is carried on. A Dutch socialistic paper was not wrong in declaring recently that this was one of Germany's greatest services in the field of culture.

This brings us to the last, most important and most disputed subject: the German conception of freedom. It combines the metaphysical religious spirit, which we have just characterized, with the political needs of the youthful Empire—as described in the opening passages of this chapter—in a peculiar, and it must be admitted, often paradoxical manner. Hence, as all controversialists correctly divine, and some express with striking clarity, this conception is different from the French and from the Anglo-Saxon.

The French idea of freedom rests upon the conception of the equality of all citizens in their contributions to the carrying out of the common will. Theoretical constitutional maxims which safeguard the *égalité* and *liberté,* and occasionally incite the imagination and the passions of the people, are of supreme importance, although in practice they fail to exclude the dominance of plutocrats and lawyers. Of *fraternité* it is perhaps best not to speak at all; it is and remains, in the words of Count Chamfort, somewhat like the *fraternité* of Cain and Abel.

The English idea of freedom, on the contrary, is a compound of Puritanic ideas and of conceptions dating from the times of the old Saxon Estates. It represents personal responsibility and

self-government of the individual; his independence of the state, based on a natural right; the creation of the state by the individual. Without attaching great importance to constitutional theories it exercises practical control over the powers of the state; it guarantees freedom of religious opinion, liberty in matters of conviction, and independence of spiritual culture from state interference. It is the realization of the universally recognized dominating position of the English citizen, who imposes upon inferior races the rules of life suitable to them, while reserving his own rules for his individual determination. The Englishman acts from his own free utilitarian convictions and in reliance on his personal inviolability. It is his creed that this freedom coincides with the welfare of the state, which he proves either in Puritanical fashion, by means of Providence, or rationalistically, by means of evolution—in any case, whichever way he looks at it, he considers it a matter of course. For this reason he links the state and government to public opinion, which is the product of these free and clever egoistic units, and he sees therein the guarantee of reason, morals and freedom.

Upon either of these two bases, great and mighty developments of political and social life are undoubtedly possible and have actually been realized. But the German idea of freedom is fundamentally different. Rising gradually from long centuries of inferiority and servitude, the German first experienced freedom in German education and the spiritual content of individuality. These ideals were permeated from the start and for all time by the old German longing for independence and defiant self-assertion, though these were for a long time denied political realization. German freedom came into being, according to Kant's conception of it, as the freedom of spontaneous recognition of duty and right, and in the romantic conception of an infinite wealth of culture, individual, but in all cases mutually complementary. Up to the present it has, in the main, retained this character. In conjunction with this, the old tendency toward particularism has persevered, manifesting itself in provincial, dialectic and dynastic peculiarities, and in the proverbial German love of dispute and discord. But this latter quality is to-day greatly moderated in its disruptive effects. It has been sublimated into individualism and distinctiveness, and has definitely subordinated itself to the strong feeling of political solidarity, which will no longer brook foreign domination and is determined to regulate its own life from within, in the true German spirit and manner. By these means we have sought in-

wardly and morally to overcome the worst obstacle to German freedom; namely, the separation of classes and castes dating from the period anterior to 1848. That is even in our day the most difficult and peculiar task of German freedom. From this point, truly, it was and still remains a long way to actual political freedom. The English model of Parliament and the system of self-government have helped us greatly along this path; likewise a great influx of French Democratic thought has permeated German party life and is still generative to-day. Our energies are directed, and must for a long time be devoted to the utilization and adaptation of these incentives in forms suitable to our nation. Nothing demonstrates more clearly than this that we are still a young and unfinished state. Our policy regarding the various nationalities embodied in the German Empire has also much to learn along these lines.

The democratization inevitably resulting from the popular army, the public school and the emancipation of the working classes, will continue to develop in Germany and will find means to adjust itself to military and political exigencies. That is a result in Germany, as everywhere else, of the condition in which modern nations find themselves; our freedom will always be different, however, from that of the Western nations. Parliaments are necessary, but in our eyes they are not the *essence* of freedom. The right of suffrage and the coöperation of the people in the duties of government educate to political maturity; but not even this is the freedom which we mean. *German freedom will never be purely political; it will always be bound up with the idealistic thought of duty and with the romantic thought of individuality.* Even as a political conception it will bear the mark of its essentially intellectual and cultural origin, in the same manner as the Englishman's conception bears the mark of Puritanism and the Frenchman's that of revolution. Above all, we desire to gain and develop this freedom ourselves and not to receive it as a gift from foreigners—least of all as the result of defeat, as the literature of our enemies so often consolingly holds out to us in prospect. Here lie our definite tasks for the future. The freedom of the nation must grow and develop to completion in a victorious Germany, and this freedom will be German freedom, not French, not English, and above all, not Russian freedom.

If, now, from this point of vantage we gather together all the traits described into the entity which they represent in life, we shall, in the main, have correctly formulated the spirit of German civilization as contrasted with that of the civilization of our

enemies—allowing, of course, for errors. Nor do our enemies, for their part, picture it very differently, save that they accentuate other points than we and with an unfriendlier emphasis. It would be childish to try to distinguish between these distinctive factors by a dogmatic pronouncement. The great national civilizations all have their advantages and their drawbacks, and there is room enough in the world for all. Let us draw attention to one result only of the German conception of freedom. It has not the nationalistic impulse of French liberty to force itself on all mankind as the scientifically sole possible form; nor like that of England, the pretended moral impulse to regard all civilization as dependent upon the supremacy of English institutions.

German freedom does not strive for world dominance, neither material nor intellectual. It stands for the freedom of the various national entities who may not destroy each other's possibilities of development nor allow them to become conventionalized in the name of any law, no matter of what nature. In this sense we believe that we are the people who are striving for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does violence to none and brings freedom to all.

The longer the war of weapons continues, the more unrelenting this *Kultur* war has become and the greater the skill of our enemies in transforming by lies or imagination violent national egoism into humanitarian principles. In this the Machiavellism of the Italians has excelled all previous performances. We, for our part, know that for us this war is not primarily a question of principles and ideas, but rather one of life and death, and that the war of diplomacy and cultural enmity has been threatening us ever since we have enjoyed an existence in a political sense. We are, in the first place, fighting for our life. But this political life of ours as a Great Power carries with it an aspiration that fills us with unshakable confidence—the belief that the various nationalities must be released from England's dominance in the political and moral ordering of the world and her tyrannical control of the seas.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POSITION

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AS was more explicitly shown in the preceding chapter, Germany lies at the centre of the most densely settled part of the globe, and is surrounded by a greater number of populous, powerful, and ambitious neighbors than any other country. On all sides, especially on the eastern and western frontiers, the way lies open for peoples strange in race, civilization and speech to enter the country with the products of their hands and brains. Germany has thus been designed by nature as the highway, and at the same time the gathering-place of Europe. Great cultural advantages undoubtedly result from this situation. Germany has never been able to live for herself, in jealous exclusiveness. Outside stimuli have at all times acted upon her life. No other nation has developed a like interest and understanding for foreign modes of life, and none has so great cause to appreciate foreign achievements along lines of civilization. Upon this basis, aided by German strength and thoroughness, there has grown up a many-sided and rich life of the spirit. Germany has become the glorious land of poets and thinkers.

But as a result of her geographical position, she also became the battle-ground for the settlement of all the disputes of Europe. For not alone to travelers, with foreign wares and foreign thoughts, but likewise to warriors, with weapons of death and firebrands in their hands, were her unprotected fields open. Upon these have been settled the greater part of European wars. Time and again has the nation experienced terrible visitations, been robbed of the fruits of its industry, and set back for generations in the development of its powers. Whereas England, her coasts safe from foreign foes, was enabled to lay aside her gains and savings in undisturbed security; and France, despite the many wars waged (mainly beyond her own borders) by her glory-seeking kings, found it possible to preserve the continuity of her commercial development, the wealth and capital of the German nation were repeatedly destroyed. These disasters were felt the more keenly in view of the fact that our

limited territory was not richly endowed by nature. With its sand dunes and hilly stretches, it is inferior in natural fertility, not only to France and England and Northern Italy, but likewise to Hungary and Southern Russia. It possesses no rich meadows, like those of the broad coastal regions of Western Europe. It brings forth neither cotton nor silk, nor rice nor corn, and wheat only sparingly. It hides no gold within its bosom, and but little silver and copper.

Three great and vital tasks are thus presented for solution to the German nation. Culturally, we must develop the advantages of our position at the heart of Europe, by cultivating every opportunity for peaceful intercourse, by the adjustment of intellectual interests, and by the encouragement, without national stultification, of understanding for all that is noble and capable of development in foreign life; politically, we must offset the disadvantages of our situation by developing our strength and holding ourselves ready to repel from our borders even a numerically superior enemy; commercially, we must overcome the handicaps of our position and of our past, by multiplying the productive factor of our labor as compared to the factors of soil and capital. These are the three great tasks which fate has laid upon the German people before all other peoples. They have not chosen them deliberately, the tasks have been imposed upon them. So long as the nation continues, so long will it be forced to strive for their accomplishment. The more nearly it succeeds, the better will it serve, not alone itself, but likewise humanity in general, whose welfare, as Germany believes, can be advanced only upon a basis of a multiplicity of equal and joyously laboring nations, but which must wither under any crushing world supremacy.

For the performance of the political task it is not sufficient to resort to energetic measures in the moment of danger. This may be done by nations for whom nature has provided a more or less satisfactory protection, like the United States, which occupies almost an entire continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and has at no point an equally powerful neighbor; or like England, who, thanks to her insular position, has remained untouched by the international disturbances of the Continent. The danger of invasion has in recent years filled England's imagination; in Germany, however, it has, at all times, through frequent recurrence, been a terrible reality. In the face of this constant danger of invasion, that permanent protection which nature has refused us must be artificially provided through organization, in contrast to England and the United States. This is

the stern lesson which history, supported by geography, at every turn impresses upon us, with an emphasis that it employs toward no other people.

To follow this teaching has not been easy for the German people, for originally its individuality ran counter to the political requirements of its position and history. Since the times of Cæsar and Tacitus, much has been written by strangers regarding the individual German's love of liberty, and we have often been described by natives and foreigners as a nation rich in striking individualities. Individualism is deep-rooted in the German soul. The antithesis between the natural inclinations of the individual and the vital demands of the whole nation was for a long time our undoing. It was gradually overcome only through two forces. At first a strong governing will, as exemplified in the Prussian Kings, was able to hold it in check only by imperious authority; it required the conscious determination of the people, developed in the relentless but indispensable school of bitter experience, finally to overcome it. These two forces were welded together through Bismarck's creative power, and the present war has convincingly shown their irresistible strength. The lasting protection which, to our undoing, we had lacked during our previous disunion, was given to us by the Prussian Kings in times of greatest stress when they imposed the universal duty of bearing arms. This they did, not in arbitrary despotism, but with a proper care of their people and as the strong and wise providers for our political needs.

In doing this they have unconsciously greatly helped also to prepare the way for the solution of the third or economic problem. For since the days of Scharnhorst, we have been accustomed to regard the duty of military service, not alone as a measure of protection, the necessity of which has now for all time been impressed upon each one of us, but at the same time as an indispensable form of training. Clear-sighted observers from all civilized lands have in recent years come to a realization of this fact. Military service, as the school of physical development, takes its place by the side of the public school, which provides the elements of mental culture for each individual; it has hitherto been a matter of regret to us that every single individual did not come under the beneficent influence of military discipline as well as under that of the public school. Compulsory education and the requirement of military service are the two solid pillars upon which rests the proud edifice of Germany's defensive power and her economic strength. That which we were forced to learn in bitter days in the army, in order to save ourselves from de-

struction, has later borne rich fruit in the field of our economic life, at the start almost to our astonishment. The same qualities which render our soldiers unconquerable in war are responsible for the superiority which the army of our workmen so often show in peace. They are the qualities which alone render every great organization efficient: the highest possible development of the individual combined with the most efficient coöperation of all.

Individual power demands mental, physical and moral development. *Mental* efficiency is secured by our school system, which is more highly developed than elsewhere and which finds its broad homogeneous basis in our 61,557 public schools, and its many-sided completion in the war academy, twenty-two universities, eleven technical high-schools, six commercial high-schools, four agricultural, forestry and veterinary high-schools, three high-schools of mining, sixteen for plastic art and eleven for music. *Physical* training, as stated, is gained by means of military service, which develops self-command and adaptability, punctuality, order and cleanliness. To these in recent years has been added a new and unique educational element in our system of workmen's insurance with its 22,838 offices, 114 trade associations and 31 insurance offices. This system has not alone provided expert medical attendance in all cases of greater or lesser need for every working-man's family, and thereby greatly assisted in the preservation and improvement of public health; it has developed far beyond this into a general social-political and social-hygienic training of the entire people, in the same manner as it has turned its attention from mere relief of poverty to its prevention. Thus in later life are developed the seeds of a healthy and economically sensible manner of living which for the great majority were sown during the period of military training. Finally, *moral* efficiency, which naturally depends greatly on that of mind and body, has also been increased through military service for the mass of the people. For here, through the most severe training, that quality is acquired which transforms a man, as the result of voluntary and intelligent subordination, into a useful member of the great present-day organizations—namely, discipline, the modern sister of industry. A sense of duty, such as the tasks of war require, even to the sacrifice of one's life, cannot fail to suffice also for coöperation in the tasks of peace. But only he who can obey can learn properly to command. The army, therefore, educates for us not alone recruits, but also officers for the vast undertakings of our industrial life; and especially does it furnish those efficient intermediate workers, equally

trained in obeying and commanding, who may be styled the under-officers of our great industries, and of whom no other nation can show the counterpart.

Without discipline, even the most able leaders are unable to make many men effectually useful in one common pursuit. In such case, the force of their will is broken in endless disputes, and a conception is lost before it takes shape in action. On the other hand, a group of men accustomed to discipline are like plastic clay. They need only the shaping hand of the creative artist. Nothing so smoothes the way from conception to realization, and so widens thereby the empire of the human will, as this quality of intelligent subordination, which raises the disunited desires of many wills from the arena of paralyzing conflict into the realm of powerful coöperative action. A nation accustomed to discipline, and that is likewise educated and energetic, is, therefore, by its very nature, a nation of organizers. The German people have proved themselves such in all branches of the army and in industrial life; in agriculture and manufacture, in trade and traffic. In times of peace our military organization, which embraces the nation, and the equally impressive organization of our economic life, stood side by side and often quite without mutual understanding. No fact in the present war, which has entered into all spheres of popular life as no previous war, is more characteristic, on the German side, than that these two, in closest coöperation, have been welded together into unconquerable unity. Victory will be gained by us, not through a rigid, antiquated "militarism," but through a vigorous conception of organization that holds promise for the future. Instead of being abandoned, it will be further strengthened into exemplary power.

I

The idea of organization grew in the field of economic life out of the vital necessities of the people, in the same manner as this idea in the military field was forced upon us through the exigency of our position and our past.

Politically, we could hold the difficult position apportioned to us by fate only by not dividing our national strength, but by concentrating it, numerically increasing and carefully husbanding it. On the other hand, the strong union which we finally achieved through the founding of the Empire and by means of universal military service, proved a powerful impelling force to further growth. Immediately following the war of 1870 there

was a sudden remarkable increase in the birth rate, which became an important factor in our further development, in so far as this new generation, on reaching its full potentiality as a labor force, proved a powerful stimulant to our economic life when this began its marvellous rise around the year 1895. But aside from this temporary increase resulting from the war, Germany suffered in general under the decrease in the birth rate common to all Western Europe. If the number of inhabitants, despite this fact, increased more rapidly than those of other European civilized nations, this, as is well known, is not to be explained by an increase in the birth rate, but by a decrease in the death rate. In Germany the "fight against death" was early taken up on all sides, with German scientific thoroughness and system. The death rate constantly decreased from 28.8 per thousand, which was the mark from 1871 to 1880, to 16.4 in 1912. Thus it was possible, despite the falling birth rate, to bring the yearly excess of births in 1874 up to 500,000; in 1887 to 600,000; and again in 1895 and 1896 to register a further yearly increase of 100,000; in 1902 this excess reached 900,000. This tremendous increase from 41,000,000 in 1871 to nearly 70,000,000 in 1915, or 75 per cent in forty-five years, so raised the population of Germany that to-day it occupies among European nations a position second only to that of Russia. France, which at the beginning of the 19th century held this position, stands to-day, with approximately 40,000,000, in fifth place. Great Britain, on the basis of her white inhabitants—45,000,000 in Europe and approximately 20,000,000 in other countries—does not equal the German figure; and although Russia, which in Europe alone is nine times the size of Germany, excels the latter notably in numbers, it is culturally so inferior in the mass of its people that it fails to equal us, not alone in its power of production, but even as a consumer. Hence, Germany enjoys the economic advantage over all European countries of having the broadest basis of production and consumption. It is the greatest inland market in the world, with the exception of the United States. Compared to its inland market, its foreign market is of relatively less importance than is the case in any other European country. We have learned for the first time during the war the strength that results from this condition. This valuable knowledge will not again be lost, but will bear fruit for us in many years of peace.

The constant striking increase of our population has been primarily of importance in subjecting German economic life to the driving force of incessantly mounting demand, as is the

case elsewhere only in the United States. Food, clothing and shelter, and above all a chance to work, had to be provided for this increasing mass. Thus enterprise and industry are kept alive in the whole nation, new organizing tasks of the most important kind are uninterruptedly unfolding, and all efforts to reduce the increasing volume of work, through the introduction of improved methods, find rich reward. Under the pressure of these natural conditions, resulting from healthy German energy, a scientific spirit and organizing instinct have developed in all branches of our economic life.

Slowly but steadily, this has become apparent in the field of agriculture, which at the time of the founding of the Empire was the most important of all the great branches of our economic activity. Forty-five years ago Germany might still be described as an agricultural country. She was able to satisfy not only her own domestic demand for food, but also exported her superfluous products to England. The latter country, since gaining a position of world dominance as the result of the long Napoleonic wars among the Continental Powers, had sacrificed its agriculture more and more to trade and manufacture, in reliance upon its fleet. German agriculture had, to be sure, during the first half of the nineteenth century, improved considerably in its scientific and technical methods; but even under the strong influence of Albrecht Thaer, the first successful founder of a higher agricultural school, this advance had consisted mainly in introducing here and there better methods, as the result of experience, in place of those handed down from previous generations.

Had German agriculture continued to be carried on in this empirical manner, it would not have proved equal in any notable degree to the task of providing for the great increase in population. The German nation would in that case have found themselves in an embarrassing dilemma. It would have been forced either to feed its increasing numbers with foreign products, and thereby place itself in the position of growing dependence on foreign countries (the dangers of which course the present war has forever impressed upon us), or it would have had to send abroad these consumers of food who threatened its safety, and would thereby have decreased not only its productive power but also its defensive strength. These two discouraging alternatives increased as practical possibilities at this moment owing to the fact that, coincident with Germany's striking growth in population, an historically important development occurred through the beginning of competition in the sale of grain

from overseas in our markets. Previously transport of large masses of goods had been limited to small distances, hence within European boundaries; but precisely at this time the great modern improvements in communication made possible the importation of such staple foods as grain, from all parts of the earth. Simultaneously the great newly opened-up grain territory in the Western part of the United States invited emigrants in large numbers, as no other foreign country had ever done. This double danger became apparent soonest and most emphatically in England. In that country, subjected as it was to its full influence, the number of wage-earners engaged in agriculture and forestry, which in all great European countries fluctuates to-day between 35 and 69 per cent, fell to 11.9 per cent in the entire United Kingdom, and in England and Wales even to 8.5 per cent; at the same time the importation of grain for bread rose to fully three-quarters of the public demand. In Germany also this double danger became threateningly apparent. Importation of those products of the cheap and fertile American soil, requiring little labor and capital, was felt most disturbingly by German agriculture from 1875 on, while at the same time the stream of emigrants, mostly agricultural workers, continued to swell, till in 1881 it reached 220,902. Had this development been allowed to continue uninterruptedly in Germany as in Great Britain, then, on the one hand, our agricultural population would have suffered a diminution of three-quarters of its numbers, resulting in a probably fatal loss of our defensive strength; on the other hand, our demand for imported grain for bread would have increased eight-fold over the present-day figure, and thereby a starvation of Germany would have become for us the unavoidable danger which to-day our enemies vainly strive to make it.

Bismarck took steps to meet this danger. With correct appreciation of the vital needs of the German people, in 1879, he introduced duty on grain. By this means, he saved our agriculture from being driven to methods of extensive production; on the contrary, by guarding its market he gained for it that security which was needed for its further intensive development. Under the protection of our tariff, the spirit of science and organization was able to enter upon its astounding path of victory.

Agriculture, which hitherto had been the victim of conservative routine, was guided into paths of science and progress, as is well known, by Justus Liebig, the founder of the science of plant physiology and agricultural chemistry. He undertook the

most extensive investigations regarding the nutritive needs of plants and the nutritive value of the soil. Our present-day knowledge of fertilizers is based upon these experiments. Up to that time, however, England had excelled in many ways in intensive agricultural production.

The science of artificial fertilization was at this time developed in Germany and it has been practically applied in ever-rising degree. It was found that that which the soil needed could be produced outside the agricultural sphere. Thanks to this valuable discovery, one connecting link after the other was forged between agriculture and the manufacturing industries. It was only now that the vast treasures became useful with which Germany is provided, in striking contrast to all other countries of the world. She possesses deposits of a salt which in foreign countries is hardly known even by name—namely, Kali. In close connection with our agriculture, our industry of Kali mining has increased ten-fold in the last twenty-five years, its production rising to 10,000,000 tons in round figures, so that to-day we export a considerable amount of this important fertilizer—for example, in 1913 63,600,000 marks' worth. Even more important fertilizers are produced by the great manufacturing industries. From the previously worthless and troublesome slag of our railway industry, in which the so-called Thomas method is supreme in Germany, we extract as a result of German discoveries the fertilizer rich in phosphoric acid of the so-called Thomas "meal," of which to-day 10,000,000 tons in round figures are used yearly. Our coke industry provides us, finally, with the third chemical ingredient which the soil needs for plant growth, and this the most important, namely, nitrogen; this is due to our having learned to extract ammonia, among other valuable ingredients, from the previously deleterious coke gases; but important as this new by-product of our coke furnaces has become for us—and in the last six years its worth has nearly doubled—nevertheless it does not satisfy the needs of our agriculture. In order to secure in sufficient quantity the nitrogen from which plants build up their albumen cells, we have become one of the greatest importers of Chili saltpeter. Almost half of all Chili saltpeter which reached Europe was used by us. This was a line in which our agriculture was dependent upon foreign countries. Even in times of peace we had felt this painfully. The war has already revealed itself to the Germans in many lines, not only as a destroyer but also as a creator, but it will doubtless remain the proudest achievement among many of our industries that, in the midst of the most

bitter struggle which a nation has perhaps ever had to undergo, we have created a great new industry exclusively by scientific means. The new nitrogen industry, which the war has magically called into being, provides us not alone with that of which we had been deprived, as a result of the interruption of our import trade, but it provides us with better and more material. It holds out great possibilities of development likewise for times of peace. At all events, one cause of depending upon foreign countries has been removed for all time. And it may be expected that that which has been achieved with regard to nitrogen on such a vast scale, and with such astounding swiftness, will be more or less possible also in other cases, where the interruption of our imports calls into activity similar forces, which remain dormant in times of peace.

The feeding of domestic animals has been put upon a similar basis as the nourishing of plants by scientific means, by which not alone agriculture but also manufacture was so vitally influenced. The science of feeding was developed, with constantly increasing care, from all points of view at the same time as the science of fertilization, and the possibility was thus opened up of widening the narrow circle of ancient and approved articles of food by means of new ones furnished by trade and industry. It was natural that at first we should take the easiest course and import with little trouble all that we lacked and desired. Therefore, in times of peace, trade in fodder was by far the most important. The war has forced us in great part to abandon this simple method, and has given us at the same time the strength to produce for ourselves that which hitherto foreign countries gladly and cheaply provided. In the beginning this was accomplished with greater difficulties and more serious expense, but in the long run it will necessarily prove to be a step forward.

The scientific theory of the nourishing of plants and animals was supplemented by scientific advance in their breeding. Plant and animal rearing was first practiced outside of Germany, especially in Scotland; but also in this line it was reserved for Germany to unite practice and science in an inseparable union. The first great success was achieved in the cultivation of that species of beets from which the German chemists Marggraf and Achard discovered the way to obtain sugar, upon the basis of which discovery a firm, hitherto unknown industry grew up to take the place of the West Indian cane sugar, of which Europe had been deprived by Napoleon's Continental System. Through nursing, the sugar producing qualities of the beet were so in-

creased that the average weight of beets necessary to produce a kilogram of raw sugar was decreased from about 26 pounds in 1870-71 to 13 pounds in 1910-11, and at the same time the average return in sugar from each hektare of land was raised from 42 cwt., at the beginning of the seventies, to 104 cwt., in the year 1910-11. Beet sugar thus not only set an example for agriculture of great and immediate value and of strong inciting power, but at the same time this industry, originally due to war, gained such strength that since 1875 it has made us quite independent of imported sugar; by rapid strides it advanced to the point of being our leading export industry, and in 1898 exceeded in the value of its products all others upon our export list. Germany owes to plant-rearing her standing as the leading country in the supply of sugar.

The German beet, however, is merely the most striking example of a great movement, which with increasing strength has seized upon Germany's whole agricultural activity. In every line of agriculture improvements in the methods of manuring, nursing and soil preparation, based on scientific research, have increased the returns in an ever greater degree. In the twenty-five years from 1885-1910, during which our population increased 30 per cent, our grain crop rose from 18,200,000 to 25,800,000 tons, and our potato crop from 29,700,000 to 45,900,000 tons, an increase of 45 and 55 per cent respectively. As in the production of beets, so likewise in the production of potatoes, Germany leads the world. In 1913 Germany produced 54,000,000 tons on 3,400,000 hektares of land, while Russia, Germany's closest competitor, produced a crop of only 3,600,000 tons, although she had 4,600,000 hektares of land under cultivation.

In the production of wheat, oats and barley, Germany occupies, it is true, third position; but in this connection she is inferior only to the United States and European Russia, which are, respectively, fifteen and nine times as large. In contrast to this, Great Britain and Ireland occupy thirteenth position in the production of wheat, seventh in that of oats, and fifth in that of barley and potatoes. Although France is more favorably placed according to statistical returns, occupying fourth position in wheat and third position in potato production, there is nevertheless a surprising difference in her comparative production on a like extent of land. To the hektare she produces 27.6 cwt. of wheat, compared to Germany's 51.2; of rye 20.6 compared to Germany's 38.2; and of potatoes 192.2 against Germany's 309.2 cwt.

What is true of agriculture is also true of cattle raising.

Save in the breeding of horses—in which Germany is excelled in Europe only by Russia, not quite equalled by Austria-Hungary and followed by France and Great Britain only at considerable distance—advance is not to be reckoned primarily by the numbers of animals. Limited territory sets fixed limitations in this field. It is in cattle breeding a question rather of carrying out to its fullest extent the economic principle of accomplishing the most with the least expenditure; and this is shown by the fact that, on one hand, we have greatly increased the weight of the individual animal in the case of cattle and hogs, and, on the other, we have strikingly hastened growth to the period of slaughter. The success of these extremely important efforts in the line of meat production cannot, of course, be expressed in statistics. But even disregarding such considerations, Germany's position among the nations of Europe as a breeder of animals is most favorable. In the breeding of hogs, which furnished nourishment for two-thirds of her people, Germany is far in the van. Russia, France and Great Britain and Ireland together did not possess in 1913 as many head of these animals as we still possessed on December 1, 1914 (25,333,772). In cattle raising, Germany, with 20,000,000 head, is, to be sure, excelled by Russia, with 37,100,000 head; but this great numerical difference is without doubt in the main balanced by superior quality. Certainly, Russia has nothing to show equal to our 11,000,000 remarkable milch cows.

After Germany, in order come Austria-Hungary, with 16,500,000 head of cattle, France, with 14,700,000, England, Ireland and Wales with 10,600,000; for Scotland no figures are obtainable. The fact that in the most extensive branch of animal raising, namely sheep raising, Germany has deliberately remained behind Russia, Great Britain and France—perhaps too far in the rear—does not vitiate the advantage which she enjoys in the other two lines of animal breeding. It remains true that by closely united science and practice we have created in our animal possessions a source of wealth such as no other people has achieved. In case of necessity we can consume these, and in times of peace by means of the acquired methods we can reproduce this wealth. Nevertheless, the war has shown us, more emphatically than books and speeches were able to do in peaceful times, that there is still room for much improvement in this field of our economic life, perhaps precisely because our advances have been so rapid. Tasks which are not only remunerative, but also necessary, were suddenly by the war brought to the attention of the whole nation with convincing clearness. Here again

the present enforced conditions will be more than a mere episode, they will prove the source of new developments rich in promise for the future. Like agriculture, cattle raising after the war will be placed upon a firmer foundation than ever. He who has been forced to learn to do without an imported article returns to its use reluctantly.

II

In the same manner as in agriculture, so likewise in the field of industry has Germany, in a short space of time, undergone changes greater than previously in unnumbered centuries, thereby rising from a modest position to a height hitherto occupied by no other great country.

Germany, it is true, in the sixteenth century led all other nations in the industrial arts. But it was brought down from this proud position through the Thirty Years' War and the resulting political schism. Even after this there remained something of the former renown of South German cities, such as Nürnberg and Augsburg; and many products of German industry, as the steel ware of Solingen and Remscheid, still enjoy their ancient reputation far beyond the borders of Germany. But in general Germany was ill adapted for the new system of mass production. She lacked a great national market, the necessary capital and enterprise. Not until 1834 were the numberless local markets hitherto protected by tariff walls brought together by the German Customs' Union into one general market, commensurate in its power of absorption with modern mass production. But aside from the union attained in customs' matters, the unfortunate political division was painfully apparent. Thus, up to the year 1877 not less than twenty-nine different patent laws were passed in the German Empire. To gain protection in all the individual German states was too complicated and costly, and that of a single state was insufficient for production on a large scale. Even in Prussia in 1871 only thirty-six patents had been granted. It was natural that, under such conditions, Germans with promising inventions should turn to England, which in 1852 had issued a liberal and uniform patent law. A patent secured in that country opened up, not only the valuable market of Europe, but likewise colonial markets—indeed, those of the whole world. Numerous valuable products of German inventive genius were therefore patented in England, and many who were conscious of ability in industrial pursuits emigrated

thither. Thus German technical ability served only to strengthen England's position of supremacy. The island kingdom had already through its own strength accomplished much in the line of modern industrial development, thanks to the fact that its position enabled it quietly and uninterruptedly to devote its powers to commerce, while the Continental states were engaged, for its benefit, in destroying each other in ever-recurring wars. With the invention of the steam-engine, but before all with the long series of new industrial machines, notably in the textile and iron industries, England had won her first great victories in modern technical fields. Here the means were at hand of cheaply obtaining the most important raw materials in large quantities, partly from the rich native soil, partly from the colonies. In England the factory system was first developed, consciously, ruthless against the workmen, not shrinking from absolute cruelty. On the other hand, foreign inventions and foreign workers of all kinds had here their meeting-place. Before America became the great land of immigration, this distinction belonged to England, not, however, for immigrants from the lowest class, but for those from the highest. England became the "workshop of the world," not exclusively through her own strength, but as the meeting-place of much of the industrial ability of the whole world; as such, she not only exported her wares to other lands, but served them also as the great model workshop. Especially Germany passed through these two stages of dependence. In the first place, she served as a market for English goods, and up to the year 1879 scarcely any other great commercial territory welcomed them so freely. But when she began to develop her own modern industry, she found herself in many ways dependent on foreign countries, politically and economically united—not only on England, but likewise on France, and even Belgium. She then became a large importer from these countries of machines, half-finished articles, foremen and *entrepreneurs*.

The superiority of England—the result of political conditions in the past—demanded of Germany a great display of energy, if the latter country wished to win for itself a position of independence and respect, commercially, as it had succeeded in doing politically through the war of 1870-71. Considerations founded upon natural conditions, and hence of permanent nature, were added to this historical and hence temporary circumstance. First of all, the island position of England gave her an extraordinary advantage in regard to transportation of goods. Germany, at the centre of the Continent, is in much higher degree dependent

upon the more expensive form of transport by land. She had to find some means of compensating this high cost of transportation if she intended to become a competitor in the markets of the world. This was especially true in regard to the iron industry, for which nature, kindly disposed, had deposited coal and iron ores in juxtaposition in England, and in the immediate neighborhood of the sea; while in Germany, as in the United States, they are widely separated. Such a counterbalance for the natural advantages of geographical position was to be found only in tirelessly perfecting production by all the methods of science and organization. In many industrial branches recognition in the markets of the world was possible only through success in gaining and retaining technical and commercial leadership. But even in those lines where transportation does not play so decisive a rôle, as in the "heavy" iron industry, England's insular position gives her advantages. Thus, for instance, especially on the west coast, the air is heavily charged with moisture from the sea, a circumstance which so facilitates the spinning of cotton-wool that for a long time it seemed impossible to equal the fineness of Lancashire yarn.

All these considerations, taken together, resulted in awaking a stronger and more versatile scientific spirit and organizing instinct in German industry than was the case in any other nation. That which had originally been withheld and made permanently difficult, owing to unfavorable historical development and geographical conditions, it was necessary to attain through superlatively efficient training and concentration of power. Here, as in agriculture, only the most efficient work was satisfactory.

The first prerequisite for obtaining this highly efficient kind of work was to diminish the pressure of English competition. For it is by no means true that all kinds of competition act as an incentive and intensifier of one's powers. This all-too general doctrine, formed to favor the stronger, was perhaps still true in the days of Adam Smith, when capitalistic industry was in its infancy. We know to-day that competition may be so strong that enterprise is paralyzed, not incited, by it. In such a case it is necessary to reduce the pressure to such an extent that the stimulating effect of the competition may make itself felt. It was in precisely such a situation that many German industries found themselves when the new German Empire came into being. Bismarck recognized the gravity of the situation and, in 1879, caused the introduction of a moderate protective tariff on manufactured articles and grain. Several purposes were served thereby: struggling German industries were

protected from ruinous competition with foreign-made articles; the home market was secured for home products; the increase in price of many foreign-made articles stimulated German ingenuity and enterprise; with financial conditions thus rendered easier, leisure was gained to invent, test and perfect improvements in all departments of production.

At this period, moreover, occurred another event of great portent. Up to this time Germany had profited little by the invention of Benjamin Bessemer, whereby pig iron was transformed into steel in about twenty minutes. By the methods in vogue before Bessemer, this operation required about one and one-half days and the saving in time by the new method caused a reduction in price of approximately 40 per cent. Bessemer's invention was the result of experiments with British ores, which are free from phosphorus. German iron ore contains a great deal of phosphorus, and hence Bessemer's invention had been of practically no value to the Empire's mineral interests. England, on the other hand, had greatly strengthened her industrial supremacy by the Bessemer process. German iron manufacturers were forced either to import Bessemer steel or the ores reducible by the Bessemer process. Some new method was needed that would apply to phosphorous ores as the Bessemer process applied to non-phosphorous ores. Germany possessed rich deposits of iron ore in Lorraine; the pressing problem was to find a way to treat them. This way was found, oddly enough, in 1878 by an English engineer named Thomas. British supremacy was menaced, although this was not realized at the time. In fact, so sure were the British that Bessemer steel would never be rivaled that the Thomas method was not only not adopted, but was decried. Not so in Germany, however. Scientists, engineers, mine-owners and manufacturers united to develop the new invention to the technical and commercial perfection necessary. These efforts were so successful that Germany became not only England's commercial rival in iron products, but a leader in the development of the iron industry.

The scientific enterprise which carried the Thomas process to commercial perfection found ample opportunities in the various branches of the complex process of turning ore and coal into iron and steel. Experiments tending to the utilization of the gases produced by the manufacture of coke led to the discovery and development of that many-sided secondary industry—the production of coal tar, benzol, and ammonia for securing nitrogen, as previously described. Benzol and coal tar are the basis of our great peace trade in dyes, and in war they have been of ines-

timable value in the production of munitions and as a substitute for benzine.

With this spirit of scientific enterprise was closely united the spirit of thorough organization. In all other European countries, and especially in England, ore and coal mines, coke ovens and blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills were all separate and distinct enterprises. In Germany these various branches of the iron industry were at an early period organized and combined into immense concerns, with the result that great savings were made in the cost of production and transport. Indeed, the system of organization was carried beyond the processes of production into that of marketing, so that the great series of operations from the first handling of the raw product to its final delivery into the hands of the ultimate consumer were united in one vast and systematized undertaking. In so far as possible, commercial chance and accident were eliminated.

Scientific enterprise and thorough organization naturally brought about a great increase in productivity and acted as the equivalent of the natural advantages which England enjoyed, natural advantages that tended to prevent development along scientific lines. The steel industry was the first to show marked signs of growth, since in this line particularly, owing to the Thomas invention, German methods first developed. In the twenty years from 1890 to 1910, the steel business grew approximately seven times as rapidly as England's in point of production. We equaled England in 1893, and to-day we produce almost three times as much steel as our former superior rival. In pig iron progress was not so rapid, since the Thomas invention, and its development was not so soon used in this field; our output did not equal England's until 1903. But in the period since then we have gained so rapidly that our present output is nearly double that of our rival. In 1912, Germany produced 17,600,000 tons, Great Britain and Ireland 9,000,000 tons. Germany at last united politically and devoting herself to previously neglected fields, by untiring and skilfully directed labor has won back what she possessed before the Thirty Years' War—European supremacy in the entire field of the iron industry.

The importance of this cannot be overestimated. Within recent years a universal change has taken place in the industrial activities of mankind. Up to the end of the nineteenth century, the utilization of vegetable and animal raw material was the basis of industrial life. No country possessed a modern industry on a large scale which could be compared in point of

strength and firmness of organization with the cotton industry of Lancashire. In fact, the Lancashire cotton industry was the standard of modern industrial ideas. With the development of cheap and quick transportation facilities, however, the basis of industrial life changed and the utilization of mineral raw materials assumed first importance. In the United States, owing to a railroad system whose total mileage exceeds that of all Europe, the iron industry gained first place; in England, with her supremacy in trans-Atlantic shipping, especially after the change from wooden to iron and steel ships, the iron industry assumed at least a temporary supremacy to cotton, which had been the industrial mainstay for centuries. This change, characteristic of our day and generation, took place earlier and more markedly in Germany, although even to-day the German demand for rails is not a third of that of the United States, and her shipbuilding not a fourth of that of England. Yet, despite these facts, the iron industry in Germany ranks first in point of importance, and although it does not stand with that of the United States, it exceeds that of England.

Great Britain is still preeminent in cotton manufacturing: the number of her spindles (55,971,501) exceeds that of the following three countries combined—the United States (31,519,766), Germany (11,404,944), and Russia (9,111,835). Her supremacy in iron has been lost to the two countries which, less burdened with the traditions of a glorious industrial past, were able to devote their entire strength to tasks of the present. The importance of this in present-day economics cannot be magnified. Cotton manufacture is simply the transformation of raw material into cloth; iron manufacture embraces many and varied products. So long as Germany was backward in the iron industry, these other fields were closed to her; but as soon as her iron and steel equalled the foreign in quality and price, industrial opportunities gave the skilled German workman ample employment.

From 1900 to 1907, cotton products, ranging in value from 219,000,000 marks to 432,000,000 marks, occupied first place in the German export list, with the exception of the year 1902. But from 1908 on, first place has been preempted by the export of machines. In 1880, the total value of machines exported was only 42,000,000 marks, in 1890, 67,500,000 marks, but by 1907 it had reached the sum of 387,000,000 marks, as against an import value of 83,000,000 marks. These figures were still, however, far behind those of England: her exports were valued at 627,000,000 marks and her imports at only 67,000,000 marks.

Five years later, the tally was different. In 1912, Germany exported 630,300,000 marks' worth of machines and England 631,600,000 marks' worth, while British imports were greater than Germany's. The year following, in 1913, the value of the exports of German machines was 680,300,000 marks. It may safely be assumed that the domestic sale of machines is greater in Germany than in Great Britain and Ireland, and, taking this into account, there seems no reason to doubt that in 1913 Germany held first place in Europe in the machine industry, the position which she had reached ten years before in the pig iron industry and twenty years before in the steel industry.

Since 1908, moreover, iron ware has held second place on the German export list. The term embraces a multitude of articles. The export value of these products in 1913 was 652,000,000 marks. Various forms of iron products are not included in this list, such as iron bars, sheet iron, iron pipes, iron wire, iron rails, pig iron and loop iron, which represent an export value of 672,000,000 marks.

In third place in the export list, since 1912, comes pit coal. Its value in 1913 was 516,000,000 marks (coke amounting to 147,000,000 marks), only 300,000,000 marks below the British figures. The closely related iron and coal industries make up a full quarter of the whole German export trade, amounting to more than 2,700,000,000 marks annually. No other branch of industry in any other country has conquered for itself such a position in the markets of the world. This has been won without force or favor from the government, purely on the face value of the goods themselves, and although it may be altered temporarily by forcible measures, in the long run it can be lost only by superior efficiency of competitors.

This may be taken as a general rule in regard to German industries, applying to many others with even greater force. Although in many instances the amount of the output is not sufficient to figure largely, yet the methods of production and marketing are classic examples of the lines along which German industry is developing. Take as an example the German chemical industry. Engaged in this are 195 stock companies, employing 300,000 workers and producing in peace times goods valued at 1,750,000,000 marks, and in war great quantities of both destructive and curative agents. The success of this thoroughly modern industry was not based on any special source of raw materials but altogether on methods and labor. Success has not been due to lucky discoveries, to a few secret formulas: it springs absolutely from systematic efforts to achieve definite goals. This

organized scientific labor, for example in the case of one factory alone, led to the application for 798 patents in 1911, or more than two per day; this factory was the Elberfeld Dye Works, which employ regularly four hundred scientifically trained chemists. The energy for such constant achievement cannot be called forth by the arbitrary exercise of power, no matter how ruthless, nor by imitation, no matter how close; it can be achieved only through long, patient and intelligently planned labor. And any interference or cessation of progress means retrogression in this field of labor, which is more closely related to scientific investigation than others.

It is not due to accident, therefore, but to the quality of the workers and their product, that the German dye industry, which is characteristic of the Empire's technical skill, is its most typical export industry. It produces four-fifths of the world's demands in dye stuffs, and its experienced workers and methods will continue to develop new fields not only for the benefit of Germany but for that of the world. As regards the value of its exports, the chemical industry, to be sure, ranks less than that of the machine and iron industry; but when the import figures are considered, it holds third place in foreign trade.

Even more favorable is the ratio of export to import in a fourth industry, that of electricity and its allied trades. The export value is less, but that is due in part to the fact that in this trade more branch factories have been established in foreign countries than in the chemical industry. All four of these industries—the manufacture of machines, iron, chemicals and electrical products—form a group representing in their processes typical modern industry, turning out products of exceptional quality and conducted upon the most advanced lines of modern big business. In all these chief branches of our export industry, remarkable personalities are in active control, assisted by large staffs of young workers who have been expertly trained in technical and commercial schools for their particular line of work. In these industries there is an unusually high proportion of educated officials as compared with mere hands, of skilled labor as compared with unskilled.

To the adequate training of the workingman, Germany has devoted unceasing care for more than a century. In addition to universal compulsory school attendance up to a certain age and universal compulsory military service, the state has added a system of thorough vocational training for all branches of industrial activity. Nor is purely cultural education for the worker neglected. In the so-called "extension schools," every oppor-

tunity is given the pupil, and it is made his duty, to carry on his studies begun in the lower grade schools and to apply them to whatever line of work he is following. Although attendance is not compulsory, custom is rapidly making it so. At the end of 1912, in Prussia alone, 19,371 teachers made up the staffs of 2,235 industrial and 392 commercial extension schools; many of these teachers were practical workers. Other federal states have advanced even further than Prussia in the development of this branch of education.

Even more noteworthy is the progress made in social legislation. The same geographical circumstances that have driven Germany to rigid economy in handling her natural treasures and raw material have forced her also to constant care for her most valuable possession—human energy. Step by step, workmen's insurance and protective legislation for workmen have been developed, until to-day they are the greatest organizations dealing with "human economics" in the world. At the beginning of the war, for instance, 25,000,000 persons were insured in the so-called Workmen's Insurance against accident, 18,000,000 against sickness, 16,000,000 against disability and old age; in 1913 the combined insurance organizations, with a capital of 3,057,000,000 marks, paid out for relief the sum of 840,000,000 marks, or at the rate of 2,250,000 marks daily.

The rapid development of our industrial enterprises, calling as it did for the expenditure of all our strength, brought with it the danger of imperiling national health. England suffered in this respect during the early years of the nineteenth century. Our social legislation, which seeks to prevent injuries and to relieve them if they do occur, has been the chief means of protecting us from a like disaster. It is due to this legislation that we possess in our urban industrial workers soldiers equally efficient as those of our rural levies. They have shown themselves not only physically capable of meeting the inclemency of the weather and hardships and deprivations of all kinds, but more than that, they have withstood that "mass test of the national nerves," which is one of the effects of the war. In times of peace, when controversies as to the suitability of certain measures tended to narrow and obscure the view, it would have been impossible to foresee how fully the demands of war have justified this social legislation, to which Bismarck gave the original impetus. The President of the Imperial Insurance Bureau has said:

"The battle of Koniggrätz, it is well known, was won by the German schoolmaster. Now it is the German schoolmaster and the system of social legislation that win the victories."

All Germans will heartily agree to this.

Encouraged by the numerous insurance organizations in which he is given a share in administration and jurisdiction, the workman himself has taken a hand in his own education. He has been compelled, in a short period, to pass through a development which in England was spread over many years. Although this did not lead to the violent conflicts which occurred in England, naturally Germany did not escape friction and disturbance. Here, too, economic insight defeated political blindness only after a long struggle. In 1891 our labor unions numbered in round figures only 350,000 members, while in the previous year in the *Reichstag* elections the Social Democrats polled 1,500,000 votes. In 1912 the economic and political organizations of the German workmen were in close agreement in numbers. In the *Reichstag* elections there were 4,500,000 Social Democratic votes, and the labor unions of all kinds numbered 3,750,000 members. In 1891 our system of unions stood far behind the older English system. It did not show a quarter of the English strength. In 1906 it equalled the English figures, and in 1912 it exceeded them in membership by nearly a million workmen, and in yearly contributions by about 20,000,000 marks. The organization of the German workmen is to-day by far the most powerful of its kind in the whole world.

Up to recently nearly the whole German working class seemed to be separated from the rest of the German people by an impassable chasm. In vain in times of peace was a means sought for bridging this breach. The war accomplished the miracle, because it was clearly recognized by the whole nation, and by every individual worker, as an unjust war of aggression and as such was indignantly resented. Our Social Democratic body of workers, which had previously opposed our military system and had been inclined to a pacifist policy, would have continued its opposition if a single doubt had existed of the justice of the German cause. Again, for the second time, the German people had reason to thank their enemies for an inspiring outburst of unity. In the gathering of princes in Versailles, on the 18th of January, 1871, the German Empire was created, to the accompaniment of the thunder of cannon on French soil; again on the 4th of August, 1914, in the east as well as in the west, the terrible voices of cannon were heard, as the representatives of the whole people in the German *Reichstag* united in a holy war enthusiasm. In 1870 a portion of the representatives abstained from voting for the war credit. In the present war an amount such as the world has never seen was unanimously approved. In spite of many-

sided jealousy and enmity, the German people have maintained their outward political unity in fourty-four years of peace. In the future, when the unavoidable strife of parties again breaks forth, we shall in spite of all attacks know how to maintain the finally acquired union of national thought and feeling. That will remain as an especially valuable gain from the terrible struggle.

III

The financial development of German industry—a subject too complex to admit of analysis here—demanded capital. Germany was still a poor country at the time of the founding of the Empire. Even the basis for the development of capital, a uniform, regulated, sound monetary system, did not yet exist. The political disunion was apparent in the fact that nearly every one of the German states had its own coinage, and as a natural result of the wide-spread poverty, the old silver standard still existed everywhere, outside of little Bremen. As England, the ruler of the commerce of the world, had attained the gold standard in 1816, through a series of fortunate events, active participation by Germany in international trade was rendered extremely difficult. For the same reason, the development of her internal economic life was delayed. The war of 1870-71 brought the solution. In political union was found the hitherto lacking constitutional basis for a statesmanlike reform of the German monetary system, while at the same time the French war indemnity provided the means necessary to the adoption of the gold standard hitherto enjoyed by England alone. It was not yet practicable, however, to establish a complete gold standard. As long as the gold supply of the world was limited, geographically, to western North America and Australia, and, technically, to the old-fashioned placer or washing method, there was not enough available metal to meet demands. It was the time of the "universal pulling at the golden blanket" and the high tide of international bimetallistic endeavors.

In 1879, when Germany's gold stock was less than 1,500,000,000 marks, we were forced to retain, in conjunction with the new gold coins, the old silver "thalers," which were legal tender up to any amount. The great increase in gold production, due to the process of mining employed in the Transvaal, made the adoption of an exclusive gold standard possible in Germany. In 1906, according to the statistics of the American Director of Mints, Germany ranked second among the states of Europe, with

a gold stock of 3,853,000,000 marks, standing, it is true, 484,000,000 marks behind France, but exceeding Russia by 263,000,000 marks and England by 1,505,000,000 marks. Upon this firm basis, Germany was enabled, in 1907, to complete her monetary reform by the withdrawal of the "thalers" from circulation.

Therewith bills on Berlin acquired the same gold value as bills on London, which had up to this time been without competition in the control of international payments. In Germany we were at last able to take measures to achieve independence of England in this field. By means of our London and trans-oceanic branch banks, we succeeded in this effort in districts which had remained behind in their development and which did not yet possess their own firm banking system. In competition with the thirty-two English Colonial Banks, which possess two thousand branches throughout the British Empire, we have accomplished hardly anything, nor, in fact, have we sought to do so. Indeed, England was able to retain on the whole her rich inheritance in this field so undiminished that before the war London could still describe itself as the center of international exchange. This position it owed to the carefully cultivated reputation of unlimited capacity and unquestionable honesty. Will it be able to maintain this reputation after the war, or will the wealthy United States succeed in gaining it for itself, and so assume the leadership in the international money market? Perhaps in this field, also, the relationship of equality of the leading commercial powers, for which Germany is striving, will be established, so that every species of supremacy will be swept aside and each nation given the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to the full extent of its capacity.

Not only the fact that the monetary reform was carried out became of importance for Germany's position in international commerce, but also the *manner* in which the gold standard was introduced. The gold stock of a country may be centralized or decentralized. It is centralized when it lies in the vaults of the banks, especially of the central note bank, decentralized when it circulates freely. All centralization means economy. The more the whole cash reserve is brought together, the more profitably can it be utilized. Such a concentration also brings about a certain saving of interest. For these reasons the British have, to a very large extent, centralized their gold reserve. This system, first developed in England, is regarded by many as a model, and steps along this line have been taken in France and Russia. One fact has been insufficiently considered. The organization of the monetary system must be adapted, more than any other

organization, not alone to normal conditions but to crises. In cases of abnormal demand, which are scarcely to be foreseen, it becomes necessary to be able to lay hands on cash in unusual quantities. This may be obtained from domestic or foreign sources. Only he who controls the gold market can depend on foreign countries.

It is one of England's chief advantages in international commerce that, as the earliest and up to 1872 the sole gold-standard country, she became the gold market of the world. This position she was enabled to maintain, even after the appearance of competing purchasers of gold in consequence of the adoption of the gold standard by other nations, owing to the fact that she controlled politically and commercially two of the greatest gold producing countries—South Africa and Australia. England believed, therefore—relying on her monopoly of the commerce in gold—that she might confidently assume the risk which attaches to her monetary system. In proportion as her commerce in gold decreased or was threatened, this risk was sure to become perceptible. Hence the Bank of England was compelled in this war to increase its gold holdings by other means. Therefore it incorporated into its stock the Indian reserve currency, the gold in hand of the Egyptian National Bank, and probably also the gold reserve of the National Bank of Belgium, which was transferred to England, as well as the gold treasure of the Argentine Conversion Fund. Moreover, it accumulated gold in South Africa and Australia through sequestration of the mine output of those countries, as well as in Canada from the debts of American financial circles due to England. This money was not brought across the ocean, it is true, on account of the high rate of insurance, but it is counted as part of the Bank of England's cash. Further, the Bank of England exacted a certain amount of gold security for advances made to the Allies of Great Britain. This measure was applied, in the first instance, to Russia. Apparently 8,000,000 pounds sterling were transferred from Petrograd to London at a very early date. But France likewise was allowed a credit of 1,500,000,000 francs only against a cash security of 500,000,000 francs in gold.

By these unusual means the Bank of England succeeded in raising the gold cover for its notes and its other liabilities falling due without notice. At the end of August, 1914, the gold cover had been as low as 18 per cent. On December 2, 1915, it had risen to 28.7 per cent, but was still 9.8 per cent below what it was on July 23, 1914. Conditions were worse in France, where the gold cover within the same

period fell from 51.5 per cent (July 30, 1914) to 28.5 per cent (December 2, 1915), and in Russia, where it decreased from 57.6 per cent (July 29, 1914) to 26.4 per cent (October 29, 1915). In regard to the Imperial Bank of Russia, it is even doubtful whether it does not book the gold transferred to London among its assets. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why the item "gold abroad," showing 35,600,000 rubles on October 29, 1915, should have risen to 228,500,000 rubles on November 29, 1915, while the gold stock of the Bank, given at 1,600,000,000 rubles on November 29, 1915, is approximately the same as it was on October 29, 1915, and on July 29, 1914. At any rate, in contrast to the general deterioration of the gold holdings of our enemies, the Imperial Bank of Germany has an improvement to show. The gold cover for all its obligations due without notice—not only banknotes but deposits likewise—increased from 30.1 per cent on July 31, 1914, to 32.1 per cent on November 30, 1915.

While the central note bank of England is dependent upon help from outside, the German Imperial Bank rests entirely upon its own strength. For Germany from the start refused to assume this dangerous risk, for the sake of the saving of interest, that results from a thorough centralization of the cash reserve. The Empire, in the gold which is in circulation, possesses a strong internal reserve capable of meeting the demands even of the greatest crisis, because gold circulates more freely in Germany than in England, France and Russia; the combined amount of gold in circulation and gold stock in banks in Germany exceeds that of England. This explains how the German Imperial Bank, in the throes of the greatest war which any country has ever had to sustain, has been able, week by week, to augment its gold stock, so that after sixteen months of war it had increased by 1,182,000,000 marks, or 98 per cent (November 30, 1915: 2,435,000,000 marks), as compared with the time of the outbreak of the war (July 31, 1914: 1,253,000,000 marks), and that it excelled the gold stock of the Bank of England of even date (December 2, 1915: 51,100,000 pounds sterling) by 1,400,000,000 marks, or 134 per cent. It is true that at first France, and finally England also, by her proclamation of July 8, 1915, have done all in their power to imitate Germany's methods, much derided at the start, of withdrawing the gold reserves from circulation; but since both countries possess only small reserves of that kind, their success was very modest. The Bank of England up to the end of October, 1915, shows an increase of its gold holdings of only 13,800,000 pounds sterling, not a quarter

of that of the Imperial Bank of Germany, while the Bank of France's gold stock rose only by 736,000,000 francs—that is to say, by half of that of the *Reichsbank*. This strong and steady increase of Germany's gold stock, which remains inexplicable for all whose knowledge is confined to the British financial system, while astonishing in itself, is yet all the more remarkable for the fact that this flow of gold into the coffers of the Central Bank from channels of uncontrolled circulation is taking place without application of any measures of compulsion. The sole impulse is to be sought in the universal patriotism of the people. As a fight carried on with "silver bullets," the war is in Germany a national war.

The credit of a country is built upon the gold stock of its banks. In the present war, in Germany the gold stock is enjoying larger internal accretions and suffering smaller deletions than in England, France and Russia. The most important task of the gold stock is to adapt circulation to rapidly changing demand, by keeping it elastic. In Germany this has been achieved in absolute perfection by bringing the supply of currency into immediate causal connection with the demand for the circulating medium, bank notes being issued on the basis of trade bills, the amount of which rises and falls with the degree of economic activity. The greater the amount of bills signed and discounted for the payment of goods purchased, the greater becomes the amount of bank notes in circulation; and this again diminishes to the degree that these discounted bills are redeemed. A perfect adjustment to the demand for money is thus automatically brought about, and the Imperial Bank has to provide only the necessary metal cover. In Germany this is fixed by law as at least one-third of the face value of the total issue of notes, whereas in England, France and Russia corresponding rules are lacking. The elasticity achieved through this method of providing cover for the bills of exchange does not exist in those countries, or only to an imperfect degree. In France this elasticity is menaced by the fact that bank notes may be issued, not only for discount transactions but likewise for loans against commercial collateral. It is quite absent in England, where the bank-note system, for historical reasons, instead of being in organic union with the economic life, has been brought into outward inflexible connection with the financial administration of the state, and where, furthermore, the amount of bank notes issued without metal cover is limited. This fundamental defect in her financial system, although at times extremely inconvenient, England was able to endure as long as her commerce in gold suffered

no interference. By means of this she was able, through the great elasticity in the gold stock, to make up for the lack of elasticity in her bank-note system. But in case the commerce in gold is in any way impeded, the results of this fundamental defect in the system can be temporarily alleviated only by all the unusual measures for the maintenance of the gold stock already described.

In Germany, on the other hand, we have been able to maintain, in time of war, the elasticity which distinguishes our bank-note system in time of peace. Slight changes were necessary to this end. In the first place, in war time, the place of the individual as buyer and as employer of labor is largely taken by the state, which thus determines to a great extent the amount of payments. Hence, if it is desired in war time, as was the case in time of peace, to make the amount of currency conform to the demand for money, it is necessary to bring the bank-note system into organic union, not only with the nation's economic activity, but with that of the state, also. This was achieved by making the bills of exchange and promissory notes issued by the Government discountable through the Imperial Bank, if payable within three months; they were thereby given the same standing as cover for bank notes which private bills of exchange enjoy. By means of this simple logical adjustment to war conditions, the Imperial Bank attained the same automatic elasticity for the unusual demands of war that distinguishes it under normal conditions.

Supplementary measures also were necessary. Since the Imperial German Bank, in order to maintain its metal cover on a high level, is not permitted, as is the Bank of France, to use the funds gained from the issue of bank notes for loans against commercial collateral as well as against bills of exchange, it endeavored to limit as much as possible the amount, and especially the length of time, of such loans. For these purposes only the capital of the bank and the deposits may be used. In times of war, however, credit demands show a general increase. Especially was this true on the present occasion; for, following the lead of the Paris Exchange, the Vienna and Brussels Exchanges were closed on July 27, 1914, the London Exchange on July 30, and the Berlin and New York Exchanges on August 1. A relief for the resulting extraordinary difficulty in the sale of bonds and stocks had to be provided by making loans upon them legal, and this without obstructing the Imperial Bank in the fulfilment of its great principal task. Accordingly, as early as August 4, 1914, after the Prussian example tested in earlier wars, loan banks were established, authorized to grant loans to

the total of 3,000,000,000 marks against judiciously appraised securities, as well as with unlimited personal liability on the part of the borrower.

For this purpose these institutions issue "loan bank notes" in amounts as low as one mark, whereby a corresponding change in the denomination of bank notes is avoided. These loan bank notes, for which, in addition to the double security above mentioned, the Empire assumes liability, must be accepted at full face value by all authorities of the Empire and of the federal states. That the public showed no reluctance in taking up this new currency was in accordance with the experience of former wars. It is, however, one of the surprises of the present war that advantage was taken of this new credit system only to a degree which seems slight for a nation of nearly seventy million people. The maximum amount of the loan bank notes in 1914 was 1,317,000,000 marks (December 31, 1914); in the first half-year of 1915 it rose to 1,574,000,000 marks (April 15, 1915), while on November 30, 1915, the total issue stood at 1,631,000,000 marks, of which 889,000,000 marks were in circulation. It is subject to constant fluctuations. If the increase, incidental to the war loan issues, must be considered surprisingly small, the decrease wont to follow them must be called surprisingly rapid. Advances taken in connection with the three big war loans, which in all amount to 25,500,000,000 marks, on October 30, 1915, stood at no more than 1,054,000,000 marks, or approximately 4%. What is more significant in regard to the economic strength of the German people, underrated both at home and abroad, is the surprising fact that the demands made on the loan banks by subscribers were smaller on the occasion of each succeeding war loan. Up to the time when the first installments fell due, payments made by means of funds raised through the loan banks, as compared to the total payments, were as follows:

	Total Amount	*Total First Payment*	*From Loan Banks Funds*	*%*
I war loan:	4,481,000,000	2,568,000,000	710,000,000	27.6
II war loan:	9,103,000,000	6,085,000,000	521,000,000	8.6
III war loan:	12,160,000,000	8,732,000,000	566,000,000	6.5

England resorted to a measure similar to the German loan banks, but narrower in scope, in that it is confined to war loans, while it is much less stringent as regards the loan conditions. Loans are made to the full, instead of to a partial value of the security, for three years, instead of six months, and at a discount

of 1% under the legal discount rate, instead of at the rate of interest for loans on commercial collateral, which would be higher than the discount rate. When the second English war loan was to be raised (McKenna), conditions were made still lighter for subscribers, in that the former liberal conditions, relative to the loanable value of the security given, were replaced by quite extraordinary rights of exchanging new loan scrip for old government bonds.

By organizing the loan business independently of the *Reichsbank,* the note cover by bills of exchange—one of the pillars of our bank-note system—was maintained in its full strength. The other pillar, which consisted in the metal cover, has been very greatly strengthened through the notable accretion of gold from inland sources. But it was necessary, from the very beginning, to organize this support so that all strains to which it could conceivably be subjected within the extreme limits of possibility might be successfully withstood. It was therefore determined that the loan bank notes should be reckoned as governmental obligations, as part of the cash in hand of the Imperial Bank. By this means the central German note-bank would be enabled, even in face of a diminishing gold reserve, to meet all demands the war might impose on the inland market. This extreme precautionary measure—the importance of which has entirely failed of comprehension abroad—has, like so many others adopted for contingencies that eventually did not arise, not proved of any practical significance. The sound condition which our monetary system has preserved, even in war time, is shown precisely by the circumstance that the German bank notes have more successfully maintained the ratio of gold cover necessary in times of peace than the bank notes of the Bank of England, despite all emergency measures, and more than those of the Bank of France or the Russian Imperial Bank, which have entirely discontinued their regular reports. In this manner Germany has given proof that her monetary system is, of its own strength, equal to the most severe demands, in war as well as in peace. Nor is this fact militated against by the precautionary measure taken by the German Imperial Bank, in consideration of the cessation of all influx of gold from abroad, for the checking of the export of gold; this it permits only for certain definite purposes. The same thing has taken place in England, though not quite to the same extent nor in the same forms. England, too, has not been able to maintain the free exportation of gold. Thus there is no difference of principle, but only of degree.

Very much the same considerations obtain with regard to

the exchange rates, if only for the reason that much more complicated channels for international payments had to be made use of. Germany's foreign exchange, soon after the war broke out, suffered a depression which was increased by deliberate misinterpretation as well as by genuine misunderstanding, but which, broadly speaking, was soon checked. The English rate of exchange was maintained as long as England's excess of imports was kept within bounds. Only when, in 1915, this excess began to assume inflated proportions, did the exchange begin to drop, and it has shown unmistakably an increased tendency to do so since the month of April. The difference existing in this respect between Germany and England—which is all the more important because the English themselves characterize the pound sterling as international currency, in contrast to the currency of other countries—is connected with the question of trade balance. It is true that to-day Germany's trade balance is negative, but the excess of imports, owing to the restriction of German commerce, is moderate. England's trade balance has developed unfavorably to an incomparably greater degree. In the first ten months of 1915, the excess of England's imports from the United States alone over the exports was 396,600,000 pounds sterling, as against 194,800,000 pounds sterling during the same period of the preceding year. In this connection, moreover, it must not be forgotten that the enormous purchases made for the account of the government are not included in these figures. It is not unlikely that by the end of 1915 the unfavorable balance of England's trade will amount to 8,000,000,000 pounds sterling.

In England, as is not the case in Germany, there are no obstacles in the way of employing whatever means seem useful in supporting the value of currency, and all such means are being liberally employed. Thus, many hundreds of millions of marks' worth of foreign securities were sold and—in addition to several smaller bank loans—the great Morgan loan of $500,000,000 was placed on the market. But all means prove futile. The pound sterling, the presumed unassailability of which used to be the mainstay of England's hegemony in the world's trade, has dropped, as the mark did before, and it will continue to drop the longer the big British importation of war material, food-stuffs and raw material continues, the more hands are withdrawn from the British export industries, the more the advances grow which England has to grant her allies (which Mr. McKenna, on September 21, 1915, figured as amounting to 423,-

000,000 pounds sterling) and, finally, the more the British credits in the United States diminish.

The depreciation of the German rate of exchange, as likewise the cutting off of Germany from the world's commerce, will pass into history as an instructive war episode in Germany's economic life. Germany possesses sufficient strength to effect the transition from war to peace just as efficiently as, under much more difficult conditions, she performed the reverse process. As regards the depreciation of the English rate of exchange, with all its many concomitant phenomena, the longer the war lasts, the more it will grow into an event of world historic character, the importance of which will still be felt in the years following the war.

Upon the described basis of our financial system, newly created with much care in time of peace and wisely strengthened in the present war, it was possible to build up an efficient private banking business. As the reconstructed German Empire was forced to content itself with an insufficient gold supply, so it was inadequately provided with capital with which to meet the great demands made upon it. It was forced, therefore, to have recourse to the countries of old established wealth. Economical methods and efficient organization were consequently especially necessary in the banking system.

The five most prominent banks to-day, taken together, had at the time of the founding of the Empire a stock capital of only 122,800,000 marks. By 1880 this had risen to 246,000,000 marks; in 1895 to 413,000,000, and on January 1, 1915, it had reached 1,020,000,000 marks, to which must be added 325,000,000 reserve funds. These banks placed their capital at the disposal of the growing industry and trade. They expressly styled themselves "Banks for Commerce and Industry," went in deliberately not only for the simple and safe operations of the money market, like the English joint-stock banks, but also for a share in the growth of Germany's economic life, and sought to develop the spirit of enterprise in all promising undertakings They considered it not only their right, but their duty, to enter into the more remunerative but likewise more risky stock investment business.

The close connection which naturally soon developed between banks and business in the young German Empire was not without drawbacks. The large banks, which showed marked preference for long-term investments subject to the fluctuations of the market, hesitated at the start to go into the short-term deposit business, which is the prominent feature of

English banking. As late as 1890 the great Berlin stock banks had only 100,000,000 marks in deposits. At about that period, however, the systematic fostering of this branch of business was undertaken, in order to help the great banks of Germany to attain their full strength. On January 1, 1915, the four greatest Berlin banks showed deposits amounting to 1,748,000,000 marks. In connection with this it should be remembered that in Germany, contrary to the English custom, credits granted for commercial purposes, but not yet used, are not entered on the books as deposits. On the above date the nine leading Berlin banks combined had at their disposal a capital of funds and deposits amounting to 6,000,000,000 marks.

But even this does not fully express the strength which they have attained. The great Berlin banks to-day no longer stand alone. As they continually engage in great speculative undertakings, it has always been their aim to diminish the risk connected with the expansion of that class of business with all the means at their disposal. The effort to reduce such risk has been in a large measure responsible for the fact that our young German banks have grown to such vast organizations. The first point to be remembered is that an increase of deposits does not imply, as in England, a reduction of the banks' own funds; on the contrary, this gives an impulse to an increase of the stock capital and reserve funds; for since the assets and liabilities cannot be balanced against each other, as is the case in England, where the banks persevere in the old-fashioned custom of confining their business to the stereotype short-term credits, in the German banking system the relation between the bank's own funds and the deposits is quite different. It is no mere coincidence that the *Deutsche Bank,* the *Diskontogesellschaft,* and the *Dresdener Bank* excel all other German banks in the development of their deposit business, and at the same time have far outstripped them in the increase of their capital stock and reserve funds.

In accumulating these great amounts a means has been sought and found of balancing the risks by investing the banks' funds among a great variety of interests, with the result that the debtors' solvency depends to a great extent on quite diverse economic circumstances, frequently of a mutually neutralizing effect. Preponderant dependence on closely connected commercial interests —that is to say, dependence on the conditions of a single locality or on a single branch of commerce or industry—is everywhere carefully avoided. Geographically, as well as in regard to the lines of business pursued, the activity of the individual banks has

been extended as completely as possible. Their investments in German enterprises are naturally heavy; their activity, however, is not confined to the Empire's boundaries but extends to nearly every country on earth.

This expansion has taken place mainly in the form of widespread affiliations. There have been cases of consolidation of more or less importance; but there is a fundamental difference between the three great French consolidated banks, with more than 1000 branches throughout the provinces, and the comprehensive organizations under the German banking system. Local peculiarities have been retained in a much higher degree. This has been the case especially where different banks have been united, not in a giant organization, but merely in details of financial or personal control, without affecting their separate existence. The fact that the three greatest German banks in their yearly statement for 1914 showed not less than 318,000,000 marks permanently invested in other banks is an indication of the importance attained in German banking by this system of affiliations. It has been estimated that in the combined balance of all the German banks these three great institutions, together with the banks affiliated with them, hold no less than 60 per cent of the total.

Mistaken foreign theories to the contrary, German banking has developed along these lines in a few years from small beginnings to a great and powerful position. There is no deadening conventionality in its vast organization to cause needless interference with its efficient working, nor are there any worn-out traditions and governmental regulations standing in its way. On the contrary, the German banking system is free, in contrast to that of France and England, to use its great powers to the fullest extent. All the fears born of this freedom have been proved by the experiences of the war to be entirely groundless. Without this unrestricted freedom, the German banks could never have identified themselves with all branches of national economic life, as they have done, and in which they have now attained a position of leadership.

To begin with, they won for themselves a dominant position in the world of finance and capital. Compared with the power of the great banks with their widely distributed clientele, which in most cases is easily influenced, the German stock exchange has come to occupy a secondary position both in standing and influence. In England the stock exchange is able to maintain its monopoly largely because of its activity in the floating of securities. Not without justice has it been said that, while the great

German banks make use of the stock exchange as a medium in promoting their new enterprises, in England it is the banks that are made use of by the promoters and speculators. That is why the closing of the exchange was less keenly felt in Germany, especially as it proved easier in Berlin than in London and Paris to liquidate smoothly the transactions for the end of July. A reopening of the exchange ostensibly took place in the two latter countries, but under such drastic restrictions that a free market does not exist. Judging from the soundness and strength exhibited by our great banks in the war, which are of such paramount importance for the stock exchange, it may be confidently assumed that when the time comes for the reopening of the Berlin exchange, happily freed from its old obligations, it will occupy a position among European exchanges not only as strong as before the war but even stronger, and that it will not fail to give proof of its innate sound condition.

In the industrial field, also, the banks have gained a position of leadership. Without them, the rapid and striking development of our industrial production would not have been possible. Their concentrated financial strength guided our young and feeble industrial enterprises past the danger of being crushed out of existence by more highly developed and experienced competitors. Indeed, the banks have not only assisted individual undertakings in case of necessity or furnished them the means for extensions of their business—they have been mainly responsible for carrying the idea of comprehensive organization, which proved so effective in banking, into the entire sphere of industry. For with its allied banks throughout all Germany, the individual great bank is no longer interested merely in a single undertaking in one branch of industry, but in several mutually competing undertakings. The evils which unrestricted competition in trade brings about are consequently felt also by the banks. Their aim, therefore, must be to diminish this harmful competition. Accordingly, they extend their interest in the particular undertaking to include all allied and mutually dependent undertakings, and thus become the leaders in the development of the "cartel" system. They are extremely active in furthering the organization of our industries along coöperative lines by means of efficient associations.[1]

This development of our banking system, which, from distinct private concerns, has brought forth a great body of institutions pursuing national and cultural aims, completes the organ-

[1] A "cartel" is an agreement between industrial or commercial concerns providing for joint action in their business policy, without otherwise destroying the independence of the members.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

ization of the internal forces of Germany's economic life. In this new setting, the economic strength of the German people, which was finally freed through the victorious war of 1870-71 from the handicap of political disunion, has developed astounding vitality in almost all fields. In a period of forty years strenuous work has thus retrieved that which had been neglected. Germany to-day is no longer a poor country. Careful estimates agree in showing that Germany now occupies the first position among European nations, not only in respect to the collective wealth of the people—amounting to about 310,000,000,000 marks—but also in respect to her total yearly income, which represents 43,000,000,000 marks. This great change has not been recognized in other countries, because Germany, in contrast to England and France, still continues to devote her immense savings primarily to the development of her own powers, and invests only a small portion of them in foreign loans. In the last five years, of the stock and bonds put on the market in England 18 per cent (38,000,000 out of 210,000,000 pounds), and in France 30 per cent (1,523,000,000 out of 4,914,000,000 francs) were domestic securities, whereas in Germany no less than 85 per cent were so applied, while in 1912 only 255,000,000 out of 2,425,000,000 marks were invested in foreign securities. It is on account of this sustained demand for capital within the country that Germany in time of peace, despite her large savings, shows regularly a higher rate of interest in the money market than England and France, where industry does not continually demand such great sums. It is only since the war that these conditions, which are so important for German foreign exchange, have begun to show signs of a readjustment. Ever since the month of December, 1914, when the Imperial Bank reduced the previous war discount rate from 6 per cent to 5 per cent, the old established difference in the official rate of discount between Germany and England and France has disappeared. And while formerly the price of the French 3 per cent loan was considerably higher, it is now below the price of the 3 per cent German loan.

The different method in the use of capital explains, furthermore, why at the beginning of the war the German stock exchange was in so much better condition than that of England, not to speak of France. The great economic crisis of the Balkan States, following in the wake of the Balkan wars (which were financed mainly by France) and the scarcely less severe crisis in Mexico, Brazil, Argentine and Canada, as well as the bursting of the Russian bubble, affected the money market of

France most strongly, that of England in scarcely lesser degree, and that of Germany least of all. Germany had her capital undiminished, therefore, for financing the war. It enabled us, shortly after the beginning of the war, to raise a loan of a larger amount than the French war indemnity of 1871. The subsequent loans, which were twice and three times as large as the first, were, in part, also raised with the help of money saved in time of peace. But in the main their great success, which was a surprise to the Germans also, was due to other causes.

Germany succeeded in making the transition from peace to war conditions with unexpected ease and thoroughness. That is partly explained by the character of this war. Every German felt that it was a war of defense. Every one realized the danger which menaced the whole, and was ready, as a part of this whole, to serve the nation and sacrifice himself for it. The moment that war had been declared, the interest of the individual subordinated itself to that of the state. There was no opposition between the state and economic interests. Everything which the latter had to offer was placed at the disposal of the state.

Combined with these inner forces, which have never swayed a great nation in like degree and extent, external forces were at work creating, as if by magic, that many-sided structure of our new war economy. This we owed to England. For when the latter paralyzed our foreign trade immediately at the outbreak of war, our economic organization of peace times to a very large extent became entirely useless. In many cases there was no choice between peace and war economy. Activity was only possible within the new war organization. The pressure of the enemy from the outside eliminated the necessity of pressure on the part of the government. Voluntary service performed what compulsion could never have accomplished to the same extent.

In this way Germany was able to restore in striking manner in her body economic the circulation interrupted by her forcible exclusion from the world's commerce; while in normal times it pulsated throughout the whole earth, it is now limited to the narrow circle of national economic life. This narrowing of its course has resulted in accelerating the circulation. Everything which formerly served the countless and varied purposes of an export trade, amounting yearly to over 10,000,000,000 marks, was now enlisted in the service of the one great object of the country itself. Germany was no longer working for the whole world, but, even more devotedly and attentively than formerly, almost exclusively for her own needs. Thus, she accomplished

the great feat of freeing herself, in the main, from the old dependence on extensive imports and on easily exhaustible supplies, by founding her entire war economy on her own work. So completely has the economy of peace times been transformed into that of war that it is certain to-day that Germany is able to provide herself with adequate supplies for any length of time. It is true that this may not always be done as economically as formerly, that it is still necessary to be saving in many things, that numerous inconveniences must be borne by those who remain at home, but the times of anxious doubt are past. We are sure to-day that no matter how long the war lasts, Germany can keep it up with her own resources. The "isolated state" which hitherto existed only in theory has become a reality.

Independence in production also means financial independence. Practically our entire financial strength remains in the country. It flows only from one hand to the other, above all in a broad and rapid stream from the state to the individual. As often as our money completes this course of inland circulation, just so often does it become available again for the state in the nature of loans. It is only a question of carefully selecting the time for a new loan and of preventing large parts of the stream, which essentially remains the same, from being withheld from the state by artificial means. If these precautions are taken, Germany's defeat cannot be caused by financial difficulties.

If our financial troubles have been overcome, thanks to our "isolation," they oppress our enemies more and more from month to month, until to-day no state feels the financial burden of the war more than England. Our enemies lack the forces which in Germany produced a new and firmly knitted war economy.

As far as England is concerned, from the very beginning a deep and serious war sentiment was lacking. It was believed that this was only a new, somewhat greater adventure on foreign soil, to be added to the list of numerous wars which England had waged all over the world in the course of the past few decades. At home the public felt itself safe. There the war was not regarded by all as of vital interest for the entire nation. On the contrary, the British drew the sword in the belief that they would suffer no more through the war than if they remained neutral, and they even endeavored to convince themselves that they were magnanimously entering the combat for Belgium and not for their own interests. Under such conditions it was not possible, even among the English people, in whom political instincts are probably more strongly and more

generally developed than in any other nation, for the interest of the state to take precedence over the interest of the individual.

Even externally the war had but little effect at first. Trade with the enemy countries ceased, it is true, but otherwise all connections with the economy of the world remained the same and the seas were open for export and import. The economic organization of peace times was not brought to a standstill. On the contrary, now that important competitors had been put out of the way, it was a question of developing it as much as possible. Great advantages for the economy of the country from the war were expected by the people and by the government. Economic interests were not placed at the disposal of the state, but it was expected that they would be promoted by the state to a degree impossible in times of peace. But the matter turned out differently than had been expected. Everywhere the demands of the war have been miscalculated, but nowhere so much as in England. More men and means were required than had been imagined. This resulted in that great conflict between state and economy which is taking place in England to-day. It consists chiefly in the fact that a war organization which has not been voluntarily created by the nation is being forced upon it. It is only partly possible to conceal the coercive character of the measures that have to be taken. As a matter of fact, it cannot be doubted that the recruiting system is regarded as an unwelcome coercion, more so than the military service in those countries which have for centuries been accustomed to the great idea of the protective and educational character of universal conscription; and as regards production, it is undeniable that the government of free England had to use compulsory measures in a manner such as has been witnessed in no other country. While in Germany all concerns, whether large or small, devoted themselves voluntarily to the new tasks imposed by the war, many hundreds of factories in England had to be placed under governmental control in order to supply the urgent needs of the war.

All of this is of added importance because England, whose productive power in many fields was not able even in time of peace to accomplish as much as Germany, has to provide not only for herself but also to a great extent for her allies. For France has been affected economically and financially through the war perhaps even more heavily than in a military sense. Her territory occupied by Germany contains her most highly developed industry, that of mining and iron, which might have

been best able to compensate for the prostration of her manufacture of fancy goods. Of the French output of coal 68.8 per cent, of coke 78.3 per cent, of iron ore 90 per cent, of pig iron 85.7 per cent, of steel 76 per cent is produced in the eight provinces of which our victorious troops have been in possession for over a year. Thus France is paralyzed in her industrial productive strength. She is in need of foreign supplies to a far greater degree than in time of peace. The circulation of forces in her economic body has been most severely disturbed. She is suffering constantly from heavy, depleting loss of blood.

Similar conditions prevail in Russia. Just as England is an industrial and commercial state, standing in need of the products of foreign agriculture to a degree hitherto true of no other people, so Russia represents the greatest agricultural country which the world has ever seen. With the agricultural products of her vast territory, she pays for all the industrial products which her uneducated population is as yet unable to produce in sufficient quantity and quality. With these products she must, above all, meet the interest on the greatest foreign debt which any state has ever contracted. Russia to-day, cut off from the world, is unable to dispose of the great staple products of her soil. Consequently she is not only deprived of the strength to which was lately due, as a result of abundant crops, the satisfactory condition of her finance and the unmistakable improvement of her economic life, but she has also suffered so fundamental a disturbance in the circulation of her economic forces that all hope of cure must seem futile. Since only a strong, healthy, industrial state, such as Russia cannot yet claim to be, is in a position to conduct a modern war by its own strength, the need for foreign supplies felt by the Russian state and by Russian national economy must increase with every month of the war. Germany alone has proved equal to the task of cutting herself free, without impairment of vitality, from the world's economic life, with which she was so thoroughly intertwined, and of placing herself upon her own feet. Germany alone has been able satisfactorily to finance the war with her loans to the amount of 25,500,000,000 marks. Only Germany is able, from every point of view, successfully to play the rôle of the "isolated state." From this fact, which was a surprise even to the nation itself, Germany may still have to draw important deductions.

IV

The general systematic development of domestic economic strength in the field of agricultural and industrial production,

as well as in that of money and credit, was bound to make its effect felt beyond the boundaries of Germany. For the great quantities of foodstuffs and raw material which, in times of peace, Germany imported from all parts of the world for her continually growing population, had to be paid for. This could be done only with the products of German labor and with services rendered to other countries in the field of transport or in money and investments—that is to say, only by activity in those spheres of economic life in which England considered herself entitled to a monopoly of the whole world. We have already dealt with money and capital transactions. We must now turn to the question of transport and commerce.

Conditions in the field of transportation do not favor Germany. The country is blessed with a number of noble rivers, but while England is washed by the sea on all, and France on three sides, Germany has access to the great international highway only in the North, whither all her rivers, with the exception of the Danube, flow. Sea-traffic is therefore not only of slight importance to inland trade, but it does not play in the field of foreign commerce the same part as in England and France or the United States. But her central Continental position and the wealth of her neighbors are an advantage to Germany. She has a great Continental trade, in addition to her seaborne trade. Of the 21,000,000,000 marks which represent her commercial transactions for 1913, approximately 8,000,000,000 worth was transported by land. When the sea trade is checked, land trade may be increased; herein lie possibilities of adjustment and development unknown before the war. Because of this land branch of her foreign trade, which has suddenly experienced an abnormal increase, Germany must organize her inland transportation as efficiently as possible. The same is true of that part of her trade which is carried on by sea; for since our maritime transport is confined to the short line of our North Sea coast, most of our import and export goods have to make long interior journeys.

Up to the time that Germany determined to adopt a protective tariff for the sake of her industries, the nations did not fully realize the importance of this transport question. Bismarck, who carried the tariff idea to rapid victory, also accomplished the nationalization of the Prussian railroads. All classes in Germany to-day regard this as his greatest and most beneficial achievement along economic lines. Many separate and poorly organized enterprises were brought together under one management, an operation which represented the first great economic

consolidation and which even to-day remains the greatest that not only Germany but perhaps the world has ever seen. It offered countless possibilities of economy, and it has proved to be the most brilliant stroke of business that Prussia or any other modern state has ever done. At the same time, this nationalization also exercised a strong influence on our industry. In the first place, it had a wholesome effect on industrial competition by limiting it to the field of prices and cost of production, and by preventing it from encroaching on the field of freight rates. In the second place, by introducing uniformity in the gauge and rolling stock, it created facilities hitherto unknown in the transportation of bulk articles; this has vastly strengthened our industry in its development into big concerns and has rendered possible the present high degree of standardization of our products.

As the German railway system is to-day the greatest in Europe, and only surpassed by that of the United States, so is the Prusso-Hessian railway combine the greatest single undertaking in the world. This is not the most important feature in German inland communication. As long as the German railways were in private hands, the development of the artificial as well as of the natural waterways was carried on only half-heartedly; with government ownership, hundreds of millions of marks have been expended in creating a highly developed and closely interconnected system of waterways, surpassed in efficiency by no other. It is characteristic of German methods that recently efforts have begun to be directed towards taking the railways and waterways out of the field of unregulated competition and bringing them into a powerful union, to the end of a reduction of freight rates.

Our shipping trade is based upon this system of interior communication, which on all frontiers extends far into the neighboring states. Proofs of our old maritime ability, as in the days of the Hanseatic League, have never been lacking, but the prohibitive features of Cromwell's Navigation Act, which with ruthless deliberation established England's position in maritime trade, pressed heavily upon German shipping. Not until the revolt of the United States from England did the Act suffer a modification important for the Hansa cities, and not until 1849 was it repealed. Then, for the first time, seatraffic with the coasts of the various continents was legally open to the Germans. But German shipping still suffered from the fact that it lacked a national flag, and consequently protection and dignity. This state of affairs was changed by the foundation of the German Empire. Not alone was the path of de-

velopment now open, but a strong national mainstay had been created.

On this new basis German shipping gained its first great success in the emigration traffic. When the preponderance of emigration shifted from England to the Continent, the ancient advantages and disadvantages of the geographical position of the various countries underwent a complete reversal. England's insular position prevented her from finding an adequate substitute for the failure of her own emigrants, while the German Hansa cities of the North Sea took deliberate advantage of their Continental situation. Through its emigrant trade to the United States Bremen gained a leading position. With Hamburg, it succeeded, when the stream of emigrants thinned in Germany, in making up for the loss and even in increasing the original traffic by an influx from other countries. Through the merits of their organization, the two cities were able to retain their position as the greatest emigrant ports in the world, even when the growth of German commerce transformed the country from a land of emigration into one with an excess of immigration. It was in this field of emigrant traffic that Germany first succeeded in securing maritime independence of England. It was more difficult to achieve this in the field of passenger traffic, for on account of her Colonial possessions and her position in international trade, England has more cabin passengers requiring transportation than any other country. It was possible to gain a place equal to England's only by attracting a portion of the non-English traffic through offering the best possible accommodation. Germany succeeded in this on several of the chief ocean routes, as was most clearly shown perhaps in the attraction exercised by her ships in the international tourist traffic. Thanks to her successes in both fields of passenger traffic, Germany has been enabled to gain a leading position on certain portions of the seas in the technically highest developed maritime branch, viz: the liner traffic, which is distinguished by speed and regularity of service. In the North Atlantic field Germany was able to win the blue ribbon, which England succeeded in recapturing only by granting, contrary to German custom, a high government subsidy to the Cunard Line for its two vessels, the *Mauretania* and the *Lusitania.*

Germany realized, however, that in order to conquer and to maintain in all departments of shipping a place next to England's, she would have to increase her competitive power to the highest possible degree by organizing the shipping business along the most rational lines. This was achieved by developing the liner

traffic, which was limited to fixed routes with definite ports and hence greatly subject to the risks of trade fluctuations, into a widely ramified system, in which one line helps the other. By this system a greater freedom of movement, and hence a greater degree of insusceptibility to natural and artificial crises, is gained, together with a far-reaching invulnerability against the effects of competition. In shipping as in banking, the chief impulse to further development lay in the desire to effect a counter-balance against local risks, and the novelty and limit placed to that development helped to make success possible. For while in England, with her older traditions, the growth of the shipping business was scattered, owing to her wealth in harbors and capital, German shipping is concentrated in two neighboring North Sea harbors, on whose small population it was originally, and is even to-day, to a great extent dependent for capital. In this field, too, Germany has achieved deliberate concentration of her strength to a much greater extent than England. Foreign countries can show no counterpart to the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd Lines, with their many-sided and systematic organization. Other countries have not developed their shipping lines into great coördinated systems to the same degree as Germany has. Nevertheless, England still enjoys a notable superiority in the shipping field. In tonnage of ships, she exceeds Germany five-fold. Wherever the dominion of the great liners ceases, and the task is one of carrying the great volumes of agricultural staple goods, which are only transported for a short period of the year and in extremely varying quantities, England still enjoys her former predominance. In the so-called trampship business, the most international branch of all, England continues to hold sway, as in scarcely any other line.

This supremacy in the trampship business is of great importance to the ship building industry. With the change from wooden to iron and steel ships, the attention of builders was turned from lumber producing countries to those rich in iron. At the same time the business grew from the narrow plane of the small undertakings of artisans to the large scale of capitalistic enterprise. The system of large production, which England first developed, owing to the invention of the Bessemer process in the iron industry, was extended almost immediately into all branches in which iron figured largely. Since the sixties England became the ship-builder of the world. Even more strikingly than for the world's carrying trade, do her figures for ship building (65 per cent for the period 1901 to 1910) surpass those of Germany (9.5 per cent) for the same period. This great superiority is

due, in part, to the international reputation which England has acquired as the possessor of the greatest navy. She was considered the builder of the best ships. Under the influence of the development of our war fleet, on the one hand, and of our passenger liners, on the other, Germany has in a short space of time established her independence in this field of high-class construction. Her great passenger steamers stand in the first rank, and her warships are inferior to those of England only in numbers, not in quality. The second mainstay of England's ship-building is the English tramp-steamer. In contrast to passenger and war ships, the trampship is a wholesale article. Just as up to within a few years our machine industry was limited almost entirely to individual products, so our ship-building trade has neglected cheap construction *en masse*. Energy has been concentrated upon the production of expensive and constantly improving individual ships. But just as our machine industry in recent years passed, as we have seen, through an important stage of standardization and then became the greatest German export industry, it is one of the great questions of German economic life whether we shall succeed in carrying the idea of production *en masse,* which is a controlling conception of to-day, into the field of our ship-building. Here, as in so many branches of industry, by placing production upon a practical and rational plane, we should retrieve lost opportunity and recover the flourishing state of the old Hansa period.

Shipping, which can be maintained on the highest plane of development only when supported by efficient ship-building, is the pace-maker for foreign trade. Although in relation to economic life in its entirety foreign trade does not play in Germany by any means the part it plays in England, or in France, nevertheless its statistics reflect strikingly the general development. The table for international trade stands thus in millions of marks:

	Germany.	England.	France.
1890	8,195	15,300	8,337
1900	11,088	17,899	9,208
1907	17,011	23,741	12,104
1913	22,530	28,644	14,814 (1912)

Although in 1890 England was so far in the van that, in a sense, she was removed from competition, Germany has gained considerably on England, while France has remained far behind both countries. The result of this development is that Germany, like the United States, increased her share of international

trade in the period from 1890-1912 from 11 per cent to 12.9 per cent, while in the same period England's share has fallen from 20.2 per cent to 16.6 per cent and France's from 11 per cent to 9 per cent. Despite this, these two countries have maintained their previous superiority to the extent that foreign trade in 1913 in England represented 596 marks to each individual of the population, in France (1912) it represented 370 marks, but in Germany only 322 marks. But the chief competitors facing each other are England and Germany. It is with them chiefly that we propose to deal hereafter.

More important than the total figures are the differences in single lines. In import trade, in which England is still far ahead of Germany, raw material and foodstuffs hold first place in both countries. In 1913, they formed 72.1 per cent of all German imports; in addition, there were 11.7 per cent of half-finished goods, which, like raw material, are subjected to a process of further manufacture, while only 13.7 per cent were finished goods. The first twenty items on the import list are raw materials, among which stand, far in the lead, cotton (607,000,000 marks), wheat (417,000,000 marks), wool (412,000,000 marks), barley (390,000,000 marks), copper (335,000,000 marks), skins (321,000,000 marks).

The twenty-first and twenty-second positions are held by agricultural products, such as butter and oil-cake, with a total value of 237,000,000 marks, and the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth by cotton and woolen yarn, both half-finished products, with a total value of 224,000,000 marks. There follows again a series of raw materials, until the first finished article of manufacture is reached with machines, to the value of 80,000,000 marks, in thirty-third place. On account of this relative unimportance of manufactured imports, the two countries of temperate climate which have the most extended territory, the United States and Russia, compete for first position on the German import list. England has maintained third position against Austro-Hungarian competition. No independent country takes from England so many goods as Germany; not even her own colonies take so much, with the exception of India. But even among England's exports to Germany, raw material and half-finished products play an important part. The first five positions are held by coal, herrings, and three different kinds of yarn. In 1912 the value of finished goods was only 246,000,000 marks, out of 842,000,000 marks for the whole import list.

Of quite a different character is the German export trade, which in 1913 reached the 10,000,000,000 mark, and which is

only 622,000,000 marks behind that of England, and 101,000,000 marks behind that of the United States. In this list in 1913, finished goods held the lead, with 63.3 per cent, to which was added 11.3 per cent of semi-manufactured goods. All parts of the earth share in these exports, which consist mainly in industrial products. In the van stand those countries which possess great purchasing power, as the result of a high state of development or of a numerous population. England stands far in the lead. In 1913 her imports from Germany, amounting to 1,438,000,000 marks, far exceeded her exports thither, amounting to 876,000,000 marks. But the great difference in the total figures of Germany's trade with England is chiefly explained by the fact that England was able to maintain her old commission trade by serving her colonies with European products, and it is counterbalanced in great part by the fact that the British colonies, contrary to the motherland, show a greater export trade to Germany than an import trade from that country. The former advanced 560,000,000 marks during the ten years from 1900 to 1911, the latter only 140,000,000 marks. England is followed by Austria-Hungary (1,104,000,000 marks), Russia (880,000,000 marks) and France (790,000,000 marks). Fifth position in Germany's export trade is held by a non-European country, the United States, with imports of 713,000,000 marks, as against exports of 1,711,000,000 marks. Germany imports more goods from the United States than any other country. Next rank again five European countries. It is obvious that the European countries are the most important for German export trade. In her export trade, too, Germany shows herself to be a European Continental state. All the sea coasts of the world may be reached with little trouble by water; in the case of transportation by land, that one of the rivals often enjoys an advantage who can avoid the trans-shipping of his goods. By the geographical position of Germany, which in this point proves an advantage rather than the reverse, the fact may doubtless be explained that German export trade has gained on that of England in Europe. For the period from 1890-1911 it has been shown that in every European state, except Portugal, imports from Germany increased more rapidly than those from England. Germany is still surpassed by England in the outer circle of European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, as well as France, but she is in advance of Britain in the other European states, although only slightly so in the inner circle comprising Sweden, Norway, Italy, Bulgaria, and Belgium. This advantage is marked in all her neighboring states

not yet cited, as well as in Russia and Serbia. Beyond the borders of Europe, however, the picture is quite different. In the countries beyond the seas, Albion has maintained the penetrating strength of her trade. England's exports show almost everywhere a greater increase in the years from 1890 to 1911 than Germany's; only Mexico, San Domingo, and Guatemala, in addition to the German colonies, are exceptions.

The German export trade, which is thus distributed over the different countries according to a kind of natural law, is made up of an extraordinary variety of goods, and consists mainly of finished products. Aside from pit coal, coke, grain and kali, it shows no such bulk articles as the import trade. For her machines and iron-ware, which occupy the leading position, include innumerable separate classes. This versatility may be considered a German peculiarity. England has among her exports bulk articles also. These are the products of her textile industry, which at the time of the founding of the German Empire formed fully one-half of the English export list, and still to-day make up nearly two-fifths of it. Since the Germans did not appear until late in the markets of the world, and lacked such great staple articles, they were forced to interest themselves in that medley of goods which the English—at first contemptuously, then enviously—styled "German articles," "German nicknacks," or "muck and truck trade." This multifariousness vests the German export trade with that adaptability which distinguishes it and which has made the German overseas merchant the experienced, resourceful and energetic man whom every one fears as a competitor. The trade in the great staple articles known as Manchester goods is, on the contrary, carried on along smooth, well-beaten tracks, in which there is slight opportunity for gaining new experience. It represents, furthermore, that branch of modern factory industry which may be most easily taken up in new industrial countries. Here again original advantages have been transformed into disadvantages and *vice versa*. This is not due in any way to improper competition, but is the natural result of progressive development.

England has had to suffer under the pressure of this development resulting from natural conditions, not alone in neutral markets but even in her own. English imports from Germany in 1912 were 69 per cent finished articles, while the German imports from England showed only 29 per cent of such goods. At the start it was believed in England that these industrial imports were the result of an inferior competition based on starvation wages and contemptible practices. They desired

to protect their own well-developed, high-quality industry against the undesirable intruder. As a consequence, there was passed the British Trade Marks Act of August 23, 1887, which required the country of origin to be stamped on all imported goods. The stamp "made in Germany," it was intended, should become a mark of inferiority for all German goods. As a matter of fact, it has become a testimonial to German ability. It showed the world, to its surprise, that German goods were no longer by any means "cheap and nasty," as they were still called at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition in 1876, and it served as an unintentional English advertisement of German industry.

When it was seen that a mistake had been made, there was a shift from the attack on foreign "truck" to an attack on foreign products of quality. The Patent Act of 1907 increased for a foreigner the difficulties in securing a patent. Any patent may be cancelled if the greater part of the goods are manufactured abroad. In this way, protection for many German inventions is prevented, or else German patent-holders are forced to surrender the rights to Englishmen or to build factories in England. But this weapon also turns against those who have forged it. For the patent law injures the English intermediate trade by forcing the foreigner to ask himself whether a particular product is intended for use in England, or only for passage through that country.

At the same time an effort was made to protect the monopoly in high-class English manufactures by organizing a campaign of vilification against German products. The entire English press throughout the world was impressed into this contemptible service. The limit, which it would be difficult to surpass in times of peace, was reached by *Eastern Engineering,* a monthly magazine founded in 1912 by the British Engineers Association for China.

This campaign is still going on, in war time, only with heightened wantonness. The campaign of defamation is assuming the gigantic proportions of the modern war *en masse.* The restrictions placed on patents are developing into patent-robbery, at least temporarily; the efforts toward tariff protection, started by Chamberlain, are finding their realization in the prohibition against "trading with the enemy," which applies not only to entering into future obligations, but to carrying out those already assumed. The competition in the shipping trade in times of peace, for which the British state granted subsidies of hitherto unheard-of amounts, is now becoming piracy; England had long

prepared for this by stubbornly blocking all progress in international law regarding naval warfare.

But war is "the continuation of politics, only with other means." It was reserved for England, whose policy was always strongly influenced by economic considerations, to carry the war spirit into all branches of economic life, with a coarse brutality such as mankind has not yet seen. What had long been regarded as a universally accepted attainment of civilization in regard to warfare is trodden under foot by England, without regard to the future, and her opponents thereby find themselves forced to measures of retaliation. The rules which were gallantly observed forty-five years ago in the war between Germany and France are thrown to the winds by England, who brutalizes and embitters warfare. The war is systematically extended to the peaceful civil population, and private property is seized, not alone at sea but even on land.

Complaints had long been heard over the "inevitable German." Now the hour had struck to get rid of the diligent rival. Immediately with the outbreak of hostilities, all male German and Austro-Hungarian citizens between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five were cooped up both in England and her colonies in concentration camps, first invented by the English in the South African War. Regard for public opinion seems to have led to certain modifications in the motherland, but the policy of force was allowed full rein in the Crown Colonies, which are under the Colonial Secretary, not under Parliament—this, notwithstanding the fact that in this case the fear of spies could not be offered as an excuse, and the common interest of the whites suggested caution. In Hongkong the Germans were even imprisoned in Chinese prisons, despite the protest of the British Governor, who replied to the order by resigning his position.

Together with the elimination of these dangerous individuals, began the destruction of that which they had created by ceaseless work. Wherever the Germans were most successful the English proceeded to enforce liquidation of their affairs. The spirit which ruled this procedure is indicated clearly in The Alien Enemies' (Winding Up) Ordinance, which was promulgated on December 7, 1914, in the Straits Settlements and in Further India. It decrees not alone that enemy firms—even those stock companies entered according to British law whose shareholders are at least two-thirds foreigners—are to be forcibly liquidated, at the cost of a commission of 2½ per cent; but, following liquidation, all books, letters and vouchers, accounts and documents, together even with the statement of the liquidator, may be de-

stroyed. The president of the Bremen Chamber of Commerce expressed the feelings of the whole German nation when he characterized this measure, taken in the name of the King of England, as "the worst warping of justice that has occurred since the existence of civilization"; he adds that the British state has thereby illustrated "the downfall of all governmental order."

The English, however, look to time for the principal gain in their economic life. This viewpoint finds expression, with classical brevity, in *The London Times* of December 11, 1914, in the following words:

"From a British manufacturer's point of view, the longer the war continues the better for British industries. We may feel the pinch at present, but years hence we shall get the benefit. Every German firm in British Colonies, which has been eating into the very vitals of the British manufacturer and operatives, will be ruined. If we had had a larger military force to rush into the field and subdue Germany at the start, the effects would not have been so far-reaching."

It was in the same spirit that Sir Edward Grey, on August 3, 1914, in justification of the British declaration of war, made the following statement, the cold-blooded calculation of which aroused the indignation of the German people, fighting for its most sacred possessions:

"For us, with a powerful fleet which we believe able to protect our commerce and to protect our shores and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside."

One cannot expect from the mouth of a diplomat the cynical frankness which characterized the British Admiral Monk, when he gave utterance to the famous words:

"What matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade which the Dutch now have."

In *The United Service Institution* for 1909, in the prize essay of a British naval officer on England's wars, the writer sums up the results of his investigation in the following equally frank soldierly declaration:

"We give all sorts of reasons for war, but at the bottom of them all is commerce."

In expectation of the war now raging, *The Saturday Review* made, as early as 1897, this statement, which has often been repeated in milder form by British newspapers in all parts of the world:

"If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would

not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession; must they not fight for 250,000,000 pounds of yearly commerce?"

If not the whole truth, still a great degree of truth is contained in this statement of an American newspaper:

"This war was not made in Germany, but 'made in Germany' is the cause of it."

Events, however, have already disappointed the great hopes, and especially the business calculations, of Sir Edward Grey. Englishmen will learn that there are higher forces in national life than cold-blooded desire for gain. As the development of German commercial strength in production and trade was not the result of frivolity and arbitrariness, or even of hostility to the English—an attitude foreign to our people, with few exceptions—but springs of necessity from natural forces which cannot be eliminated, in like manner war cannot bring victory to backwardness over progress. It can destroy the careful but antiquated work of previous generations, but not the forces of progress, rich in promise for the future, which created this work. The longing of the German people is only to gain a freer field for the exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. As surely as Napoleonic plans of world-conquest are foreign to the soul of the nation, just so surely will that longing remain alive in it while the earth bears German men. For this reason the war appears to the German people as a war of freedom. It is aimed against Russia's Pan-Slavic plans of conquest on the European-Asiatic Continent, and against England's rule of the sea. It aims at a balance of power, not alone on the European Continent to the advantage of a clever outsider, but likewise upon the ocean. In this fight for the equality of the nations, Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind. And thanks to her scientific training and strength of organization, she will win mankind's gratitude, as soon as the mists of defamation have cleared away and freedom has been achieved for the judgment of the nations.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY

DR. WILLIAM SOLF, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

THIS article is no apology, no excuse for our having colonies, and no explanation why we have them. Germany has colonies because she wished to, and had to have them. We know that we have obtained all of our colonies in a legal manner and have not stolen them, and we are responsible to ourselves and to no foreign power for the existence of our colonial possessions. If I have determined to prepare a contribution for the purposes of the present book dealing with Germany's colonial policy, it is done with the well-considered intention of showing, by means of an analysis of the spirit of our colonial administration, how far Germany's colonial policy is from being "militaristic," in the sense in which that adjective is used by our enemies.

Our enemies are not clear in regard to the fundamental fact that that which is called "militarism" stands in close interrelationship with the geographical, economic and general political foundations on which a modern state develops. They ignore the fact that in every modern centralized state, which from the interplay of its geographical, commercial and political factors is impelled to form a standing army, the spirit of militarism exists and everywhere takes on the same or similar forms of activity.

Although in the birth of German militarism in Prussia, the same factors were originally active as in other countries with standing armies, nevertheless certain special factors of local geographical and national-ethical nature gave it a particular stamp. The principal element in this differentiation was that of bitter necessity—the position of small and poor Prussia, surrounded by mighty and rich neighbors, who obstructed and rendered difficult, as much as possible, her rise and existence. The *dira necessitas,* or "holy necessity," made the concentration of all powers imperative, and left no chance for a costly policy of force and prestige. Necessity drove the Prussian rulers to a stronger centralization of their state, to the creation of a bureaucracy which treated the inadequate supplies of the public treasury with the care accorded to the "Arc of the Covenant."

Necessity has been the great teacher and disciplinarian of the Prussian state, on the throne, in the army, among the employees of the Civil Service, and in all ranks of the people; it created that laconic, reserved, but wiry and persevering Prussian type.

The Prussian state is indeed like the woolen shirt, which irritates but furnishes warmth; it was forced to assume rough and harsh characteristics, created by bitter necessity. In constant pitiless discipline and fulfillment of duty, the people and their princes became great; the state remained long deprived of all that makes life rich, joyous and beautiful. The peculiar marks of militarism which gave Prussia her individuality remain with her to-day, for the reason that the prerequisites for the existence of Germany as a state are more and more found to be the same as those which were once the deciding factors for Prussia.

While other countries, as the result of a more fortunate geographical position, were able more easily to regulate their governmental, military and economic needs and institutions, "holy necessity"—the present time proves this once again—remained the indispensable teacher and long familiar disciplinarian for Prussia, lying as she does at the centre of Europe, protected for long distances by no natural boundaries and surrounded by jealous enemies. *"Toujours en vedette"* may serve as a motto, not alone for Prussia but also for the whole German Empire, which has only of recent years approached a condition of affluence. The whole German nation is to-day filled with the same spirit which first rendered Prussia great and unconquerable.

The tactics of our enemies in accusing us of militarism are as unjust as they are foolish. They misunderstand entirely the peculiar bases of our young empire. Were Germany free to act and move in the same manner as other states have long been able to do—most of which have for centuries enjoyed political and territorial union—she would perhaps have rid herself of many characteristics which have been the result of her development during a period of great stress.

We see that in "New Germany." We thought in our colonies to gain the freedom of development denied us in the Fatherland. In her colonies Germany did not reckon with foreign foes, did not contemplate the conquest of her possessions by European Powers. Trusting in the solidarity of interests of the white race, and supported by the provisions and spirit of the Congo Act, the military protection of our colonies was slight, and intended principally for the preservation of peace and order among the natives, and for the suppression of the

slave-trade. Such were the legally limited tasks of our defence and police troops. In all the colonies of Africa and in the South Seas the German government introduced at many points different and freer rules in the field of administration and military control, as well as in economic life, in trade and traffic, in railroad management, in agriculture, etc., than was possible at home. In none of our colonies is there a military administration. Were militarism the idol of Germans, and did Germans really possess the war-like characteristics and piratical instincts attributed to them, our colonies would inevitably furnish proof of the fact, and a welcome arena would be seen in them for this supposed soldierly brutality and love of fighting. The fact that this is not so, that we have introduced a civil and peaceful form of government and have not transplanted the restraints and limitations historically necessary for Germany into these new fields of our administrative activity—that, taken all in all, we have developed a freer spirit in them—this appears truly remarkable. It shows the real spirit of the German nature and policy as it manifests itself when free from foreign enemies, from belligerent neighbors and "holy necessity," and as it would everywhere and universally manifest itself were this possible.

The history of the conception of colonial aspirations in Germany and of its slow, gradual development shows that no ambitious impulse for great deeds, no prompting of a sudden whim or passing ill-humor, no desire for an increase of power prompted the German government to enter upon the thorny path of an active colonial policy. Formerly this was freely acknowledged, even in the camp of our present enemies, who are now actively engaged in taking possession of our colonies. Prince Bismarck was finally brought to abandon his views against the acquisition of distant colonies by the bitter experiences which Germans suffered at the hands of the "impartial" and "just" British colonial administration in the Fiji Islands, in their ten-year struggle for lawfully acquired land titles and monetary claims. For a long time it was his sincere desire to be guided in all questions of maritime and commercial importance by the assumption of the identity of German and British interests. But the effect of the annexation of the Fiji Islands by England in the year 1874 upon the trade and plantation undertakings of Germans settled there showed Bismarck clearly that England was ready to go hand in hand with Germany in the introduction of freedom in trade and commerce only so far as she herself was able to gain by this partnership. These experiences were the main factor in forcing Bismarck to the conviction that Ger-

man interests overseas were in need of a more thorough protection than could be expected from England, friendly, it is true, but selfish and under certain circumstances given to acting ruthlessly against foreign interests. With other colonial powers we had had even worse experiences.

Long enough had the arbiter of the destiny of the young German Empire postponed Germany's entrance into the ranks of the colonial powers, for fear of the dissipation of its energies so urgently needed for internal strengthening. Had the spirit of German trade and enterprise in foreign colonies enjoyed protection and equal opportunity, had the expectation been justified that the colonial territories as yet unappropriated would remain open to international commerce, German policy would perhaps never have taken this step. Its ultimate necessity was the result of bitter experiences. The care and responsibility for the future of the German nation, rapidly growing in numbers and in economic power, forced the government to place under the protection of the German flag a portion of the still unappropriated lands in Africa and in the South Seas. As these were territories whose position had hitherto not seemed desirable to the older colonial powers, it might have been expected that the recognition of the German occupation would have met with recognition by the other powers without friction. For Germany was most careful, in this connection, to avoid encroachment on existing rights or interests.

The reverse was the case. Innumerable obstacles were placed in the way of Germany's claims to new land. Step by step we were forced to contend with the jealousy and malevolence of neighboring colonial powers. Attempts were made by every means to block German colonial plans and to diminish the German colonial territory. The other colonial powers had originally confined themselves to occupation of the unclaimed coastal districts of the African Continent, but after the birth of the conception of the colonial "hinterland" there began keen competition in the expansion of colonial possessions from the coast into the interior of Africa. France especially sought at this point to curtail our West African colonies, by despatching numerous military missions and by the manufacture of legal claims. In the years 1898 and 1899, French colonial agents in Dahomey, basing their claims on a wrong longitudinal calculation, occupied a stretch of land of two thousand square kilometers, to the injury of the neighboring Togo Land. Negotiations covering sixteen years, frequently most delicate but always conducted on the German side with the greatest patience and long-suffering, were necessary with

the French government, as well as new and expensive boundary expeditions, in order to convince the latter government of the incorrect work of its former commissioners and to uphold the German treaty rights at this boundary.

So difficult was it made for Germany to come to a definite understanding with her colonial neighbors regarding her boundaries that even to-day, after a complete generation, the boundary lines of the German protectorate have not yet everywhere been finally regulated and settled. Mountains of documents have been written and oceans of ink spilled in this connection. The French colonial administration has at all times shown itself notably lacking in the spirit of conciliation and broad-mindedness in questions of boundary regulation.

The responsible leaders of Germany's policy have missed no opportunity to emphasize how much they valued the preservation of pleasant relations with their colonial neighbors, especially with England, and that these pleasant relations should not be disturbed by differences in colonial matters. In the report concerning the motives for the German-English understanding of July 1, 1890 (the so-called Zanzibar Agreement), these words occur: "The thought is not to be entertained of being forced into a rupture with England on account of a colonial dispute. It is not to be doubted that our colonial possessions are materially too unimportant to balance the disadvantages of a war which would deeply affect the prosperity of both parties. Not alone is actual warfare to be avoided, but alienation of the nations, embittering of feeling in wide circles and diplomatic feuds on account of these possessions can not be countenanced. We desire urgently to maintain in the future our former cordial relations with England."

On December 11, 1894, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, explained to the Reichstag the guiding motives of Germany's colonial policy. They were, he said, partly of an economic, partly of a national, and partly of an ideal and religious nature, the latter in respect to the campaign against the disgraceful slave-trade and the support of the missions. He closed with the warning that, with due regard for all foreign rights, the maintenance of our colonial possessions was demanded by our national honor and was an outward sign of our national prestige which we would stand ready to defend.

On February 13, 1896, Herr von Marschall, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, said in the Reichstag:

"It is not the German fashion to seek quarrels or to cause trouble or to attack others' rights. We are always ready, and

have given proof of it to England, to respect the rights and interests of others. We are most willing on this basis to stand in close relationship with all nations. But this is on the assumption that our consideration of others is founded upon a full measure of reciprocity."

On December 14, 1895, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Bülow, declared that by "world policy" he understood simply "that in the field of commerce, industry and shipping we demand the same consideration as all other countries, and that we intend to stand upon a footing of equality with the whole world." Again, on November 14, 1906, he said that it was his aim so to conduct a wise, well-considered and deliberately moderate world policy that the safety of the German people might not be endangered and the future of the nation not compromised.

But on no occasion have the true aims and the unselfishness of the German colonial policy been shown in a clearer light than in our attitude toward the colonial plans of King Leopold II of Belgium. Prince Bismarck, from the start, did everything in his power to further them. His bridal present to the young Congo State was Catanga, rich in copper and to-day the pearl of the Belgian colonial possessions. Two German explorers at that time had just proclaimed its economic importance. To secure a large free trade zone in Central Africa appeared to Bismarck almost as desirable as the acquisition of colonies of our own. But how little the Belgian King acted in accordance with the spirit and aims of the Congo Act of the year 1885! What bitter struggles and material sacrifices Belgium was compelled to make in order to recover from the selfish monopolistic policy of Leopold's period in the Belgian Congo!

With justice the geographer, Dr. Supan, declared that no colonial policy had ever been so inspired by the spirit of peace and respect for the rights of others as the German.

Even Gladstone saw himself compelled in the British Parliament, in 1885, in view of the moderate attitude of the German government, to invoke the blessing of heaven upon Germany's colonial aspirations, and to welcome her as England's friend and colleague for the blessing of mankind, and to declare:

"I welcome her entrance into this field of action and shall be delighted for her to become our associate in spreading light and civilization in poorly civilized territories. In this work she will encounter our most heartfelt and best wishes and every encouragement which lies in our power."

Many misunderstandings would perhaps have been avoided had the planless division of Africa in the 80's of the last cen-

tury, dictated by various outward circumstances, been more organically regulated by mutual understanding and consideration of the interested states. Proposals were frequently made looking to a consolidation and re-grouping, especially of the German and English colonial possessions in Africa, and aiming at a simplification of their administration. Unfortunately these efforts were made at a time when in the colonies in question, through private and governmental activity, so many interests of various kinds had been created that a peaceful territorial adjustment or exchange could not but seem impracticable, even with the best intentions. The right moment for the regulation of European possessions in Africa on a natural basis had been irrevocably neglected.

One might, however, have expected that with the outbreak of the present war the interested Powers would have remembered Article 11 of the Congo Act of February 26, 1885. This article binds the parties to the Congo Act, in case one of the Powers exercising rights of sovereignty in the Congo Basin should be involved in a war, to lend their good offices, in order that, at the request of the state in question, the disputed territory be placed during the war under the rule of neutrality. This wise and humane provision had been included in the Congo Act at the special initiative of the United States of America. One of that country's delegates, Mr. Kasson, had, in an exhaustive and convincing exposition, shown what terrible atrocities had resulted from involving the Indian tribes in the military complications of the European states which possessed colonies in North America in the eighteenth century. The repetition of such unfortunate happenings should, he said, be avoided in the Congo Basin. Efforts should be made to prevent, in case of war, the arousing of the passions of the Central African tribes, already by nature inclined to pillage and plunder, so that the work of incipient civilization and the entire success of the missionaries might not be destroyed at one blow.

On the German side, immediately following the outbreak of hostilities, the necessary steps were taken to bring about, through the intervention of the United States, the neutralization of that part of the Cameroons belonging to the Congo Basin, covered by the convention, as well as of German East Africa. A similar effort was made also by Belgium, as shown by the Belgian Gray Book; France was at the start inclined to agree to the proposition; later, however, under the influence of England, who openly declared it necessary to injure Germany

at all possible points, she rejected the proposal, in union with Great Britain. As the reason for the rejection, it was declared that Germany was the one who had started the opening of hostilities in Africa.

According to all available reports, however, it stands established that in East Africa, as well as in the Cameroons, hostilities were begun by the Allies. Particularly in the Cameroon portion of the Congo Basin, the German stations at the beginning of the crisis were cut off from all news from Europe, and in many cases were surprised by the enemy forces. But even in the event that later searching investigation should prove that in individual cases these conflicts had been precipitated by subordinate German representatives, unfamiliar with the Congo Act, there would still have been time according to the wording of Article 11, had there been the proper desire, to intervene and disregard an isolated incident.

Germany fulfilled her duty by working for the peace of Africa, despite the fact that the only information which reached her was of attacks by English ships in German East Africa. As is shown by the Belgian Gray Book, with almost cynical frankness, England and France did not themselves take their officially offered grounds of refusal very seriously. These were nothing more than masks for their true intentions of violence.

The opening of hostilities on Colonial soil reawakened all those instincts and inclinations which it has been the earnest endeavor during recent years to restrain among the natives by peaceful training, and gradually to eliminate altogether. This cannot fail to undermine seriously faith in Europeans as the representatives and imparters of "civilization." All previous achievements in the opening up of Africa and the elevation of its population have been wiped out at one blow. The uncounted millions expended by Christian missionary work in Central Africa have been spent in vain. The action of the English and French toward the German civil population in the protectorates, contrary to international law and all colonial tradition, has thoroughly undermined the position of the white race.

Upon England and France, then, rests the full responsibility in the judgment of history for the disastrous violation of the Congo Act, which, but a short while ago, would have been considered unthinkable.

The general administration of the German colonies has frequently been characterized by foreign critics as military and bureaucratic. This criticism is unfounded. A military admin-

istration exists nowhere in the German protectorates; civil administration has been introduced everywhere in such a way that the troops are subject to the governor, and the latter again to the Colonial Secretary, as the representative of the Imperial Chancellor in the field of Colonial Administration. This is not universally the case in foreign countries; a great part of the troops in the French colonies, including the Foreign Legion, is directly responsible to the war ministry at Paris, which in West Africa has even introduced universal conscription. One might here more justly speak of militarism than in regard to our system, since under our administration in Togo Land and the South Seas there are no colonial troops at all, and but few in the other colonies.

The charge of bureaucracy, which has also frequently been made in Germany, has been answered by a report (1913) regarding the administration of the European colonial states. Extensive investigations have shown that the number of officials in the German colonies was by no means excessive, that they were even fewer than in most of the colonies of other countries. A comparison of the budget appropriations for the officials of tropical colonies demonstrates that the German protectorates in Africa have lower expenses for the administrative staff than most of the neighboring English, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies. Equally incorrect is the statement that bureaucracy in the German colonial administration excludes the people from a share in it. In no other colonial state in the world is, for instance, the home administration of the colonies subject to so extensive control through Parliament, as in Germany. But likewise, in the colonies themselves, the people's representatives organized in the governmental council have not less influence than in the tropical colonies of like development of other colonial powers. This is true to an even higher degree of the representative body in our only settlement colony, South West Africa. With the progress of the financial independence of the colonies from the mother country, self-government will increase in scope. This principle has repeatedly been announced by the central administration.

Like the general administration, the financial management in the German colonies is thoroughly liberal. The greatest publicity, the most punctilious accounting and the strictest control on the part of the financial authorities of the Empire and of Parliament prevent all exploitation and inhuman tendencies in the financial administration of the colonies.

There is in our colonies no special taxation of foreigners,

no deviation from the principle of equality and justice. Only in the case of the missions are certain privileges granted.

One of the principal sources of income is from the customs duties, which are laid in the main upon articles of luxury or such other goods that can be dispensed with or that may be replaced—seldom or never on those needed for the increase of production, such as machines, utensils, etc. Owing to the fact that revenue is chiefly based on the customs, it is possible in the German colonies to keep those taxes low by means of which, in other colonies, the raising of the revenue is shifted entirely, or in great part, on to the shoulders of the natives. While, of course, fully realizing the educational value of the tax for the natives, the German government believes that it should be increased gradually, according to the natives' understanding of the nature of taxation and with consideration for their economic strength.

The financial administration of the German colonies has also refrained from imposing taxes on articles of consumption, in addition to the import duties, a system which has been developed in the colonies of countries in which discriminations in the import tariff in favor of the motherland cause a shortage in the customs revenue. Such consumption taxes have mostly the purpose of placing the burdens of the colonial administration upon the natives.

These principles which, after some years of hesitation and uncertainty, are at present universally applied throughout the German colonies, have had the pleasing result that the native population gradually has developed not only peaceful coöperation but absolute confidence in the administration, while the economic situation and state of civilization have advanced everywhere in the most favorable manner. The financial sacrifices which were necessary for a considerable time were not made in vain, and the liberal and lenient methods applied in the financial administration have been so far from preventing a favorable economic development that to-day Togo Land and Samoa are able to meet all their expenses, while the three great African colonies meet all those of the civil administration, only New Guinea receiving a subsidy for general administrative purposes.

The economic colonial policy of Germany is filled with the same spirit of humanity and inspired with the same liberal ideas that distinguish the other branches of her colonial policy, especially that in regard to social matters, which stand in such close connection with those of an economic nature. Wher-

ever the contrary is asserted abroad, there is an absence of facts to serve as proof. It is true that occasionally some German writer or politician is cited to testify to the correctness of such false statements. For example, Meynier, the French writer on colonial subjects, refers to a German colonial politician entirely unknown in Germany, "Carl Otto," who is said to advocate economic exploitation of the colonies, without regard for the natives. On the strength of the authority quoted by Meynier, the respected French colonial magazine, *La Dépêche Coloniale,* believes itself justified in writing: *"L'on appliqua sans mesure la politique de la colonisation à la manière forte."* Thus simply by substituting the word *"l'on"* for "Otto," the German Government is held up as the representative of principles in its colonial policy which are not only illiberal, but actually detestable.

Every chapter of this book shows how little the German colonial policy is inclined, in its care for the welfare of the natives, to the principles of colonization *à la manière forte,* and how determined it is in its resistance to all contrary desires. This policy *"à la manière forte"* has been entirely absent from Germany's general economic policy of colonial administration, although in this field opposing desires and interests were not lacking. These measures, based on force, belong to the arsenal of the old Mercantilism, which has recently reappeared under the name of the New Mercantilism. Their aim is to exploit the colonies exclusively from the standpoint of their financial usefulness to the motherland, with disregard of the welfare of the colonies themselves, and with the greatest possible exclusion of other countries from remunerative undertakings in them. Such a policy tends to the most ruthless exploiting of the natural resources and of the strength of the natives, by means of monopolies, differential tariffs toward foreign countries, and bounties for the motherland. Although these measures are no longer employed in the same brutal manner as in the palmy days of Mercantilism, nevertheless colonization *à la manière forte* is being tentatively put forth by this Neo-Mercantilism in the field of international economics. Germany has not followed this current in her colonial economic policy, although nearly all the colonial Powers manifest an inclination to readjust their economic policy from this point of view. Germany has remained consistently faithful in her protectorates to the principles of free trade and the open door, of international competition on an equal footing and of industrial freedom of trade and residence. Likewise, monopo-

lies and concessions tending to check economic development have been recently refused by the German colonial administration, which, indeed, has sought to set aside those already existing.

Germany is the only colonial state, except Holland, that has not favored her own trade either in the tariff laws of the motherland or in those of her colonies. France has assimilated Algeria and a portion of her colonies from the point of view of customs. She regards them almost completely as within her tariff boundaries, which fact gives French commerce the advantage over that of other nations trading with these colonies. In regard to her other colonies France has introduced preferential tariffs favoring the motherland, and reciprocally the colonies, which amount to as much as 85 per cent of the normal duties. In Tunis, likewise, France has favored her own trade in important lines, such as grain, by admitting them free of duty when carried in French bottoms. Portugal has introduced discriminating customs rates up to 90 per cent of the regular tariff in favor of her own colonial shipping. Spain has acted similarly. England also enjoys tariff advantages as high as 33 per cent of the normal rate in her self-governing colonies. She has in this manner secured for British industry a market which, without this preference, she would not have been able to maintain to the same degree. Likewise, the United States has to a large extent assimilated its colonies in customs matters. Belgium has, it is true, no preferential tariff, but by means of her extensive system of concessions she has practically precluded the competition of other states and secured a monopoly in the trade with her own colonies.

Further measures for the benefit of the motherland in its relation to the colonies are shipping subsidies without corresponding return, rebates of charges made to national trade (as in the Suez Canal) as well as export duties on goods not intended for the motherland. In the French colonies the export duties are entirely or partially remitted for goods bound for France. In Further India the export trade with France is quite free from duty; in other colonies it is reduced 50 per cent. If the goods are from the plantations of Frenchmen they are wholly or in part relieved of export duty. Cocoa pays in St. Thomé an export duty of eighteen *reis* per kilo when exported in Portuguese ships, but sixty *reis* per kilo when shipped in foreign bottoms and bound for foreign ports.

German economic policy practices none of these measures in favor of Germany's own colonial trade. The few export

duties on the products of the German colonies are entirely of a fiscal or protective character, and not for the purpose of discriminating to the advantage of the motherland. This almost unique adoption of the principles of free trade in the German colonies has occasionally resulted in hardships which have been publicly aired in Germany. It is sufficient to mention the fact that important classes of products from the German colonies do not find a market in Germany, although they are badly needed there and have therefore to be imported from other countries. Thus, in the absence of any preferential regulations, the following articles do not go to Germany, but to foreign countries: Diamonds, principally to Antwerp; South West African copper to the United States and Belgium; East African skins and hemp to North America. While France exports the products of her West African colonies almost entirely for use in French factories, most of the cocoa and palm oil from the Cameroons is sold in England. The principal export article of our South Sea colonies, copra, is carried in great part to Marseilles and other non-German ports. We, on the contrary, buy these raw materials in large quantities from other countries, especially from foreign colonies, thereby developing their export trade. The result of this is that our import trade with these colonies stands at a disadvantage compared with our export trade, and that we furnish excellent markets for the industries of foreign colonial states. *The Manchester Guardian* justly remarked in regard to this liberal trade policy of ours:

"Germany, in mounting degree, receives the products of our English factories indirectly, by our disposing of them in India and other colonies, which obtain the money for them by the export of raw materials to Germany."

Germany's international economic policy stands consistently on the principle of "Live and Let Live," and everywhere maintains the open door for foreign commerce and shipping in her spheres of interests and colonies, in the hope that German trade and shipping will be treated in equally liberal manner. There was from the start no room for a narrow-minded colonial policy in connection with such broad and generous principles. There would seem to be more reason to reproach Germany's colonial policy with the opposite fault, when it is borne in mind that only since 1893 have the German colonies enjoyed the right of the most favored nation in the German customs territory; and when the praise is remembered which the French colonial politician, Renty, gives to our colonial trade policy:

"The German colonies in Africa are surrounded by trade rivals, who will profit by the former's inactivity in order to gain the market for themselves and to develop a predominant influence under the protection of the German flag."

In one field only has the German colonial trade policy sought to make use of measures of colonization *à la manière forte,* not, however, in order to promote German trade and injure that of other countries, but, at the sacrifice of important commercial and financial interests, to advance humanitarian aims and common international interests in the African Continent. The German government is a leader in the movement, by means of international measures, of exclusive and prohibitive duties, to impede and if possible to prevent entirely the importation of brandy, as well as of weapons and ammunition into the African Colonies of the European states, according to the declaration of Brussels relative to the Congo Act. It is only owing to the opposition of other European colonial states that this object has not been entirely accomplished. Some of the states would not support the idea of an international agreement to put an end to the smuggling of weapons and ammunition, so beneficial for their trade, and to the not less lucrative trade in brandy, so deleterious to the natives of Africa. Although exposed to the danger of smuggling from neighboring colonies, the German government took steps against the trade in weapons and brandy in its African colonies by introducing measures which are more radical than anything that other colonial states were willing to adopt. For instance, the importation of brandy for the use of natives is absolutely forbidden in German East Africa and German Southwest Africa and Samoa. In the Cameroons its use has been greatly restricted by an especially high duty, prohibition zones and other measures of control; in Togo Land, the importation of brandy was materially reduced, despite financial loss to this protectorate, whose revenues are small.

In the same manner as freedom of trade is absolutely unrestricted in Germany's colonial policy, save as affected by the above-mentioned humanitarian measures, so is commercial freedom the rule in connection with a liberal industrial policy. While in the colonies of other countries there is frequently a ruthless effort to prevent industries and trades from being developed which flourish in the motherland, there are no such measures in the German colonies; even for foreigners there is absolute freedom of trade and residence. In German East Africa several thousand East Indians, who are British sub-

jects, find themselves freer to practice their trades undisturbed than even in several British colonies, as, for example, South Africa. On the other hand, no industries are artificially encouraged by means of premiums and other kinds of favors, as in Australia and Canada, with the aim of crushing out international trade. The German colonial trade policy makes use of such measures as little as it does of colonial protective tariffs.

The attitude of the German government in regard to the investment of foreign capital in the colonies corresponds to this liberal policy in regard to trade and industry. No obstacle is placed in the way of foreign capital. Of course, in cases where capital is found to be entering upon a course contrary to the general interest, as was the case with some large chartered companies, the endeavor is made by the same measures as are employed in like case against German capital—viz., by agreement or by redemption of their rights—to obviate the evil. As a result of these liberal conditions, the investment of foreign capital in the German colonies has considerably increased. Of the 506,000,000 marks represented by the capital of various companies which is at present invested in German colonies, not less than 89,000,000 belong to foreigners. The German government is careful to assure itself that the invested capital and the undertakings founded thereon in the protectorates are as sound as possible. A "Permanent Trade Commission of the Colonial Administration" acts in an advisory capacity to the colonial authorities in questions which regard capital and its influence.

Likewise in the field of money, banks, and credit, thoroughly liberal tendencies are the rule. The use of money is introduced everywhere in the protectorates in place of barter, and wages are paid in cash instead of in kind. In agreement with this, we find markets encouraged in the German colonies with the aim of facilitating for the natives advantageous sales of their products. In the field of credit, also, the German colonial administration has been successful in advancing ideas of social protection for the natives, by prohibiting the giving of credit by merchants for tropical products, the so-called trust system, that is so harmful to the native element. Further steps along this line have been taken by the creation of savings banks through the local authorities and post offices, or in connection with the existing trade banks.

From all this it is plain that the general economic policy of Germany in her colonies is in no way a colonization *à la manière forte,* but that it is rather a colonization decidedly

à la manière douce; for it is free from mercantilism, which is militarism in the field of political economy. Despite the rejection of all severe measures calculated to injure other nations for the benefit of German interests, it is able to show such brilliant successes that it finds its justification in itself and sees no cause to depart from its well-tested principles. Especially during the last ten years this policy has produced such rapid economic progress in the German colonies as is seen in but few colonies of other countries. Capital, which was at first shy, has shown an increasing confidence in the economic development of the German colonies, so that to-day more than half a billion marks is represented by the companies operating there. Twenty years ago less than 62,000,000 marks of private capital were invested in the German colonies. If capital during this period has increased tenfold, the extent of the foreign trade of the German colonies has grown twice this amount in the same time. These brilliant economic successes have been achieved under a thoroughly liberal colonial trade policy, thanks to the efficiency of the merchants, planters and other *entrepreneurs* active in the colonies, who are mostly Germans, supported as they are by a liberal and far-sighted administration, with an understanding of economic questions.

In matters of jurisdiction in the colonies there exists a difference between the whites and the natives, but no one who knows the principles underlying the treatment of the natives will for a moment doubt that this difference owes its origin to fatherly care for the natives, and finds its justification therein, and that this legal differentiation is not planned to bring about a privileged position for the whites as a master race. In regard to these guiding principles, I expressed myself exhaustively two years ago, before the Reichstag, and I should like to repeat here what I then said:

"The natives are our protégés, and the German government has, therefore, the duty to regard their lawful interests as its own. For we do not wish to annihilate the natives, we wish to preserve them. This is a duty of common decency which we undertook with the raising of the German flag in our African colonies and in the South Seas. The exercise of this duty is also a matter of wisdom; for by this means alone can we secure the possibility of a reasonable economic policy and thereby the basis for German national activity.

"I shall not repeat the phrase of the 'master nation' and the 'serving race.' I am of the opinion, however, that the white man stands in relation to the natives as the guardian to the

ward, as the grown person to the child. If, for example, the native is granted unrestricted control of his land, he will dispose of it in a short time, waste the money received for it and fall into poverty. If the government, in addition, permits the free use of alcohol, moral deterioration is added to poverty; the natives degenerate and disappear. Of course, to colonize in this fashion is possible, and it is the desire of many so to do. For what else is the aim and the hope of the great horde of colonists who regard natives chiefly as a handicap to the development of their own interests? To what other goal do all the efforts lead which are sought to be justified by phrases like the 'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest'? That colonization simply implies the economic exploitation of the colonies is just as false as that the duty of our home administration is limited to efforts looking to the improvement of trade, industry and agriculture. Besides the natural wish of the ruling nation to reap advantages from its colonies, we must not forget that the colonies are the home of people to whom we have promised our protection, for whom we must take thought. Other duties are born of this one, equally great for the colonizer. The peoples with whom our colonization activity brings us in touch stand upon a lower level of civilization, occupy a much inferior standpoint than we civilized whites—in some cases they are very far beneath us. Not alone the legal obligation which belongs to us as protectors, but our position as a civilized state forces us, with the obvious arguments of a civilized cosmic conception, to aid these peoples, and to try to provide better living conditions for them than they, with their limited intelligence and capacity, have been able to provide for themselves.

"To colonize is to 'missionize'—to missionize in the noble sense of educating to *Kultur*. In the same manner as the correct appreciation of the spiritual essence of his own nation is one of the most important duties of a statesman, likewise the colonizer must unceasingly strive to study and to fathom the thoughts and feelings of the natives, and must regulate his methods accordingly. His tasks are many and multifarious. The natives are ignorant—they must be instructed. They are lazy—they must learn to work. They are afflicted with all kinds of diseases—they must be cured. They are savage, cruel and superstitious—they must be tamed and enlightened. All in all, they are big children who need training and guiding.

"These principles have nothing in common with the standpoint of a master class which is so violently attacked by the Social Democrats. Nor can they be characterized as a weak

policy of cuddling the natives. These principles are pre-eminently practicable; by means of them alone can one solve the chief problem of every colonial system, the problem of rendering native labor useful, and of releasing the energy stored up as *rudis indigestaque moles* in the lower peoples for the aims and broad field of activity of our higher intelligence.

"I come now to a difficult point, and I beg you not to misunderstand me—I believe, indeed, that I cannot be misunderstood in this connection. How are the natives to be educated to this work of civilization—are they to be persuaded to work (I do not use the word 'forced' in order to avoid misunderstanding), or what means are to be employed? That depends upon the character of the different peoples, on their moral level, and the degree of their education. This problem must be solved differently in every protectorate. It cannot be accomplished from this end by means of general principles. Each governor must study the question in his territory and act accordingly. But for the planter, as well as for the merchant, there is in the colonies but one single policy—that of the preservation of the natives, the utilization of their work for the planters, a multiplication of their needs and therewith the increasing of their purchasing power to the advantage of our trade.

"The division of work between the natives and the whites must be such that the native places the work of his hands at the service of the white man's intelligence. The policy of feeding on the lower races, of extermination and destruction, is antiquated and immoral, likewise unwise—one does not kill the hen that lays the eggs. Treat the native with justice. This may not preclude severity and harshness where they are necessary. But grant him conditions of life consonant with his wishes, and raise him gradually. For periods of fifty and one hundred years make but slight difference in the development of peoples. In this manner the economic development of the colonies will vigorously progress—by means of the natives and *with* them, not despite the natives and *against* them."

These principles governing the policy to be followed with the natives are not newly announced and introduced by me, but since the beginning of our colonial activity they have been practiced with absolute conviction by every one of my predecessors in office. In the interest of the natives, as the postulate of harmonizing in an equitable manner the traditions of the primitive peoples, the protection of whom we have undertaken, with the conceptions of Germans as representatives of European culture and civilization, the creation of a separate legal position

for the natives was a prerequisite. While, in the main, for the whites the law of the motherland holds, the tribal customs of the natives were on principle not disturbed, in so far as this did not offend against the most elemental rules of common sense and morality. This consideration was our duty as human beings. The colonies are the home of the natives. The white man is more or less a guest. There are millions of negroes to a few whites. The natives have a right to see their view of life and law respected. German law can demand from them only secondary recognition. Where tribal customs offer no solution, German legal principles may be applied. And this actually occurs, only on the basis of custom, it is true, not by force of express legislation. The introduction of German law as a whole had to be withheld for reasons of legislative policy. Germany herself had had occasion to learn, when in the sixteenth century the foreign Roman law was forced upon her, that however excellent a law system may be, it is not calculated to satisfy a nation and awaken confidence if it has not grown out of the life of the people itself. A system of law so developed in all lines as the German can be grasped and made use of only by a correspondingly developed intellect. The native of the German colonies is absolutely without this mental maturity. He would be incapable of making beneficial use of the rights which the German law would give him, and he would be unable to fulfill the duties which it would place upon him. It is only necessary to think of the oath upon which German procedure is based. The native has not yet learned to make clear, trustworthy observations and to repeat them simply and unadorned before the court. His unbridled imagination causes him to see visions which have little to do with reality. The taking of an oath would place him in danger of legal prosecution. Were we, however, to release him from responsibility, on the ground that he lacked mental training and the required perception, the oath would sink to a mere empty formula and lose all its value as a proof —the very purpose for which it is taken. It would then be better to suppress the taking of all oaths.

The retention of the tribal laws can be nothing more than a transition in a progressive development. The association with the whites constantly creates new complications which require legal settlement. As a matter of fact, numerous breaches have already been made in the tribal system, and it is the undeviating aim of the government to maintain the natives' law on a level with improving economic and cultural conditions.

All members of tribes indigenous to the protectorate, as well

as hybrid tribes, come under the head of "natives." In addition, members of outside negro tribes are reckoned in this category. Those belonging to other races than the white who possess German citizenship, or who, as citizens of other civilized states, stand on a footing of equality with our own, either according to treaty right or by custom, are subject to the laws of the whites.

The German Empire represents the protective power in the colonies, which is nothing less than full sovereign power. It is exercised by the German Emperor in the name of the Reichstag. By virtue of sovereignty, the Empire and the Emperor possess legislative power, which the Empire exercises in the form of laws and the Emperor in the form of ordinances. To a limited degree, the right of issuing ordinances is vested also in the Imperial Chancellor and the governors. The Empire makes law primarily for the whites; the regulating of the native law lies within the provinces of the Emperor, the Imperial Chancellor and the governors. A greater mobility is called for in this latter field than is possible with the legal machinery of the Empire. Since the Empire regulates the budget of the protectorates, it possesses a far-reaching influence on the administration, together with the possibility of supervision of legislative measures, most of which are issued in the form of laws.

For the whites and that part of the native population on a like footing, the German civil, criminal and bankruptcy laws, as well as the German rules of procedure, are in general in effect, by virtue of the law concerning the protectorates. This is true, likewise, of the regulations touching matters of voluntary jurisdiction. Provisions of Prussian law have supplementary force. It was necessary for the courts to be organized on a basis of simplicity corresponding to the existing primitive conditions. Only two grades of courts were created: district and upper courts. The district judge has individual jurisdiction in questions which in Germany are under the jurisdiction of the judges of local courts. In other matters the district court sits with three members in some cases, with five in others, on the bench. The larger number acts in cases of crime or serious misdemeanor. The upper court consists of the chief justice and four assessors or associates. The district judges and the chief justice must be qualified to hold the office of a judge in one of the federal states, and they are authorized to exercise their judicial functions by the Imperial Chancellor. In the exercise of these functions they are independent and subject only to the law. The assessors are chosen from the ranks of those subject

to the jurisdiction of the court (*Gerichtseingesessenen*). The right of appeal (*Revision*) is still lacking. Its introduction is contemplated through the establishment of an Imperial colonial court. The state's attorney takes part in criminal cases only at the main proceeding in the first instance, in connection with the prayer for legal remedy, and in cases before the higher court. Lawyers and notaries have a similar position as in Germany.

The law for the natives, as already explained, is based on the tribal law. The resulting difference in comparison with the law governing the whites is limited to the question of material rights and the manner of procedure in the presentation of claims; it does not extend to the personal standing before the law. The native has different, but not inferior rights. Life, health, freedom and property are secured to him to the same extent as to the white man. To him also the government lends its strength in obtaining his rights. There are, it is true, in East Africa, Togo Land and the Cameroons remnants of so-called house-slavery. But this is without influence on the personal legal standing of those subject to it. The house-slave is considered by the judge as legally competent, and enjoys full legal protection. The government has taken steps to prevent such conditions arising in future and an early termination of those still existing is aimed at.

For the protection of the natives againt the exploitation of their inexperience, detailed regulations have been issued in regard to the making and to the nature of credit and surety undertakings and of contracts for work. Credit and surety undertakings must have in some cases official approval, while in others reduction to writing suffices. Especial attention has been given to labor contracts. It was important, among other things, to prevent conditions similar to slavery from arising, as well as to obviate alienation of the worker from his home connections. Labor contracts may not exceed a certain length of time. The hours of daily work are fixed. The rate of wages is regulated. Wages must be paid in cash and may not be curtailed. In addition, the employer has numerous duties regarding the social welfare of the workers. He must provide healthy living quarters, proper care, sufficient food, nursing in the event of sickness, medicine, bandages and, if necessary, medical attendance. In the case of a sufficient number of workers, specially arranged sick-quarters and a complete apothecary shop must be kept ready. Disregard of these duties entitles the worker to break the contract without losing his right to wages, or the contract violated by the employer may be voided by the authorities.

In connection with the regulation and development of real estate rights, it was the constant aim of the government to maintain the natives in possession of land sufficient for them and their descendants to be permanently protected against economic ruin. They were either confirmed in their original holdings or received as much land as they needed for their livelihood. Disposing of this property to whites, as well as its encumbrance, has been either absolutely forbidden or made contingent on the approval of the governor. It was intended that the natives be protected against exploitation by foreign greed. These protective provisions are still in force, despite the fact that, owing to continued development, native real estate law has appreciably approximated to that of the whites.

The real estate book (*Grundbuch*) forms the nucleus of German real estate law. In it the holdings of land are fixed officially as to size and location, as well as the conditions of ownership and encumbrances. In the real estate book, which may be inspected by any one, reliable information is given in regard to the actual and legal conditions of any piece of ground, and the necessary data are offered for the conclusion of a real estate transaction. Especially does it promote the extremely important branch of credit on real estate, by giving trustworthy information on the points important for this purpose. This institution has been introduced into the colonies and arrangements have been made for the natives to avail themselves of it, in so far as it does not threaten them with disadvantages. Land entered in the real estate book may be acquired by the natives without limit. The governor, however, decides as to the entering of their holdings in the book, in the interest of the natives themselves; for the legal and economic conditions resulting from this entering presuppose, for their profitable use, a higher degree of understanding than the native on the average possesses.

Family and inheritance laws of the natives have been least influenced by German legal ideas. Marriage and its legal results are so deeply rooted in the spiritual life of a people, however low it may stand in the scale, that it is impossible to attempt to adapt them to our higher conceptions until the necessary moral basis has been created. The spread of Christian principles through instruction and exemplary conduct prepares the way for leading the natives to the proper goal. The government is constantly endeavoring to bring about by all mild means a moral elevation of the people's character, in order to give to the wife and mother her proper position in the family.

The material law of inheritance of the natives has hitherto

proved unamenable to legal regulation, in the same way as has the law of the family. In German East Africa, however, where Indians and Arabians live in conditions of comfort, a beginning has been made toward official regulation of estates. The heirs, in the case of an inheritance, may entrust its administration and distribution to the local authorities. Similar possibilities have been created among the inhabitants of Samoa, among whom, as a result of deaths, disputes as to title and land play an important part.

A radical change has taken place under German rule in the field of criminal law. The decisions of responsible authorities resting upon established principles of penal law took the place of the frequently arbitrary caprice of tyrannical chieftains. Such principles were seldom found in the native laws, which showed scarcely the first beginnings of an enlightened system of penal laws. They could be abstracted only from the German statutes. German penal law thus furnished the provisions according to which the natives are made responsible for criminal offenses. There could, however, be no thought of proceeding sweepingly by introducing the German criminal code as a whole. With its sharply defined legal conceptions and definitions of criminal acts, it would have remained incomprehensible to the natives. On the other hand, it was necessary to leave a certain amount of freedom to the judge, in order that he might give to the customs and conceptions of the natives the proper influence in weighing the question of guilt. Thus far no exhaustive enumeration of punishable acts has been made in any of our protectorates. It is, however, a matter of course that punishment is dealt out for such crimes as result from superstition or from the cultural conceptions of the natives, as, for example, the giving of poison, blood-revenge, etc.

The considerations which operate against an enumeration of punishable acts are not operative as regards the fixing of the different kinds of punishment. There are, therefore, general rules respecting them. Admissible punishments in the African colonies are castigation, fines, imprisonment with enforced labor, imprisonment in chains and the death penalty. In the South Seas castigation and imprisonment in chains are not permissible, but in their place enforced labor without imprisonment has been substituted. Where castigation is permitted, it was already customary before the establishment of German rule. It is still indispensable as an educational measure, since the natives themselves consider it necessary for their own protection and demand its application. It cannot be applied in the case of women or

elder persons; natives of higher education or of a better social position are, on principle, to be exempted from its operation. The right of castigation may be exercised only upon approval by the governor. The punishment is applied under the supervision of a physician. The death penalty rests on the ultimate decision of the governor.

Jurisdiction over the natives rests, on principle, in the hand of the local administration, as represented by the *Bezirksamtmann* (sub-governor) and the heads of the stations. The reasons urged against the separation of the judicial and administrative functions are convincing. The administrative official is in uninterrupted touch with the natives; he is in the best position to discover their ideas of right and he enjoys their confidence. His dignity would suffer if he did not have the power to punish and to decide disputes. Natives are admitted to the proceedings as far as possible as advisors and experts. In this manner they help to spread a knowledge of the law and themselves become familiar with the legal conceptions of the whites. This tends to strengthen confidence in the legal verdicts. Native customs serve as a model for the conduct of the proceeding; the hearing is oral and public. The natives are not sworn, but a deliberately false statement is punishable. Measures for securing a confession which are not permissible according to native custom may not be employed.

While in German East Africa and South West Africa the law is administered only by whites, in the Cameroons, Togo Land and in the South Seas, part of the jurisdiction has been left in the hands of the natives or entrusted to them. The government, however, has retained control and the right of revising the decision. In the Cameroons for certain native tribes and territories, local chiefs are active as single judges, and native courts of arbitration serve as collegiate courts. Their jurisdiction is limited according to the amount at issue and the seriousness of the offense. They have no jurisdiction in cases of murder and manslaughter. The courts of arbitration serve furthermore as courts of appeal in cases heard before the native chiefs. All cases can in the last instance be submitted to the governor for decision. Furthermore, provision has been made for a revision in cases where large sums of money are in dispute or severe punishment is involved. The decision in these circumstances rests with the governor or the chief justice. Execution is limited to such property which the debtor can dispense with without endangering his economic position. Tribal possessions may be taken in no case. The proceedings take

place without the presence of a state's attorney. Criminal prosecution is left to the decision of the court. There is thus no legal obligation in the matter. The accused is at liberty at any stage of the proceeding to secure counsel.

From the history of the development of our military strength in the protectorates, it is clear that the acquisition of colonies by Germany was carried on by peaceful means and that her entrance into the ranks of colonial Powers was not prompted by *conquistador* instincts. When Germany entered upon the acquisition of colonial possessions, those in authority conceived of their development as purely mercantile and under mercantile forms, as great trade and plantation undertakings. It was not considered advisable or wise to employ military force for these chartered companies. The Empire provided protection for them as regards the outside world; internal safety was left to their own police-soldier forces.

This system did not prove adequate. The companies, in their attempts peacefully to open up the country, encountered the opposition of native potentates, or came into conflict, as in the Central African districts, with tribes that had long carried on trade there and whose ruthless exploitation and slave-trade could not be quietly endured.

The companies were likewise powerless, through lack of the necessary force, to put a stop to the incessant fighting of the native tribes among themselves. The possibility of their exercising influence toward a healthy development of their spheres of interest continued to decrease. The various concerns soon found themselves at the end of their financial resources. The Empire stepped in, and by means of the power at its disposal succeeded in establishing an orderly state of affairs.

The experience was thus again repeated, which has been that of all colonizing Powers, that the opening up and developing of territories occupied by peoples of inferior civilization is impossible without the protection of military force.

As a result of this observation, police and defence troops were established in the possessions of the companies, which were taken over as protectorates by the Imperial Government. The express purpose of these troops was, as stated in the beginning, the maintenance of peace and order in the protectorates and the suppression of the slave-trade. Neither at the beginning nor in the course of later development was there any thought, in connection with the organization of a military force in our colonies, of guarding the territories under our protection against states belonging to the civilized community of international

law. While in Southwest Africa, our sole colony suitable for settlement purposes, the defence troops are made up of white officers, petty officers and men taken from the home army as volunteers, in the tropical colonies only the first two classes are white, the rank and file being negroes serving for pay.

The strength of the various defence troops was regulated according to the power of the natives in the colonies in question. From small beginnings their numbers increased automatically with the progressive opening up of the colonies; nevertheless, they remained within moderate limits, save for temporarily necessary increases. In recent years there has been rather a reduction than an increase of these troops in the various colonies.

The fighting unit generally is a company. Divided into such units, and widely scattered, the defence troops are distributed over the colony. That which the individual troop lacks in numerical strength must be made up for by its intrinsic worth, which is the result of adequate training and instruction. The soldiers who have come from the home army furnish the qualities necessary for this purpose, but the European instructors have also succeeded, by tact and discretion, in raising the negro troops to the highest possible standard of discipline and military efficiency. It is a proof of the sound condition of the whole organization that up to this time none of the negro troops have failed in any case. Their reliability stood the test in brilliant fashion in recent occurrences.

Not alone, however, in the purely military field, but especially in the non-military field have the defence troops accomplished great things. From the beginning of our colonial administration up to the most recent time, officers and petty-officers of these troops have worked hand in hand with the civil authorities in the peaceful labor of general administration. The results achieved in this connection furnished the basis on which the civil administration could proceed with its extensive measures as soon as a district was pacified.

In the work of establishing stations and district offices the troops were of the greatest assistance. Officers, petty-officers and men have never failed, by strenuous work together with tireless interest and practical common sense, to accomplish their prescribed work, despite a frequent lack of training in the technique of civil administration. The individual tasks were by no means slight and required political skill and a grasp of the affairs of the natives. Supported in general by only a slight military force, these men, transplanted into absolutely

unfamiliar territory, had, first of all, to gain a firm footing in order, by gradually extending their influence into broader spheres, to accustom the inhabitants to their new masters and to the new order of affairs.

Closely connected with the general activity of the administration are the technical and cultural tasks performed by the troops in the various districts. Most of the stations are entirely the work of the troops, who succeeded in creating not alone practical, but likewise architecturally pleasing buildings for the administration, surrounded by hospitals, wells, storehouses, markets and slaughter houses, and where the means were available, tasteful gardens and all kinds of useful institutions serving cultural aims.

Special attention was paid to the development of roads. Most of them were laid out by the troops and provided with bridges, dams, tunnels, culverts, etc. Worthy of mention are also the attempts made in raising domestic animals. The efforts met with excellent success, for example in Southwest Africa in the line of horse-breeding. The achievements of the troops in the field of administration and the cultural improvement of the colonies deserve all the more acknowledgment because in most cases the means for these purposes were very limited.

In addition to the manifold claims upon them in military and administrative fields, a large number of officers of the troop and of the medical staff find time for scientific activity and have published in pamphlets and current scientific works the knowledge of land and people which they have gained in the colonial service. Others, through extensive work in the field of cartography, have gathered extensive material important for the opening up of the colonies. Special attention must be called to the service which the officers of the medical staff of the troops have rendered, not alone in the exercise of their medical profession with the troops, but also in scientific study of tropical sickness and animal epidemics, as well as in the line of tropical hygiene.

We thus see that in all branches of colonizing work the troops have developed a multifarious and strenuous activity. Though with the continuing development of the colonies they will have to place in other hands one or the other of the branches of their successful activity in the field of general administration to which they have become devoted—thus finally limiting themselves entirely to their military duties—nevertheless the satisfaction and the credit belong to the troops for having laid the foundation for the political, cultural and economic development of the colonies.

Now that the war has extended even to the colonies, the defence troops find themselves face to face with tasks which they were never intended to perform. Their use for purposes of defence against an enemy from abroad had not been contemplated. Such a contingency seemed excluded, since, as already mentioned, the protectorates had been neutralized by the Congo Act in case of war-like developments among the signatory Powers in Europe.

It remained for the enemies of Germany to break that agreement and to carry the war into the colonies. But despite the employment of numerically much superior forces, they have not yet been successful in obtaining any decisive success. The defence-troops have proved worthy of their traditions also in meeting this absolutely new task.[1]

[1] This chapter was written in the early part of the year 1915.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

CHAPTER V

THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM COMPARED WITH THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND RUSSIAN SYSTEMS

PROFESSOR HANS DELBRÜCK, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

THE Prussian army, which forms the backbone of the Imperial German army, goes back to the reconstruction of the old Prussian army, which, shattered by Napoleon in 1806, had gone to pieces. In order to free Prussia from the French yoke, General Scharnhorst conceived the idea of summoning to arms the entire population capable of bearing them. In 1813, this plan was put into operation. Only through this tremendous effort of Prussia, in conjunction with all the other Powers, was it possible to put an end to the menace of Napoleon's universal dominion. Napoleon's power was already so great that his mediate and immediate subjects amounted to seventy million; his opponents, taken all together, were scarcely more numerous. No one of them, therefore, could be spared for victory, neither England, nor Prussia, nor Austria; and Prussia, which did not yet number five millions, was forced to introduce universal military duty and carry it to complete adoption. This universal duty of bearing arms proved such a brilliant success in the Wars of Liberation that it was retained in times of peace, although it was not alone a heavy burden for the Prussian people but was fraught with difficulties in execution.

The standing army still showed great resemblance to the armies of the eighteenth century, as the English army still does to-day. A large proportion of the soldiers served twenty years, and even longer. As a result, there was in this army but little room for the recruits who were called by universal conscription, especially as these were to be retained with the colors for a period of three years. The great mass of the recruits, very superficially trained or not at all, were incorporated into the *Landwehr*. This Prussian *Landwehr* thus bore a great similarity to the British militia, and its military usefulness was slight. Only gradually, in the course of the nineteenth century, was this evil overcome. On the one hand, the class of soldiers serving for a long number of years dwindled, as the

favorable development of economic life and industry brought about better wages than the slender pay in the army. To-day it is considered sufficient to retain merely that number of soldiers after a long period of service adequate to satisfy the need for non-commissioned officers. On the other hand, after long hesitation, the time of service was reduced from three years to two years—with the exception of the cavalry and the mounted field artillery. This reduction, in 1893, aroused great apprehension in officers' circles and among many patriots. It was thought that the military spirit would suffer, and that the army would really be no army at all, but merely a *Volkswehr,* or militia, since only the first-year class would be under arms at the moment when the elder class was released and the new recruits were not yet trained. But subsequent success proved that the fears were groundless. Through continued and great efforts, and through the most careful use of the time, the two-year period of service has been made to furnish excellent military material.

The organization is now very simple. The duty of military service extends from the twentieth to the forty-fifth year. The two youngest classes form the standing army. The next classes are made use of in the event of war, approximately to double the strength of the regiments, to form reserve regiments, and to create *Ersatz* or compensating battalions with *Ersatz* reserves. *Landwehr* regiments are formed from the elder *Landwehr* soldiers, and finally from the last classes up to the forty-fifth year are formed the *Landsturm,* or last reserve regiments, who are used principally for barracks service and as guards for prisoners, but who in this war have frequently fought at the front. Recourse is had only in the last event to the youngest class from the seventeenth to the twentieth year.

When Minister of War Boyen, the disciple and follower of Scharnhorst, organized the new army of peace in the autumn of 1814, he established the principle that the standing army should contain about ten thousand men for every million of the population. This represented at that time, as Prussia numbered ten million in population, something over 100,000 men, or 1 per cent of the total number. This percentage has varied but little during the last century. When no fresh contingents were formed for some time it would occasionally sink slightly below that level; and when for the purpose of absorbing the excess of young men, new regiments were authorized, usually as the result of parliamentary struggles, the ratio would increase by a fraction over 1 per cent. In the summer of the year

1914 it stood at 1.117 per cent for the army, and 1.27 per cent for the army and navy together, not counting the officers. The natural aim, however, of such a policy—to have all serviceable young men pass through the training school of the army—has never been realized, not even at the outbreak of the present war. Although in the year 1913 the standing army was increased by 63,000 recruits, there still remained 30,000 thoroughly serviceable young men, and not less than approximately 200,000 with slight physical disabilities (*Ersatz* reserve and *Landsturm* with weapons), who might have been called to the colors and who are now, with the progress of the war, gradually being drafted into the army. The reforms undertaken in the army during the last century had, on the whole, for their purpose not so much to increase the numbers in the army in proportion to the population as through reduction of the term of service to reduce the individual burden connected with this militaristic system, and to make room for the training of a greater fraction of the nation. But we have never carried the universal duty of military service to its final conclusion.

Of the greatest importance, from the political as well as the military standpoint, is the institution of the One-Year Volunteers (*Einjährig-Freiwillige*). The name "volunteer" is no longer applicable. It originated at the time when the army was not yet large enough to accommodate all eligible men, and when lots were drawn among the superfluous. In order to enjoy the privilege of one-year service, a recruit had to relinquish the right of drawing lots, and to this extent the service was voluntary. To be eligible to serve as a one-year volunteer a young man has to provide his outfit, and receiving no pay, to support himself. Likewise, proof must be given of a superior education, by means of school testimonials or on the basis of a rather severe examination. The one-year voluntary service, then, is in no sense a privilege of wealth, but rather a privilege of education, for, whereas the examination may never be remitted, assistance is given to young men of superior education who lack the means for supporting themselves throughout the entire year.

The one-year service, which was introduced by Minister of War von Boyen in 1814, together with the duty of general military service, has two striking advantages. In the first place, military service for only one year interrupts but slightly the general training of our young men. On the contrary, it is regarded by many as a great advantage that young men, whether merchants, students or farmers, interrupt once in their life their civil employment and become familiar with an entirely new

world. In the second place, these one-year volunteers provide the indispensable material for replenishing the body of officers. After one year of service has rendered a sifting possible, the superiors select those suitable for the position of officers, who are then called to the colors twice for a period of eight weeks, thoroughly trained, and commissioned as officers. In the event of mobilization, these reserve and *Landwehr* officers are intermingled with the regular officers in such a manner that a great number of reserve officers are drawn into the line regiments, while regular officers are assigned to the reserve and *Landwehr* regiments, especially in positions of command. Acquaintance with German officers' corps in time of war shows that a large proportion of them are judges, state's attorneys, teachers, professors, artists, writers, farmers, merchants, engineers and officials of all kinds.

The French army is different from the German in three important points. In order to maintain a strength approximately equal to that of Germany, in view of the difference in population (thirty-nine and one-half million as against sixty-eight million), the levy is much stricter than with us. In France the duty of universal military service is not merely a theory, but a reality. The army, therefore, does not, as in Germany, form 1 per cent but 1½ per cent of the population. Further, the system of one-year voluntary service is lacking. An attempt was made in 1872, it is true, to introduce it, but as time passed it became more and more apparent that the French administration was too unreliable in its application. The one-year service became the privilege of wealth and influence. All of the representatives in parliament were active in procuring this advantage for the sons of their constituents, and the examination became a mere farce. Accordingly, in 1906 the system was abandoned. This was bearable as long as the time of active service in the French army was only two years, as in the German. But with the return to a period of three years (August 13, 1913), a condition was created that in the long run could result in nothing less than the choking of higher education in France. From a military point of view, the gain was a corps of reserve officers of admirable qualifications. But it is self-evident that a student or an engineer who is forced to interrupt his course for a period of three years, and not for two as in Germany, and to immerse himself in a military existence, is able to resume his former studies only in exceptional cases. In respect to the French military organization, it may be truthfully said that militarism has become a power inimical

to civilization. Finally, the French army is distinguished from the German through the make-up of the corps of officers. In Germany, officers are chosen exclusively from among young men of higher education and members of educated families. Only in time of war are non-commissioned officers who have distinguished themselves by unusual bravery promoted to the rank of commissioned officers. In France, non-commissioned officers may rise to the rank of captain. This is not the place to discuss the relative advantages of the two systems. Politically, the observation may be permitted that these old captains were the chief supporters of "Bonapartism," of the rule of the sword, under Napoleon I as well as under Napoleon III.

The Russian army resembles superficially the French most closely. It also is based on the universal duty of bearing arms and on the three-year service—indeed, for a large proportion of the army, as the cavalry, mounted artillery, engineer troops and the five army corps in Asia, this extends to four years. In 1913 this period of service was increased by a further half-year, through the provision that the eldest class of soldiers may not be released until the recruits have completed their training. It may be said, then, that there is in the Russian army an average period of service of four years. This is without reference to the Cossacks, who are a permanent and but poorly disciplined body. But even greater is the distinction which results from the difference in wealth and education of the French and Russian peoples. While in France all young men who are at all serviceable actually serve, in Russia, despite the immense size of the army, many of them remain exempt, so that universal service exists in theory but not in practice. Russia possesses neither the wealth nor the human material for a corresponding body of officers. The great mass of the Russians—approximately eighty per cent—are peasants, who in almost all cases can neither read nor write. The broad middle class, which in France as in Germany furnishes the corps of reserve officers, exists in Russia in but slight degree. Indeed, there is even such a lack of individuals fit to become non-commissioned officers that the companies have only half as many as in Germany. Russia is thus not in a position to form the reserve and *Landwehr* bodies which serve to increase the French and German armies to such a great extent in case of mobilization. Reserve divisions are formed, it is true, but in the main the veteran reservists are used simply to fill out and replace the *cadres* of the standing army. On the other hand, the mass of the Russian people is so great that the Russian army on a peace footing is larger than

the German, Austrian and Italian armies reckoned together. In 1911, on a peace footing, Germany had 615,000 men under arms, Austria-Hungary 395,000, Italy 243,500, or a total of 1,253,500, while Russia had 1,380,000.

In foreign countries the effort has been made to spread the view that the mad race in the increase of the armaments of European countries was caused by the constant growth of the German army. This is true only to the extent that, following our victories in 1866 and 1870, all the other states increased their armaments. But how slight the growth of the German army has been during the last twenty years is seen from the following table:

Called to the colors in	Recruits [1]
1894	283,200
1898	267,900
1904	262,600
1905	282,100
1906	270,400
1910	285,400
1911	292,200
1912	308,000

Not until the year 1913 did the number of recruits rise to 382,900 (one-year volunteers, etc., included). This notable increase, like the lesser increases of the three previous years, was caused by the extremely threatening attitude of Russia on our borders, in connection with the disturbances in the Balkans. In 1913, simultaneously with an increase of our army by 63,000 recruits, the Russian contingent of recruits was increased by 130,000, and since at the same time the period of service was lengthened by a half-year, the army's peace footing rose from 1,380,000 to 1,850,000, or by 470,000. The German army at this time numbered in round figures 790,000, including the officers (30,000); and, by a further increase of the contingent of recruits in the autumn of 1914 to 661,175 privates, the entire army (including officers, non-commissioned officers, volunteers, etc.) would have stood approximately at 830,000 men.

Let us now contemplate, from the point of view of "militarism," the three armies which we have compared. Various meanings may be attached to this word. First, we may under-

[1] Including the navy, one-year volunteers, public-school teachers, etc.

stand the absorption of the nation's strength to a degree that seriously hinders its cultural development. This is most strikingly the case in France. The combining of the absolutely universal obligation to bear arms with the three-year period of service proved a condition intolerable in the long run for a civilized nation. A few months previous to the outbreak of the war, a French visitor who called upon me could not restrain himself from expressing his absolute despair at this French law. As a result of it, French civilization, he declared, would be destroyed. Not without justice, therefore, was the suspicion rife at the time the law went into effect that it indicated the early coming of war. It was impossible to conceive of it as a permanent condition; it could be regarded only as a disguised and round-about form of mobilization. To deny or to doubt this is to concede all the more unreservedly that France had, in fact, fallen into a militarism inimical to civilization.

Conditions were not otherwise in Russia. Although in that country the three or four-year period of service affects only a small proportion of the people—and those mostly peasants at that, who are on such a low level that it is a matter of indifference whether they wear the uniform of the Emperor a shorter or longer time—nevertheless, it is all the more unfortunate for the mass of the nation that the army and navy absorb so large a part of the annual revenue of the state that nothing is left for a public school system. It may be true that the ruling classes and the Church in Russia do not desire a public school, because they fear that an enlightened peasantry, able to read, might disrupt Church and State; but even if this design and the sinister motive prompting it does not exist, the means to the end would be lacking. A universal public school is an extremely expensive institution. Russia, however, is too poor to maintain at the same time an immense army, a great fleet and a good general system of education. Here again we find a kind of militarism which one must designate as an enemy of culture.

The German military system is so little inimical to culture that it has not alone not prevented us from maintaining together with it a model system of education from the public school up to the universities, but we have also been able to carry out great social reforms, as a result of which in Germany there is practically no longer a proletariat class.

The military spirit in the three armies which we have examined is chiefly represented in their corps of officers and in the education which they impart to the youth of the land. If it is

justifiable to call this education "militarism," it is nevertheless clear that the reproach which that word carries again applies to Germany least of all.

Here is the declaration which was signed by more than four thousand German teachers of the higher schools:

"We teachers in Germany's universities and advanced schools are servants of science and conduct the work of peace. But it fills us with indignation that the enemies of Germany, with England in the van, seek to draw a distinction, ostensibly in our favor, between the spirit of German science and what they call Prussian militarism. In the German army there is the same spirit as in the German people, for the two are one, and we also are part of it. Our army also cultivates science and owes its achievements to this fact in no slight degree. The service in the army renders the youth of the land capable for all works of peace, science among them. For it educates them to a self-denying sense of duty, and gives to them the self-confidence and sense of honor of the truly free man, who willingly subordinates himself to the state. This spirit lives not alone in Prussia, but it is the same in all the states of the German Empire. It is the same in war and in peace. Our army is now engaged in war for Germany's freedom, and therewith for all the possessions of peace and morality, not alone in Germany. Our belief is that the whole culture of Europe is dependent on the victory which German 'militarism' will achieve—manly discipline, fidelity and the spirit of sacrifice of the united German people."

He knows the German army of to-day but superficially who judges it by the outward uniformity and the severe, often harsh form of drill by which it is created. The aims and achievements of true military training are thus characterized by a leading military authority (Deutelmoser):

"An army fit for war is not a great machine in which, if it is properly constructed throughout, the motive power proceeds from one point and by automatic compulsion sets the most distant wheels in operation. Each element of which an army is composed is an individual being, has its own world of thoughts and feelings, with an individual will, which may just as easily express itself against the operation of the whole as in agreement with it. Herein lies the principal difficulty in the leading of great masses. If the highest plane of agreement is to be reached, it is needful that the many thousands act together, not under mechanical compulsion, but as independently thinking and willing units. Formerly this was quite different from today, since the close-rank formations of the past left but slight latitude for the individual. King Frederick's Grenadiers fought shoulder to shoulder, closely knit in serried ranks. Each one supported the other, and the command of the leaders regulated the gunfire or the fight with the bare weapon quite as mechanically as did the orders on parade. The battle formation of present-day infantry fighting, on the contrary, is that of the deployed firing line. The deadliness and quick fire of modern weapons means sure annihilation to mass formations, such as the close ranks of the linear tactics. They demand that the fighting troop be split into its smallest elements, the individual riflemen. And the carrying power of these weapons necessitates further that this separation take place while at a great distance from the enemy. Thus the individual, at the very moment when brought face to face

with the immediate danger of death, is deprived of the influence of the word of command. He must, furthermore, seek cover in the landscape in order to offer the smallest possible target to the enemy. As a result, he disappears from the supervising eye of the leader more than might be desired, and he is in a high degree left to himself. The danger is herewith created that the expediency and uniformity of the action be lost, and that the 'will to victory' give way to the consciousness of the continuing presence of death, calculated to undermine the morale. There is but one counter-measure for this: so to develop in each man in time of peace the independent power of decision that he knows how to act correctly without constant direction, and above all to train him to honorable feelings and strength of will which under the stress of necessity and danger by their own force overcome the instinct of self-preservation."

Can one blame us Germans that we value highly, from a purely pedagogical standpoint, quite aside from its military worth, such a training, which aims at subordination, obedience and fulfillment of duty, as well as at free and independent decision, but never at despotic oppression; and that we wish the entire youth of the country, as far as possible, to enjoy it? That is all that Germany has done. It is true that from time to time we have increased our army and created new units, but only in correspondence to the increase in the number of young men. The reproach of competing in military preparation, therefore, is directed really against the German mothers, who have taken care that Germany since 1870 has increased from forty to sixty-eight millions, while France has remained stationary at about thirty-nine to forty millions, owing to a lack of the maternal instinct among Frenchwomen.

The British army stands, as a purely mercenary institution, in fundamental contrast to the German, French and Russian armies, which are all three more or less national armies. The Englishmen hates the compulsion which the universal duty of bearing arms implies, as well as the military spirit with which the entire people become filled, as the result of passing through military training. From this feeling, therefore, has proceeded the reproach of "militarism" which is directed against Germany, especially Prussia, since this institution was first created in the latter country and has been only imitated by the others. Is a mercenary army, however, in every connection less military than a national army? I read recently in an English newspaper (the London *Morning Post*) that the essence of militarism lies in the misuse of military power for ambitious aims. The English nation, thanks to its mercenary army and its tremendous fleet, has brought into subjection more than 350 million people, nearly a quarter of all the inhabitants of the earth, and

it exercises supremacy over all the seas of the world. This would never have been possible with a national army.

General Ian Hamilton demonstrates in his book "Compulsory Service" (1911), that precisely for this reason England must not introduce universal military service, since the recruiting for the colonial army, which upholds England's world supremacy, would thereby suffer too great a restriction, and since a popular army is not adaptable for this work. Lord Esher, the friend of King Edward VII, expresses the same opinion in a pamphlet, "The Maritime and Military Position of the British Isles."

"The British people," he says, "are war-like and aggressive; they have for centuries been constantly fighting, and, indeed, until quite recently it has been difficult to find any single year in which the British Empire has not been at war in some part of the world."

One should, therefore, he says, speak not of "Imperial Defence" but of "Imperial Offence." A popular army is not suited to such work. As a matter of fact, all states which have created great colonial empires have always made use of specially hired troops for this purpose, with the exception of Russia, and recently Italy in the Tripoli campaign. But the Russian army, as a result of the low state of culture, the limited levy and the long period of service, is nearer to the nature of a mercenary army than that of Germany and France. English militarism is, therefore, much more adaptable for a misuse of power than is Continental militarism; and it is only necessary to read in "The History of Our Own Times," by Justin McCarthy, the story of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, in order to see what spirit the Colonial army produces in its officers. The entire race of the descendants of the great King Baber, twenty-four princes, were exterminated. Lieut. Hodson murdered three princes with his own hands, on detecting them among the prisoners; and McCarthy declares that public opinion in England, as a whole, recognized Hodson's deed as patriotic and worthy of praise. A mercenary army, it is true, has also its sense of military honor, and is, therefore, not without idealism; but this idealism is quite different from that which inspires the German army and, we are glad to add, the French army as well. For that which we style a universal duty to bear arms, the English have no other expression than "compulsory service." It will not be long before they have learned otherwise on this point. In quite the same manner as with us, tens of thousands of young men in England, especially of the upper classes, have voluntarily entered the army, not for the

sake of the "king's shilling," but in order to stand shoulder to shoulder with Tommy Atkins in the defence of their country, or more accurately, to uphold England's world supremacy. Even at the moment when they summon the whole world to battle against Prussian militarism, they themselves are already in the midst of it.

The German army is the most thoroughly trained and most powerful war instrument of all the armies of the world, but at the same time the one which is the least available for a mere policy of ambition and thirst for power. It is true that it is bound in unconditional fealty and obedience to its Emperor, but the Emperor himself dare claim this obedience only as the representative of the nation's interest as a whole, or as he himself expressed it on the occasion of his coronation, as "The First Servant of the State." In other words, our army is strong only on the political defensive, as when it is a question of defending the existence and the honor of the Empire against foreign aggression. If in foreign countries the German spirit of aggression is often spoken of, and to this end German military writers are quoted, it must be made clear that by this is meant a strategical and tactical offensive, the spirit of which, it is true, is properly cultivated in our army. But to a political offensive, to the deliberate starting of a war like the present, for the sake of conquest or for world supremacy, our people would never lend themselves; and of what value would be all the technical skill and discipline in this army without the spirit which results from free and full agreement, and which is none other than the spirit of the entire nation? Not more than 15 per cent of the army now in the field was in uniform on the day before the mobilization; the other 85 per cent are citizens and peasants, workers and students, the great proportion heads of families. Would such men be ready, for the sake of mere plans of ambition, to let themselves be led to death?

But the objection to this is made in foreign countries that the real ruling class in Germany is the officer caste. In the first place, our officer class is not a caste. Under Frederick the Great it possessed something of this character; to-day entrance into this body is open to every qualified young man of education and breeding. War Minister von Roon spoke of that class on one occasion when writing to Emperor William I as: "That part of Your Majesty's subjects who bear Your Majesty's weapons." This class, upon whose efficiency and educational activity our national freedom in great part depends, enjoys among us the greatest consideration, but it is far removed from ruling the

state. The English officer-corps, shortly before the outbreak of the war, was on the point of mutiny and had already refused obedience to the civil government, because the parliamentary policy in Ireland displeased it. The French officer corps has obeyed the civil government since 1871, but, as is well known, with inward revolt. They had to submit to the leaders of the parliamentary groups, of the political slate-makers and demagogues, not because they were victims of the superstition that the Chambers represented the will of the French people (the French themselves speak with the greatest contempt of this ruling body), but because they had been defeated at Sedan. Every one in France is aware that had the French army been successful in defeating Germany, it would have marked the end of parliamentary lawyer-rule, and the army would have seized the powers of government, as under the Bonapartes. In Germany it is not the army which rules, but the Emperor, with the Federal Council and the Reichstag. To be sure, the Emperor feels himself to be the supreme commander and head of the army, and he will always have respect for its feelings, but he will consider in equal degree the feelings of his people, because he knows he is able thoroughly to fulfill his duties as ruler and to exercise, to its full extent, his royal right, only if the army and people are united under his leadership. Neither will the officer-corps ever mutiny as in England—not even if the Emperor, for political reasons, acts against its desires—nor can the victorious army oppress civil freedom, as in France, because the army is the Emperor's, who is bound by the Reichstag and the Constitution. If there have ever occurred disputes between officers and civilians, it was only in regard to questions of local and slight importance, which were exaggerated abroad in an unfriendly fashion. How superficial these differences were has been strikingly brought to our realization by this war.

From whatever point of view one contemplates the constitution of the armies of the four states which we have considered, it is clear that the reproach of "militarism" applies least of all to Germany; unless it be for the fact that this country first of all enunciated the principle that every citizen is a born defender of the Fatherland, and consistently carried it through, the other states falling into line later. With this principle, however, Prussia first saved Europe from the universal domination of Napoleon and then from that of the Czar.

Even if we may claim that Germany (Prussia) for the last one hundred years has kept, with slight variations, her army in the same ratio to her population (1 per cent), we are neverthe-

less forced to admit, and we do it gladly, that in *one* respect we have greatly increased our armament.

In order not to be excluded from international politics, in order not to be forced to be an idle spectator when the other Great Powers divided Africa and Asia among themselves, in order finally to protect her constantly growing maritime trade, Germany has gradually, since 1888, developed her fleet and thereby aroused England's deepest jealousy. But in this connection, also, quite false data are circulated abroad regarding us. In order to prove how the Germans were hastening the growth of their navy, the English have always compared the number of ships which were laid down; but this gives quite a false impression, as England needs only two, Germany three years for the building of a great battleship. A correct comparison is afforded by the following table, which groups together the battleships and the big armored cruisers.

BIG BATTLESHIPS READY

England	Germany	England	Germany
1907		1912	1912
1. Dreadnought 2. Indomitable 3. Inflexible 4. Invincible	None	21. King George V. 22. Centurion 23. Ajax 24. Audacious 25. Australia 26. New Zealand 27. Queen Mary	10. Oldenburg 11. Kaiser 12. Friedrich der Grosse 13. Goeben
1908		1913	1913
5. Temeraire 6. Bellerophon 7. Superb	None	28. Iron Duke 29. Marlborough 30. Emperor of India 31. Benbow 32. Tiger	14. Kaiserin 15. Prinzregent Luitpold 16. König Albert 17. Seydlitz
1909	1909	1914	1914
8. St. Vincent 9. Collingwood 10. Vanguard	1. Nassau 2. Westfalen	33. Queen Elizabeth 34. Warspite 35. Barham 36. Valiant 37. Malaya	18. Markgraf 19. Grosser Kurfürst 20. König 21. Derfflinger
1910	1910	1915	1915
11. Neptune 12. Indefatigable	3. Rheinland 4. Posen 5. v. d. Tann	38. Resolution 39. Revenge 40. Ramillies 41. Royal-Oak 42. Royal-Sovereign[1]	22. Kronprinz 23. Lützow
1911	1911		
13. Colossus 14. Hercules 15. Orion 16. Conqueror 17. Monarch 18. Thunderer 19. Lion 20. Princess Royal	6. Ostfriesland 7. Helgoland 8. Thüringen 9. Moltke		

[1] To this must be added: 43. Agincourt; 44. Erin; 45. Canada. 43 and 44 were built for Turkey, 45 for Chili; these were subsequently seized and added to the British fleet.

In the year 1915 England had thus from 42 to 45, Germany 23 great battleships ready; since 1910 the ratio has changed but slightly; and if a certain competition in this line has existed between England and Germany, it was begun by the former, not by the latter. Germany, it is true, has taken the liberty of building a fleet, of entering upon the construction of modern dreadnoughts, but only as following England's lead.

The charge is thus disposed of that Germany created her fleet in order some day to attack England with it. For more than 150 years the English nation has lived in the constant fear of a foreign invasion. At one time it was the Spaniards, generally the French, occasionally the Russians, and now it is the Germans who disturb the peaceful sleep of the English citizen. To what purpose, however, does Germany build a fleet, if not to attack England with it? England, it is true, needs a fleet to protect and maintain her world empire, such as history and the bravery of her ancestors have bestowed on her; the German fleet, however, is not in keeping with the meagreness of the German colonies; it is a strong battle fleet; it would be a pure luxury if it were not intended for an attack on England.

The error in this reasoning lies in overlooking the value and importance of military preparation, even if not put to any actual use. Our naval experts have always claimed that a fleet, even in the face of a greatly stronger enemy, is of notable importance, because the latter, even with the prospect of complete victory, is sure to suffer severe losses himself, which will weaken his position in the world. This has been called the "principle of risk." If there were, perhaps, in Germany persons so fanciful as to dream of an immediate landing in England, in responsible circles there was a much soberer line of thought. It was desired, it is true, that the great battle fleet should be for something more than the mere protection of our own coasts, but this by no means implied a desire for an attack on those of England. What was desired lay between these two extremes. Our aim was to be able to exercise, whether on England or on other Powers, a pressure sufficient to compel them to grant to Germany in world politics such a place in the sun as her power and her internal strength gave her the right to demand by the side of the others. New and extensive territory in Africa and Asia was continually being divided up among English, French, Russians, Americans and Japanese. Germany could not permit herself, and did not intend, to be permanently excluded from this. Had Germany built no fleet she would not have been able to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey. Eng-

land, no doubt, found it extremely unpleasant that the main part of her fleet was held permanently in the North Sea through the growth of Germany's navy. But it is a long step from this to an attack, and England would have removed the drawbacks of the situation without great trouble by an honest understanding with Germany. Undoubtedly, there was in England a party which loyally strove for such a peaceful understanding, and the Emperor and Chancellor, supported by universal public opinion, met this movement willingly half-way and without any *arrière pensée*. If, nevertheless, the opposition party in England finally gained the ascendency, this was not due to the actual impossibility of a compromise, and in still less degree to any aggressive intentions on Germany's part; it was due solely to the fact that the aggressive policy of Pan-Slavism in the Balkan Peninsula, which finally resulted in the murder of the Archducal Heir Apparent, brought about a general crisis in Europe and gave the English war-party the upper hand.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN INSTITUTIONS

PROFESSOR GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

THE charge has been brought against Germany and Prussia that they lack the spirit of free institutions, that they are ruled by a harsh militarism inimical to culture. He who speaks thus may perhaps have in mind Herbert Spencer's thoroughly mistaken conception of the two separate modern types of state: the old reactionary type of the military state, and the advanced liberal type of the industrial state. Or the present-day glorification of democracy may hark back to the constitution of Attica, to the days when the great statesmen of Athens from Solon and Kleisthenes to Pericles created the democratic constitution by which the *demos,* or people, were supposed to rule. Spencer's conception is as mistaken as is the comparison of our great states with tiny Attica. This state had, at all events in the period of its democratic glory, a thorough military form; and to-day the United States of America maintains a small army only because it has no powerful neighbors. It would support a large standing army, says Professor Sloane of Columbia University, if it had three such dangerous neighbors as Germany has (*Preussische Jahrbücher,* Vol. 158, p. 466). We admire Attica, which at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War counted 250,000 inhabitants, not so much on account of the rule of the *demos,* as for the fact that it saved western civilization from suffocation by Persia. It saved this civilization because it was able to unite its infantry division of *hoplites,* who were drawn from the burghers and peasants, with its aristocratic cavalry squadrons, and to build a war fleet capable of opposing the Persians. The true greatness, however, of this incomparable democratic state is to be seen in the fact that, three hundred years before Christ, it followed its great aristocratic leaders, and that these leaders, while not emancipating the slaves and half-free classes, educated the mass of the ordinary citizens to a devotion to their public duties that has scarcely been equalled since. The superiority of Athens lay not in the rule of its *demos,* but in the obedience of its people

down to the Peloponnesian War to their aristocratic leaders, and in the fact that these leaders created in the people a strong public spirit and educated them to devote themselves to the ideals of the state.

There have been, no doubt, barbaric and semi-barbaric peoples of warlike nature who, as a consequence of a rough nomadic life, possessed a military, more or less despotic constitution precluding free political institutions, like the Arabians under Mahomet, or like many of the German tribes and states during and after the wanderings of the peoples. But a military constitution and lack of political freedom are by no means historically inseparable, nor does one by any means always follow the other.

If we exclude the older types of states organized on a military basis (which cannot really be compared with the present-day states), the best explanation for the causes of the development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of military states, leading to certain limitations of civil freedom, is given by the great Oxford professor, Seeley. He says: "The amount of freedom that may reasonably exist in a state is in indirect proportion to the military-political pressure exerted by foreign states against its boundaries."

Germany was driven to universal military service by the unprecedented pressure of the French wars and of the Napoleonic domination from 1792 to 1813. The development of the German fleet and the army increases from 1890 to the present day are traceable to the English encircling policy (*Einkreisungspolitik*), and to the increased pressure of Russia and France against Germany. Had England, who, during the period from 1792 to 1814, destroyed the fleets of the other nations and conquered most of their colonies, been content with the position of power which she enjoyed from 1815 to 1850; had she continued to the present day the peaceful policy pursued from 1846 to 1870, when she granted independence to her most important colonies and limited her naval programme—in such event, we Germans would probably have built no fleet nor made such increases in our army as we have made. But since Disraeli's day she has followed a new policy of conquest. During the period from 1800 to 1900 she annexed between seven and eight million square kilometers of land and one hundred millions of people, and increased her fleet enormously. England has again become such as Kant described her in the eighteenth century: most greedy for conquest and the most warlike state in Europe. It is no wonder that the other states have been forced to imitate her in a degree. But has England by this fact become less free,

less democratic? Certainly not. Just as untrue is it that Prussia and Germany, because during the last two centuries they assumed a military character, have become a country without freedom, without a constitutional form of government. Germany is different, it is true, in essential points, from France, England and the United States. She does not have parliamentary government—that is to say, control of the highest administrative positions by the parliamentary majority. But the freedom of the citizen is protected against arbitrary encroachment on the part of the state authorities as well, if not better, than elsewhere.

But what is understood by this political freedom in which we are said to be lacking? Principally two things: 1. A certain influence of the people on the government, on legislation and on the leading principles of interior and foreign policy; 2. a secure guarantee of the freedom of action of the citizens in questions of faith and religion, in family life, in expressions of opinion, in literature and in the press, in private economic affairs, in the formation of societies, in public gatherings, etc. It is necessary that every civilized state should to-day exercise influence in such matters by certain legislative measures. But it must do this with tact and discretion, applying the laws impartially; the courts and the administration should act in a strictly legal manner.

In determining the powers of the Government, as well as in the circumscription of the sphere of individual freedom as against the powers of the state and arbitrary actions of the Government, one thing above all must be avoided: class rule and class abuse. Or rather, since this is never entirely feasible, class abuse must be limited by law as much as possible. And since for the last two hundred or three hundred years all civilized states have seen entirely new class systems develop, with the most pronounced tendencies toward class abuse and class dominance, the vital question of the new interior development of the state is in many cases the following: Where, under what forms and institutions of government, and with what laws has the nearest approach been made to preventing the degradation of the lower classes and to limiting the abuses of the ruling classes? It cannot be questioned that, although royal despotism in ancient times and in the Middle Ages in many cases manifested and directly promoted pronounced class abuse, nevertheless the later enlightened despotism as well as the military and bureaucratic state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have limited this notably. Just as certain is it that, although the development of

the democratic idea in the constitutions led to the expectation of the elimination of class abuses—indeed, it held this out as a promise—nevertheless, while not unavoidable nor common to all states, in many of them the increase of democratization brought with it an increase of these abuses. This was the result chiefly of the moral and political level which the upper classes had reached before gaining greater rights and greater influence; and of the moral and mental development of the lower classes, who fought against the upper in the free state for political rights, but even more for possessions and income.

The greater the political freedom is in any given state from the dual point of view of influence exercised by the people on the Government and the protection of the individual rights of freedom, the more emphatically can it be affirmed that these two factors have a beneficent effect proportionate to the degree of morality and of political and individual virtues attained to by the upper and lower classes. Premature granting of political freedom leads ofttimes to the downfall of the nation, or at least to bitter and long-continued inner strife. Extensive political freedom is held to be more easily realized with success in small states, especially those protected against the outside world, like Switzerland, than in large states, among well-balanced nations than among hot-blooded races. Such freedom, it is claimed, operates much more often in a beneficial manner in times of quiet development than in times of great social changes, of technical advances and of outward and inward struggles.

But let us come to the point. Let us try to grasp the spirit of German institutions as it developed from 1650 to 1815, and as it was rounded out from 1815 to 1915. It first took form in the secondary states, which were mostly ruled by the patrician classes of the cities and the rural nobility. These states gained a firm governing power through gifted families, through the union of several territories and through the political struggles and wars of the period; from semi- or entirely aristocratic republics they became military and bureaucratic states. There arose here the best type of that which has been styled enlightened despotism. Representatives of this were the Prussian Princes from 1640 to 1786, Maria Theresa, Joseph II, and certain Saxon, Brunswick, Hessian, Bavarian and Württemberg princes. In England the same type of state had been discredited by the Stuarts of the seventeenth century, while Cromwell's dictatorship had approximated to it temporarily. In the Netherlands the princes of the House of Orange had been too weak, as

opposed to the capitalistic city aristocracy, to reach their goal. In France love of display and conquest, religious intolerance, royal extravagance and vanity undermined enlightened despotism. In the England of a later period a foreign dynasty, with mostly incompetent princes, was able to accomplish nothing from 1714 to 1815 and was crowded aside by a great and capable aristocracy. The latter succeeded in establishing England's trade supremacy, but at the price of outrageous enrichment and domination of the upper classes, and of degradation of the workers, which caused the country to stand on the brink of a social revolution practically from 1790 to 1850. This was prevented from coming to a head only by the severest of discriminating laws, by military force and cannons.

What, now, did the German bureaucratic and military state in Prussia and in Austria and in the German secondary states achieve from 1640 to 1840? What did it indicate? Of what did it consist? What were its aims? How is the spirit of the resulting institutions to be expressed in a few words?

This German bureaucratic and military state suppressed or checked feudal class rule and made it possible for the ruling princes to create efficient executive state organs at the centre and at the periphery. It put an end to the economic struggles between the city and the country. There was thus created a strong monarchic power of a type which became an example for the whole world. It brought together the best elements of the people of all classes in bureaucratic and military service to form a new leading class, a new civil service aristocracy that stands high above the feudal as well as the money and capitalistic aristocracy of other countries and times. In the main, it succeeded in protecting and saving the peasant class from being overburdened or impoverished and from being robbed of its land by extortionate sales. It reformed the corrupt city and guild constitutions of the Middle Ages, and rendered the city inhabitants ready for sound self-administration and for freedom of trade and residence, and it assisted the peasant class to gain free ownership of its land. It introduced religious tolerance and universal education. It created at first in the individual states, then in the Customs Union and the Empire, a free interior market and a national trade constitution. It advanced and emancipated science, through the codification of the law, through great reforms in the organization of the courts, and through the suppression of all Star Chamber justice it guaranteed in the years from 1746 to 1840 personal individual freedom such as existed at that time in no other European state. Although at the same time the

military burdens, the weight of taxation and the governmental conduct of economic matters did at many points operate oppressively against the citizens; although England, through her parliamentary constitution (the admiration and imitation of which was preached by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century) was in certain respects much in advance of Germany—despite all this, there is room for a difference of opinion whether the England of the three Georges or the Prussia of Frederick the Great stood higher from a cultural point of view. Of none of the English kings or statesmen could an English poet have said what Goethe said of Frederick: "He shone upon us from the north like the pole star, about which the whole world seemed to turn."

It is true that the energetic development of the bureaucratic and military state had also its drawbacks: from 1780 to 1850 it became somewhat petrified, and the change to constitutional life was not made easily or quickly. We shall later return to this point. But, on the other hand, its traditions prevented hurried, ill-considered constitutional experiments, and its vital institutions, adapted both to the nation and to the times, have laid the foundations for a free constitutional life.

In order to prove this, let us first examine somewhat more closely the personal elements of the bureaucratic state and then its more important government reforms. Our first question is: Of what nature was the class of civil servants and officers who, in Germany, under the leadership of the prince, the "first servant of the state," from 1640 to 1840, secured governing powers—the class that from 1640 to 1820 ruled mainly alone, but from then on in coöperation with the estates and the constitutional representatives—and that in Germany to-day still possesses political preponderance, as in no other state in the world? Imitation of it, it is true, has been attempted since the middle of the nineteenth century in many differently ruled states, for instance, in the American Civil Service reform and in the British service in India.

Since the once healthy local system of self-government had degenerated into oligarchic class domination, and since the landed aristocracy and the city patricians more and more abused and exploited the peasants and small burghers, the better German princes felt increasing need of protecting the middle and lower classes through councilmen, judges and magistrates who stood outside of the old aristocratic and city cliques. For this purpose clergymen and court officials offered their services, but especially jurists who had studied in Bologna, Prague, Leipsic,

and other new German universities, and had gained knowledge of Roman law and of the imperial prerogatives it prescribes; in other cases these officials were burghers or noblemen from neighboring states who had no connection with the home cliques. In this way the Hohenzollern of the fifteenth century ruled in the Mark Brandenburg by means of knights, priests and writers from their Frankish home state. Their successors in the sixteenth century depended, in the main, on the Saxon or Meissen jurists, like the two Chancellors Distelmeyer, and also on Saxon and Bohemian noblemen. When, under Joachim Friedrich (1598-1608), the estates complained of the many foreigners in office, the elector replied that they themselves were quite lacking in the necessary knowledge; and his minister, the Bohemian Count Schlick, added that with the exception of one or two persons, the elector had no faithful men among the Brandenburg nobility.

In the seventeenth century there appear, by the side of and above the native Brandenburg civil servants, the powerful Protestant nobility of East Prussia (such as, above all, the Dohnas), and capable officials from Cleve-Mark, Magdeburg and Westphalia, whom the Great Elector gladly attracted to Berlin. An especially important foreign element for the Brandenburg-Prussian officers' and officials' class was furnished by the French Huguenot families, who had fled to Brandenburg-Prussia, and among whom were many learned men, jurists and officers. In the year 1688 there were, among 1,030 Brandenburg officers, not less than 300 Huguenots, and probably also many Dutch, Swedes and Danes. We shall refer again to the fact that in many provinces, as late as 1713 to 1740, the nobility would not enter the Brandenburg army. The daughters of Huguenots influenced the official class by marriage with the nobility of all the provinces; in like manner the Princesses on the Brandenburg throne of the families of Orange and the Palatinate brought with them from the Netherlands and Heidelberg thoughts and men of Protestant and progressive stripe, thereby forming at the court itself a strong counterweight to the ruling squire class, or *Junkerstand*. From the time of Friedrich Wilhelm I, it became the custom to fill the higher provincial offices with a preponderant number of men from the other provinces, in order to create a royal local administration which stood above the selfish interests of the provinces and the nobility. Under Frederick the Great, and even more perhaps under Friedrich Wilhelm III, the great talents and characters from the whole of Germany thronged to the Prussian service. The great Minister of Jus-

tice, Carmer, was from the Palatinate and of Scottish extraction; the Minister of Mining and Commerce, Heinitz, was a Saxon; Baron von Stein was from the Rhine. Hardenberg and Scharnhorst were Hanoverians; Gneisenau came from Austria, Niebuhr from Holstein. The great reforms from 1808 to 1820 could scarcely have been carried through without this foreign contingent in Prussian officialdom.

It is a simple physiological fact that through this blood and race mixture from 1680 to 1820 the production of remarkable talent, even of genius, in Prussian official circles was likely to be considerably increased.

At all events, within this order of officials and officers from different provinces and classes there grew up a united spirit, with distinctive feelings and views; there came to exist a strong bond of union, a pronounced *esprit de corps,* in contrast to the classes and circles inimical to the king and the civil service, together with an increasing devotion to the ruler, the government and the state. The officials all felt themselves to be an *ecclesia militans,* a reform party within the state, opposed to all manner of local, special and class interests. Sons of officials and of officers were encouraged to follow the career of their fathers. Frederick the Great was fond of saying that in this manner the sons grew up from their youth in an atmosphere of honor and with the welfare of the state at heart. Talented and striking characters from both high and low social strata were welded into a uniform official class. It was here possible—as once in the Roman Church—for the lowest day-laborer or peasant's son to rise. Ministers of such origin sat beside counts and princes from 1640 to 1850, although for certain positions nobles were preferred, or ordinary citizens were ennobled to fill them. One need only refer to the career of Rother, who advanced between the years 1806-1848 from the rank of an army clerk to that of a minister of state.

The sons and grandsons of the most selfish squires (*Junker*), the most bitter enemies of the monarchy, acquired quite different feelings in military and government service, and became imbued with the conception and interests of the state. The new associations in which they found themselves and amid which they worked freed them from the old ties, and turned many of them into efficient coöperators in an anti-feudal policy for the benefit of the peasants, trade and industry—a policy which tended to strengthen the monarchy. They shared in the enlightened tendencies of Frederick the Great, and in the political ideals of Friedrich Wilhelm III and his advisers.

This sense of spiritual unity in the bureaucratic state was strengthened by the gradual development of an identical economic basis for all members of the official and officer class.

Those occupying official positions in the old established states were landed proprietors and generally hereditary holders of the office, or they held yearly elective positions which, as wealthy aristocrats, were open to them only. With the increasing division of labor, both of these classes of officials proved insufficient, even harmful. In neither case was the office-holder's chief devotion given to his work, but to his material possessions and their increase, to family and class interests. With the growth of the power of money in the economic life and the increasing division of labor, appointment by the ruler of officials for life, living exclusively for their work, and receiving fixed remuneration and special training, became feasible and more and more frequent in the monarchic state. The Roman emperors were the first to develop such an official class, working for fixed salaries; the Church of Rome applied this form of the imperial administration to its priests, and the other states, with France in the lead, sought from the thirteenth century on to develop such an official class; from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century it gradually repressed the older official system. Burgundy and Austria imitated the French model, and the more important German territorial states followed suit.

It was a new and difficult question to organize all the offices and bureaus, to find, educate and train suitable men, and to develop official careers; this effort could succeed only gropingly, and against great difficulties. The chief problem was to conquer constantly arising abuses. It was a question of creating in that epoch of incipient money circulation a social mechanism of the most complicated kind; even the most capable princes and governments succeeded in accomplishing this only through particularly favorable circumstances and by efforts continued through decades and centuries.

German officialdom of the fifteenth to the seventeenth century had been, to a great extent, a body of rather doubtful men; but in Prussia from 1670 to 1750 trustworthiness and efficiency had become the rule among them. Gneist speaks of the officials and generals who surrounded Frederick the Great as forming one of the most intellectual generations which Germany had ever produced. The old system of payment by perquisites or in kind from property administered by the officials themselves had to be superseded by a regular and reliable system of salaries in cash; the hunt for vacant fiefs and other similar privileges had

to be done away with and the right of appointment to be gathered into the hand of the sovereign. A clear civil service law, distinct official instructions and a strict government control had to be introduced, while allowing the officials far-reaching initiative in making proposals within the province of their office. The officials had to be made subject to just laws of disciplinary punishment and a gradually adapted system of examinations, admitting only the efficient and well-trained. A certain routine of promotion had to be established, and in consequence thereof a certain tradition as to the classes from which officials were to be taken. The result of all this was to create uniform standards of duty and official probity throughout the entire officialdom.

To be sure, there were dangers connected with this institution of professional officials, such as development of cliquedom, of patronage by superiors and members of Parliament, and of a tendency to stagnant routine. Furthermore, with the guaranteed income and comparative security from dismissal which the officials enjoyed, there was also the danger of their inclining too much to consulting their own convenience and developing a lack of initiative in their official activity. The official is called upon to display the greatest degree of ardor and devotion for objects which do not concern his personal interests. Personal ambition alone is not sufficient as an impelling force; it must be supplemented by a strong sense of duty, high ethical and intellectual training, and a strong moral and political *esprit de corps*.

The assured economic position, income and pension, the rule adopted at an early period against taking part in stock transactions or engaging in business, had the beneficial effect of enabling the official to devote himself entirely to his work and to the interests of the public, and of placing him above the social battles of the classes.

"The essence of the state and of official position," says Ernst Meyer, "is the protection of the general welfare against the particular interests of the wealthy classes."

It was the historical task of the bureaucratic state to create for this purpose an order whose collective intellectual and spiritual qualities were devoted to the service of the state, who subordinated their personal interests as well as their prejudices to official duty. To be sure, that ideal was unconditionally attained only in the case of nobler natures, in connection with home education, school and university training.

Prussian officialdom, however, approached thereto most closely in the eighteenth century, and again from 1810 to 1840.

Furthermore, in the constitutional period from 1850 on, the ethical and political qualities of the official class remained the intellectual and moral backbone of the state. Only in connection with great events and great spiritual, political and moral movements, and under the guidance of great princes, generals and statesmen, was Prussia able to raise her officials to their high plane of efficiency, of integrity and coöperation. And in the other great territorial states the development had been similar in the years from 1700 to 1850. But in 1786, as well as in the period from 1720 to 1850, the natural drawbacks of the bureaucratic state became evident. The officials had become a ruling class. The people rightfully demanded a greater share in the state and government. It was necessary that a constitutional epoch should rejuvenate the bureaucratic state, raise it again to a higher plane; competition with nobility and civilians demanded greater efforts of it. We can with confidence state that the political transformation which took place from 1840 to the present time has not destroyed the chief qualities of our just, intelligent, mentally and morally elevated official class.

We shall now speak of the principal achievements of the Prussian bureaucratic aristocracy from 1640 down to our own time. They deserve careful consideration, if one wishes fairly to judge the drawbacks of the German bureaucratic and military state in the period to 1840 and if one desires duly to appreciate its effect on present-day conditions. These achievements consist in: 1. The introduction and carrying out of universal education, the founding of the public school as well as of other institutions of learning. 2. The organization of the army and the adoption of the universal duty of bearing arms. 3. The judicial reforms. 4. The reform of the system of self-government, beginning in this period, and its later development.

In considering the inner structure of society in the European civilized states from the Carlovingian period down to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nothing is more important, next to the division of wealth, the feudal system and the beginnings of monetary development and government finances, than the fact that the thin upper stratum of the country and city aristocracy, under the guidance of priests and clergymen, had learned to read, write, reckon and keep books, while the mass of the people in city and country, owing to their lack of such knowledge, were condemned to social subordination, to dominance and exploitation at the hands of the aristocracy of the learned. The German Reformation had set up the requirement that the entire

German nation must learn to read the Bible unaided. That is the origin of modern public schools, the first message of good hope for the elevation of the lower and middle classes. The enlightenment of the eighteenth century next demanded the sharing of the people in this intellectual progress, and thus gave a strong impulse to the development of the schools. The better ruled German states, especially Prussia, underwent in the eighteenth century and down to 1850 an important improvement in their school system, although the upper conservative classes feared that as a result the young men would become insubordinate and the girls dissolute. The development of the public school, however, was not completed in Germany and elsewhere, until the period from 1830 to 1850. At the same time the government school system, effecting a marked restriction of the religious and private schools, gained a general victory in Germany. Nowhere else was universal education made a reality to such an extent as in the German bureaucratic states. The result was a uniform spreading of moral and cultural conceptions, and an approach of the lower and middle classes to the upper without parallel anywhere else. In France, Guizot had created a more or less widespread school system in the period from 1830 to 1840; in England the state did not begin to concern itself with education until a generation ago. The moral and economic destitution of the lower classes in England from 1750 to 1830 is one evidence of this fact. The generation at the helm to-day in Europe was born from 1850 to 1870. In the sixties, of children from six to fourteen years of age, only 4 per cent were non-attendants at school in Prussia, while in France 20 per cent, in England 25 per cent and in Russia 90 per cent came under this head.

The greatest social reformers of all times have appreciated the political and social importance of the public school. Solon desired to open the schools of Attica to the great majority of the people; Robert Owen laid chief stress in social reform on schools for the children of workers; and the best English administrative officials of India demanded schools for that country, in order to combat the caste system from within. Extensive political rights and a democratic constitution, without a good public-school system, are a political paradox, if not, indeed, a madness or a crime. And, in addition to the public school, the people must have extension schools, and industrial and vocational schools. The higher system of education, the universities, the technical and commercial schools, can be built properly only upon this foundation. Especially in this line has no other nation

in the world made greater progress than Germany, from 1850 down to the present. It may be stated without exaggeration that the advancement of talent in the lower classes, a certain freedom of vocational choice, the approach of all classes to each other and the bridging of the abyss separating the people from the aristocracy is rendered possible only through a broad and efficient system of educational institutions, from the lowest grade to the highest. The 110,000 non-commissioned officers in the present-day German army, who became soldiers with a common-school education, thanks to the instruction offered them as non-commissioned officers, enjoy the opportunity, as well as the right to enter, when 32 years of age, into the lower and middle positions of the army, civil or municipal service. This service has from a third to a half-million excellent officials, of whom many before 1860 passed on to higher careers, and whose sons and grandsons are still to-day in many cases advancing to the upper ranks of officialdom.

Previous to 1834, when graduation from the *Gymnasium* was first introduced, and down to 1840 when it became more and more the requirement for admission to all higher official positions, many of the numerous ex-non-commissioned officers advanced from the middle positions to the higher service. This still occurs to-day in individual cases. It would have been better to retain in the main the principle of advancement which obtained from 1790 to 1850.

Finally, on the subject of education let us make one more observation in regard to scientific freedom in our universities, since they have recently been frequently branded as unfree government institutions. The European universities grew up from the fourteenth century, in connection with the Church; their first great achievements were in Bologna, Paris, Prague and Leipsic, and then throughout Germany after the Reformation. Their guildlike character, however, led in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a narrow-minded system of cliques and nepotism. The free university administration degenerated in the same manner as the old free city constitutions. A striking new revival of the German universities begins with the great princely foundations; Halle and Göttingen in the eighteenth century, Berlin, Munich and Bonn at the beginning of the nineteenth century head the list. The older universities followed the modern lead and were remodeled on similar lines. The right of the princes to appoint professors rejuvenated the universities. Government funds in greater and greater amounts were placed at their disposal. Appointment by the state does not preclude

the fact that *savants* proposed by the faculties are almost always appointed. The absolutely free body of *Privatdozenten*, or free-lance lecturers, furnishes the necessary healthy competition for the officially appointed professors. Each of the numerous federal states strives to attract the best men. He who is disciplined in Göttingen may receive a call to Berlin, as did the brothers Grimm. Freedom in lecturing, teaching and method, as well as in literary activity, is unlimited. The administration of the university by the faculty and the academic senate preserves the republican form, as contrasted with the American absolutism of university presidents and the influence of trustees, who, believers in a protective tariff, remove professors advocating free trade—a thing which could not happen in Germany. At all events, the German universities during the last sixty years have stood assuredly not under but above those of other civilized states. This has always been unconditionally admitted in Russia, North America, Japan and elsewhere.

The European armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rested upon the system of the free enlistment of paid mercenaries from the home country and from abroad, these mercenaries being welded together into brotherhoods and companies by private military contractors (*condottieri*), mostly noble captains who had become rich, or by war commissioners who had received an enlistment patent from some prince. The traditions of the Swiss who hired themselves out in foreign lands, and the mercenary brotherhoods (*Landsknechtsbruderschaften*) which had been formed by Emperor Maximilian, originally controlled this development. William of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, and the French kings and generals improved the organization and the methods of fighting, sought to transform these bodies partially into national troops, and paved the way for monarchic discipline. The regiments, which were formed only for the summer months, gradually became permanent. The Great Elector was the first, in 1660, after the Northern War, not to release his troops in Brandenburg-Prussia. From that time on there was a Brandenburg-Prussian army, which from 1660 to 1786 was the first, as well as the best, in Europe. The Elector transformed the purely private enterprises of majors and captains, who were only perfunctorily controlled by princely war commissioners, into bodies of troops whose officers he appointed. During the period from 1680 to 1713 the army became a purely governmental undertaking of permanent nature, the officers changed from greedy money-makers into officials with the gov-

ernment's commission and under princely control. An increasing proportion of officers and men were already natives and subjects, or became such. The system of levies was used in conjunction with that of free enlistment; communities and cities were called upon to furnish soldiers. The general canvassing of soldiers as the only method, especially in foreign countries, proved to be too dear, and often furnished useless rabble that constantly deserted.

When Friedrich Wilhelm I, for the sake of his household, as he said, from 1714 to 1730 at times went too far in the hiring of foreign soldiers and thereby brought about unfavorable results, recourse was had to the mixed system, which continued until 1808. A portion of the company consisted of enlisted foreigners, who served almost for life and who were encouraged as much as possible to marry native women; during part of the year, for reasons of economy, they were given furloughs within the garrison for industrial work—the so-called *Freiwächter*. This part of the army could not be increased in time of war. The other part consisted of native peasant boys, who were apportioned to the regiments according to the so-called *canton* districts. They received training for one year, supplemented by several periods of from one to two months, and remained for twenty years subject to call. They were the more numerous in time of war, as the foreigners were in time of peace. Although the so-called *canton* ordinance of 1773 declared that "all the inhabitants of the land are born to bear arms," the higher classes of society were not yet subject to this military duty, and the exceptions increased for economic reasons until 1806. A determined opposition against this duty of national military service was offered from 1733 on, not primarily by the peasants, who were proud to be enrolled and have a bunch of feathers in their hats, but by their overlords. The latter considered it an infringement of their rights that the peasant was now more dependent on his regiment commander than on his overlord. The duty of military service was a great step toward the development of universal citizenship. The peasant had now a direct connection with his king, whom he had often seen, perhaps spoken with, and whose battles he had helped to win.

A still more important fact was that, with the increase of the army (1713, 38,000; 1740, 83,000; 1786, 200,000; 1806, 250,000 men—the last two numbers equalling 2.3 per cent and 3.7 per cent, respectively, of the population), the whole nobility were more and more drafted into the corps of officers. The poor lower nobility of Pomerania early entered military service in order to

increase their small incomes; the Brandenburgian nobles also readily joined the army. But it was quite otherwise from 1713 to 1740 with the East Prussian aristocracy, who lived generally on their feudal incomes and whom Friedrich Wilhelm I had frequently to compel to send their fourteen- to eighteen-year-old sons to the cadet schools and regiments. The result as a whole, however, was that the entire nobility of the kingdom, by the year 1800, had become accustomed to seeing all of their sons officers or officials. That nobility, in 1700 still in great part feudal and anti-monarchic, was now a faithful and trustworthy monarchic party, to which fact was due their loyal devotion in the nineteenth century to the national cause.

Under this system Prussia had a small army for peace, a large army for the field. The foreigners, lifelong professional soldiers, formed the core and backbone about which the native peasants were grouped. A relentless discipline was needed to keep these utterly different elements together. In time of war there were usually no more foreigners to be had, but it was always easy to fill out the regiments by means of the numerous men liable for service in the *cantons* who had not yet been called. Although the whole Prussian military system had a certain harshness, nevertheless it appeared, even to Mirabeau-Mauvillon, despite its drawbacks and evils, to possess great advantages. It provided for the poor nobility, he said, and gave work and shelter to the idle proletariat; as a result Prussia, despite her poverty, had a like birthrate with the most prosperous and fertile countries of Europe.

On the other hand, unfriendly criticism of the Prussian military system increased from 1786 to 1806. The elder officials supported it unreservedly, but public opinion and the young generation of the most capable officers demanded more and more the abolition of the foreign levy, the formation of reserve or militia troops, or even indeed universal military service.

The government down to 1806 was not energetic and bold enough for a great reform; the footless war against France from 1792 to 1795, the ill-conceived divisions of Poland between 1793 and 1795, which strengthened Prussia only outwardly, not inwardly, had been too costly to leave any money over for military reform. This came, however, from 1808 to 1820. Among the regulations introduced during this period were the universal duty of bearing arms, the creation of a large *Landwehr* in connection with the regular army, a thorough reconstruction of the officers' corps, on the basis of equality of the ordinary citizen with the nobles. It was no slight task, even under the pressure of

war, for War Minister von Boyen, in the years 1814 to 1815, to create a moderately large army of peace, with three years' service, besides the two classes of *Landwehr* reserves which were formed on the basis of universal conscription. This was an achievement of the great idealistic and liberal statesmen and generals to which the vacillating King, Friedrich Wilhelm III, gave his approval only because Boyen cleverly represented it to him as merely the development of existing institutions. The two Ministers, Altenstein and Dohna, had been, in 1810, as were later the Berlin city representatives, against general military service, in the pretended interest of civilization. Scharnhorst conceived of a standing army of the indigent and of a permanent militia of the upper classes in connection with it. Gneisenau attributed the relaxing and deteriorating of the nations and the dying out of a sense of public duty to the standing mercenary armies. Universal military duty, he said, mingles the upper and lower classes, does away with social prejudices, compels better education of the common people and rests upon a moral principle which sets the masses in movement and blends them together. Baron von Stein regarded the universal duty of bearing arms as the chief means of creating a sense of solidarity, of combating the opposition of the various classes to each other and the tendency of the upper classes to unwarlike and effeminate habits.

Metternich, of course, regarded universal military duty as a mistake. Emperor Alexander feared the democratic character of this institution so greatly that in Paris he expressed doubt whether it would not soon be necessary to send help to the King of Prussia against his own army. In Koblenz, Gneisenau, as commanding general, was suspected of being a demagogic general. The French made merry over the Prussian "child-army." General Bülow and many of the elder generals urgently demanded the return to the old system. Only Adjutant-General von Witzleben held the King in 1819 firmly to the great reform.

The Prussian army law of September 3, 1814, is perhaps the most important law of this epoch. It has been of fundamental importance for the development of moral and political conceptions, at first in Prussia, then in Germany, during the whole period down to the present. It was a democratic law in the best sense of the word. Germany stands, as does no other state, upon universal education and the universal duty of bearing arms. With universal military duty the standing army became, above all else, a training-school for the whole nation. Its intro-

duction, says one of our great historians, was a bold stroke, without precedent, bringing to mind the energy of the antique conception of the state. Universal military duty presupposes the agreement of people and government. It permits of no war of which the nation does not approve. With it no war of conquest is possible, but only a defensive war, a war for the life and existence of the nation.

The changes which, from 1814 down to to-day, took place in the Prussian and German army constitutions need not be traced here. They did not change its basic character. However heatedly the reform of the army was discussed from 1859 to 1866, however strongly feudal the officers of the standing army temporarily seemed, while the *Landwehr* appeared to be the only popular part of the organization, nevertheless this basic idea remained: The standing army, with its professional officers, is the backbone of our military strength and the school for the whole nation; but the greater part of the troops who take the field are citizens, not professional soldiers nor professional officers. We still have, as from 1813 to 1815, as in 1830, 1848, 1864 to 1870, a people's army, which is more truly popular than any other army in the world. It is not more beloved of our princes and nobility than of our citizens, peasants and workers. Every one who is familiar with our Social Democracy knows that even for the Social Democrat his period of service remains the most delightful memory. We have witnessed the manner in which the Social Democrats, without exception, joyously responded to the summons. He who knows the relation of our officers to their men is aware that I have been justified in often making this declaration in lectures and in writing: "If our *entrepreneurs* and their agents stood toward their workers on the same footing as our officers toward the men under them, we should have no social question among us."

All this chatter about an unsocial despotic German militarism, inimical to liberal civilization, is the talk of people who have, or desire to have, no knowledge of our internal conditions.

We pass now from the reform of school and army to the judicial reform. Nothing is more important for the security of the individual freedom of modern man in the state of to-day than a high standard of public justice: *Justitia fundamentum regnorum.* No task was more difficult in the change from the state of the Middle Ages to the modern commonwealth, than the creation of an able, impartial body of judges, of an up-to-date

court organization, of efficient civil and criminal laws. Much of this was accomplished by the old Prussian state before 1800; and together with the other German states, Prussia made considerable progress from 1800 to 1870. Between that date and the present day Germany has achieved a model of uniform court organization and a uniform code of civil law, which unites the merits of the *Code Civil* and of the old Prussian state law (*Landrecht*).

It is no easy task to present concretely, in a few words, the law reforms of a thousand years. But let us attempt it.

The elder Germanic legal procedure provided for the conduct of cases by the community under the presidency of the count and of the magistrate, whose functions were merely formal; a strictly formal verbal process, without appeal, led to the decision. As early as the time of Charlemagne the communities proved inefficient and the Emperor replaced them by sheriffs (*Schöffen*). This reform was not sufficient. The *Schöffen* court in the late Middle Ages had completely broken down. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in all European states, it was necessary to introduce a monarchic system of court organization, judges appointed by the ruler, and a scientific body of law. But the change from the old to the new was extremely difficult. To create a learned body of judges was no easy task, especially for the lower courts. Old and new institutions remained for hundreds of years, existing side by side, and mutually obstructing each other. The Roman Law gained the upper hand more and more from the fifteenth century on, not as a better, but as a written, learned system of a higher state of civilization. The legal procedure of the Roman Church, with its principles of equity, and that of the princes and their counsellors, which was fashioned after it, was preferred to the procedure of the old court organizations. At the same time there grew up the written procedure with clerks of the court. Next, from the eighteenth century on, there appeared, as an important step forward, the collegiate courts, like the Imperial Court and the higher princely courts.

In the local courts everything remained unchanged; the functions of the sheriffs sank, in most places, to mere coöperation in the drawing up of legal documents. The judges had insufficient legal training, or none at all; they became dependent on grasping clerks and cunning lawyers, as well as on the latter's go-betweens, the so-called procurators, who were the channel through which all corruption passed. Almost all the judges, especially those of the lower courts, were without regular pay and were supposed to

live from perquisites of the court. As late as the sixteenth century, the courts sat only one to two weeks four times yearly, although the written procedure long since had demanded a continuous official activity throughout the whole year. The civil law was entirely uncertain, the criminal barbaric; the procedure was everywhere conducted according to precedent and whim. Interference with justice by the princes and their commissioners was the order of the day; the dragging out of the cases was promoted by the cupidity of the judges and lawyers, and the tediousness of the written procedure became unbearable. As there was confidence in no body of judges, in no city or manorial court, the sole hope of a just decision rested in sending the papers in the case to the law faculties, or to the few *Schöffen* courts that were still respected. Jurisdiction in Germany reached its lowest point about 1650.

The attempts at reform in Brandenburg-Prussia from 1650 to 1740 were numerous—but of little avail. Provincial upper courts were created; in 1717 criminal cases were taken from the local county courts, that is to say, from the overlords; in 1718, in East Prussia, the county law was reformed; frequent attempts were made to revive the system of oral pleadings in the Berlin Upper Court (*Kammergericht*). But it remained mere patchwork. The reformers were powerless against the advocates of the old dilly-dallying methods. There were no funds with which to pay competent judges.

It was the great achievement of Frederick the Great and of his relentlessly energetic High Chancellor, Samuel Cocceji, that during the period from 1745 to 1755 an upright, learned body of judges was created, no longer dependent on perquisites, but with regular salaries, that the "procurators" were done away with and reduced to lawyers' clerks, that the body of judges and lawyers was thoroughly overhauled and placed under close surveillance, and that the payment of lawyers was deferred until the termination of the cases. Through Cocceji justice became speedy in Prussia. Cocceji, says Ranke, founded the Prussian judiciary anew. From that period on, he adds, personal freedom was to a certain extent guaranteed. Star Chamber justice was done away with and jurisdiction confined to the regular courts admitting of two appeals. All judges stood now under the surveillance of the chief justice, all lower courts under that of the upper courts. The training of judges was strictly regulated by examination and by promotion through the preparatory grades of *Auskultator* and *Referendar*. The personnel and the organization of justice had now reached the plane to which the Prussian adminis-

trative system had already attained in the years from 1680 to 1740.

What Cocceji began was completed by two men, less ruthless than he, but standing even above him in point of moral nobility and intellectual endowment—the High Chancellor von Carmer and his Councillor Suarez (1780-1795).

The reform of the civil procedure (April 26, 1781, and July 6, 1793), the introduction of oral pleadings, the increase of the judges' power to unlimited freedom in establishing the material truth, and the limitation of lawyers' activity was designed to secure justice for the peasants and the people of the lower classes. This has been called the procedure by inquiry: The judge was bound *ex officio* to discover the truth. He was vested with a kind of tutelary, almost state-socialistic power, which was to counteract the untrustworthiness of the lawyers of that time and the helplessness of the litigants. The judges were intended to occupy, on a small scale, a position such as the all-powerful king occupied on a large scale, with his desire to understand and to help the lowly. The windmill owner of Sans-Souci who is supposed to have impelled the King to leave him in peace by saying: *"Il y a des juges à Berlin,"* never spoke thus. But Carmer's code of procedure, like the King's interference in behalf of the miller Arnold against his overlord, Count Schmettau, made the whole Prussian people believe that there was now *one* state in Europe in which the obscure man could secure justice against the great man.

Attempts were made in all the greater German territories, from the sixteenth century on, to create a uniform whole out of the conglomeration of the adopted Roman Law, the German legal institutions, and the legislation subsequent to the year 1500. Friedrich Wilhelm I attempted to do what Leibnitz had advised; Cocceji also outlined a plan, but only Carmer possessed the courage to influence Frederick the Great to attempt the creation of a code comprehensible to the people. It was intended to make it so clear and complete that the disputes of the jurists should cease. The outline was printed during the period 1784 to 1788; and despite many attacks and criticisms it was put into effect on June 1, 1792. Its aim was not to create a new law but to codify and elucidate the existing law.

This general common law (*Allgemeines Landrecht*) reflects the conditions of the half-feudal, half-absolute state, of the bureaucratic and military state. It was from the start subject to much discussion, but it was nevertheless recognized as an epoch-making advance by the greatest and most far-seeing men of the

age. It provided for the first time a uniform law for a state with radically different provinces. It created a fixed and purely German law nomenclature; it was a compromise between Roman and German law. It vastly increased legal security. It helped more than anything else the transition from the "police state" to the legal state. It was the worthy predecessor of the French *code civil* and of the German general civil code (*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*) of our day. It became the foundation for the whole German legal life of the nineteenth century.

The nineteenth century continued to build upon the foundations of the eighteenth century. The jurisdiction of the manorial courts in Prussia, which had long since been restricted, was in 1849 entirely abolished, although it was much superior to the jurisdiction of the English justices of the peace; Lord Brougham, as is well known, once remarked of the latter that it was worse and more partial even than the justice of a Turkish "cadi." Trial by jury was introduced. The great reforms in procedure and court constitution between 1877-1879 created in all Germany a uniform procedure, and attached laymen as assessors to the courts of the first instance. In short, Germany has to-day a system which, as regards the legal protection of the people and of individuals, is surpassed by that of no other nation; it has enjoyed this, in its main outlines and principles, for quite a number of generations.

We come finally to the question of self-government. It is, in the proper form, the best training school for political freedom; it can, however, develop along false lines into an instrument of class rule and of political corruption. We understand, in this connection, by self-government the administration of the municipalities and other communal units by the citizens themselves, with more or less independence as regards the state authorities and officials. If this independence goes as far as it went at one time in the German Free Cities, or in the greater Territorial Cities from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, as well as among the manorial lords, or in the county and district corporations, the resistance of the state to this independence and its abuses becomes necessary, as the German princes from 1500 to 1800 found to be the case. Since in England a strong monarchy from the early Norman kings down to the Tudors kept the nobility and cities subordinate to the central power, the healthy self-government which grew up in the county, township and parish caused great admiration on the Continent, especially in Germany, down to the time of Gneist, and sugges-

tions were made for its imitation in Germany. But the advocates of such measures failed to see that the English self-government in county and township had long since degenerated into class rule.

In the state of to-day the central power and its organs must rule absolutely in the whole legislative field, in foreign and military affairs, and as regards justice. In the field of finance, police and internal administration the authorities of the municipalities and other communal corporations may be entrusted with the carrying out of certain governmental affairs; others, especially institutions of general utility of all kinds, may be left entirely or partially to them, ordinarily in such a manner that they choose their own bodies and appoint their own officials for these undertakings. Especially does the purely business administration of the municipalities belong to this category.

Where the communal authorities are inspired by the proper feeling, this self-government, within its proper limits, is a higher form of political life. These locally chosen authorities stand nearer to concrete conditions, and bring a great sum of character and intelligence to bear on the public service which would otherwise be lost to it. Such a self-government educates the whole people politically, raises its sense of solidarity. But it must not be forgotten in this connection that the well-to-do classes are primarily the ones to enter this service of self-government, and that they are continually subjected to the temptation of misuse of power. An eminent teacher of German constitutional law said, therefore, not without justification: "Self-government is always more or less class rule." Only by taking this point of view, which enables one to contemplate as a whole the historic development of self-government and its different possible results, is one able correctly to appreciate the various phases of its growth.

From this point of view it is easy to understand why the German governmental authorities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were obliged, in the same manner as they found it necessary to eliminate the rule of the nobles in the heart of the state, to resist just as strongly the freedom of the German cities as that of the manorial rulers and of the county and district corporations of the rural nobility. The Prussian city administration, as well as the rule of the rural nobility, had to be brought under governmental control during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the administration of the taxes and debts of the Estates proved too corrupt and had to be transferred to the state. It was found necessary to place the district and county

government under partial or entire state management, and the city administration had to be freed of its pronounced abuses.

Let us examine somewhat more closely the transformation of urban and rural self-government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The German Free and Territorial Cities were in the seventeenth century in a deplorable condition. The economic decadence from the end of the sixteenth century, the destruction due to the Thirty Years' War, the vast indebtedness, the clinging to the ideal of local economic independence in the age of upgrowth of national states, the selfish exploitation of city rule by a small oligarchy—these are the characteristics of urban life of that period. The rising territorial state had to combat as anachronistic the independence of the cities in matters of economic policy. The cities in which the rulers of the great German states had their abodes, Berlin, Munich, and Dresden, began at this time to revive again, but all others were losing ground in proportion as they were independent.

In the Brandenburg-Prussian cities, governmental interference was brought about primarily through the municipalities' inability to meet the interest on their debts, and through the complaints of their creditors. Princely commissions for investigation were numerous from 1680 to 1750; they revealed not alone the hopeless condition of the city finances, but an abyss of the worst abuses of the governing clique as well.

In the same period, through the creation of a standing army, the cities were given princely garrisons—barracks did not yet exist. Every citizen had soldiers permanently billeted upon him; the commandant of the city assumed position beside the aldermen and was forced frequently to interfere. He had to inform himself as regards the city administration, negotiate with the body of aldermen, and regulate various matters in conjunction with them. He reported to the War Commissioner of the territory or to the Chief War Commissioner in Berlin. As the old direct city taxes proved unavailing, the Great Elector and his son introduced in their place the city excise tax (1664 to 1713), which the aldermen generally opposed, but which the plain people desired. It was possible to collect this tax satisfactorily and justly only by changing it from a city to a princely tax. The commissioner, the so-called tax councillor of later times, who supervised the excise in six to fifteen neighboring cities, automatically became between 1680 and 1740 the royal comptroller for the whole city administration. Was his report too unfavorable, there would be appointed for the city in question, for one or two years, one of the above-mentioned investi-

gating commissions, which would result in a rearrangement of the whole constitution and administration of the city in the form of a so-called "city hall ordinance."

The most important point, at the same time the preliminary for all material reform, was the regulation of the city indebtedness. A greater part of the indebtedness was paid off from the royal treasury, the unduly high rate of interest was reduced, in some cases the means for payment of interest and refunding were gained from the excise tax. The suffrage for the city council and city courts and their powers were regulated anew. Everywhere the yearly changing city administration was done away with, and a *magistratus perpetuus* created; the superfluous and dishonest aldermen and city officials were eliminated and replaced by better elements. Appointment to many offices by the head of the state remained customary, although the old right of election was usually not formally rescinded. The aldermen, who were, according to precedent, called in for auditing purposes but contemptuously treated—in case of dispute even beaten—gained an established position. The *magistratus perpetuus,* cut down to a smaller number of members, came under the strict surveillance of the tax commissioner (*Steuerrat*).

This commissioner also, it is true, occasionally abused his power. But, on the whole, the tax commissioners in the eighteenth century were among the most capable officials; through them the whole city administration once more became honest, economical and just. An entirely new and better police system was rendered possible. The greatest obstacle to such a system was eliminated. In almost every city of from five to forty thousand inhabitants and over, there were from two to five independent communities, existing side by side, and ten to twenty so-called princely, noble, and religious "franchises" (*Freiheiten*), independent of all city authority. This condition was done away with by centralizing all executive powers in the hands of one city council and of the city commandant. The Prussian state obtained thus from 1680 to 1750 uniformly governed cities, an ideal which London did not realize until 1888 or 1889, for which reason the condition of its police and administration was often likened, even in England herself, to that of Constantinople.

The Prussian state had thus from 1706 to 1808 achieved a city government thoroughly controlled by the central power, but absolutely honest and capable, and which was able to make proper use of the far-reaching communal freedom that Baron von Stein gave to it in the City Ordinance (*Städteordnung*) of

1808. This law became the basis of Prussian and German independent self-government of modern times. It is, together with the law regarding general military service of 1814, politically the most important and beneficent German law of the nineteenth century.

The Prussian City Ordinance of 1808 determined the later laws of 1831 and 1853, and those of the new Prussian provinces, and up to a certain point also those of the rest of Germany. Its characteristic features were: 1. That the collegiate magistracy governs the city. 2. That the representatives of the citizens, the aldermen, elect the members of the magistracy and also vote the budget and the taxes. 3. That numerous deputations or commissions formed from the magistracy, the aldermen, and qualified citizens administer the city's affairs in detail. In the magistracy there is a minority of paid members elected for from six to twelve years (burgomaster, syndic, chamberlain, public works commissioners and superintendent of schools), together with a majority of honorary members elected from among the citizens and who usually give their whole time to the city's administration. The paid members receive a pension in case of failure of re-election. The best elements of the professional state officials have placed themselves at the disposal of the cities for these positions. The aldermen naturally possess great influence, for the reason that they appropriate the funds for the administration of the city; but one reaches membership of the council as a rule only after having learned to fulfill serious duties by years of work in the mixed commissions, and in the various administrative branches. In this manner the boards of aldermen of the German cities have, on the whole, been kept from developing into city parliaments, in which only honor, influence and contracts are sought and in which the majority, by cunningly devised tax schemes, lays the minority under contribution, and individuals selfishly pursue their own interests.

The German chief city burgomasters stand head and shoulders, as regards capacity and achievement, above the majority of their colleagues in other civilized states; the latter in part are capable only of presiding at banquets or of putting their name to what their secretaries have thought out, planned and submitted to them, like the Lord Mayor of London, or like the majority of the mayors of the French cities; those in the United States stand in many cases at the head of secret or open unions which plunder the cities, as has long been the case in New York.

The German burgomasters often play a decisive part in the German parliaments; they rise to ministerial positions or become chief burgomasters after having been ministers, like the present chief burgomaster of Berlin, who is a retired Imperial minister. The German burgomasters have become the real educators of the German people in political thought and in the fulfillment of their duty toward the state.

The German city constitution founded by Stein was justly taken as the model for the Prussian county ordinance (*Kreisordnung*) and the constitution of the counties from 1872 on. Before this end was attained, however, the Prussian and German county constitutions had to pass through many crises and make many false starts.

If in East Prussia the rural village communities remained too long merely an appanage of the feudal manor, nevertheless the development of the aristocratic County Estates (*Kreisstände*), from the seventeenth century on, and their employment for the military and tax purposes of the state from 1640 to 1806, resulted in the county commissioner (*Landrat*), who had originally been chosen from among their members, becoming more and more a royal official, without ceasing to be a trusted confidant of those within the jurisdiction of the county. Hardenburg attempted to make him altogether a dependent professional official, but did not succeed in his attempt. The feudal reaction, under the guidance of the romantic Crown Prince, from 1820 to 1840, gained the upper hand in the conduct of the state, without being able to suppress entirely the old Prussian liberal officialdom, which from 1806 to 1820 had saved and reformed the state. The provincial constitutions on the basis of the old Estates and the provincial county ordinances (1823 to 1848) were a baneful victory of the feudal reaction, but the controlling officials did not surrender to these bodies the right of taxation or other important functions. The victory of liberalism brought from 1848 to 1850 a one-sided liberal county and communal ordinance, which was again set aside in 1853. The reform of local self-government made no progress until 1872. But then, from 1872 to 1891, came one of the most sweeping reforms which the Prussian state ever experienced: the introduction of a healthy form of rural self-government, together with the reform of the administrative organization and the creation of the jurisdiction by administrative law courts (*Verwaltungsrechtsprechung*) calculated to protect the rights of the individuals and the public. We will not enumerate the individual laws in question. A central posi-

tion is held, as mentioned, by the new county constitution of 1872, an imitation of the city ordinance. Its characteristic points are a justly divided representation of the great landed proprietors and the smaller holdings, and of the small cities belonging to the county system; a corresponding taxation of the counties voted by this representative body; and a reform of the office of county commissioner (*Landrat*). The *Landrat* remains half state-official, half-trusted confidant of the county, but a county committee assists and controls him. The county authorities attend to government affairs, and the economic questions of the county. The development of administrative jurisdiction, the reform of the local governments and of the provincial authorities, finally the ordinance for rural communities (*Landgemeindeordnung*) of July 3, 1891, all conceived and carried out in the same spirit, complete the great reform.

The spiritual fathers of this reform were the liberal historian of constitutional law, Rudolf Gneist, and the conservative Minister of the Interior, Fritz von Eulenburg; moderate liberals and those conservatives friendly to great reforms had united for this work, towards which there was violent opposition. Bismarck had come to realize more and more the necessity for such reform. It was a question of imposing strict duties of self-government upon the county aristocracy and the peasants, and of letting the lower classes share in these duties. By this means, that which had been done for the city inhabitants by the city ordinance of 1808, was now done for the open country.

All classes down to the workers take part to-day in the city and county administration. The beneficial effects of this are seen to-day among the Social Democrats whose share in the system of self-government is praised by all unbiased leading officials, especially by the burgomasters. They are doing excellent service in this line, and they thereby become accustomed to fulfill serious official duties, like the middle and upper classes.

In most of the other German states, reforms similar to those here described have begun to be undertaken. England, after long seeking in the dark, achieved modern laws of self-government comparable with those of Germany only through her two great Local Government Acts of August 13, 1888, and March 15, 1894. In France, Napoleon did away with almost all self-government, and since 1870 not much has been done to change this.

What is left, then, of the reproach of our enemies and of

many of our lukewarm well-wishers among the neutrals, that Germany is to-day still a reactionary military and bureaucratic state, without political freedom, and that since Bismarck's days, instead of working for political and democratic advance, we have striven only for power and military strength, and finally that we proclaim the doctrine that might is greater than right and wish to destroy England's position of world supremacy and place ourselves in her stead by the power of arms? It is true that the German Empire was born amid the clangor of arms from 1864 to 1870; it would not exist at all had it not been for the Prussian army and Bismarck's plans for practical political power. But would the United States have come into existence without the Revolutionary War, without Washington, without France's military aid, and would it continue to exist without the victory of the Northern States in the Civil War? Is it possible to conceive of France without her wars from 1490 to 1815? Did England's world power arise without maritime, commercial and colonial wars extending through centuries?

It is certain that Prussia and Germany issued triumphant from the pitiful divisions of the German nation in the Holy Roman Empire only by means of the Brandenburg-Prussian military and bureaucratic state, which finally from 1866 to 1870 brought about German unity. It was not victorious, however, because of its military strength alone, but because at the same time it possessed a model interior administration and because its organization represented a political training and schooling of the highest order for Germany.

Certain South German states, it is true, did not gain a constitutional form of government until the period from 1818 to 1848—Prussia, indeed, not until 1848 to 1850. It would perhaps have been better for Prussia had she entered upon the constitutional path as early as 1820 or 1830. But the earlier entrance upon this course would not materially have altered the fact that the monarchy, army and officials, even after the granting of the constitution, remained the chief controlling powers, which remain to the present day. Nor would an earlier adherence to such principles have altered the fact that Germany's geographic position, as it had done for centuries and is still doing to-day, invited her neighbors to invasion and conquest. Germany would have shared the fate of Poland, if the military and bureaucratic state had not been victorious and survived, feudal control by the nobles being out of the question. If in 1830, 1848, or later, some, or even a majority of the German states had followed the course of the Swiss democracy, the spirit of the "little canton"

would have become triumphant with us, as in Switzerland. We should assuredly not have become a united Empire. Nor should we, in compensation, have produced other poets like Goethe and Schiller, which, according to English jingoism, should be our only legitimate occupation.

But if we did not have the official aristocracy of our conscientious civil servants and of our incomparable body of officers, we might have a ruling aristocracy of money and capital, such as on the whole impose their will in England, France and in the United States. In that case, to be sure, we should have a somewhat more complete democratization of all our institutions. We are undoubtedly advancing toward changes along these lines—for example, toward a reform of the Prussian suffrage law. But we desire neither England's nor France's parliamentary system, nor party rule such as that in the United States, based in part upon purchased votes. Certainly, many of our institutions are still a long way from perfection. But we, nevertheless, consider them better than those of the great western democratic countries—at all events more adapted to Germany's spirit and history.

Undoubtedly, democracy is able to bring forth healthy conditions in small states. And the great states, likewise, to-day strive more earnestly than formerly to educate the mass of the people to self-rule and to a share in the government. But in doing this certain dangers are always run: the democratic form of government usually brings forth capitalistic class-rule, corruption, buying of votes, and an uncertain, changeable foreign policy. At all events, the blessings of democratic reforms are to be gained only in those cases where a strong, self-reliant, central power is preserved, and where the populace, before gaining greater rights and influence, has been accustomed for a long time to important government duties. The degree of admissible democratic institutions is determined to-day more than ever, as Seeley teaches us, according to the security of the state's exterior position (such as Switzerland, but not Germany, enjoys), and according to the degree in which healthy, aristocratic strength is preserved, such as England possesses in her gentry, and Germany in her officialdom.

The present-day German Empire presents a strange mixture of "great state" and "little state," of aristocratic forces and conditions in Prussia, of democratic in the west and south. These forces have learned to adapt themselves to each other, to understand each other, and to unite for the accomplishment of great tasks. Prussia has developed from a territorial state,

which was almost a republic of nobles, to a constitutional state, after passing through the military stage; she has educated her aristocracy to the conception of public duty through service as officials and officers and through self-government. The royal power has reconciled itself with the democratic and constitutional tendencies, on the basis of the official state which it preeminently represents. The Imperial power has made social reform its motto, in conjunction with exterior protection, without in any wise destroying the spirit of industrial enterprise. The landed aristocracy and the aristocracy of wealth have clasped hands, and each of them finds honor and occupation in the army and in the administration. The means of reconciliation with the lower classes is found in the universal duty of bearing arms.

Our ministers and party leaders spring to-day almost more from the middle class than from the aristocracy, in part also from the lower classes. But almost all of these political leaders have been through the school of official service and of self-administration, so that they do not bring with them into their high positions the instincts of the money-maker or the vanity of the position-seeker. Bismarck and the Eulenburgs, Caprivi, Hohenlohe and Bülow, Bethmann and Delbrück, Bötticher and Miquel, Bennigsen and Eugen Richter, as well as Schulze-Delitzsch, rose by passing through this school and that of self-government. In the middle-sized and small states purely official ministers are more common even than in Prussia. Naturally this type of character, which prevails on the ministerial benches and among the party leaders, has its drawbacks as well as its advantages. But where does one find a type of humanity, a ruling class, or an institution without the complementary faults of its good qualities?

The attacks which are made to-day in such violently exaggerated fashion, especially in England and France, and even in the United States, against the manner in which Germany is governed, result chiefly from a lack of understanding of German conditions and from the difficulty of grasping them with English or French conceptions and prejudices, when viewed from the standpoint of fundamentally different governmental, administrative, legal and social conditions. In addition, in individuals, anger at the destruction of war, the influence of aroused national passion, personal experiences, the degree of politico-historical training, or the lack of it are factors which give birth to such fairy tales as the one that Germany was driven into the war by the teachings of a neurasthenic philos-

opher (Nietzsche), of a chauvinistic general (von Bernhardi) and of a great historian who hated England (von Treitschke). These three wicked men, it is claimed, have for the last twenty to thirty years hypnotized the whole of Germany, deceived her into believing that England was bound for destruction in any event, and that Germany must seize her inheritance. We shall not examine this stupid invention more closely; it is disproved in another part of this book. In closing, we shall say a few words further in regard to the misleading statements of President Emeritus Eliot, of Harvard University, in the *New York Times*. He is well known to many German scholars, who had certainly hoped to hear more veracious and more sensible things from him about Germany.

We are not conversant with his earlier work as a natural scientist. As a director of the leading American university, his achievements have been great and exemplary. But as a political historian he is an absolute failure; he looks down upon Germany with arrogant superiority, because he sees that Germany has other institutions than his native country.

He speaks somewhat in this manner: You Germans have, it is true, achieved something in literature, art, science and education, but if you do not renounce your autocratic government, your standing army with its universal military service, your secret treaties, your unyielding bureaucracy, your love of power, your aspirations for colonies, we free Americans can have no sympathy for you.

Much—indeed, most of that which he blames us for—applies to the majority of European and non-European states, and above all to France, Russia and England. But France appears to him sufficiently democratic to be pardoned for having founded by military means an immense colonial empire in the last forty years. He closes his eyes to Russia's brutal policy of force and conquest, because she was the originator of the Hague conferences! In regard to England, he does not seem to be quite aware through what measures of force her tremendous colonial empire came into existence, or how gigantic her conquests by force have been precisely in the period since 1870. But England, in compensation for this, does not have universal military duty, which, according to him, takes away freedom, restricts unfettered social movement, and costs even the well-to-do liberty, health, and under certain conditions life itself. All states to-day enter into secret treaties, even the United States, but Germany alone is made responsible for this. Germany is blamed by Eliot for having conquered and annexed Schleswig-Holstein

and Alsace-Lorraine, in 1864 and 1870, respectively; he forgets to say that both were German countries, and that the latter had once been taken from us by force. Eliot complains bitterly that there was no vote of the people taken in regard to these conquests. I should like to remind him of what his colleague, Sloane (*Preussische Jahrbücher,* Vol. 158, p. 460), says in regard to the conquests of the United States: "We have gained neighboring territory through force, through war or occupation, and through purchase or exchange. In none of these cases have we inquired through a vote of the people as to the wishes of the inhabitants in the particular territory, nor have we approached the Hague tribunal for advice. We have always had the same excuse, namely, that it was required by our interests." Professor Sloane possesses the historical and constitutional knowledge in which President Eliot is so sadly lacking. The latter declares that our relation to other states cannot improve until we have repudiated Bismarck's policies. Eliot would assuredly consider us insane were we to demand of the Americans that they renounce the policy of Washington and of the great Federalists, who gave them a fatherland, in the same manner as Bismarck's policy gave us ours.

Eliot takes the attitude of the child who expects roses from an apple-tree when he blames us for not sharing the political opinions of the present-day American, who stands for "human freedom and peace." We answer him that we do stand for these things, but we cannot strive for such goals at all times nor always under the conditions which appear proper to him and to some Americans who share his views.

We have reached the end of our discussion. Its aim was to attempt an exposition of the spirit of our public life as this presents itself to the German writer on economics and constitutional law. Naturally, our view is in direct opposition to that taken of this spirit by our enemies, who in many cases are quite ignorant of Germany and her history.

The judgment of our enemies will not be easily changed. But the truth in regard to the causes of the present war and the state of German conditions will, nevertheless, finally prevail—more, to be sure, through the logic of facts than through the efforts of German scholars. With time the world will learn the truth as to German militarism, German lack of freedom and German barbarism. It will be recognized that Germans know well how to appreciate the blessings of political freedom, but only when it is joined with a strong sense of feel-

ing for the state and for the fulfilment of political duty. The fact will be recognized that we suffer from fewer abuses of class power, because in addition to and above the aristocracy of wealth, we possess an unimpeachable official aristocracy and a strong monarchy and imperial power. It will be recognized that we appreciate the right of self-government for municipalities as highly as other nations, but that we are willing to grant these rights only to such as have been educated to them. It will be recognized that we are no warlike, aggressive nation, precisely on account of the universal duty of bearing arms, and that we are by far less greedy of conquests than the English, the Russians, the French and the Americans. It will be recognized that our imperialism demands only "a place in the sun," while that of England aims at exclusive control of international trade. The world will come to realize that we protect the smaller states better than England, unless they conspire against us. We prevented France in 1830 from annexing Belgium, and in 1867 Napoleon from annexing Luxemburg.

In contrast to the world-embracing plans of our enemies, we stand for the balance of power among all the great civilized states, for the system which the great Scipio family once desired to introduce in the Mediterranean, when selfish merchants of Rome forced the state into the course of international trade supremacy. Since that time, in every case, the momentarily greatest states have succumbed to the same temptation—first Spain, then Holland, then France, then England. To-day the United States faces a like danger. These tendencies toward world supremacy have always injured rather than benefited the states manifesting them. We Germans shall not succumb to this danger. We are, therefore, the nation capable of doing most for the advancement of international law and international arbitration.

CHAPTER VII

THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

DR. HANS LUTHER, CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN

CO-OPERATION of the citizen in public affairs is a characteristic of the modern state. Strange to say, the opinion is encountered among foreigners, even among intelligent and usually well-informed foreigners, that such a citizenship scarcely exists in Germany, if, indeed, at all. This conception seems to result from the conviction that the democratic form of government is the only one that gives citizens the proper influence on the destinies of the state. This is a confusion between form and substance. The important question is the realization of the state as a corporate entity in which the individual lives in freedom and can assert himself. By what means this goal is to be reached is a question of form, which must be decided differently according to the historical and geographical conditions of the individual nations. The constitutional principles of the so-called democratic states, likewise, vary greatly among themselves. It is only necessary, for example, to compare the United States with France. Furthermore, constitutional forms, like all things human, are subject to development. The German constitution will continue to progress without doubt in the line of an ever-increasing development of citizenship.

If the present condition of citizenship within the German Empire is to be understood, one must consider not only the right of suffrage, as it exists in the Empire for the *Reichstag,* and in the component states of the Union, *e. g.,* for the Prussian legislature, or *Abgeordnetenhaus.* The fact is of great importance that citizens whose appointment depends on election coöperate to a marked degree in ordinary administration—that is to say, not alone in connection with legislation, which is reserved for the legislative bodies. Such elected members, for example, are found in Prussia in the County Councils (*Kreisausschüsse*) and District Councils (*Bezirksausschüsse*). These authorities are called upon to decide in regard to a variety of important administrative questions; in addition, they constitute Administrative Courts (*Verwaltungsgerichte*). Fur-

ther, the laity is well represented also in the other courts. Thus, the more serious crimes are tried by the *Schwurgericht,* in which the jurors decide questions of fact as well as of guilt. Less serious offenses are decided before a court consisting of a professional judge, who presides, and two laymen, who are called *Schöffen.* Laymen are active, likewise, in civil cases, in so far as they deal with affairs of trade and industry or with conditions relating to commercial employers and employees; in all of these courts the presiding officer alone is a professional judge, while the associates, who are in the majority, are laymen. The associates in the industrial and mercantile courts (*Gewerbegericht, Kaufmannsgericht*) are chosen directly from the members of the business in question, primarily according to the principle of proportional election.

All these rights of the citizens concern the state in a narrower sense. No one, however, will be able to judge or even to understand the German state organism who sees nothing on the one hand but the state, and on the other the individual. Public life is built up in numerous intermediate steps passing over the family, over the community, the profession, race connections and many other unifying conditions until a comprehensive whole is reached. This comprehensive whole alone is the state in the narrow sense. If, now, it is the duty of the state organism to adapt itself to the actual conditions of the nation's life, it must in its various activities do justice to all of these intermediate phenomena. The resulting organisms of a vastly manifold nature are, however, not an exclusive peculiarity of the German Empire. England has a great number of such organisms intervening between the individual and the state in the narrow sense, and which in their collectivity represent the sum total of public life (*Staatsleben*). These intermediate organisms exist, of course, also in France and other countries, although less developed. Hence, if one wishes to gauge the importance of the individual in public life, the question must not be: What influence has the individual upon the affairs of the state in the narrow sense? It must be framed thus: To what degree does the individual play a part in the general expression of public life? Having thus correctly expressed our question, we are faced by an abundance of rights, but likewise duties, of the individual citizen in the public life of Germany. In no other country are the intermediate organisms between the state and the individual endowed with so many rights and so much actual influence on public life as in the German Empire.

The legal point of departure for these intermediate organ-

isms is the conception of self-government, or municipal home-rule. Considered purely from the juridical point of view, the corporations for the exercise of self-government are legal personages of the public law, who are not subordinate to the state as its appointees, but stand side by side with the state with a certain degree of independence. By means of such a legal formula, however, one cannot grasp the fundamental nature of these typically German forms of expression of public life. The whole of German history reveals a strong impulse of the people toward self-government, in the broadest sense of the word. This tendency has at times proved most dangerous in the history of the German people. In the old German Empire the tendency of the individual to regard rather the particular object close at hand than a more distant general goal was a destructive element, which was overcome only gradually along the course of development leading through the strong "territorial state." To-day, however, self-government is no longer a disturbing factor. For the mighty German Empire of the present has given to the German people that state and national consciousness which almost all the other nations of the world have possessed for a long time, and which they, therefore, begrudged us Germans. On this basis, self-government is a source of strength, since it directs the attention of the individual not alone to those affairs of public life which are removed from his immediate perception, but also to those matters directly under his eye and hence subject to his judgment. A German body politic without a system of self-government is unthinkable.

In the modern development of self-government, the cities, or municipalities (*Stadtgemeinden*), can claim for themselves the right of priority. They are followed by the rural communities (*Landgemeinden*). Organizations of a higher kind in Prussia are the counties (*Landkreise*), which embrace the smaller cities and the rural communities, and the provincial units (*Provinzialverbände*), which are formed from the greater cities and the counties. Provinces and counties are called communal unions (*Kommunalverbände*), in contrast to the single communities (*Gemeinde*). Besides these communal corporations, with extensive functions, there are still a large number of special organs of self-government, namely, such bodies as are called upon to fulfill one or more definitely specified duties. These bodies have in many cases come down from olden times, especially as local associations for common interests (*Interessenvereinigungen*). These coöperative bodies are most highly developed in regard to water rights; an example are the numer-

ous dike-associations. Modern vocational representation is of more widespread importance: the chambers of agriculture, the chambers of commerce, the chambers of trade and industry; undoubtedly also we shall soon have labor chambers or chambers of workmen. All of these chambers, each of which is limited to a definite territory, have public legal authority to protect the vocational interests which they represent. In the case of disputes as to the extent of their authority, they can appeal to the decision of the Administrative Courts. The Government does not exercise any influence on the appointment of the chief officers of these bodies for self-government. The members of the trades or callings represented in these chambers work in perfect freedom through their many organs. Further, these bodies are not restricted in their freedom of combination. In this way associations have arisen whose influence on our entire public life has been very perceptible: the Council of Agriculture (*Landwirtschaftsrat*) from the chambers of agriculture, the Diet of Commerce (*Handelstag*) from the chambers of commerce, the Diet of Trade and Industry from the chambers of trade and industry. Legislation has recognized these free associations in various ways; for example, the Council of Agriculture, as well as the Diet of Commerce, were given seats in the Imperial Distribution Board (*Reichsverteilungsstelle*), whose important task is the distribution of the grain and flour on hand to the various communities.

The German Diet of Cities (*Städtetag*) is also represented in the Imperial Distribution Board. It is a union of the German cities sprung from their own initiative. This association is all the more important because it is in the city organizations that the idea of self-government is most highly developed. The tasks of the cities are more comprehensive than those of any other self-governing body, including the other communal corporations. The counties and the rural communities have, only when considered as entities, approximately identical tasks. The activity of the provinces is more or less confined to definite lines, such as highways, care of the insane, of the blind and of the deaf and dumb, and supplementary charities. The cities, on the contrary, can each claim in their particular territory the same universality of aims as the state. To be sure, they are excluded from a number of fields of public activity, naturally from that of foreign affairs. For the rest, the cities determine alone what tasks lie in their province simply by assuming them. Their decision is influenced by the state only to the degree that certain tasks are assigned to the cities by law. On the other

hand, there is no legal requirement for the cities to secure the state's approval before extending the field of their activity. Actual development has forced them, in many fields, to the forefront of progress. A few statistics will prove the truth of this statement in a general way. In the period from 1895 to 1908 the budgets of Prussian cities of 25,000 inhabitants and over increased more than threefold. At present the total cost of running the German communities is not less than that of the Empire itself. The debts of the municipalities—in the main contracted for profitable purposes—are notably higher than the Imperial Government debt before the outbreak of the war.

The constitutional form of the German cities is republican—if, indeed, one can properly apply to self-governing bodies this conception adapted to the state as a whole. Chief importance, in this connection, attaches to allowing individual citizens the greatest possible participation in affairs. It may with confidence be asserted that the acts of the self-governing bodies are acts of the citizens. To be sure, chief place in the city administration is held by a burgomaster, generally styled "Chief Burgomaster," who is always a professional official, and nearly always a lawyer (jurist). His constitutional influence, however, is clearly circumscribed. He is not appointed by the central government (as in Holland), but is chosen by the other officials of the city, and requires only the approval of the state government. The overwhelming majority of Germans agree that this practice of filling the chief city positions with professional officials is one of the greatest safeguards for the relative independence of the cities from the state as a whole. Professional superiority of the central state officials, constantly in touch with public affairs, by which the layman is so likely to be unduly influenced, carries no weight with a Chief Burgomaster; for he, too, has professional experience, generally of an entire lifetime, to draw upon. The danger, moreover, that the Chief Burgomaster, since he himself is an official by profession, might secretly feel himself more in sympathy with the government officials than with the inhabitants of the city, is obviated in the first place by the fact that the other city officials elect him—generally for twelve years. Further, the preëminence of his position depends precisely upon the independence of the city administration from the state. Hence the professional Chief Burgomasters, as well as the assistant burgomasters, city councillors, deputies, etc., are in the practice of our public life determined supporters of the idea of self-government.

The position of these professional city officials within the

self-government organism is quite different in the various German states, nay, even within the various sections of the individual states. In this connection the individual "city ordinances" are determining. Efforts to create a uniform system in place of the existing variety are sporadic, and, except where special abuses have developed, are generally regarded as inadmissible interference with justifiable local peculiarities. This is a further proof that German constitutional life has not been built up according to some system or other thought out with pen and paper. Therefore, it finds no favor with those persons who believe in the beneficent power of only one formula. German constitutional life has developed organically and is, therefore, multiform and variegated, like a mountain group which does not lack uniformity in its basic outlines and inner harmony. We have thus in the city administration in some places the bicameral, and in others the uni-cameral system. In the case of the uni-cameral system, there is only one determinative body, namely, that of the city aldermen—municipal representation after the model of popular representation in the state; their presiding officer is the Chief Burgomaster. In the case of the bicameral system, there exists, beside the body of aldermen, a "magistracy," with co-determinative functions. In this system one of the aldermen is elected from their midst as chairman at their meetings, whereas the Chief Burgomaster presides in the "magistracy," but has only an equal vote with all the other members. The underlying principle, however, of all the municipal systems is the same, namely, that the aldermen are elected by the citizens. Electoral franchise varies in the different city statutes; in some we find three classes of voters, in others universal equality of direct suffrage, *et cetera*. The method is predominant of electing only a third of the representative body at a time, so that a certain amount of consistency is preserved in the administration. Widespread, but recently much opposed, is the so-called houseowners' privilege, whereby half of the aldermen must be houseowners. In all cases the aldermen are elected directly by the inhabitants of the city. The Chief Burgomaster, on the contrary, and the other principal city officials, and especially the members of the "magistracy" (where such exists), are elected in some cases by the aldermen, in others in the same manner as these themselves, by the citizens. The "magistracy" is not made up exclusively of professional officials, but at least half of its members are citizens who serve in an honorary capacity. This variety of suffrage rights does not appear to be of decisive influence on the

quality of the work of the various city administrations. For, taken by and large, despite the fact that certain differentiations exist, the main tendencies of the work of administrations is everywhere the same.

Everywhere, also, the prerequisite of administrative success is identical, namely, coöperation of citizens and professional officials. This coöperation is extremely close. In the first place, the fact that all city administration is local in many cases gives the aldermen familiar with the conditions the advantage over the professional officials, who are often strangers. Further, it is a distinctive characteristic of our system of self-government that the officials and the elected representatives of the citizens do not stand in the same relationship to each other as the Government and the popular representatives in the states. The division of power between Government and Parliament is nearly always such that the Parliament only has coöperative functions in regard to law-making and appropriation of funds. The actual administration, however, which is the part of the state's activity most keenly felt by the individual, is exercised exclusively by the Government. This is true not alone of Germany, but likewise of states with a parliamentary form of government. Matters are quite different in the German city administration. Here the representatives of the citizens, the aldermanic body, are the executive power, enjoying equal rights with the "magistracy." In those cities in which there is no "magistracy," the aldermen administer the city's affairs alone. It is self-evident, however, that so great a gathering as that of the aldermen (about 75 members in a city of 300,000; in Berlin, 150 members) cannot decide every single administrative question. For this reason the notion of "current administration" has developed in our municipalities. Every important act of administration, such as all special matters of moment, and, of course, all fundamental questions, are decided upon by the entire aldermanic body, at least concurrently. At the same time, the current administration is not controlled entirely by the professional officials. For this purpose administrative deputations, or committees, have been created. These administrative committees are the most ingenious contrivance of our city constitutions.

Since the Chief Burgomaster, or the "magistracy," is responsible for the current administration, the committees are subordinate to them in a legal sense, it is true; but as a matter of fact, the committees are a means of making the aldermen, and even individual private citizens, permanent participants in the current administration. For although, generally, a professional

official is chairman of the committees, the vast majority of the members are aldermen or so-called citizen deputies (*Bürgerdeputierte*)—that is to say, citizens who are elected as members of the committees by the aldermanic body, although they are not aldermen. With such a membership of the committees, it is impossible for the professional officials to conduct the administration otherwise than in agreement with the committees. The members of the committees, however, gain an insight into all the details of the city's affairs. The custom exists of having certain committee members constantly attend to a certain line of affairs. In this manner the city administration is conducted, in its smallest details, under continuous, active and decisive coöperation of the citizens. For as a rule the entire municipal administrative field is divided up among the various committees. Thus we have committees for the administration of buildings, gardens, charities, schools, hospitals, bathing and other sanitary branches, cemeteries, savings banks, street railways, drainage, water-works, gas-works, electric works, slaughter houses, etc.; in addition, according to the field of activity of the individual cities, there are committees for theatres, orchestras, museums, public libraries, harbor improvements, factory sites, forestry and universities. Further, there are special committees for individual undertakings, as for example, the building of a bridge, the making of treaties of municipal incorporation, coöperation in the building of a local railway, the starting of an exposition, etc. In these executive committees the citizens are called upon for extremely active administrative participation, for in these cases the citizens do not act from a distance and through the intermediary of some outside intelligence, as they do in the exercise of their federal suffrage right. The citizen here decides of his own knowledge, and the privilege therefore becomes an important duty. One ideal of citizenship is thereby achieved.

The best proof of any public institution is furnished by its success. By their fruits ye shall know them. Schmoller has already called attention to the fact that the excellence of the institutions of a state may be measured by the services rendered to the poorer classes. That these services are greater in the German Empire than in any other state in the world is disputed by no one who knows. In this connection, the activity of the German state as regards the poorer classes is to be measured not only from the point of view of the state—that is to say, on the assumption that the state wishes to maintain its human material in as good a condition as possible. Equally decisive is the desire to create real citizenship. This is apparent from the one

fact alone that the nucleus of these endeavors has always been the development of the school system. Germany is the country with the fewest illiterate persons. But likewise the social insurance institutions (sick insurance, invalidity insurance, old-age pensions and accident insurance, together with the assistance given dependent relatives), are devised with care and forethought in such a manner that the persons insured are not alone not dependent on the state but that they themselves or their employers pay a considerable insurance premium. Hence, these insurance undertakings, owing to the feeling of right and security which they give to the insured, work for an enhancement of citizenship. I shall now endeavor to describe more in detail the achievements of citizenship in the field of self-government.

As a determining factor the question may be asked, first, as to whether class politics are played in our municipal administration. In answering this question, one must start with the fact that the municipal representative bodies seldom reach their decisions from political considerations such as govern the politics of the state. Thus, in a great number of cities, factions are not known in the representative bodies. In other cities, it is true, factions exist, but the lines of division separating them are not political in a broad sense, but of a communal nature. In a final group of cities, it must be admitted, the factions correspond to certain political parties of the state, but even with such conditions, experience shows that important municipal decisions are reached without decisive regard for political party programmes. This applies to a considerable extent even to the Social Democratic party, which is striving to form a faction of its partisans in every municipal body, as it does in the national representative body. Since our city administration, owing to the extent of its activity and to the degree of its independence, is so powerful a body, the result is that the decisions are preponderantly made with a view to particular local conditions. These particular local conditions, however, usually cannot be included in a political programme, all the less so since every alderman has personal knowledge of the matters upon which he has to decide. For this reason, the work in the municipal bodies is far more personal than in the national representative bodies. This fact alone offers a certain protection against class politics, since personal opinions and private interests need not by any means coincide. Where they do agree, and where perhaps single families or groups of families possess a predominating influence, there exists the danger of affairs being con-

ducted against the public welfare; this danger may as a rule be considered the greater, the smaller the municipality is. The "houseowners' privilege," according to which half of the city representatives are houseowners, is regarded by many as a kind of legal basis for class politics.

In spite of this privelege, however, in very many cities the houseowners are of the opinion that the city administration does not sufficiently consider their interests, and that, owing to their burden of taxation, they stand in need of particular protection against the communal authorities. Now, the opinion of the houseowners is mistaken, but the very existence of such an opinion proves that one is not justified in speaking of a general houseowners' oligarchy in the city administrations.

There are still other drawbacks which some persons thought they discovered in the text of the city constitutions but which do not exist in practice; as, for instance, the fear lest the city administration, as controlled by the "three-class" suffrage, might act anti-socially. As a matter of fact, in the majority of the Prussian cities, suffrage is proportional to the income, so that only under quite exceptional circumstances can the working class gain a majority in the aldermanic body. Nevertheless, the city administrations show an unmistakable social tendency. Practically everywhere, at least in all the larger communities, the spontaneous activity of the city authorities in one line or the other has surpassed, in many cases very considerably, the social legislation of the *Reichstag*. Even the question of insurance against lack of occupation, toward which the German Imperial government has hitherto turned an unfriendly ear, has in many cities, in so far as single communities can undertake such a problem at all, been solved to a certain extent. Likewise, the workmen in the employ of the city enjoy benefits of a social nature which are entirely lacking in the vast majority of private undertakings.

Yet the number of the workmen employed by the cities is in many cases considerable. This is to be explained by the fact that the German municipalities, in ever-increasing degree, have taken over those great undertakings which are for the immediate benefit of the community. For us the thought is incomprehensible that the city's waterworks should not be under municipal administration. So, too, the gas and electric works are in a vast majority of cases under city management. The same is true of most of the tramways. All this was possible because the German cities were entitled to undertake these enterprises of their own volition, without need of any coöperation on the part of government. The

influence of capital, which is not slight in Germany, is equally powerless to influence the decisions of the city administrative boards. It is true that in individual cases capital has shown itself friendly to the idea of having the city acquire public utilities. On the whole, however, bitter fights were fought, for it was a question for the cities not of acquiring possession of the undertakings, but above all, of doing this at a price which insured a return on the money. Undoubtedly capital is at the present moment endeavoring to maintain, as far as possible, what remains of its power in city works, and to recover lost ground as far as possible. Characteristic illustrations of this condition are the "mixed economic concerns" (*gemischtwirtschaftliche Unternehmungen*), which have been much discussed in Germany recently. In this species of enterprise great public undertakings are to be worked conjointly by the municipal administration and private capital. Outwardly, the creation of such "mixed economic concerns" is advocated on the ground that purely public enterprises are not conducted in a sufficiently business-like manner. Whether this claim is to the point or not is open to dispute. It may be stated, however, that in such enterprises, which are carried on for the public interests, the essential point is by no means only to place them on a paying basis in the sense of a private enterprise; often the general economic condition of a city is benefited, when this aim is abandoned, as for example, when a tramway is run rather from the point of view of facilitating transportation than with an eye to high dividends. This is the common opinion in our cities. For this reason a year ago in the general session of the Diet of German Cities, the designation "mixed economic concerns" was replaced by the new one of the "public enterprise under legally private form" (*Öffentliche Unternehmung in Privatrechtsform*). This means that the German cities are determined, even if in such great enterprises they profit by existing advantages of the private legal form of the concern—as, for example, when founding their electricity works on the basis of a stock company—not to let them lose the character of public utility concerns conducted exclusively for the public interest. But opinions differ, likewise, in regard to the question whether the private legal form is advisable or necessary for the attainment of the desired goal. Thus, in regard to the gigantic electricity works of Berlin, which are soon to be taken over by the city, the attempt is to be made so to determine the changeable provisions of the city statutes that even without the private legal form the advantages of private management may, nevertheless, be secured for the new city undertaking; the directing and supervising board

are to enjoy the same powers as they would in a stock company.

Unfortunately, I must refrain from consideration of the other fields of activity to which the city administrations extended in times of peace. The reader is referred to the previous enumeration of the various administrative committees, which gives a general though by no means exhaustive idea of communal activity. That enumeration does not comprise all those matters which the city administration undertakes, not as intrinsically within its province, but which are referred to as affairs "transferred by the state." Under this head, for example, is to be reckoned the police administration, which is in the hands of special government authorities only in the largest Prussian cities, and even so not in all cases. On the other hand, I cannot close my discussion without mentioning the activity of the municipalities since the outbreak of the war.

The war tasks of the communes in the beginning were based upon legal obligations only to a slight degree. Even in regard to the granting of assistance to the families of soldiers, at least in the larger cities half of the burden rests on the shoulders of the municipalities, which must in addition devise proper means for carrying out the various measures. Thus, in every city the question arose as to what portion, if any, of the grants to soldiers' families, should be paid to the landlord as rent, and under what conditions. It had to be decided whether grants should be made in the form of money or goods. The extending of help to the unemployed lay entirely in the discretion of the municipalities. It is necessary still to-day to continue this form of assistance, although our economic life has again reached a very high standard, for there are numerous branches of economic activity that are entirely suspended in time of war. In addition to this support, there are many direct contributions toward the needs of the army, such especially as furnishing quarters for the soldiers. A line in which work of the communes attained quite special importance was the providing of food.

When, after several months of war, it was realized in the German Empire that special measures would have to be taken in order to make our food and provender supply hold out, the first attempt made was to secure the necessary amount and its distribution by means of private enterprise. To this end the War Grain Company was founded, whose task it was to buy up the necessary amount of grain for the last months of the harvest year. Two-fifths of the company's capital was contributed by the large German cities. In order to give an idea of the elasticity of the administration in the large cities, mention may be

made of the fact that it was possible to raise this money within a very few days. But after a few more months it became evident that the method of private economic enterprise was not an adequate solution of the food problem. The Empire, therefore, took the matter in hand as a public task. As such, it was divided into two main undertakings, apart from the plan of organization. One was the collection of the existing supply of grain and flour, the other was its distribution to the consumers. For collecting the supply, the form of private enterprise was adhered to with complete success, the purchase of the material being entrusted to commissioners of the War Grain Company—on the basis, it is true, of previous requisition. In later undertakings—as, for example, the securing of the supply of oats and potatoes—the method of collecting by private means was abandoned and this task was assigned to the counties in which the supplies lay. The county communal organizations took up this work with great energy. But even more general is the activity of the communes in the distribution of the supply to the consumers. In this connection, the most difficult task fell to the share of the cities. Many things are to be distributed, as oats and other provender to owners of horses, but especially flour in the raw state, or as bread to the consumers; care for the potato supply also was imposed on the cities. The attempt to limit the consumption of bread at first appeared difficult to the degree of impossibility. Nevertheless, the cities completely solved the problem within a few weeks after the order was issued by the Imperial government. Everywhere the new economic condition is evident from the presence of bread and flour cards. These cards are not orders issued against money for a certain amount of bread and flour; they are a manifestation of an absolutely new economic problem which the war has brought with it—the problem of supply. They give to the holder merely the right to purchase a certain amount of bread and flour, a right which he has not without such a card. It is characteristic of the German system of self-government that by no means all the cities have chosen the same form of bread and flour cards. Only such economic territories as, in certain respects, belong together, despite municipal separation, have effected a union. In many cases the cities have also linked themselves together with the surrounding country districts to form economic units. For the rest, the flour and bread cards show clearly that they are adapted to local conditions. The system of control is different in large and small cities. The amount of flour in proportion to bread varies according to the customary food consumption of the

inhabitants. The task of the cities, however, was not completed with the issuing of bread and flour cards. Less noticeable, but just as difficult, is the regulation of flour distribution to the bakers and dealers. It is thus not alone the measures taken by the Imperial government that deserve to be regarded as a remarkable achievement in organization; even more noteworthy is the vigor with which the municipalities took hold of the great problem. The solving of the problem indicates nothing less than a complete change in our economic life. In the city administrations politically liberal views are in the ascendancy, tending to uphold the freedom of private enterprise. But as little as this fundamental political conception hindered the municipalization of the great interests serving the public, as little has it been an obstacle when it was necessary to safeguard the people's food by means of quick action.

The activity of the municipalities in the work of feeding the nation, however, goes much further. A considerable number of cities, especially the largest, held it to be their natural duty with the outbreak of the war to lay aside a certain emergency supply of the chief foodstuffs. The leading idea in doing this was mainly the consideration that in war-time, when the railroads are frequently subject to unexpected strain in transporting troops, a stoppage in supplies could easily take place. At the same time, from the very beginning the possibility of a certain shortage in foodstuffs in the last months of the harvest year was taken into consideration. In addition to these voluntary accomplishments dealing with the various food supplies, it was made compulsory for the cities in the course of the winter to provide for a supply of non-perishable pork. The reason for this measure was the economic consideration that, through the slaughtering of a number of millions of hogs, the danger would be eliminated of their being fed with food suitable for human beings. The solving of this task fell in great part to the cities. In its accomplishment the previously mentioned voluntary union of municipalities in the Diet of the German Cities (*Städtetag*) facilitated the framing of uniform contracts, which in many cases are backed by government funds.

All these achievements of the cities in war-time were accomplished without serious dispute in the city administrations. Although in the municipal executive bodies tongues were not stopped by a general civic political truce, nevertheless action was speedy and energetic. In view of the novelty and vastness of the tasks, this seems to me to mark a great success in organization in the field of self-government. The success is all the

greater in view of the fact that for the accomplishment of these undertakings considerable sums of money had everywhere to be raised, which was accomplished without recourse to the open market. The finances of the cities proved to be in so sound a condition that for the new fiscal year, 1915, in many cases no increase of taxation was necessary, while in other cases relatively slight increases sufficed. At the same time, no municipal administration repudiated any of its financial obligations. There was not even an interruption in the redemption of the city debts.

In a state which possesses so efficient and independent a form of self-government, there lives assuredly the spirit of free citizenship. Indeed, our whole body politic is imbued with this spirit. The wholesome struggle in internal politics is only concerned with the limitations and the form in which that spirit is to manifest itself. Without doubt, continued development will tend to an ever fuller growth of the rights of the individual citizen. The power and strength of the German Empire must, of course, not be allowed to suffer on that account. For, although we desire to be free citizens, we wish to be such only on our free native soil and as members of a powerful state.

Closing Word by Chief Burgomaster Wermuth of Berlin

We are aware how many ill-considered opinions the world has formed in regard to the essence and value of the spirit of German citizenship. It will be difficult in the future, as it has been in the past, to prepare the way everywhere for a correct appreciation, nor shall we be successful in this with a single effort. But the war has advanced us materially in this respect. It has become an important witness for the truth, whose voice other nations will hear. It shows the Germans not as a nation restricted in their internal political life, under guardianship and in bonds and without political self-consciousness resting on conviction; on the contrary, it reveals a picture of the consciously disciplined strength of an inwardly free commonwealth, which, ready for self-sacrifice and with a clear vision of its aims in each of its members, stands at the helm of its own destiny. What nation not imbued with a free spirit of self-determination could do this? What nation in such case would be able to raise herself, not only in culture and science, commerce and technical achievements, but also politically to the height achieved by Germany?

It is true that the movement toward freedom which governs

our public life ever more strongly is not without checks and limitations. But wherever in our state organism we encounter such control, of which foreigners disapprove, it proves to be the very factor which has made us great and strong. What is foremost in my mind is compulsory military service, which claims an important part of the strength of the nation and of its economic powers. It is dismissed with the contemptuous catch-word "militarism," and yet in our ears it has a pleasant sound. It is the great leveller and educator, it is one of the tested foundations of our national life in which are rooted our strongest moral forces. We shall always retain this military duty, and we shall always use our military power exclusively to protect ourselves against injustice; if used for other purposes, it would disintegrate. Equally important as the blessings resulting from compulsory military service must we regard those which spring from the long-standing institution of compulsory education, that has now broadened out into compulsory attendance at the so-called "continuation schools."

Our citizenship has ample room for free development. Universal and equal suffrage throughout the German Empire guarantees to the individual his proper influence on the fundamental principles of our public life. This finds expression in the right of legislation and control of the German *Reichstag*. But of special importance for the position of the citizen is his immediate participation in the administration of public affairs, whether these be affairs of state or of the municipalities or of other public associations. More than anything else, this direct interest in the great public workshop gives to the right of citizenship its highest value and awakens as does no other factor the sense of solidarity, sharpening the sense of responsibility for future development. The broadest field in this connection is offered by self-government in the municipalities, which for more than a hundred years have regarded this as their most precious possession. The high development of the German city system is due to the free and untrammeled activity of the best men in their administration. The excellent results which have been accomplished in this line will be unconditionally acknowledged, even abroad. Especially under the stress of this world war have the German cities shown themselves amply prepared for the onrush of difficult tasks. And when, in the future, history shall render its decision as regards this great period, it will not neglect to give due praise to the unselfish work of German citizens in the self-government of the German municipalities.

BOOK II

GERMANY'S ALLIES

CHAPTER I

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

A. The Inner Structure of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

THE world has always been skeptical as to the solidity of the monarchy ruled over by the Austrian Royal House. Napoleon I contemptuously referred to it as a "geographical conception," by which expression he meant that practically all prerequisites were lacking for its existence as a state. Strange to say, no one ever took the trouble to learn by what means this conglomeration of countries, formed by the marriage of the Austrian dynasty with foreign dynasties, and lacking all integral unity, has been able, from 1526, the year of its birth, down to the present day to play a world-historical rôle, which, as far as we can predict, it will continue to play for many years to come.

The backbone of this unique commonwealth, to which with the passage of time other German countries have attached themselves (Hungary and Bohemia, 1526), is formed by the "East Mark," erected by Charlemagne as the outpost of his vast empire against the Avars, the "yellow peril" of that time. This culturally important function, both for Christianity and European civilization, was later effectively exercised by the "East Mark," developed into the Eastern Empire, or Austria, against the Magyars, and again in conjunction with a portion of the Magyars against the Turks. As already mentioned, in the year 1526 the countries of the Hungarian and Bohemian crown attached themselves to the House of Austria—that is to say, to the ruling branch of the House of Hapsburg in Austria, the powerful dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. They did this by choosing as their king Archduke Ferdinand, the later Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. From the standpoint of the controlling constitutional view at that time, Ferdinand, through marriage, had acquired claims to the succession in these kingdoms. But it is subject to no doubt that these claims to the royal power would have been unsuccessful had not the noble and religious oligarchic corporations in both

kingdoms (known under the name of "estates"), believed that they would gain, from connection with a dynasty so powerful in the German Empire, security for their own preëminent political position in the face of inner disturbances—more especially revolts of the peasants—as well as against foreign attacks. For Hungary, it must be remembered, the Turkish danger was always imminent. In so far as the Hungarian and Bohemian nations remained under the rule of the nobility and the church, the preservation of both of these nations was dependent on the continuance of the monarchy. The achievements of the dynasty for safeguarding and strengthening all the countries ruled over by it, were acknowledged by the estates of these countries from 1720 to 1722; this they did, partly in the manner of the Hungarians by offering the right of female succession to the dynasty threatened with extinction in its male branch; partly, like the non-Hungarians, by acknowledging the family law of 1719 founded upon this principle. The public acts of the dynasty and of the estates looking to this result are included under the general name of the Pragmatic Sanction, which might thus, in view of the pronouncement of the estates, be styled a plebiscite for the monarchy and the dynasty—were there not a contradiction of terms in the name "plebiscite" when applied to aristocracy and estates.

The peculiar laws which governed the feudal monarchy and according to which the ruler could dispose of his prerogatives as of his own property, or the so-called patrimonial conception of the state, made it possible for the Austrian rulers, by means of their royal or princely right, to unite the countries under their power which resisted a joining together through a federation of the estates. Supported by this patrimonial view of the state, the various monarchs welded together those rights of rulership which belonged to them by virtue of the various constitutions, as well as those which were not dependent on feudal coöperation, to form a single sovereign right; they, then, by virtue of their prerogative of organization, created uniform organs of authority for the whole territory under their rule, for the purpose of gaining uniform exercise of the rights created by this welding process.

At the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, the royal administration and legal procedure in the German-Austrian countries were remarkably well organized, when compared with the inefficiency of the preceding period; this organization extended to all conceivable conditions. The chief aim of the legal reform was to furnish protection to the

unfree peasants and other socially inferior groups of the population (the so-called *minus potentes*) against the misuse of power by the feudal over-lords, who possessed jurisdictional and police powers, or against such misuse by the authorities in existence under the system of self-government which obtained among the estates. The princes derived their authority for this reform from the "missionary" conception of their right of jurisdiction, according to which it was a power given to them by God for the suppression of every form of injustice, and in the exercise of which they were responsible to God alone. Their position was strengthened by the fact that the members of the estates, who were at loggerheads among themselves, assumed the identical standpoint by appealing to royal assistance in their disputes.

It was not possible to proceed with the same thoroughness in organizing the Hungarian and Bohemian territories, as these countries were burdened with vastly more powerful feudal groups than was the case in the German-Austrian lands.

Nevertheless, the Austrian rulers, by firmness and wisdom, which were especially necessary in the case of the recalcitrant Hungarian estates, were able to maintain their *jus belli ac pacis* —that is to say, the military administration in the constructive or organizing sense of that word, as well as the management of foreign affairs. Further, they established the right of forming crown and governmental councils for consideration of the principles of government and of the governmental acts of the crown, as exclusive monarchical prerogatives and removed from the co-operation of the estates. In this manner, they were enabled throughout the whole territory under their rule to establish, within the above-mentioned limits, those uniform and central regulations which made it possible for the monarchy to carry out its world-historical rôle. The Austrian rulers were financially able to pursue their policy of centralization, for, according to the constitutional view of the time, they possessed unrestricted right of disposal as regards the income from the domains set aside in each country for the benefit of the monarch, and also as regards that accruing from certain tributes levied for the same purpose (the so-called "chamber revenue"); in addition, they controlled the taxes which were voted by the estates. The underlying principle of this policy is known as the Austrian unity, or imperial concept (*Gesamtstaats- oder Reichsidee*).

The extremely primitive form of the feudal-monarchic constitutions, which gave to royal absolutism legal authority to use its rights to the full scope permitted by the political situation, rendered it possible under Empress Maria Theresa, in the year 1749,

to establish both for the German-Austrian and the Bohemian lands a single supreme legal tribunal and a single office for the consideration and preparation of the government's decrees. For the same reason, it has been possible to maintain this centralization down to the present day, whereas Hungary succeeded in resisting all centralization extending beyond the army administration, the administration of foreign affairs and the immediate participation of the Sovereign. Imperial decrees sent to Hungary could be promulgated only through the Hungarian Royal Chancellery. This was due to the fact that in Hungary the feudal system found a broader basis in the constitutionally organized lower and middle nobility, and was therefore more capable of resistance than in Bohemia, where the agrarian foundation of the prerogatives of the higher nobility became constantly more insecure, as the result of the agrarian reforms in neighboring Prussia. In this difference as regards the success of centralization is to be seen the reason for the later development of so-called Dualism.

At all events, the efficiency of this centralization, carried through with such patience and foresight, was brilliantly attested at this period: all the uniform national states had acquiesced in the destiny prepared for them by Napoleon I, yet this state, which he had styled a "geographical conception," undertook the rôle of *ultima ratio* and destroyed the fiction of the Emperor's invincibility. Through this success the monarchy aided the development of the idea of national freedom, which had been threatened by Napoleon's plans of universal power, at the same time that it created for itself the great problem which down to the present day governs its political life; as a result of the development of human rights, this problem took the place of that other one, which had been solved, of the suppression of the privileged estates.

In the year 1804 the regent of the monarchy was proclaimed Emperor; in 1806 the royal sovereignty was announced as extending to those countries that had stood in a constitutional relationship to the old historical German Empire, which was abrogated. With these countries Austria entered into the German Confederacy, founded in 1815, but whose dissolution occurred in 1866, as the result of the unfortunate outcome of the struggle with Prussia for the leadership of Germany.

The extremely difficult task of transforming the monarchy on a constitutional basis took place in the year 1867, after several failures between 1848 and 1867, and again after an interregnum of absolutism extending from 1849 to 1860; the

result was that the non-Hungarian countries known as *Reichsratsländer* gained permanent constitutional representation in the *Reichsrat* (Austrian Parliament), and that the *Reichstag* (Hungarian Parliament), under the form of a convention with the monarch—that is to say, by means of the so-called compromise—agreed to the demand for recognition of uniformity in the management of foreign affairs and in the army organization. As a result the centralization, previously so extensive, became limited to those activities which at all times have been the absolutely undisputed prerogatives of the monarchy. In the matter of parliamentary control of the affairs of state, the two agglomerations of territories which had been formed into states act independently. Despite the uniformity of the army organization, this independence is maintained even in the furnishing of recruits and also as regards the system of defense, for which only an agreement on general principles is provided; all the more is it true in regard to those affairs which are not common to both states. The contributions of the two states toward the expenses of the common administration, the so-called quota, are agreed upon at regular intervals of ten years between the two parliaments and by sanction of the monarch. For the same period of time, with the approval of both parliaments, the agreement of the two states, or the compromise, is effected in regard to the regulation of their customs and commercial-political relations; down to the year 1907 this was in the form of a customs-union, but in that year it took the form of a treaty of customs and trade. This treaty extends also to the sumptuary taxes, which are so closely related to the customs, to the minting of coins and printing of paper money, and to other commercial-political matters. The fixing of the yearly budget of the two states for the common administration — the so-called common budget — whose largest item is for the army, is accomplished separately by means of two parliamentary bodies, the so-called delegations; these are elected by vote of the two chambers in either of the two parliaments and meet always at the same time in Vienna and Budapest, alternately. These delegations also exercise parliamentary control of the common ministers, according to the forms existing for this purpose. This system of union between the two monarchic states is called dualism, not only because the ruler enjoys separate and distinct prerogatives as King of Hungary and Emperor of Austria, but also because of the separate parliamentary handling even of those affairs common under the union. The Emperor's autograph letter of 1868, announcing the change of the state's name from "Austrian Monarchy" to "Austro-Hun-

garian Monarchy," and of the ruler's title from "Emperor of Austria" to "Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary," was intended as an outward sign of the altered constitutional position of Hungary within the monarchy.

Universal, equal and direct suffrage was established in the year 1907 as the elective system for the Austrian central parliament, the *Reichsrat,* through the decisive influence of the Emperor, before which all obstacles yielded. In Hungary a movement has been launched by the monarch, as King of Hungary, for the development of the same elective system, which is already in preparation.

In both states legislation has been decentralized. Among the Hungarian crown lands, the kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia occupies a preeminent position, like that of a separate state, by virtue of which the constitutional relation between Croatia and Hungary proper can be altered only through agreement between the Croatian diet and the Hungarian parliament. The Croatian diet likewise controls cultural legislation. The head of the government, who is called *banus,* is constitutionally responsible to this diet.

In Hungary proper not alone the administration of local and provincial interests, but also to a great degree the administration of the state, is carried on through the self-governing bodies of the municipalities and counties; the formation of these bodies, it is supposed, was effected by the administrative organization of Charles the Great; throughout the ages they have formed the bulwark of the political freedom of the ruling classes of the Magyars.

As regards the kingdoms and countries represented in the *Reichsrat* and making up the state of Austria, they have throughout the whole period of constitutional growth formed the basis on which the Austrian state was built up. All of them, seventeen in number, have representative bodies in their one-chamber diets, which coöperate in legislation, especially in matters pertaining to agriculture, public works, charities, schools and municipalities; they have legislative rights as regards laws touching nationality, civil and criminal matters. Further, it is the practice of the Imperial legislative powers to turn over to the various countries control of all affairs within each one's sphere. The diets and the national committees elected from their midst, control the provincial administration or the administration of the land by virtue of the right of financial self-government constitutionally granted to them; they furthermore exercise oversight of the extensive self-government of the communities, which also

enjoy local police authority. The system of home-rule is almost republican, in so far as the central administration cannot autonomously settle disputes with the independent local government of the country; it must appeal to the Imperial Court for a decision. The system is republican also in the fact that the state can establish its legal financial claims against a province only in the civil courts or in the Imperial Court, according to their private or public nature. The municipal authorities, as well as the highest communal authorities who supervise them, including the national committees, are called autonomous authorities, owing to their independence of the state; for the same reason the central and autonomous administration are spoken of as a dual administration.

The two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were united to the monarchy in 1908, received in the form of an imperial decree a catalogue of universal rights of citizens; they received also an almost complete constitution formed after those of the Austrian provinces, but containing some deviations due to consideration for the peculiar religious and national conditions of the two countries. The supreme government of the two provinces is in the lands of a common ministry.

It is noteworthy that as early as 1811, that is to say, in the epoch of pronounced absolutism and centralization, the universal Civil Code (*bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*), regulating the civil law in the non-Hungarian countries, announced in articles 16 and 17 that every human being has certain natural rights which are dictated by reason; and that all prerogatives resulting from these rights must be assumed to exist as long as their restriction by law is not proved. The same law announces in article 1459 that the right of a person in respect to his own acts is subject to no limitation through the lapse of time. These principles of natural rights are the formal sanction of the efforts of the Austrian rulers, beginning as early as the sixteenth century, which looked to the improvement of the position of the bonded peasantry, who were under the dominance of their feudal masters and manorial lords; these efforts find their culmination in the elimination of this personal lack of freedom under Emperor Joseph II, and in the suppression in the years 1848-1849 of the imposts and personal services to the over-lords, partly on the basis of indemnification and partly without such indemnification. To have brought about this legal condition without bloodshed, in the face of a socially powerful body of feudal nobility, is one of the great achievements of the Austrian policy.

The constitution of April 25, 1848, which was the first effort

to found constitutionalism in the non-Hungarian provinces, contains in Article IV this important statement of natural rights: "The inviolability of nationality and language is guaranteed to all classes of society."

This principle was given emphatic expression in the following manner in Article XIX of the fundamental law concerning the General Rights of Citizens, which forms the basis for the development of Austria's law as regards nationalities: "All the different races of the state stand on an equality, and each has an inalienable right to have its nationality and religion respected and preserved. The equality of the various languages in school, in office and public life is recognized by the state. In those provinces where more than two races live, public schools are to be so organized that each race receives the support necessary for the development of its language, without compulsion to learn a second tongue." Despite the fact that famous jurists have taken the position that this principle, as it stands, cannot be directly applied and that special laws are needed for its execution, nevertheless, the two highest courts—namely, the Imperial Court and the Court of Administration—have formulated, for the safeguarding of public rights by means of ingenious decisions, a far-reaching protection of the national minorities in the various provinces; nor, in view of the strong nationalistic tendencies of the autonomous local authorities, has difficulty been encountered in its practical application. Further, the legislatures of the various provinces with mixed nationalities seek to attain the same object by means of thorough-going laws regarding language, school and electoral rights for the diet.

The organizing of Austria's various nations by law into central and branch associations is in process of being carried out. This advance is due mainly to the noble-spirited writings of the publicists, Adolph Tischof, Otto Lang and Karl Renner. Legal development along this line has been less favorable in Hungary, owing to the undeniable obstacles created by the dogma of the national supremacy of the Magyar race. Nevertheless, a comparison of the legal position of the non-Magyar nationalities with that of the non-Russian nations of Russia, or with that of the barbarically suppressed Balkan countries, is quite inadmissible. There are, furthermore, plain indications that in the immediate future, as a result of the contemplated adoption of universal and equal suffrage, the dogma of national priority will be subjected to further modification.

As a result of the stubbornness and violence of the national disputes within the Monarchy and of the emphatic manner in

which the constitutional demands of the Magyar nation are customarily expressed, extremely unfavorable conclusions have been drawn throughout the entire world regarding the solidity of the Austro-Hungarian union. This unfavorable estimate may safely be assumed to have been one of the causes for the decision in favor of war by the Triple Entente. But from these national struggles, which, compared with the deathlike silence of the non-Russian peoples of Russia, must be regarded as a symptom of an extensive freedom of movement among the nations of the Monarchy, there has been developed, as we have shown, as a result of the hearty coöperation of the legislative and judicial branches, an admirable law system regarding the relation of the races among themselves, such as is found nowhere else. This may serve to give an idea of the extent of the demands of the various races, which, whenever necessary, are satisfied by judicial protection, without regard for the increased administrative difficulties. An admirable short summary of this ingenious system of law is to be found in a recent article from the pen of the Austrian jurist, Herrnritt, in the Austrian *Zeitschrift für Oeffentliches Recht.* This system regarding nationalities, at a period when nationalism has developed into a serious danger for the West-European world, represents a cultural achievement by the state of the highest order; the various races of the Monarchy have never realized its benefits more than at present, when Russia feels herself called upon to substitute her "civilizing and liberating mission" and her policy of nationalities for the work done within our borders by our own Monarchy. The Austrian Monarchy, owing to its ancient character as a tribunal of arbitration, in which point no other monarchy in the world is to be compared to it, has for centuries been able to bind together its heterogeneous national elements into a conservative commonwealth; it has astonished the entire world to see how these diverse elements prove equal to tasks in coöperation through the influence of the monarchical power to which they would not have been equal through ties of confederation. And if we are again successful in repelling from Europe the Asiatic hordes, which England and France have so unexpectedly summoned and so powerfully seconded, history will be forced to ascribe a glorious share in this success to our monarchical system, that is the subject of such great misunderstanding.

B. Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy

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The foreign policy of Austria-Hungary finds problems awaiting it in three directions: toward Germany, Italy and the Orient. The connection with Germany and Italy has existed for centuries. It came about through the fact that the ruling princes of Austria, the Hapsburgs, became at the same time Roman-German emperors. Not alone in Germany, but in Italy also, the Empire has interests at stake, as the result of family possessions. After the dissolution of the German Empire in 1806, there was created the German Confederation, in which Austria again played the leading rôle. But in the year 1866 a change took place. Austria separated from Germany, and under Prussian leadership was first formed the North German Confederation, and then, following the Franco-Prussian War, the German Empire. The question arose in Austria as to what attitude she was to assume toward the new state.

Austria had in Italy, on the one hand, her own possessions; on the other, near relatives of the Imperial family were ruling in the small Italian states. The Austrian occupation was regarded as the greatest obstacle in the way of Italian unity. In 1859, the Kingdom of Sardinia succeeded, with the aid of foreign assistance, in acquiring Lombardy, and in 1866 Venetia. Between these two dates the Italian kingdom had been formed, into which the small Austrian states were absorbed. Despite this success, a portion of the Italians considered their task not yet accomplished, since territory occupied by compatriots was still under Austrian rule. From this fact was derived the doctrine of *Italia irredenta,* which held that there was still an "unredeemed" Italy. Even with the most liberal interpretation, the term could be applied only to certain parts of Istria and Dalmatia, which had previously formed part of the old Republic of Venice. The other portions of Austria-Italy had never belonged to the territories which to-day constitute the Kingdom of Italy. Trieste, Gorizia and the County of Mitterburg in Istria have for centuries belonged to Austria; while the Trentino, whose connection with Austria dates only from a century ago, was an independent bishopric. The second question, therefore, for Austrian diplomacy to decide was as to the attitude it should assume toward the new Kingdom of Italy and its ambitions.

The problem is quite a different one as regards the Orient.

From the earliest times Austria had stood as a barrier against the tribes who poured in from the East: Avars, Magyars, Turks. It was a question of preserving Western civilization, and at the same time of carrying it into the East. Austria has always served as a connection between West and East: the course of the Danube—the great river flowing through the country—urged to a commercial connection with the Orient. With the incorporation into Austria in 1526 of Hungary and Transylvania, this oriental policy gained a further impetus. Fresh acquisitions in the eighteenth century, like Galicia and Bukovina, rounded out still more the eastern boundaries of the Monarchy.

The third question which demanded an answer was whether Austria, following the course of the Danube, should make new territorial acquisitions, or content herself merely with the economic conquest of the Orient. While Austria-Hungary early came to an understanding with Germany and Italy, her relations with the Power which also had important interests at stake in the Orient—namely, Russia—remained always doubtful. On this account the relations of the Danube State to Russia during the last sixty or seventy years have been of the greatest importance.

For the last two hundred years the aim of the Muscovite State has been to gain Constantinople and a passage into the Mediterranean. For this purpose it was necessary to destroy or absorb Turkey and split it up into its various elements—Slavs, Greeks, Rumanians. With the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula, Austria-Hungary had intimate connection through her own South-Slavic subjects. Of these South-Slavs, the Croatians have always been distinguished by their pronounced attachment to Austria and a certain unfriendliness toward Hungary. The feeling at the beginning of the eighteenth century that started the movement of the Pragmatic Sanction was a logical outcome of this. It established the indivisibility of the Austrian countries and the succession to the throne within their boundaries. The Croatians had feared lest they might be separated eventually from Austria. Their South-Slavic sister-nation, Serbia, who is distinguished from Croatia by religion and script, found her chief point of accord with the latter country in hatred of Hungary. This was intense enough to outweigh her affection for Austria. Thus movements against Austria always found encouragement on Serbian soil. Austria-Hungary's attitude toward Turkey and toward the latter's vassal states, as well as toward her own Slavic subjects, is strongly influenced by Russian politics; in the changeable attitude of the latter toward Austrian

policy the key is chiefly to be sought for the acts of the Austrian foreign minister.

The relations between Russia, Austria and Prussia had been friendly since the "Holy Alliance" had transformed a romantic idea of Emperor Alexander I, of Russia, into a practical reality. Personal friendship among the monarchs strengthened this connection. In the year 1849 Russia helped to suppress the Hungarian revolt. The manner in which this was done, it is true, did not quite meet the wishes of the Austrian government. The message which the Russian general after the capitulation of the Hungarian army sent to his Emperor—"The whole of Hungary lies at Your Majesty's feet"—gave no intimation that the Austrians had coöperated bravely in the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and that the Russians had merely been their allies.

Russia herself over-estimated the value of her assistance to Austria. She believed that she had made the entire Austrian policy subject to her dictates. In the year 1853, trusting to this and filled with contempt for the other European Powers, she undertook an attack against Turkey. She had, however, made a mistake in her calculations. Not only did Austria refuse to coöperate with her in this attack against the Porte, but likewise France, England and later Sardinia proclaimed their opposition to it. We are interested, however, only in Austria's attitude. She hoped to be able, under the guidance of Count Buol, to support the Western Powers, to persuade Russia to abandon her dangerous design, and thereby to gain territorial acquisitions. And this she thought to do without taking part in the war. This proved to be a mistake. The result was that without gaining the confidence of the Western Powers, she earned Russia's bitter hatred, and in the treaty of peace (1856) was forced to give up the principalities of Moldau and Wallachia, which she had already occupied. Russia made Austria pay dearly for her course. As a matter of fact, she had no reason to resent the attitude of the Danube State, for if Austria had joined the other enemies of Russia, the latter might have been brought at that time into the greatest distress, and the fruits of a successful war for Austria would probably have been the acquisition of one or more of the Balkan States. One may say of Austria's policy at this time that it was weak, but unconditionally peaceful.

From this time on, at every turn, Vienna encountered Russia as an enemy. This enmity was without cause, for it was Austria's foreign minister, Count Beust, who at the end of the six-

ties pointed out the possibility of altering the conditions of the peace of 1856, which had placed sharp limitations on Russia's naval power in the Black Sea. When later, during the Franco-Prussian war, Russia, of her own initiative, declared the agreement void, she was able to refer to Beust's proposition. Neither Germany nor Austria offered opposition to Russia, but it proved difficult to win England over. In the year 1871 the new German Empire was brought into being; Austria-Hungary accepted this condition without hesitation, and took successful steps to enter into pleasant relations with the new state and also with Russia. Beust's successor, Count Andrassy, followed wisely in this path. In the year 1872 there was a meeting of the three Emperors in Berlin, the immediate result of which was the establishment of friendly relations among them; and during the next year this led to treaties among the three Powers. Visits of Emperor Alexander II to Vienna and of Emperor Franz Joseph to Petrograd rendered possible the settling of all delicate diplomatic questions in a peaceful manner.

But this truce was not destined to last long; critical days began in the Balkan Peninsula. The states standing under suzerainty longed more and more for full independence, and the peoples directly subject to the Porte wanted freedom. In Herzegovina a dangerous rebellion broke out, which communicated itself to Bosnia, was encouraged by Serbia and Montenegro, and even affected the South-Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary. So deeply was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy affected by this that two absolutely unimpeachable witnesses, the Russian diplomat Count Ignatiev and Prince Nikita of Montenegro, expressed the thought independently of each other that Austria would have to interfere. Above all, however, Russia desired to profit by the disturbances in the Balkan Peninsula for her own purposes. As a prerequisite to this she had to be certain that Austria-Hungary would not attack her from behind. Hence in Reichstadt in Bohemia, on July 8, 1876, a treaty was made, according to which, in case of Russian success, the Danube State was to acquire a portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This agreement was supplemented at the beginning of the year 1877 to the effect that these provinces were to fall entirely into Austria-Hungary's hands, not alone for occupation but for absolute possession. Protected in this manner, Russia began the war against Turkey, in which she at first suffered heavy losses; but later, when Rumania had joined her, brilliant successes followed. Russia desired to profit unrestrictedly thereby. In the treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878), the

map of the Balkan Peninsula was completely altered. There was no more talk, however, of a cession to Austria-Hungary! The latter country could not allow itself to be treated thus, and since England also assumed an attitude of emphatic opposition to Russia, a great clash of arms seemed imminent. It was due to Bismarck that this catastrophe was prevented.

In the Congress of Berlin, that lasted from June 13 to July 13, 1878, Russia was forced to submit to material changes in the treaty of San Stefano. The destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina was settled. On June 28, England's second representative at the Congress, Lord Salisbury, made the motion that the two provinces should be given up to Austria-Hungary for occupation and administration. For reasons of safety, she was also granted the right of military occupation of the district of Novi-Bazar (Sandjak). It would have been easy for Austria at that time to carry through the annexation of these provinces; neither England nor Russia would have been able to prevent this. It was due primarily to the consideration of Count Andrassy for Turkey, whose feelings he desired not to wound, that Austria-Hungary did not occupy them. The Sandjak of Novi-Bazar remained under Turkey's civil administration.

A glance at the map shows how important the possession of these provinces is for Austria-Hungary. They furnish the necessary *hinterland* for the South-Slavic provinces, Dalmatia especially gaining protection in her rear. It must not be forgotten that Herzegovina territory touches the Adriatic Sea at two places, cutting Dalmatia at these points. Further, it must be remembered that the continual disturbances in these countries were a constant danger to Austria-Hungary and that an end could be put to them only by firm and energetic administration on the part of Austria. Even the most uncompromising enemies of the Dual Monarchy cannot deny that it has accomplished important cultural work in the two provinces in the period since 1878.[1] Military occupation of the Sandjak was important and of value for Austria's political position, as by this means a wedge was driven between Serbia and Montenegro. It was assumed in foreign countries that Austria some day would take advantage of this advance post to make an attack against Sa-

[1] See *Austrian Policy since* 1867, by Murray Beaven, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, pp. 8-9: . . . "That Austria efficiently carried out the task entrusted to her is not now disputed. . . . The condition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the date of their definite annexation in 1890 is a standing contradiction to Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian statement: 'There is not a spot upon the map of Europe where you can lay your fingers and say: "There Austria did good."' "

See also *The War and Democracy*, by R. W. Seton-Watson, London, 1914, p. 146: "Great material progress had been made. Roads, railways, public buildings had been created out of nothing, etc."

loniki, through the Vardar valley. A state with an aggressive military policy would assuredly have taken this step in the course of the following years.

We may be permitted finally to recall to the mind of the reader that at the Congress of Berlin the independence of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro was established, the principality of Bulgaria created, and, in addition, a separate Turkish province of East Rumelia. The last two, after a few years, celebrated their union. As a reward for Rumania's faithful assistance her "patron" (Russia) deprived her of the valuable province of Bessarabia, giving her in return only the Dobrudja.

The attitude of Russia in these last years had been so unreliable and so threatening to the general peace of Europe (as a result of Emperor Alexander II having given himself into the hands of advisors who preached the evangel of Pan-Slavism and were obsessed with the most rabid Germanophobia), that Prince Bismarck was most doubtful of the continuance of German-Russian friendship and sought to guard against a Russian attack. It was evident that such an attack would instantly have caused a war between France and Germany, and against this double danger Bismarck was called upon to protect the German Empire. He, therefore, made a treaty offer to Austria which met the secret wishes of Count Andrassy. Emperor Franz Joseph forgot in the most generous manner the events of 1866, and gladly agreed to this treaty. Bismarck succeeded in convincing Emperor William I of the necessity of such an alliance. On October 7, 1879, a treaty was signed between Austria and Germany of a purely defensive character. It was aimed expressly against Russia and obligated both signatories, in case of an attack by Russia, to support each other with their whole strength, and to sign peace only in common. No other state was mentioned, but it was said that in case "such a Power" (meaning France) should attack Germany, or Austria-Hungary (probably indicating Italy), and should be supported in this attack by Russia—in such an event also the above-mentioned treaty should come into force. The treaty was drawn for no definite period of time, but was to continue automatically, unless abrogated. So clearly did it meet the needs of the two states, and so great a factor has it been for thirty years in preserving European peace, that it has thus continued automatically since 1879.

The fact must be emphasized that this treaty had a most desirable influence on Russia. In the year 1881 it was possible to renew, among the three emperors, the friendly conferences which, in 1884, led to the meeting of the three monarchs in

Scierniewice. It was intended to prevent war-like complications, and to this end misunderstandings were to be settled by discussion as they arose. This was a revival of the agreement of 1872.

Lord Salisbury called the signing of the German-Austrian alliance "an event of great joy"; three years afterward it received an important extension, which was greeted by England's hearty expressions of sympathy.

In the year 1881, France unexpectedly occupied Tunis. Italy had designs upon this country; she regarded this ruthless act of France as the result of her own absolute isolation, from which she now made energetic efforts to free herself. The negotiations, begun in Rome, were brought to a relatively speedy conclusion through the visit of the royal Italian couple to Vienna. As early as May, 1882, the alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy was signed, which is known as the *Dreibund*. It is said to have been made for a period of twelve years, with certain clauses relating to its abrogation, and has subsequently been regularly renewed before its expiration. The last term ran until the summer of 1914, but it was renewed as early as December 7, 1912. We are not definitely familiar with its provisions; it is known only that the three Powers have reciprocally guaranteed each others' possessions, and that the alliance is exclusively for purposes of defense. We know, further, that in the year 1902 it was supplemented by a provision touching Austria-Hungary and Italy alone, to the effect that territorial acquisition in Macedonia by Austria-Hungary was to bring with it a compensation for Italy. This provision, however, was rendered nugatory by the recent Balkan wars.

Count Andrassy retired from his position immediately following the formation of the German-Austrian alliance; but his successors, no matter who they have been, have faithfully pursued his policy. This policy may be expressed in the following manner: continuance of the friendship with Germany and Italy, maintenance of correct relations with England and France, with whom Austria has but a few points of contact, careful preservation of peace with Russia, strengthening and upholding of the Turkish Empire, and preservation of peace in the Balkans.

To preserve friendship with Germany was the easiest of all. This was largely owing to the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm II has maintained the most intimate personal relations, not only with Emperor Franz Joseph, but with the latter's probable successors as well. We all vividly remember the close bonds of friendship which united the German Emperor both with Crown Prince

Rudolph and with Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This Austro-German friendship successfully stood the test on many occasions. To mention two striking examples will suffice. It was the Austrian diplomatic representative, Count Welsersheim, who, at the portentous conference of Algeciras (1906), at a very critical moment, supported Emperor Wilhelm, to use the latter's own expression, "as a most brilliant second"; Austria in 1909 received a full return when her ally checked the threatening attack of Russia, and thereby preserved peace.

It was a much more difficult matter always to preserve peaceful relations with Italy. The exaggerated ardor of Italian patriots, who were united in the effort to rescue "unreclaimed" territory (*Italia irredenta*), has been a stumbling block in the path of our well-intending statesmen; but in conjunction with the never-failing skill of Italian statesmen, it has proved possible for Vienna to overcome these obstacles. For the Italian Government was hitherto always wise enough to perceive that the greatness and prosperity of the country did not depend upon the acquisition of a village in the Trentino or in Dalmatia, but that it did depend upon the development of Italian supremacy in the great and promising territory in North Africa. After Tunis had been lost to Italy, and her Abyssinia enterprise had come to naught, she finally turned her attention to Tripoli, and during the conquest of this country and the war against Turkey she found her rear most effectively protected by Austria. Questions of common interests between Austria and Italy in the Balkan Peninsula were also settled in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. Apart from the already mentioned treaty concerning Macedonia, it was necessary to confer in regard to Albania. According to a report which has never been contradicted, toward the end of the nineties a division of the spheres of interest in the Balkans was effected between Austria and Russia; through this division Albania would have come under Austrian influence. It was obviously important for Italy not to lose sight of the east coast of the Adriatic. In full appreciation of this condition, in the year 1897, and again in the year 1900, the Austrian Government gave the Italian Government the assurance that it desired to settle the future of Albania only on a basis of mutual understanding. The result of this loyal agreement was that, when in 1913 the re-formation of the Balkan Peninsula was being discussed, the two Powers conjointly advocated an independent principality for Albania, the practicability of which, it is true, has not yet been proved beyond doubt.

As we have seen, through the meeting in Scierniewice, the

relation of Austria with Russia had taken on a more or less favorable aspect, which the ministers, Counts Kalnoky and Goluchovski, strove honestly and successfully to preserve. Nor was this relationship disturbed by any direct Austro-Hungarian differences, such as border disputes in Galicia or Poland, or by commercial rivalry; the only disturbing factor was jealousy as regards the Balkans.

In that connection there were many dangerous shoals to be crossed. As, for instance, when in the year 1885 Bulgaria and East Rumelia formed their union, and immediately war broke out between Bulgaria and Serbia; in 1886 the fall of the first Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, took place, and in the next year the new Prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, was forced to sue for Russia's recognition. In these various affairs Austria succeeded in gaining many important concessions from Russia. These matters lead us to discuss in detail the relation of Austro-Hungarian politics to the rise and development of the various Balkan States.

As early as the fifties in the last century, weighty voices in Austria had called attention to the importance of Serbia. Many persons believed that Serbia was destined to play the same rôle in the Balkan Peninsula as Sardinia had played in Italy, and Prussia in Germany. It was, therefore, in Austria's interest to maintain the most friendly relations with Serbia, without, however, allowing this state to become too powerful. The first of these aims was accomplished at the time of the war already referred to between Bulgaria and Serbia (1885-86), when the Austrian government placed an emphatic check on the victorious advance of Bulgaria into the heart of Serbia. The immediate result was a close treaty of friendship between Serbia and Austria. As long as King Milan reigned, conditions remained unchanged. With the advent, however, in 1889, of Milan's son, Alexander, to the throne, the relation of the great state to its small, restless neighbor became less favorable. A condition bordering on anarchy, fostered by Russia, came into existence, and led eventually to the king's murder. The murderers placed Peter Karageorgevich on the throne, and Russian dominance now became evident in Serbia, driving the country into increasing enmity toward Austria. The statesmen of Austria felt called upon to combat this unfriendly attitude in the commercial field and this led to the so-called "Hog War." The heavy economic losses which resulted from it rendered the name of Austria daily more odious, and drove Serbia unreservedly into Russia's arms. There may be people who hold the opinion that Austria-

Hungary might have acted with more consideration for Serbia's feelings, and have shown greater readiness in meeting the demands of the king's murderers, without regard to political etiquette. Translated from diplomatic language into plain English, this would mean that the statesmen who had gained power in Serbia should have been flattered by gold and favor. But, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that this course was generously followed with regard to Montenegro, which has existed down to the present time on Austrian gold; yet, despite this fact, the Russian Czar was able to declare that Montenegro was "Russia's sole genuine friend in the Balkan Peninsula."

Another consideration to which weight must be given is the fact that, as a result of the racial affinity of the Serbs on the two sides of the Austrian boundary line, Serbian enmity early succeeded in arousing tendencies within the Empire which rendered a friendly attitude toward the new government in Belgrade scarcely possible.

The relations of Austria to Bulgaria have at all times been free from such difficulties; so that the Vienna government, after the failure of its efforts to support Serbia against Bulgaria, was able to turn, without scruple, to the advancement of the Bulgarian plans. The disagreement between Serbia and Bulgaria, which had assumed unexpected proportions as a result of the last Balkan War, offered a tempting opening for the Austrian statesmen, nor did the Vienna government need to have this pointed out to it a second time. Unfortunately, this led to less favorable relations with Rumania.

Of the two non-Slavic states which, toward the north and south, guard the entrance to the Balkans, Rumania has from the start been favorably inclined toward the policy of the *Dreibund*. She had felt all too keenly in 1878 the thanklessness of Russia, who, as already mentioned, had deprived her of the fruitful province of Bessarabia. Other factors, however, contribute to render Rumania's attitude comprehensible—the nationality of King Charles, who was never able to forget that he had been a German prince, and Italy's alliance with Austria. There was naturally a bond of union between Rumania and the linguistically related country south of the Apennines. Rumania carefully abstained from participation in the last Balkan War, awaiting the development of affairs. When, after the victory of the Balkan League, disputes that eventually led to war broke out in regard to the division of Macedonia between the previous allies, Serbia and Bulgaria, the two leading Slav states, Rumania at the last moment drew her sword to

enforce a decision. The territorial extension which she desired was to be secured only from Bulgaria. The Viennese government thereby found itself in a difficult position—should it side with Rumania or Bulgaria? To decide this question in a manner above criticism was, perhaps, beyond human wisdom. At all events, the immediate result was in so far unsatisfactory that neither Bulgaria nor Rumania felt that their interests had been sufficiently considered; especially did the Bukharest government make this known through a perceptible cooling in its Austrian sympathies. Fortunately, however, great political policies are not controlled by temporary sentiment, but by permanent interests, and these tend constantly to lead Rumania back to the Central Powers.

In this connection mention must be made of the fact that in view of the unavoidable action and reaction of interior and foreign politics, the governments both at Vienna and Budapest will find a rich field for activity after the war: a more general regard for the feelings of the Italian subjects in one part of the Empire and of the Rumanian subjects in the other will lead to a better understanding between the two states.

As regards Greece, the other Balkan border state, she has always enjoyed friendly treatment at the hands of Austria-Hungary, as was repeatedly made clear at the time of the settlement of the Cretan question.

It must not, however, be forgotten that all of these states of which mention has been made formerly formed part of Turkey in Europe, and that every increase in power of any of them denotes a weakening of Turkey. How difficult was it, then, to reconcile the preservation of Turkey with the benevolent attitude which the young, ambitious Balkan States expected of Vienna! In this connection it must be borne in mind that each sign of coolness from Austria-Hungary was apt to drive the states in question into Russia's arms. The difficulties which the various Austro-Hungarian ministers were called upon to meet are scarcely to be gauged. These difficulties were often still further increased by Turkey's recalcitrant attitude in regard to sincere suggestions of reform.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, Russian and Austrian politics in the Balkans were fairly at a balance; no particularly warm friendship developed between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but on the other hand there was no marked clash of opposing interests. In Petrograd diplomats were well satisfied to be able to oppose to the *Dreibund* the alliance with France, which had taken shape during the years 1891 to 1895,

and efforts were made to preserve the friendly relations of the moment. Russian statesmen at this time conceived ambitious plans as regards Asia. They hoped to be able to carry them through without great difficulty; the only Power which might be dangerous to them in this connection, England, stood "in splendid isolation." These Asiatic plans demanded European peace as a prerequisite, and when, in 1897, Emperor Franz Joseph paid another visit to Petrograd, the opportunity was taken advantage of to divide the Balkan Peninsula into Russian and Austrian spheres of interest. The friendly understanding thereby achieved seemed to justify a hope that in the future every movement in the Balkan Peninsula would be observed by the Austro-Hungarian and Russian statesmen, and discussed by them before it could develop into a dangerous conflagration. The plan seemed to be successful, and a few years later it was decided to subject the Macedonian trouble to the same treatment. On October 2, 1903, the Russian and Austrian foreign ministers met at the Imperial Austrian hunting lodge at Mürzsteg and reached a definite understanding by which all problems arising in the future in the Balkans were to be solved in common. The Macedonian revolt was to be the first question so treated; in this manner, the Austro-Russian understanding was confirmed, and Russia was able without anxiety to devote herself to her Asiatic endeavors.

Russia's Asiatic plans had encountered opposition from a quarter where it had not been anticipated—Japan. In the year 1904-5 war broke out between the two states, resulting, after stubborn resistance, in Russia's complete defeat. As a result of this war, an internal movement started in Russia, which for a long time paralyzed the resources of the state and occupied its entire strength. While Russia was passing through this grave crisis, Austria-Hungary observed a strictly correct attitude. The possibility of proceeding to a change of the *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula during this period (even if this had meant merely the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was not taken advantage of by the government on the Danube. Austria-Hungary's statesmen may perhaps be blamed for weakness at this point, but they can in no wise be charged with war-like proclivities. Austria-Hungary was at that time in just as favorable a position for war as ten years later. The provisions of the *Dreibund,* which was intended for defense, not for attack, were carried out literally. Russia was enabled undisturbed to recall her defeated regiments from Asia and to employ them for the suppression of the revolution—her influence in the Bal-

kans suffered not the slightest diminution. Austria-Hungary carried out the programme of Mürzsteg in a meticulously conscientious manner. Count Goluchovski was displaced in the Vienna foreign ministry by Count Aehrenthal. But for the moment Austria-Hungary's policy continued as before, although European conditions had long since undergone a great change. This change must be briefly considered here, since the policy of the Danube State could not escape its influence.

An English pamphleteer of the present war has characterized the *Dreibund* and its epoch, in a manner which calls for unreserved endorsement. He states that the *Triple Entente* was created as a reply to the *Dreibund,* and he continues thus:

"Both alliances were concluded originally as purely defensive. For twenty years European peace rested upon a secure basis, for the simple reason that there was no Power which might have profited by a disturbance of the peace."

This is correct down to the last word—for if one reckons twenty years from the formation of the *Dreibund* one reaches the year 1902, and this was the first year of the reign of King Edward VII. Under him the one Power which might have had an interest in a disturbance of the peace, namely, England, came into the foreground. This is not the place to enumerate the reasons and the many proofs of England's belligerent attitude. The fact remains that at this time the encircling of Germany began, which was gradually to include Austria-Hungary also. There followed King Edward's trips to Paris, Spain and to Italy, in the course of which this policy was partly prepared and partly carried through. The crowning touch was put to it by the English king's visits to Ischl and Reval. We are unfortunately insufficiently informed in regard to these events, but the results plainly indicate their nature. The attempt to entice Austria to abandon the *Dreibund* was a failure; but, on the other hand, the pronounced differences between England and France and between England and Russia were temporarily eliminated. One could not long fail to see that storm clouds of the most threatening character were gathering at all points.

Quite unexpectedly, however, even to the most trained observer, the storm broke in Constantinople. The Young Turk movement in 1908 brought old Turkey to her knees. The "Sick Man," for whose recovery the European doctors had so often vainly striven and who had been forced to swallow so many "reform pills," to no avail, was now finally made an end of; a new and youthful spirit, armed with all the modern measures of *Kultur* (parliamentary system, etc.), was to rule at the

Sublime Porte. The states of the *Dreibund* encouraged in the most emphatic manner this movement toward betterment at the Golden Horn, as it was in accordance with their conservative peace policy that the existing Turkish State be upheld. At the same time, however, it appeared to Aehrenthal high time finally to put an end to the uncertain status in Bosnia and Herzegovina and frankly to apply the proper name to a situation which had in fact long existed. Austria-Hungary, through thirty years of unremitting effort, had so striven for the welfare of these occupied provinces that it appeared only right that the occupation should be changed into an annexation, as a reward for this labor. We will let the English pamphleteer speak again on this point. He says:

"Bosnia-Herzegovina had been Austrian territory for thirty years, save in name only; and there was no more reason for assuming that Austria would ever leave these countries than for the assumption that Great Britain would willingly abandon Egypt." [1]

How was this measure carried through? Far from springing a *fait accompli* on Europe, Austria had carefully prepared the ground for the annexation. According to our information, the Russian Foreign Minister Isvolsky, on June 19, 1908, suggested to his Austrian colleague the words which the latter afterward used. He did even more: he advised not only the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but likewise that of the Sandjak. In September of the same year the two ministers met at Buchlau in Moravia. Aehrenthal made no secret of his intention to carry out the annexation. The Russian minister seems to have agreed in principle, but with diplomatic slyness at the same time he attempted to gain for his own state what in June he had already hinted at: he demanded a further revision of the Treaty of 1856, namely the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian war fleet. Russia was at last to gain the long-desired entrance into the Mediterranean. The demands of the two ministers stand in marked contrast to each other as regards their import. One of them desired only clearly to establish an existing condition, whereby the actual relations of the Powers would not suffer the slightest derangement; the other sought to force the

[1] *Austrian Policy since* 1867, Beaven, pp. 16-17. See also *The War and Democracy*, by R. W. Seton-Watson, p. 146: "To any impartial observer it had been obvious from the first that those who dreamt of Austria-Hungary's voluntary withdrawal from the two provinces were living in a fool's paradise. The formal act of annexation merely set a seal to thirty years of effective Austrian administration. . . . Austria had come to stay, and Aehrenthal, in annexing the provinces, felt himself to be merely setting the seal to a document which had been signed a generation earlier. . . ."

Eastern question into a new phase and greatly to strengthen Russia's power.

Both statesmen, however, separated in seeming satisfaction. As was later learned, Count Aehrenthal offered no objection in principle to the passage of the Russian ships through the Dardanelles, on the condition that certain measures of precaution were taken for the safety of this maritime highway, similar to those taken with regard to the Suez Canal. But this matter was by no means ripe for action and settlement, while there was no reason for delay as regards the Austro-Hungarian proposition. In connection with Bulgaria's proclamation of the change to a kingdom, Austria-Hungary completed the annexation of the two provinces on October 5, 1908.

Thereupon a storm broke loose in the Russian, English and Serbian press, which was calculated to make one believe that the three Powers had suffered injury in the most unheard-of manner. As a matter of fact, they seem to have been surprised only by the speedy action of the Austro-Hungarian minister, whereas there could be no room for doubt as to his intention, and also as to harmlessness of the act. Isvolsky asserts, however, that he had been outwitted by von Aehrenthal—a fact which does slight honor to his skill as a diplomat. The date of the annexation, it is true, seems not to have been fixed in Buchlau, Aehrenthal promising to write once more beforehand to his colleague. The Russian received this letter in Paris on October 2, but allowed the following days to pass without making a move. Not until a week later, *in London,* did he make an outcry and publicly declare that he had been duped.

Russia and Serbia stood in need of an excuse for their anger against Austria-Hungary, and England also desired to let the Vienna government feel the force of her displeasure for having resisted the English bait. Both sides began to arm, war appeared inevitable between Austria and Serbia, and Russia seemed ready to take part.

In this connection one step of the Austrian minister must be clearly remembered. Simultaneously with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary surrendered her valuable and important position in the Sandjak and gave this territory back to Turkey. An act of such unselfishness is unknown to history. Thereby Austria abandoned her designs on Saloniki and retained for herself only the commercial conquest of the Balkans. It might have been expected that the new Turkish government would appreciate Austria's moderation and give its blessing to the rechristening of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfor-

tunately, the new rulers at Constantinople were badly advised, and offered the most stubborn opposition to Austria's policy. Only as a result of extended discussion, and of a boycotting which bore heavily on Austria's commerce, followed finally by the payment of a large sum of money, was the approval of the annexation gained in Constantinople.

Meanwhile, a veritable witches' sabbath had come upon Europe, and it required a very emphatic declaration by Germany that if Russia attacked Austria the German Empire would be found by the latter's side, to force Russia to call a halt, thereby placing a damper on the Serbian outburst. But the wick continued to smoulder with much evil-smelling smoke. Serbia declared herself threatened in the highest degree by conditions which she had calmly contemplated for thirty years, and she now sought to mobilize Serbians in Austria-Hungary for her own purposes. Austria's desire for peace, for which her surrender of the important Sandjak had again given so convincing a proof, was contemptuously interpreted as weakness. It became an axiom in the Balkan states, especially in Serbia, that Austria was a dying power. It was claimed that the patriarchal respect which the aged Emperor Franz Joseph enjoyed among his subjects scarcely sufficed to hold the state together. This view was spread throughout the whole political world, was everywhere more or less accepted, and influenced opinion against the Danube State in the most remarkable manner. As excuse for the credulous, who have since had their calculations upset by Austria's cohesive strength, it must be stated that they were unfortunately to a great extent supported in their view by Slavic voices within the Monarchy itself. This is an extremely regrettable confession, but one which cannot be withheld in devotion to truth. It was not a question of *agents provocateurs* who were paid by the Austrian Government to mislead foreign countries, but of conscienceless, traitorous scoundrels whose company we do not begrudge to our enemies.

Count Aebrenthal, who had guided the ship of state with firm hand during a difficult period, became seriously ill and was forced to make place for Count Berchthold. Difficult tasks awaited this diplomat as he undertook the burdens of office. Serbian discontent continued uninterrupted, partial mobilization had to be undertaken anew, Austria's commerce suffered under continued threat of war, and the state paid heavily for this apparent peace.

The Balkan Alliance continued meanwhile to be quietly formed. Before the Young Turkish state could develop its

full strength, the one-time vassals of European Turkey hoped completely to destroy it.

The Balkan War broke out. Austria-Hungary took no steps to furnish aid to Turkey—a course which would have been to her political advantage—but abandoned the Balkan Peninsula to the Balkan peoples. Turkey was conquered and lost nearly her entire European possessions. A violent dispute immediately broke out in regard to the booty, the allies being unable to agree on the division of the spoils. Serbia was determined, before all, to reach the Adriatic and acquire a harbor. Montenegro likewise demanded a portion of Albania, together with Scutari, the old Albanian capital. The Vienna Government offered uncompromising opposition to both of these demands; in this it enjoyed the most ardent support from its ally, Italy, which could permit as little as could Austria, a Slavic great power to gain a firm footing on the east coast of the Adriatic or occupy important portions of Albania. For it was perfectly clear that Serbia or Montenegro would serve merely as proxy for Russia. The two allies were successful in their opposition, and Serbia, ousted from the west, turned toward the east. It was demanded that Bulgaria surrender Macedonian territory, upon which she had already placed her hand; over this dispute war broke out between the two previous allies, the results of which have already been discussed. The peace of Bukharest of 1913 is the epilogue to these conflicts.

Serbia's machinations against Austria, incited by Russia, continued to increase in violence. The tension between the two Powers became unbearable. On June 28, 1914, the explosion occurred. Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort were shot down in Serajevo by Serbian murderers. This death was really a dramatic fatality. It had been said of the murdered Archduke that had he lived he would have worked for an improvement of the condition of the Slavs in Austria; certain is it that his whole environment had educated him to Slavic sympathies. It would be presumptuous positively to assert that the Archduke would have substituted for the Dualism a Trialism in Austria, by which the South Slavs would have been enabled to play an important rôle. Nevertheless, such an intention must be considered as within the realms of the possible. By this means the South Slavic inhabitants of Austria would perhaps have been able to win over their brothers beyond the border and thus offer the strongest check to Serbia's propaganda in Austria. All these dreams were shattered by the death of the Archduke. A thorough-going search for the actors in the tragedy and their

backers, which Austria was in duty bound to make, led to persons who were in positions of honor and trust in Serbia. Indeed, the tracks led even beyond the Serbian boundary. It would have been unworthy of a great state to permit such a band of murderers to remain at its borders without making an effort to avenge the crime and to prevent a recurrence of similar events, which the next time might involve the monarch himself. Vengeance was not demanded in the first heat of anger, but only after four weeks had elapsed and after contempt had again begun to be expressed at Austria's weakness. It was demanded that an investigation of the strictest kind be made by the Serbian government, and that guarantees be given that the affair would not degenerate into fine phrases and regretful shrugging of the shoulders. The sole possible manner of securing a serious investigation was to undertake it with the coöperation of Austrian officials. Only with such control would it have been possible to get to the bottom of the matter, and to prevent the Serbian government from encouraging such crimes in future. But precisely against this condition did the Serbian government protest most violently, thereby giving proof that it had cause to fear the investigation. A government quite uninvolved in the affair might quietly have submitted to this formality. That Austria had at last developed energy was regarded in Belgrade as an insult.[1]

Although Austria's demand was justified and, as pointed out, offered the only guarantee for a rigid prosecution of the investigation, the Vienna government would have been willing, as we know to-day, to renounce its demand at the instigation of its ally, Germany. But Russia, desiring war, did not await the result of German intervention, but mobilized, and thereby started the World War.

If we now throw a comprehensive glance back on the Austro-Hungarian policy of the last twenty or thirty years we cannot but arrive at the conclusion that it has been conservative and peace-loving in the highest degree. True friendship towards Austria's allies, and friendly readiness to meet her rival, Russia, half-way—such have been its characteristics.

Austrian diplomacy refused to take advantage of favorable opportunities to increase its power, such as the Russo-Japanese

[1] See *Austria-Hungary and the War*, Ernst Ludwig, Consul of Austria-Hungary at Cleveland; New York, 1915, p. 65. An interesting precedent is noted. On June 10, 1808, Prince Michael Obrenovich of Servia was assassinated in Topchider. The traces of the murder led to Servians living in Hungary. For this reason an investigation was started by the Hungarian government. Thereupon Servia requested that Servian officials be allowed to assist in the investigation, and the Hungarian government, having nothing to hide, consented without hesitation.

War. One is almost tempted to say that it neglected to protect the Turkish Empire against its vassals. It abandoned the Balkans to the Balkan nations, and protected its own interests only to the minimum of necessity. For herself Austria desired and received nothing beyond the possession of the two provinces which had been offered to her by Russia and almost forced upon her by Europe. Nor were these provinces taken until thirty years of beneficent service had been rendered to them. But all this restraint availed Austria nothing. At the moment when she showed courage to demand vengeance for a crime without parallel, her enemies attacked and sought to punish her for the sole crime which she had committed—namely, that of living.

History, the judge of events, will undertake in more peaceful future times the impartial award of praise and blame. It will establish this fact: the Austro-Hungarian policy may frequently be accused of unduly calm reserve and caution, but never of belligerency or desire for war. The best expression of this is to be found in a statement of the universally revered Emperor Franz Joseph:

"Austria-Hungary can never wage an offensive war, she must wait until she is attacked."

CHAPTER II

TURKEY

PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN

TURKEY'S accession to the cause of the Central Powers was a great surprise to outsiders. For many years we had been accustomed to see the Sublime Porte skillfully play one Great Power off against the other, without identifying herself with the interests of either. The friendly relations of Germany and Turkey were a matter of common knowledge, but so was the deep-seated influence of the Entente Powers. From Germany and Austria-Hungary the Porte had nothing to fear; at the beginning of the war England, Russia and France had solemnly guaranteed her territorial possessions in case of loyal neutrality. The Ottoman Empire, moreover, had shortly before suffered the terrible disaster of the Balkan War; party conflicts were raging within its boundaries, and sweeping reforms demanded attention. In short, even a superficial acquaintance with conditions seemed to show that Turkey's traditions and interests dictated absolute neutrality. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the war those in authority at Constantinople left no stone unturned in the effort to be prepared for a possible struggle on four fronts against the Entente Powers; and when finally the demands of the Western allies became unreasonable, in the last days of October, 1914, they drew the sword.

The official publications of England and Russia make it appear as if peaceful Turkey had been plunged into an undertaking of incalculable consequences and of a nature contrary to her true interests, through pressure from Germany exercised through the German military mission and through the cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau,* which the Turkish Government had purchased. For purposes of anti-German propaganda, this explanation is admirable; unfortunately, it does not accord with the facts. The English and French fleets lay at the entrance to the Dardanelles; the faintest sign, therefore, from the Sublime Porte would have sufficed to bring relief from unwelcome German coercion. The German military mission might have been rendered innocuous just as easily as the English naval mission.

But these considerations are not to the point. Turkey entered of her own initiative into this war, which is for her a war of defense in the strictest sense of the word. The fact that the decision of the cabinet was not unanimous proves nothing as to the government's desire for war—it is a matter of common knowledge that several of the English ministers resigned their portfolios. That Turkey was in close touch with her German advisers in regard to this decision is only natural. But the very fact that she had selected German advisers and that she had joyfully welcomed German ships in the Dardanelles proves conclusively that in responsible Turkish circles an identification with the German cause was desired from inner conviction. According to the Turkish, as well as to the German view, the interests of the two countries were identical. The development of the German friendship into a German-Turkish community of interest, in the face of the political supremacy of the Entente Powers on the Bosphorus and of the French and English influence in matters of education and the press—that is the real problem of the German-Turkish alliance.

The only possible course for the Asiatic states, if they wish to survive despite the European policy of power, lies in strengthening themselves internally by making use of the ideal forces of the modern state and in adapting themselves to the demands of a world organized along capitalistic lines. The decisive problems are, therefore, those of the state and of economics. The problem of civilization, or culture, is inseparably connected with each of these. Hence, that Asiatic state will show itself most capable of survival which is able to graft the new requirements onto the ancient roots of its strength, and which gains the opportunity for organic development through outward conditions of peace. Japan occupied this unique position, thanks to her insular situation far removed from Europe, and thanks to the homogeneity of her population and to the adaptability of her ideals of government and of her civilization. China, which might easily follow in the same course, is forced to contend with other and more serious difficulties: ancient historical divergencies between the provinces, the proximity of the Great Powers, whose greed for land and political and commercial interests run counter to the strengthening, even to the preservation of China, and finally childish experiments with a form of state that disregards all national traditions. But, from every point of view, the position of Turkey favors survival the least.

Geographically, Turkey invites the interference of the Great

Powers. Placed at the meeting-point of three continents, she commands the natural gateway into Asia and threatens the flank of Africa. If strengthened in a military way, she might block land communication between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, she might indeed threaten the water connection between these two seas. As mistress of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, Turkey holds in her hand the key to the international commerce of all the Mediterranean powers. At the same time, her territory is by nature one of the richest in the world and the seat of the most ancient civilization of mankind. There where the Babylonian, the Assyrian and the Greek civilization has bloomed, as well as that of the Caliphs, a new and glorious world might at any moment arise. The ruins and deserts of Asia Minor call, as it were, for the living waters of European organization.

Even more complicated are the ethnographic conditions. Turkey unfortunately is not inhabited by Turks, as Japan is by Japanese; Turks and Arabs, Armenians and Kurds, Greeks and Bulgarians are forced to live side by side in this empire, not to speak of smaller remnants of other races. This mixture of races was much worse before the Balkan War, and in this respect the painful amputation of the European provinces was undoubtedly beneficial to Turkey. The racial mixture, however, is to-day still a problem. This multiformity, however, would not be such an impediment did the peoples in question live entirely within the Turkish boundaries. But the bulk of the Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians, the Christian citizens of Mohammedan Turkey, live outside of Turkey. Especially do the Greeks flirt with the thought of liberation and the realization of the national ideal of a Greater Greece. Their enthusiasm, therefore, for the renaissance of Turkey is not great. Likewise the Bulgarians, who are not very numerous, regard themselves as "unredeemed." The Armenians are scattered throughout the entire empire, but the main portion of the nation dwells in Russia and Persia and the recollection of their national independence lives unquenched in their hearts. The unfavorable position of the Russian Armenians influences them, it is true, in the main to be loyal coöperators in the rebuilding of Turkey; but certain circles have sought too long by sanguinary means to force the interference of Europe and have suffered too greatly from the Kurds to be able entirely to repudiate this past. Of the Mohammedan peoples, the uncivilized Kurds are not for the moment to be considered in the work of coöperation; while the Turks and Arabs, the most important national elements, stand in sharp racial

opposition to each other. The Turks are the master nation, they have conquered all these countries and peoples, they are the upholders and the military backbone of the state. The glorious traditions of Turkey are bound up with their name, with their national dynasty. The Arabs, on the other hand, are the chosen people of religious tradition, according to the Mohammedan view the chief among the nations; in their aristocratic pride they submit only with inward protest to the rule of the Turks, who excel them in capability and especially as regards character. The leadership of Islam properly belongs to the Arabs. But the opposition between Turks and Arabs is by no means the whole of the problem. The Arabs are split as regards religion; their most industrious racial relatives are the Catholic Syrians, to whom for a double reason Turkish supremacy is hateful. Both peoples, finally, are represented beyond the boundaries of Turkey, and Pan-Turkish interests are furthered among the Turks, Pan-Arabic interests among the Arabs—a fact which does not contribute to simplify the ethnologic problem of the Ottoman State.

National and political boundaries thus coördinate at no point; we have here the difficulties of Austria-Hungary translated to the Orient. They are increased still further by an economic factor. The nations most active commercially of Turkey are Christian, especially the Greeks and Armenians. They have for a long time furnished the commercial as well as the cultural connection with Europe, or more properly expressed, with the Levantines, the South-European emigrants who settled on the east coasts of the Mediterranean, where they served to advance the economic interests of European expansion. The elder Turkish civilization oppressed and molested this class, and in consequence it sought the protection of those powers interested in the weakening of Turkey. Such ancient habits are not to be uprooted on the spur of the moment, by means of a still very imperfect constitution. The ruling race of Turks has not been able, in view of its national character and traditions, to compete commercially with these elements. The Anatolic peasant, upon whose labor in the last analysis the welfare of Turkey depends, is too undeveloped and too ruthlessly exploited to form the nucleus of the national economic system of the Mohammedan-Turkish state, though, together with his Arabian co-religionist in Irak, he will one day be called upon to play this rôle. Political power and economic strength, the two fundamentals of a modern state, are thus divided among different peoples in Turkey, a fact which plainly tends to sharpen racial contrasts. Then, too, there is the constantly threatening danger of commer-

cial and political interference by great and small Powers, which see in the evolutionary conflicts in Turkey only the "beginning of the end," and eagerly await the moment which, with the ruin of Turkey, will bring the long hoped-for and carefully prepared realization of their secret desires.

Previous to the age of capitalism, of commercial intercourse and imperialism, these centrifugal elements of Turkey were held in check by the patriarchal and absolute Islam state. Herein the Turkish-Islamic elements, strengthened by Arabs, Kurds and Albanians, ruled not alone *de facto,* but also *de jure,* as a master caste over the economically active Christian Raja peoples. If the latter provided public revenues, the former bore arms for their protection. The real state was formed only by the faithful; the Christians were subject peoples, who as regards their individual and legal rights formed separate groups under the protection of the Turkish government. The Turkish Sultan was the absolute ruler, for the Turks had conquered the Arabs and Kurds, although the latters' position as Moslems was a different one from that of the non-Moslem races; the fiction of the Islam state with the Caliph at its head was preserved. The Sultan as the most powerful ruler in Islam claimed the Caliphate, that is, the temporal leadership of the faithful. He was the protector of the Holy Cities, he waged his wars as Holy Wars (*djihad*), he was the protagonist of the Faith against Heresy. The Holy Law of the *Sheriat* was the law of the state, although in practice it was frequently not applied, or was supplemented by secular laws, the so-called *kanun-namehs.* With all the conscious strength of racial bonds, the Ottoman state rested upon a purely religious foundation. Nationalistic thought is in the Orient a product of most recent development. The state was held together by the will of the ruling Turkish class and supported by the consciousness of religious solidarity among its Mohammedan subjects. The Christians were subject foreign peoples, like the Tartars in present-day Russia. The economic bond, well into the nineteenth century, was the Turkish feudal system, which was not based like the Western system on land, but on rent and tax-rent. It lies in the nature of Orthodox Islam to spread; if it retreats its destiny is sealed. Turkish supremacy is slowly being crowded out of Europe, and the previously so despised "heathen" are beginning gradually with their commerce, with their political power, and above all with their ideas, to undermine the ancient conception of the state. The superior strength of the modern state is recognized, hence the work of reform by Mohammed II. The army was

reorganized, the feudal system gave way before the provincial constitution, European jurisdiction and legal equality of the Christians was proclaimed ever anew, but never, or only partially, made a reality. The previously contemptuously granted "capitulations" became an unbearable burden, which robbed the growing modern Turkish state of all freedom of movement. The premature ultra-liberal experiment of a western constitution (*midhat,* 1876) was crushed by the reaction of Abdul-Hamid. The power of the state became a despotism. Opposed to the advance of European ideas, the Sultan emphasized more and more his title as Caliph. With increasing feebleness, he attempted a policy of prestige-seeking by gathering, at least theoretically, around his tottering throne the Mohammedans of the whole world, who, in the face of increasing intercourse, become more conscious of their solidarity, although their political union is no more than a Utopian dream. Europe, therefore, ignorantly regarded him as a Prince of the Church, a sort of Mohammedan pope. But absolutism in its exaggerated form led to a catastrophe. Young Turkey came into being with the watchword of the French Revolution.

The belief in the omnipotence of modern ideas gives the Turkish Revolution and the resulting attempts at reform a touching character. Only gradually and following bitter experiences were the ideal value of historical inheritance, and the importance of power for practical politics recognized as the real state problem of the present. The question arises: How must the new Turkish state be organized under the above described geographic, ethnographic and historical conditions, if it is to assert itself?

Self-assertion was the goal clearly in view of everybody following the revolution; indeed, in regard to the question of sovereignty, there was a marked sensitiveness, even where this sovereignty was nothing more than a name. Bulgaria's declaration of independence, the Bosnian and Cretan questions were the source of almost as great excitement as later the Tripoli and Balkan wars. Up to the time of the outbreak of the World War, the degrading tutelage of the "capitulations" was keenly felt. All interference of the Great Powers in internal affairs was indignantly resented. Maintenance of Turkish independence—this was the first, the fundamental demand of Young Turkey. No protectorate, of whatever nature it might be, no international supervision was to be endured. But for the carrying through of this program, strengthening of the state was necessary, and before all a reorganization of the army. This task, however, demanded as a prerequisite the purifying of the consti-

tutional conception of the Empire. But on this point there was a wide divergence of opinion among the different parties, and the embittered conflicts of the various committees were mainly in regard to the fundamental attitude toward the problem of the state. There was a violent struggle as to the form of government—whether it should be that of a union or of a federation—and also as to its character—whether a neutral Turkish national state on a constitutional basis, or a state of the Caliph of all Islam.

The first of these questions was the chief point of dispute between the Committee for Unity and Progress, on the one hand, and the Liberals, on the other. A Turkish statesman has characterized this antithesis, which seems to him also a structural antithesis, as the difference between the centralization of France and the decentralization of England and her daughter states. "At bottom, the battle of the two parties was in effect that between the ideas of Auguste Comte and those of John Stuart Mill and Desmoulins." Closely connected with this was the second problem of state, although on this point the defenders of the different theories frequently united in a single party. Should the various nationalities and religions be brought together with equal rights and duties under the standard of Ottoman national unity? This was the view especially of the theorists from Paris. Or should the Turks, as the rulers, dominate all and seek contact with their ethnological relatives beyond the borders of the Empire? This was the hope not alone in many circles in Constantinople, but equally among the tools of Russia. Or, finally, should the glorious Caliph tradition be preserved as developed by Abdul-Hamid, and Pan-Islamism be used as a weapon against the outside world, as many among the Mohammedans held, especially the Arabs and the rank and file of the army?

The Turkish parliament and the struggles of the committees have often been severely criticized; but could such a portentous decision be reached without conflict? The ideals of the Caliphate as a state and those of the French Revolution cannot be combined without compromise.

The liberal, European neutral form of government was at first triumphant; Christians, who had previously been excluded from the army, were now admitted. Utopians throughout the world were jubilant. It had not been a revolution, it was declared, but an evolution. It was proper that the form of state should thus develop of itself. The experienced politicians of the old *régime,* however, continued to rule, the Young Turks not immediately assuming the actual direction of affairs. Time

was to be granted for the new ideas to make their way. This was the great mistake in the calculation. Power, not ideas, is the decisive factor in all historical development. Presently outlying territories were lost, while within the Empire itself confusion reigned; in short, the exigencies of the battle for existence forced the advocates of centralization to assume responsibility. The idea of a federal state gave way at the moment of need, because those upholding it coquetted with the possibility of foreign protectorates and thereby endangered the basis of the state's preservation.

The army, as the upholder of the revolution, was forced to seize the reins of government, or all would have been lost. All "imported" desires of the theorists had to be sacrificed to the necessity of maintaining the morale of the army. Thus, under the spur of necessity, return was made to the old conception of the Islam state, with retention, however, of the constitution. The Christians in the army had not measured up to the standard; but neither had the Turkish soldier proved of great value in a secular war for the unfamiliar conception of the "Fatherland."

"Fanaticism is the only motive able to move the Anatolian soldier. . . . The idea of a fatherland is foreign to the Turkish mind, and the Young Turk Committee that had striven to create 'Ottomanism' achieved naught." These are the words of a French eye-witness of the Turkish collapse in the Balkan war.[1] For the army, the state conception of Islam was a necessity. The emphasizing, however, of the Islamic idea in the constitutional state had become less dangerous, as the result of the Balkan War, since the most important Christian provinces had suffered amputation, and the Islamic element was numerically far in excess in this new and diminished Turkey. In addition, there had been a steady stream of Mohammedan immigration from the lost provinces. Further, in the Islam state Arabians and Turks, the most important national elements, were able to work peacefully together on the basis of historical tradition, and with typical Oriental disregard of nationality. A decisive factor, finally, was the knowledge that the European Powers with Mohammedan subjects regarded with suspicion the idea of the international solidarity of Islam; but since the days of Abdul-Hamid the Turkish government had learned how to play on this string. To counteract the increasing pressure of the Powers, the decision was reached in Constantinople to cultivate Pan-Islamism as a political weapon. The Young Turks desired to

[1] *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Le Vicompte de la Jonquière, Paris, 1914 (2me ed.), Vol. II, p. 396.

be an Islamic Great Power, and by means of the international nature of Islam they thought to increase their prestige. Thus, the outcome of the constitutional struggles and of the military reverses has been a centralized Islam state—not the state, however, of the old Caliphate, but a modern constitutional state, with the Caliph at the helm and with Pan-Islam tendencies. The Christian subjects enjoy freedom and equality in the Turkish Empire, but the state religion is Islam. We have a parallel in the religious character of the Christian constitutional states, Austria and Russia. In the same manner that Russia is waging a war for the realization of ancient religious ideals, so likewise the Sultan-Caliph proclaims the holy war of Islam. The Turkish demands, on the basis of this solution of the problem of state are: self-preservation, strengthening of the army, a constitution, and the Islamic character of the state.

The economic problem has, of course, not yet been solved; but its elements, so far as the state's interests are concerned, are evident. Every genuinely Turkish policy must reckon with the inherited economic conditions and with the natural treasures of the soil. The new state authorities, however, despite their good intentions, found themselves face to face with a difficult situation springing from inherited conditions. In their efforts to pursue a national economic policy, they ran counter to foreign interests at every turn. Foreign policy and economic reform were inseparably bound together. This resulted not only from the backwardness of the country, but very largely from two further fundamental causes, one historical, the other economic: from the "capitulations" and from the lack of capital in Turkey.

The "capitulations" have developed from old commercial treaties. As regards the state, their chief economic significance lies in the fact that tariff increases require the approval of the treaty Powers, and that Europeans enjoy immunity from taxation. The customs duties are exclusively *ad valorem*. In recent years they have been gradually raised from eight to fifteen per cent. The economic condition is monstrous which allows a state no tariff differentiation, either as regards countries or classes of goods. In case of an increased need of revenue, quite uncontemplated economic injury may result. Every fractional tariff raise must be arranged with the Powers, each of whom demands compensation in the form of commercial or even political concessions. But even this is not all. The immunity from taxation of the Europeans, who are almost exclusively merchants, makes it impossible adequately to tax the natives engaged in

commerce, since they would thereby be rendered incapable of competition. It has thus hitherto been impossible, though these circles are financially the most competent, to tax them correspondingly, and the chief burden has been laid on the feeble shoulders of the rural population. The leading men of Turkey longingly awaited the moment when it would be possible to free themselves from this economic strait-jacket, to say nothing of the restrictions placed upon the authority of the state as regards police and judicial matters. The war has at last opened the way in Turkey for healthy reforms in these fields, especially for the regulation of the finances on an independent basis.

Lack of capital in Turkey, both government and private, was another incentive for the policy of interference. The fact that the Turkish national bank, *la Banque Ottomane,* is an absolutely French undertaking, will not be gone into further at this point, important as it is; but Turkey is a thoroughly typical debtor state. In the balance of trade the item of commercial paper stands exclusively on the debit side of Turkey's ledger. In order to secure money for her loans, she is driven to great sacrifices—indeed, the attempt has even been made to force her to grant political concessions in return for loans. For economic and strategic reasons, extension of her railroads was needed. European private capital was eagerly offered for these promising undertakings, but behind the companies stood the political representatives of the capitalists, and their desires were defeated or hindered by competing states. The Anatolian railway was not allowed to be continued through the eastern part of Asia Minor, since Russia considered her boundary threatened thereby; and even the Hedjaz railway, which had been built by Turkey herself with non-European capital, was refused a terminus on the Red Sea, since England feared for the Suez Canal. When one Power gained a concession, despite the protests of the other Powers, the latter immediately demanded indemnity concessions. Turkey's national economic policy, therefore, was not dictated by her own interests, but by the private economic interests of European capitalists, or by the political ambitions of the great Powers.

As long as Turkey worked in conjunction with all the Powers, there could be no great uniform plan for her benefit, or for strengthening the country internally. To throw herself unreservedly into the arms of any one of the Powers was not possible without a complete breach with all the others; and the danger was always present that the price of healthy economic development might be the loss of independence. For was there a single

great Power which had an interest in seeing Turkey strengthen herself as an independent state? Was not the desire of all of them to gain economic spheres of interest in order to pave the way for territorial acquisitions? The interests of the Turkish state demanded European guidance, since economic reform could not be achieved independently. The more uniform this guidance was, the better it would be. The natural leader of Turkey, from the Turkish point of view, must be that great Power whose own interests demanded a strengthening of Turkey. But did such a Power exist?

Before we attempt to answer this question, however, we must contemplate the economic problem from the economic point of view, in the narrower sense of the word. What are the economic conditions and demands for the future suggested by Turkey's natural treasures? Soil and climate predestine Turkey as an agrarian state along great lines. Grain is not the only factor in this connection; the most important place is held by the product which has greater value in the world's market—cotton. In addition to the well-watered territory of Southern Anatolia, which offers a fine field for this staple, the ancient country between the Euphrates and the Tigris, where cotton even grows wild, is one of the natural places for its cultivation on a vast scale. Were the necessary irrigation provided, results might be achieved according to the statement of the English engineer, Sir W. Willcocks,[1] which would far surpass in quality and quantity the Egyptian product. New Turkey must reckon with this great potential factor in determining her future political attitude toward the Powers.

But Turkey has also an industrial future. In view of her stage of development, she will not be able for many years to count upon native industries of a quality equal to those of England or Germany, since a high grade of popular education is a prerequisite for this. But she will be in a position before long to provide independently for the industrial utilization of the products of her soil by simple weaving and milling industries. The production of petroleum will be another important activity. There are petroleum deposits of great extent in Asiatic Turkey, not to speak of mineral treasures which are as yet almost untouched. Turkey's interest, therefore, demands that if she is to enter into closer relation with any Power, not only must the political aims of the two states be reconcilable, but their natural economic conditions be complementary, so that Turkey may be hindered neither politically nor economically in her justifiable

[1] *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, 1905.

development into a modern state, but assisted in a full and speedy evolution.

What, then, must be the nature of Turkey's foreign policy, on the basis of her political and economic needs as outlined above? To continue to solve the problem as hitherto—namely, with the rival coöperation of all the Powers—has already been shown to be irreconcilable with Turkish interests. Let us for this purpose examine the political and economic relation of the various states to Turkey.

Russia, Turkey's powerful northern neighbor, must at the start be rejected as a possible mentor, for the Muscovites are hereditary enemies of the Ottomans. The gradual advance of the Russians, first to the banks of the Black Sea and then around this great inland body of water, was made at the cost of Turkey. The Dardanelles are the historical goal of Russia's imperialistic policy, they are the gateway to the ocean for Russian trade, while for the Russian Church the possession of Constantinople and Jerusalem would mark the fulfilment of century-old longings. Political hopes, economic necessity and religious antitheses make Russia the natural enemy of Turkey. Far from strengthening Turkey as a state, for more than a century the policy of the Czars has been in every way to weaken her as much as possible. Whoever strengthens or supports Turkey is the enemy of Russia. This is the explanation of Russia's anger against Germany in the matter of the German military mission of 1913-14. The view taken by public opinion in Russia at the time was "that a real strengthening of Turkey appears to the Russian Empire as something which must be prevented." [1] Russia, it is true, saved Constantinople in the Balkan War from being engulfed by the Bulgarians; but this she did not in order to preserve it for the Turks, but that she might conquer it for herself, as Sassonov boldly stated on February 9, 1915, during the war session of the Duma. Whatever may be thought regarding the indiscretion of this statement, nevertheless it formulated the will of the nation. [2] In keeping with this, Russian schools, churches and commercial enterprises were established for the purpose, not of strengthening, but of undermining Turkey. Moreover, Russia is an agrarian state like Turkey, she produces the same things in great quantities; her industries are in a state of infancy to which Turkey's might easily attain—

[1] *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik* 1888 *bis* 1913, Count Ernst zu Reventlow, p. 383.
[2] See *Preussische Jahrbücher,* Mitrofanov, 1914.

hence, economically an alliance between Russia and Turkey would be contrary to reason. In such a case, Turkey would sink, politically as well as economically, to the condition of a Russian province, and Russia would merely acquire a few additional enslaved foreign peoples.

But if Russia was the hereditary enemy of Turkey, until recently England was her traditional friend. Up to the last few decades of the nineteenth century, England had a genuine interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire: English and Turkish interests seemed identical.

England's interest in the maintenance of Turkey was twofold—it was governed by colonial as well as international considerations. With one hundred million Mohammedan colonial subjects of her own, England could not with impunity view the growing sentiment of Pan-Islamism. Since the mutiny of 1857, no security was felt regarding the Islamic population of India. Friendly diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte were sought in order that England might pose as the protector of Islam and thereby influence the loyalty of the Indians. The chief factor, however, in England's Turkish policy was her antagonism to Russia. The high tide of this feeling was reached at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. In keeping with an old principle of action, England avoided the creation of a land boundary between her own possessions and any Continental Great Power, and for this reason she strove for the preservation of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan as the natural buffer states between the Russian and English spheres of interest. The abandonment of this policy was not the result of a sudden decision, but was due to a number of motives. After the opening of the Suez Canal, despite England's efforts to prevent it, this direct course to India became so important that Great Britain was forced to occupy Egypt. The Red Sea, however, is a continuation of the Suez Canal. This meant for England the beginning of the problem of an Arabian question. But at the same time the new course of English policy, commonly called Imperialism, had been entered upon.

In addition to the Cape-to-Cairo program, there arose the new battle-cry "From Cairo to Calcutta!" Egypt, which was still legally a Turkish province, became the corner stone of the British world empire. The occupation of Egypt, called temporary in all official statements, became thereby definitive. The friendship between England and Turkey suffered a severe strain. The logical extension of this policy could result only in the severance of the Arabian provinces from the Ottoman Em-

pire. Only if weakened, could Turkey be permitted to remain mistress of the borderlands of the Red Sea. England, therefore, began to foster throughout Arabia the seditious elements and to hinder the strengthening of Turkey. The rebels in the province of Asir, in the Yemen district, which had never been entirely conquered by Turkey, found support and encouragement from England. The Hedjaz railway, which is vital for the strengthening of Turkish influence in Arabia, could not be continued to the Red Sea, owing to English opposition. Turkey, it is true, was badly advised in the unfortunate Akaba affair. Further inland, where the Bedouin Empires of the Banu Sa'ud and of the Banu Rashid stood opposed to each other, the former, who were enemies of the Turks, gained the upper hand by means of English weapons. As a consequence, Turkey saw herself forced to furnish weapons to the Banu Rashid; this was a measure which cut both ways as regards the peace of Arabia and Mesopotamia.

This policy carries us through the Central Arabian uplands to the Persian Gulf, where Turkish supremacy had never been very firmly established, although individual local sheiks and other rulers found it to their advantage to accept an official Turkish title. The extension of British influence to this point was part of the policy that aimed at the protection of India's flank, and that did battle against the pirates and slave-dealers, and is not to be construed as a manifestation of political enmity to Turkey, any more than England's relations with the southern coast of Arabia. The treaty with Maskat in 1798 was aimed rather at France and Holland. The treaties in the early part of the nineteenth century, also, were merely treaties of commerce and friendship—thus England's connection with the Gulf was legitimate and long-standing. As early as November, 1839, the first Anglo-Indian report was published in regard to the harbor of Koweit, which later became so celebrated; but in the period of imperialism these treaties gradually acquired a different character. One little sheik after the other renounced the right of negotiation with foreign powers—in 1892 the Sheik of Bahrein, in 1899 the Sheik of Koweit. These are protectorate agreements with careful avoidance of the word. But Turkey likewise asserted certain claims to Koweit, whose sheik was a Turkish *kaimmakam,* and to Bahrein. Koweit became of the greatest importance for Turkey with the beginning of the Bagdad railway, as for a long time it was regarded as the only possible terminus of that road. England, however, sought to gain possession of this harbor. It was not until 1913 that an agreement was reached in regard to Koweit between England and Turkey,

by which Turkey was forced to yield to English pressure along the whole line. England at the same time sought and gained a free hand in respect to Bahrein. At about the same period Ibn Sa'ud occupied the last Turkish possessions on the Persian Gulf in which Turkish garrisons were still to be found, namely the districts of El-Hasa and El-Katif. According to the general belief of the Orient, Sa'ud is merely a tool of England. Thus at the very moment when Turkey's outside possessions began to be of importance for the increase of her strength, she found herself face to face with the silent and tenacious Arabian policy of England, seeking to deprive her of one province after the other.

In regard to England's ultimate aim, however, there could be no doubt in the mind of any thinking Oriental after her action in Persia. Russia, following her disastrous defeat at the hands of Japan, had ceased to be England's chief opponent. Germany was so greatly strengthened that England changed her traditional Asiatic policy fundamentally, in order to secure a free hand against Germany. The idea of a buffer state was definitely abandoned in the Persian Treaty of 1907, and North Persia was sacrificed to Russia. In his book, "The Strangling of Persia" (London, 1912), W. Morgan Shuster has shown the absolute lack of scruple in the course which was followed. He had been employed to reorganize the finances of Persia. But as this did not agree with the interests of Russia, he was forced to yield. He says:

"Russia is now (April 30, 1912) the sovereign power in Persia. She is the practical and effective ruler of the country. The whole of Persia is to-day a satrapy. The peoples, however brutally treated, have no means of protest. Fear, deadly sickening fear of the prison, noose and torture, is the force with which Russia governs." (p. 236.)

According to Shuster's opinion, however, responsibility for this lies with England, who, from dread of Germany, has sacrificed every one of her ideals in her Asiatic policy. "British prestige has suffered all over the world, and the English people are openly dissatisfied because they can no longer appear as the friend of weak and struggling nations." The Turks understood this. The interest of the British world empire, as conceived in the Foreign Office after 1907, demanded the dismemberment of Turkey, for in view of the unparalleled rapidity of Russia's advance in Persia, the Persian Gulf was threatened unless Russia could be deflected toward the Dardanelles. Arabia, Mesopotamia and South Persia to be given to England; the

north of Turkey to Russia—such was the plan which would have fulfilled Muscovite hopes and at the same time have realized the uninterrupted English overland connection of Cairo and Calcutta. Furthermore, this would have given the death blow to Germany's ambitions in Turkey. Such political aims are seldom realized by a direct process; but only by keeping these ultimate aims of England in mind is it possible to understand her policy toward Turkey. This has been openly admitted by French observers. René Pinon speaks thus of England:

"She boldly assumed the offensive, encouraged the revolts of Yemen and Hedjaz, gave shelter in Egypt to the committees of the 'national Arab party,' despatched the engineer Sir William Willcocks to Mesopotamia—provoked finally the Koweit affair and profited by that of Tabah." [1]

The aim of all these undertakings was to weaken Turkey. And that policy which had been successful in Egypt, should it not be feasible also in other Arabian provinces of the Ottoman Empire?

England's imperialistic course and her understanding with Russia rendered her impossible as a political guide for Turkey, whereas from a purely economic point of view she seemed to be predestined to be such. France, the oldest friend of the Porte, was for similar reasons excluded from this candidacy, despite the fact that since the days of Francis I her enmity towards Austria had frequently brought the two countries together in a community of interests, that the "capitulations" had developed mainly from French treaties, that the modern Orient is quite controlled by French cultural ideals, and that France is not alone the traditional banker but likewise the chief creditor of Turkey. The author of the anonymous Oxford pamphlet No. 39 ("Turkey in Europe and Asia") even regards this indebtedness of Turkey as the chief reason for her continued existence down to the present day. France, it is true, has for a long time advanced claims against Syria. She has no desire to be excluded from a division of Turkey; but on the other hand, French interests might easily have become reconciled with the maintenance of Turkey. It is even possible that Russia's advance may have disquieted her ally on the Seine, but France was ready to sacrifice everything to her policy of *revanche*. Therefore, she seconded the Anglo-Russian political work of undermining Turkey, and this she did with her most characteristic weapons—with her press and her financial policy. The aim of the latter especially was to keep Turkey in leading strings: on the occasion of the

[1] *L'Europe et l'Empire Ottoman*, René Pinon, Paris, 1908, p. 392.

loan (1910) France did not hesitate to demand the right of political interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish ministry of finance. This caused, as is well known, the failure of the transaction, and Germany thereupon sprang into the breach; the money was, it is true, not so cheaply obtained, but on the other hand it brought with it no political humiliation. From the purely commercial point of view, France, with her plentiful capital, might very well seem a desirable friend to an impecunious Turkey; but Turkey, growing in strength, did not offer the needed commercial advantages; for France does not possess a highly developed industry like England or Germany, but exports to Turkey simple articles manufactured *en masse,* which might be produced equally well in Turkish territory within reasonable time. The two countries are not complementary to each other in respect to trade, but are competitors. Further, such satisfactory deals could not be made by French bankers with Turkey if she became strengthened. Hence, while it was to France's interest to maintain Turkey, it was so only under the *status quo.* The financial independence of Turkey, on the basis of an active trade balance, which would be in keeping with the country's own interests, ran counter to the interests of the money market of Paris, and on that account was undesirable in the eyes of the French government.

Thus as regards the Entente Powers, there was no great objection to the dismemberment of Turkey—at all events, they were all equally interested in her gradual disintegration and the prevention of her renascence. But Turkey did not fall to pieces; for before an agreement had been reached as to her dismemberment she had found a strong helper in Germany. The accession of Emperor Wilhelm II to the throne coincides, approximately, with the time when Germany, through her economic development, was forced into the path of world politics. Following the Emperor's first visit to Constantinople (1888), the building of the Anatolian railway was started; the second visit (1898) ushered in the period of the Bagdad railway. To the superficial observer it appeared that a new power, in addition to France, England and Russia, had entered the lists in order to gain economic concessions from disintegrating Turkey, and thereby to lay the foundation for claims to territorial acquisitions in the final division. It so appeared without doubt; in Germany, too, "unofficial" politicians spent their time in "annexing" Anatolia and Syria in order to secure colonies for Germany's future excess of population. And yet a glance at the

map, at Germany's unfortunate geographical position, shows the folly of such plans. In the face of the Mediterranean Powers and Russia, a German colony on Turkish soil would have proved a still-born child. The German Imperial policy proceeded from healthier considerations, and had none but economic aims. Herein lies the fundamental difference between the German Oriental policy and that of every other state, with the possible exception of the United States. Since Germany could not think of occupation nor of protecting herself even in local possessions, she advocated the independence and the strengthening of Turkey. There was system in this policy, for in Morocco and China the same course had been pursued. Germany discouraged premature reforms, which would have led only to a guardianship for the Oriental states, or even to the dominance of some especially interested Great Power. This may have given rise to the opinion that Germany was the upholder of barbarism.

"In Macedonia, as in Russia, as in China, as in Morocco, as everywhere, the interests of William II run counter to the needs of humanity," says Victor Bérard. [1]

The author is undoubtedly right in stating that our policy was not of a sentimental kind, but was guided solely by German interests. But those interests did not demand territorial acquisitions, as was the case with the other Powers, but exclusively economic influence. In the entire Islamic world, in North Africa, in Egypt, in India, everywhere where higher races had first been commercially exploited by European Powers and then deprived of their political rights, it had been demonstrated that territorial acquisition was, in the long run, a mistake; this policy had, it is true, been of great advantage for a few generations, but with the increasing education of peoples capable of development it had inevitably led to serious conflicts. In view of this fact, Germany had no intention, in the general division of the Oriental world still remaining independent, to acquire even a slight portion for her exclusive exploitation; on the contrary, a much better bargain was anticipated through the maintenance of the Oriental states, since we reckoned on being able more than to hold our own in a market thrown open to international competition. From this point of view, therefore, a strengthening of these states, especially of Turkey, was desirable in our own interest; for only a strong state is in a position to develop its trade to its own advantage without diplomatic concessions. It is only necessary to follow this course of reasoning to realize that Germany promised to be for Turkey an ally whose help and

[1] *La France et Guillaume II*, Paris, 1907, p. 208 ff.

advice the latter state could accept, since Turkey was not the object of, but a partner in, Germany's political reckoning, and that not alone from an economic point of view.

In his book, in which he justifies his foreign policy, Prince Bülow says regarding this point:

"Especially since the Oriental voyage of the Emperor and Empress have our relations with Turkey and Islam been carefully nurtured. These relations were not of a sentimental nature; we had, on the contrary, an important economic, military and also political interest in the maintenance of Turkey. The country was for us, both from the economic and financial point of view, a fruitful field of activity, to which Rodbertus and Friedrich List had already called attention, and which we have cultivated to great advantage. In the undesirable, but not impossible case of a general war, the military strength of Turkey might have been a very perceptible factor on our side. Turkey was the most desirable neighbor possible for our Austrian allv. That her collapse might be a loss for us was revealed by the last army bill, which resulted from the situation brought about by the Balkan War.—Turkey has for many years remained a useful and important link in the chain of our political relations." [1]

From the point of view of these military and political interests, it is explicable that the German Empire, following old Prussian traditions, at the very beginning of its Turkish economic policy assisted in modernizing the famous Ottoman Army. Likewise, German-built railways did not serve economic purposes alone. In many places, in planning the course of the line, economic advantages were sacrificed to the strategic desires of the Turkish general staff. During the period of absolutism, many a desirable plan could not be carried through, but there was no lack of good will and sincere work; a Frenchman, Victor Bérard, who is by no means a friend of Germany, is forced, in speaking of the Graeco-Turkish war, to acknowledge the success attained. He says:

"Without the discipline and the strategy of von der Goltz, the army of the Caliph would never have gained the Thessalian victories." [2]

René Pinon, another unbiassed Frenchman, thus characterizes the German policy:

"The certain and permanent interest of Germany is to preserve and increase the Turkish power, and to make use of it in order to extend her own power throughout the domain of

[1] *Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II*, Vol. 1, p. 31.
[2] *La mort de Stamboul*, p. 96.

Islam. To galvanize the Sick Man, to fortify his army for the purpose of using it as an auxiliary for her own political designs—such is the interest of Germany and such is the policy of the Emperor. Thus the Ottoman Empire continues, despite so many predictions, stronger perhaps than it has been for a long time, at all events more Mussulman, more Turkish." [1]

With these words, a political opponent frankly admits that the German policy, by its very character, has served the best interests of Turkey. He is forced to admit the same of Germany's economic policy, especially as regards the effect of the Bagdad Railway:

"If, then, the Bagdad Railway is to become an instrument of domination, this may well be for the benefit of the Turks and of Islam. As for Germany, if she succeeds in carrying through her gigantic enterprise she will, without doubt, gain political advantage from it, but she will find it primarily a means of economic expansion, a market from which her products will be scattered throughout Central Asia." [2]

That Turkey also would enjoy great economic profit from it is self-evident; demand increases with traffic facilities, and automatically revenues from customs and taxes rise. The history of the *Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie* has again proved the fact that railways, even when they show a private deficit, nevertheless pay well from a government point of view, and this is the best justification for the "kilometer guarantee" granted in the case of the German undertakings. But even more important for Turkey than the increase of revenue, is the fact that through her railways the distant provinces have been brought so much nearer to the capital that her political solidarity gains in strength through the greater mobility of troops and officials.

The great problem of the German-Turkish relations is characterized by the catchword "Berlin to Bagdad." Political enmity has seen in this an effort by Germany for dominance; Turkey has been spoken of as "a German province," or at all events a German protectorate over Turkey has been thought possible. The problem, however, is purely economic; it would be nonsensical to develop a future protectorate in a military way to the point of being self-protecting, not to speak of the geographical and political obstacles to a possible German desire for conquest. No, Bagdad and Berlin stand here in opposition, as the termini of a vast railway undertaking that is approaching completion, and which binds together countries of quite different commercial

[1] *L'Europe et l'Empire Ottoman*, p. 76.
[2] Ibid., p. 334.

structure and renders possible an exchange of their products. It makes them independent of inimical competition, of the attacks of enemies, and above all of the dominance of the sea. What is in question, therefore, is a great unified trade territory as the basis of political friendship. Every one of the states through which the line passes—the German industrial states in the north, the great Turkish agrarian state in the southeast, and the Balkan states in between—will seek to carry out their own national policy; but they all have the same interest in exchanging their products through this new artery of international communication. Although, on account of the lower cost of transportation in times of peace, freight will be sent by sea, nevertheless precisely the present international crisis shows the incalculable importance of such a secure means of land communication, which is comparable in importance to the great trunk lines of the United States. Germany, however, has not the least intention of taking advantage of Turkey's economically undeveloped condition by crushing her with capital. The experiences of other states have taught us that a political friendship can never continue if the stronger party exploits the weaker economically. The attempt, at all events, will be made to protect the future economic interests of Turkey, against ephemeral private interests, even of German *entrepreneurs;* for only in this manner can there be permanent profit. Thus the words "Berlin to Bagdad" have also an idealistic meaning. They symbolize the friendly relations between Germany and Turkey, they show the path which Germany has followed in opening up the riches of Turkey for the Turks, as well as for the whole world, the path along which Germany will continue to provide Turkey with whatever of a material and spiritual nature she needs for her inner development.

The identity of German and Turkish interests was so evident that Abdul Hamid, in pursuance of a wise policy, turned ever more emphatically toward Germany. In view of the unpopularity of absolutism which had finally led to political caricature and to oppression, it was easy for our enemies to represent "reactionary" Germany as the fortress of the old régime, and the enemy of Turkish freedom. These disseminations found, it is true, no credence among the military circles of the Young Turks, who had learned the blessing of German industry; but they encountered belief among the refugees who had been affectionately welcomed in Paris and London, and who after the successful revolution controlled the opinion of the thoughtless

mob with French catchwords of freedom. But even they, after a period of error, were won back by the force of facts to Abdul Hamid's pro-German policy. A "former Grand Vizier" who is friendly to the Entente Powers, has recently in a neutral publication admirably characterized this reversal. His course of reasoning brings us directly to the threshold of the war. He writes:

"All that Germany had done to uphold Turkey, as providing her with the weapons of war, sending a military mission, abstention from active participation in anti-Turkish movements, great works of public utility—the Young Turks had attributed all this to the personal friendship of the sovereigns or even to a desire for 'fat' and onerous contracts. All the Franco-English acts harmful to Ottoman interests, as the seizure of Egypt, questions regarding the frontier of Yemen and Akaba, the Armenian, Cretan and Macedonian questions, the benevolent protection of Greece, the protectorate of Tunis, the occupation of Metelin, etc.—all these were considered only as a natural consequence of a tyrannical system and of a disastrous political course, and not as marking a new departure in the policy of the states who were the authors of these moves." [1]

For this reason, Young Turkey with Kiamil, the friend of England, threw itself into the arms of Great Britain, who at the time of the separation of Bosnia and Bulgaria, reached the zenith of her influence. Gradually, however, the truth began to make itself felt. Russia was unmasked as an accomplice in the Bosnian affair, and she recognized Bulgaria after establishing her influence at Sofia. After the fall of Kiamil, brought about through internal causes, England treated the Young Turks as her enemies and supported the opposition.

"The Young Turks, full of illusions as regards the liberal sentiments of Western Europe . . . were greatly astonished to find that this liberal Europe had welcomed Ottoman constitutionalism not as a new instrument of Turkish unity but rather as a new means of separatism for the Christian races in Turkey."

Europe made concessions to "Liberal Turkey" as little as she had done when Turkey was "absolute." The furious press campaign against the Turkish loan of 1910, which even frightened off England from undertaking it, shows the unreliability of the feelings of the Western Powers. The sale of the German men-of-war and the granting of the loan through Berlin and Vienna

[1] "Reflections sur le rôle de la Turquie," *Revue Politique Internationale*, November and December, 1914, p. 351 ff. The editor says the writer of this article is "a very high person who played a rôle of the first importance in the events of the last five years."

showed where Turkey's true friends were to be found. Russia feared that a strong Turkey would permanently block her way into the Mediterranean, England entertained similar fears for Egypt. "The Young Turks were thus brought to retrace their steps, to enter into a path of German friendship which appeared to them to offer a better way out."

Even worse was the effect of the reproaches which were addressed to Young Turkey from the camp of the Entente Powers. They were blamed for their nationalism because, on the basis of local autonomy, a crowd of small and easily influenced states had been hoped for on Turkish soil. When it was found that this dismemberment of Turkey had not come about *on a crié au nationalisme à outrance.* (Nationalism was bitterly denounced.) The non-Turkish peoples enjoyed greater freedom than the Algerians and East Indians; they were forbidden only to foment revolution, and to educate their children in an anti-Turkish spirit. "What barbarism! Better the old régime!" This was repeated *ad nauseam.* Equally grotesque did the reproach of Pan-Islamism appear to the Turks. The Mohammedans of Russia, England and France did not enjoy the political rights to which they were entitled.

"The European and American, and even certain Asiastic peoples, have cast off the yoke which deprived them of human rights. Is it so extraordinary that the Mussulmans have the same ideas and the same desires? It seems that it is extraordinary, since as soon as a Mussulman begins to manifest them, to feel himself the equal of other men and to demand an amelioration of his social and political condition, this is branded as the crime of Pan-Islamism.—A Caliphate is not tolerated which may become a symbol of progress for Mussulmans in general. If German diplomacy has been able successfully to undergo severe tests at Constantinople, this was because the Turks felt that this diplomacy was not directed to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, nor to an encouragement of disruptive elements, nor that it was an indication of violent opposition to the renascence and the progress of the Islam world."

When things were going badly for Turkey, the German press was the only one which did not join in the joyful acclaim of the victory of the Balkan States. "It was the Anglo-French joy at this period which destroyed the political reputation of Kiamil Pasha, caused his overthrow and the return to power of the Young Turks."

When, following the war, Turkey strove for internal reforms, the prerequisites were an increase in the tariff and the

building of railways. Certain territory had to remain unopened, because Russia so desired, and the building of the Bagdad Railway, which meant the laying of the foundation for Turkish prosperity, was deferred and the necessary tariff increase not permitted, because the Entente Powers did not consider the welfare of Turkey but desired only to place obstacles in Germany's way. When in future the diplomatic history of this period is written, "it will be seen what enormous sacrifices Turkey had consented to in order to enjoy—and that with restrictions—the rights and advantages which the smallest Christian state (Montenegro, for example) acquired at its birth."

Plainly perceptible at this time was the influence of Russia, which blocked all progress, and in the face of which even England did not dare to send English police officers to Turkey for her reform of the provinces.

At this point the war broke out, and Turkey immediately declared her neutrality. England's first act was to confiscate the two Turkish dreadnoughts which had already been paid for and were to have been turned over to Turkey at this time. "The seizure was made without warning, without the slightest attempt at courtesy, and no offer was made by the British government to pay back at least the price of the two ships."

Turkey, then, as is well known, purchased the German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau*. The storm which thereupon broke out against Turkey in the Entente press, the threats which were made against her, the plans for dismemberment which were evolved—this was well calculated to awaken among the Turks the conviction that their last hour had come, "that the plans projected in the form of threats had already somewhere been reduced to writing."

Preparations were, therefore, made for war, but the first blow was not struck until the French and English fleets already lay in the Dardanelles, and Russian mine ships were strewing mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus.

This presentation of the case by a leading Turkish statesman sounds quite different from the English Blue Book. That at this time, and after such experiences, Turkey no longer trusted in the promise of the Entente Powers to observe her integrity can astonish no one. The same guarantee as to her territory before the Balkan War, though given by all the Powers, had not prevented her from losing her European provinces. Could she, then, now trust to the deceitful promises of her natural enemies, who had banded together to destroy her sole natural protector in order themselves to have a free hand in the Orient? For

Russia, this war was admittedly a struggle for Constantinople, and as regards England the Bagdad Railway question played an important rôle. The Sultan, therefore, unfurled the standard of the Prophet as a last recourse. If he summoned the Moslems of the whole world to a Holy War, it was done for the reasons stated above. He emphatically embraced the cause of the German Empire; for only from Germany, which has an interest in her preservation, can Turkey expect help.

BOOK III

OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE

CHAPTER I

ENGLAND'S POLICY OF FORCE

PROFESSOR ERICH MARCKS, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH

THE British world empire is the greatest known, not alone to the history of modern times, but to that of ancient as well. It has grown to its present proportions through stages clearly and logically resulting one from the other. In this development there have not been lacking pauses and digressions, but the coherence of the whole is of impressive unity. Likewise, the means employed are uniform and of constant recurrence; everywhere a policy based on force, a chain of conquests, of life-and-death struggles, prompted by as bellicose a spirit as that of any other nation—indeed, one is tempted to say, as that of any nation save Russia in the world with which we are familiar.

This development does not begin until a late period. The long conflicts for the conquest of France form an older, independent series. The modern history of England commences with the Tudors, the inauguration of her far-aiming foreign policy with Elizabeth. England had first to free herself, economically and politically, from the power of other states, before being able to assume her own position in the world. Of tremendous importance in that connection was her separation from the Catholic Church; it assigned to England her place in a definite international group and influenced deeply her internal spiritual development. It gave an impulse toward independence, both internal and external. But the most important factor in the development of the country was its insular position. This became decisive after Europe's entrance upon what may be styled the "oceanic" period: from 1600 on, England influenced the Continent, from an outside position, in trade and politics, while herself turning to the sea and the outer world. She seized upon the Baltic, the North Sea, and then the Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became the shipbuilder and merchant for the majority of the European nations. The sea was for her the source of everything: independence, security, acquisition of goods and territory; the ocean protected her and saved her from having powerful neighbors. Thus, she was able to hold fast in her internal life to parliament, popular administration and government, avoiding the establish-

ment of a powerful, armed monarchy, such as was necessary on the Continent. England was able, undisturbed, to develop the characteristics of her race—namely, individual energy, called forth by contact with the sea; personal freedom, complemented but not suppressed by a strong government. Thanks to the sea, she was free to turn to the outside world, herself protected in the rear. But in doing this, without being chained to Europe, she never lost touch with the Continent—not alone, however, because Europe remained the field for her commerce. English politics never ceased to lay hold on and influence the Continent, at first rather in a defensive manner, then more and more as a deliberate policy. The division of power on the Continent was always for England one of the fundamental conditions of her own existence; it influenced her attitude toward the world beyond Europe; but at the same time, owing to a hundred commercial and political ties, she always continued to be a European Power. Her insular position enabled her to enjoy the tremendous advantage of being able to exercise her influence on the Continent, without finding herself forced to tie up her strength in so doing. The Continent was always involved in its own affairs, in its own differences and antitheses; England was able to influence it without being drawn too strongly into the vortex. The country grew thoroughly accustomed to this untrammeled position, to the fact that it had no neighbors, and that it would never have any, not even on the sea—this came to seem more and more a God-given privilege. The limitations under which other Powers suffered, owing to their geographical position, did not exist for England. The security furnished by her girdle of waters challenged her, as it were, to venture out into limitless space and to regard every check as an injustice.

The course to be followed by the island people lay plainly indicated; only gradually, however, was it entered upon. England started out by freeing herself from ancient European bonds, and by rendering innocuous her neighboring states, Scotland and Ireland, which she united to herself. She sought to find a path midway between the two great Powers of the sixteenth century, France and Spain, and to maintain her own independence. Her real entrance onto the stage of modern world history did not begin until the struggle of Elizabeth against the more powerful of these two states, namely, the Spain of Philip II. In this conflict, political and religious independence went hand in hand with England's first strong bid for maritime trade, for the treasures of the New World, for gain and adventure. Statesman and merchant, pirate and admiral united in the effort,

and this union remained characteristic for England's future. A strong touch of daring and lawlessness marks all of England's world struggles throughout the centuries down to the present day. And through it all there was the union of trade and state, the control of all commercial and colonizing expansion by the government of the country; these two forces have worked inseparably together, trade and maritime enterprise always being backed by the power of weapons. Already in the struggle against the Armada (1588), a sturdy feeling of patriotism, a crude national pride, bound all other motives, noble and ignoble, into a firm unity. Upon this victory against Spain was founded the pride and glory of the greatness and culture of the Elizabethan period—the greatness of Shakespeare. But the ambition of the younger generation, impatient of the aged Queen, was already eager for extensive enterprises of conquest in the Spanish and American world.

The first Stuarts brought about a reversal; England sank back into herself, inglorious and inactive. The Puritans undertook the colonization of North America in opposition to the home policy. Not until fifty years after Elizabeth's death—that is, after the year 1650—did a second impulse for an English world policy manifest itself out of the confusion of the Puritan Revolution: Oliver Cromwell renewed the war against Spain and added that against Holland. He acted as a Protestant, yet nevertheless attacked the neighboring Protestant state. He desired to acquire Spanish colonies and gained a footing in the West Indies, he led England politically and as a warlike state into the Baltic and the Mediterranean; but his greatest blow was delivered against the commercial rival across the Channel, through the sea battles of Robert Blake, which were decisive not alone for the moment but also for the future. Religious faith, power and commerce were again as closely bound together as under Elizabeth, but this time the attack proceeded exclusively from the English side, and the lust of conquest spread far and wide. This impulse was directly transmitted to posterity, which indirectly, despite all resistance, inherited also the spiritual sentiments of the Puritans. England was permeated through and through by their sternness, their self-discipline, their love of work, their economy, their national and religious ambition. England's expansion in the world was due, in no small degree, to the spirit of Puritanism which she had imbibed. From the Puritans, also, was derived her claim to play the rôle of the people chosen of God from among the nations, singled out with

especial moral right to force her way into the world for the universal good.

The Restoration of 1660 carried the foreign and colonial policy of Cromwell's times to further development; it also led to a continuation of the war against Holland. Then, after Holland had been rendered innocuous, the struggle against France claimed first attention. The same causes are again operative: in addition to religious factors, those of a purely secular nature, as expressed in the opposition to France's threatening political and military power, and even more pronounced than in the case of Holland, to her commercial rivalry. For France under Louis XIV did not aim alone at the hegemony of the Continent. She rose rapidly in industry and trade, and under Colbert's leadership turned her attention to the sea, and even beyond, and became the first colonial power of the time. London and the Whigs took up the fight along the whole line and turned the struggle into a commercial and world war.

This was waged as a gigantic duel with the weapons of force for the possession of the world, and with power and wealth as the prize. The battleground was Europe: allied with the French, England had at first repressed the Netherlands; her policy was now to proceed against France, hand in hand with the Netherlands and Europe. King William III of Orange formed this union and left it as an inheritance to posterity; in 1688 and 1701 he led Europe against the French hegemony. More closely than ever before, England identified herself with the European coalition: the common enemy bound them together. Spain's power had long since been broken, and the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs inherited from the Spanish not its threatening greatness, but only its hatred of France.

England announced the principle which she had previously supported in practice: the principle of the European balance of power, which she applied against every important European state. It became England's chief weapon against the French, and grew into an essentially English theory. Its effect has always been to create such a balance among the Continental states that England's accession to any group rendered this one the strongest; England is the fifth wheel to this wagon; balance of power means England's dominance of power. From her island she holds the Continent in suspense and remains the arbiter of all; she paralyzes the strongest state on the Continent which might become inconvenient to herself, by means of the other states, which she organizes and leads. She becomes the ally of the enemies of her enemy. In this manner she defeated

Spain and Holland; and thus she sought to gain the Emperor against France. She opposed the greatest military Power by the second greatest, or if possible by a collection of Continental states: as Austria, Prussia, German Middle States, Italian states, Savoy, and occasionally Russia. England herself sent her armies and her generals across the Channel; or she preferably employed Continental troops for her service; while paying her Continental allies, she herself also took part in the struggle, but her real battlefield remained the sea, her peculiar weapon the fleet. She fought with France and sought to prevent the union of France with Spain and with Spain's vast colonial possessions; she forced her way into the Spanish-American trade, and seized the slave trade; she finally had to fight the Bourbons in both Paris and in Madrid. She opposed Spain through her alliance with Portugal, and through the acquisition of Gibraltar she assured the entrance into the Mediterranean for her fleet. Time and again, through wars and peace congresses, she rearranged Europe according to her own advantage, but always on the plea that she was doing it for the good of the other states, for the balancing of their power. In the 126 years since 1688 she brought about one war after another: according to Sir J. R. Seeley, more than half the time was spent in war, and even the "years of peace" were often enough an open conflict. [1]

There were pauses, increases and decreases in warlike activity, but the guiding impulse was furnished by professional soldiers, and this impulse was active even in times of truce. The elder Pitt brought thus, in four short years following 1756, his country and its future under the control of his stormy ambition, of his world-embracing policy of power—one of the most imperialistic of English history. He was consciously an aggressor; he desired war and gain; he and his like—statesmen, generals, admirals, controlled the course of events, and were the real leaders of the great mass of merchants and business men and colonists. During that century, says Seeley, England's history lies not in England, but in America and Asia; the expansion of England becomes the dominant fact of this period. Pitt's saying is familiar that America was won on German battle fields, indicating the world-wide significance of the Seven Years' War, when the dice were really cast for the possession of Canada and for the future of India. Following 1600 and 1650, the year 1760 indicates a new epoch: the idea of conquest occupies the foreground. By seeking to hold the colonial empire in subjection to the motherland, England lost the thirteen North American

[1] *The Expansion of England,* Sir J. R. Seeley, London, 1901, p. 20.

colonies, it is true. France had her revenge for Canada, by encouraging this revolt. But on the sea England was successful against France and her allies. Precisely at this period, about 1780, for the first time a number of seafaring neutrals formed a union against England's attacks on neutral trade. The loss of the Thirteen Colonies appeared to have disrupted England's colonial empire, and in fact, the situation was discouraging: nevertheless, the younger Pitt again resurrected his country, and in India the development continued uninterrupted. In 1773, India gained something more like a state organization through a governor general, the country was drawn closer to Parliament and the central government, and in India English supremacy, English wealth and English conquest grew uninterruptedly. Periods of peace, of acquisition, were always followed by far-reaching wars, and this possession now for the first time became internally and externally of real importance for England.

From this point of view, as from every other, the epoch of the French wars reached its culmination during the last years of their duration. Pitt unwillingly entered the war against the French Revolution; the feeling of the English nation, as represented by Burke, supported such a policy all the more ardently, with a passionate consciousness of old and deep-lying antagonism. From 1793 to 1815 the world war was, in its last analysis, a war between France and England; Napoleon accepted the entire inheritance of four generations and in grandiose manner sought to realize it. The battle was for everything: for the Continent, the seas and the colonies, for trade, not alone that of the enemy, but likewise of his allies and of the neutrals; and in this war England at last won universal supremacy over trade and colonies. She crushed the French, Spanish and Dutch shipping trade, and the Franco-Spanish fleet. She sought, in the same manner as Napoleon, to cut off the enemy commercially. She secured a firmer footing in the Mediterranean and in Africa; she assured the route to India; she robbed the Dutch and French of Cape Colony and of the islands which controlled this route; she waged under Wellesley the last decisive war against the French—India now for the first time assumed its full importance. Canada and the West Indies had never been lost; the balancing weight of the world empire, however, had now definitely been shifted to India—it continued to develop around the Indian Ocean.

At one and the same time England fought *for,* and *upon* the Continent; she pursued her old policy of letting the Continental Powers bear the main burden of the land warfare. There were, however, years when she appeared to the Continent as the com-

mon enemy, for the reason that she maltreated every state upon the sea, destroyed all trade and disturbed the existence of all neutrals. Again, in 1800, an alliance of neutrals was formed against England—she disrupted it by force. The resulting hatred was great and explicable; the *coup d' état* against Copenhagen in 1807, by which a possible future rival was ruthlessly and pitilessly crushed, aroused wide-spread and deep dissatisfaction, and Canning's coolly practical justification of the pretended necessity by no means pleased the neutrals. The United States, with its trade unbearably restricted by France and England, and long maltreated by England, in 1812, after long hesitation, declared war on the unfriendly motherland, and hoped by this means to acquire Canada. By this time a reversal of feeling in Europe had already taken place: the pressure exerted by Napoleon, his universal supremacy, drove all the Continental states into England's arms, and with their assistance she triumphed in 1814-15 over her deadly enemy, the tyrant of the world. As the ally and almost the leader of the Continent, she again regulated in Vienna the affairs of the Continent in her own interest. The arch enemy was conquered, but it was not intended to annihilate him. Germany was not to be allowed to become too great, while Prussia was to be divided into an Eastern and a Western portion, and Russia's future growth was to be checked in time. The European balance of power was again in the foreground—the struggle of 1688 was at an end.

Throughout a long war period England had stood in the forefront; for one hundred and twenty-five years every war had in the last analysis been her war. For fifty years she was now able to enjoy the fruits thereof in peace. This time she had protected herself for many years to come. From 1815 to 1865, and again to 1874, her attention was carefully fixed on European politics; she soon withdrew from the group of the conservative Eastern Powers, and fell back jealously upon herself. Wherever able, she created counterbalances to these powers, encouraged the smaller rising states against them, and thereby increased her own strength. From 1830 she relied upon France, which had grown liberal, but at the same time remained France's distrustful rival. Every independent manifestation of strength by France—in the eastern Mediterranean, in Spain, upon the sea, before and after 1848, was carefully watched and suppressed. Friendship and enmity alternated under Louis Philippe, and especially under Napoleon III. Palmerston desired to prevent the latter's alliance with Russia—the French fleet aroused suspicion and angry panic in England. Nevertheless, the antagonism towards Russia

was in the foreground. This had its root in India, and spread by way of Afghanistan, to the routes to India, Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean. It early led to rivalry in the Turkish question; Russia desired to subdue or annihilate Turkey; on that very account England protected her and closed the Mediterranean to Russia—indeed, even the maintenance of a fleet on the Black Sea was denied to her. This antagonism again burst forth in the Crimean War in 1854, which, viewed from a broad standpoint, was primarily England's conflict and England's success. The war expelled Russia from the Balkans, but turned her all the more definitely toward Central Asia. For a long time this remained England's sole European war. Her diplomacy was as energetic and belligerent as could be desired, and in Lord Palmerston (1830 to 1865) there was a strong consciousness of power which achieved many successes; but on the whole diplomatic measures were sufficient.

Thus protected, with the prestige of her former victories, England turned during these two generations back to her own peculiar field—the world beyond Europe. With the exception of Russia alone she here encountered no rival. She was able to employ peaceful weapons, and in this period, since she was without opposition, she depended for the conquest of the world upon her trade, her industry and free colonization. This was the dawn of the days of her great world-surpassing epoch, which reached its full glory toward the middle of the century. Freedom of trade corresponded to the position of supremacy of British industry, internally and externally; the liberal period developed the method and the doctrine of freedom in every field of human activity, in commercial policy, as well as in constitutional matters and those concerning Imperial administration. Conviction and interest went hand in hand. Likewise as regards the Imperial policy, the state withheld its hand: it gave the widest possible rule to the great colonies; it left the settlement of the new territories, especially of Australia, to economic enterprise alone. It was inclined to hold the reins of colonial administration as loosely as possible. While the Conservatives were in favor of having the state control the colonial policy, the Radicals held that it would be wisest to grant absolute freedom to the colonies and to India, that the best thing would be to get rid of them. In the Colonial Office, there was for a long time, to say the least, a spirit of negligence, of the most pronounced abstention from interference. This was the characteristic tone of the period.

England on that account, however, did not cease to hold fast to her traditions of a policy of force. The two tendencies

existed side by side. The conception of a strong governmental policy gained the upper hand in India. Despite all reforms, conquest and war still remained in full force there. The possession and the security of the Empire led automatically to expansion; the governor generals, Lord Hastings and Lord Dalhousie, continued in a warlike manner down through 1850 the work of Wellesley. Finally there came the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, and the taking over by the government of the East Indian Company. Force was here the only possible measure. Trade spread this policy further, beyond Farther India and toward China. The infamous Opium War of 1840, which was waged by official England to uphold the poisoning of Chinamen with opium against China's opposition, to protect Anglo-Indian merchants in their profits from this trade and to increase it, while strengthening England's position in the Chinese Empire —this war, which was coolly and with conviction defended by the Liberal Palmerston, was quite in the spirit of the mercantile policy of the eighteenth century; trade and power indissolubly bound together. In 1860 there came the aftermath of the war: wherever England found force necessary for breaking up and strangling the world she employed it ruthlessly even in these liberal days.

At the same time, in Europe and America she was the protector of struggling national states, of their emancipation and of their freedom. This, like the liberal commercial policy, corresponded to the sentiments of the new ruling middle class and at the same time redounded to the profit of British politics. This course, however, was not everywhere consistently pursued. Where, as in the case of Turkey and Austria, the old ruling state was needed by England's interests as against Russia and where it therefore had to be protected from the young national movements directed against it, there at times she found herself between two fires and occasionally in great embarrassment—as in the case of the Balkan nations, the Poles, and Hungarians, and for a time also in relation to the Italians. While on the whole she encouraged Italy's rise, she was all the more opposed to that of Germany. Thus she supported Denmark, in spite of all national and liberty-loving claims of Schleswig-Holstein and of the German nation. She did not desire any Germans between the Baltic and the North Sea, just as she had looked with disfavor on the German Customs Union and the economic unity of the nation. England's encouragement of the principles of freedom and nationality has always ceased when her own commercial and political advantage was at stake. Indeed, this encouragement was in great part

inspired by her advantage. Wherever England supported a nation struggling for freedom, in South America or in Southern Europe, this was always done in the well-considered interest of British trade, and English assistance always meant a carefully placed mine to be sprung against a possible rival among the Great Powers. The parliamentary freedom to which she generously helped her *protégés* by no means always corresponded to their political maturity and their general welfare. Considerations of practical British politics were always dominant, seeking to make capital with the public abroad out of this reputation of English love of freedom. This does not mean that public opinion among English Liberals, who took pride in these humane achievements of their country, was insincere; even English diplomacy was not necessarily so. But, as in the case of her war against France, England has always skilfully understood how to make herself appear as the benefactor of the whole world. Her own interests at this time corresponded to many humane desires, in which her own people believed, and she profited by this coincidence to appear before herself and before the world as liberal, cosmopolitan and ready to help, when in reality she acted in the main solely for herself. Her cousins in North America, whom at all times she sought to impress by these moral means, experienced to their cost how strong the prompting of force nevertheless remained in England. How keenly felt were the disputes in regard to the Oregon boundary, after the year 1840. How decisively in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, with a certain matter-of-course air, did England assume rights regarding the future Panama Canal (1850). Above all, how puzzling and insultingly one-sided was the attitude of Liberal England in the American Civil War, her sympathy for the slave-dealers against the Union springing from commercial selfishness and political rivalry.

Her political motives remained unchanged. Outwardly, she was peaceful and liberty-loving; without doubt, this corresponded to the secret wishes of dominant Liberalism; it corresponded absolutely to the sentiments of the idealistic, radical wing of the party represented by Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone. The opposite view was supported by Palmerston, but he died in 1865; internal conflicts and the great Gladstone Reform Ministry forced foreign measures into the background for a period of ten years. Liberal England had its fling. But then, from 1874 on, Benjamin Disraeli brought about a radical change.

The conditions which were the basis of England's relation to the world since 1815 underwent a change between 1860 and 1870. The development of the Continent had been completed,

new national states came into existence, and pressed Austria and France into the background; on the other side of the ocean the Northern States had been victorious, and the welding of the Union was complete. In America, as well as in Germany, a strong competition grew up against England, who had previously stood alone. Free trade suffered an eclipse, protection gained the upper hand, new industrial states claimed recognition, new world Powers began to assert themselves as England's peers. The world, which had stood empty since 1815, open only to England, gradually again became filled, and England again found herself with competitors. In Asia, Russia advanced as a dominant power; in the Balkans Pan-Slavism sought to gain a footing. Disraeli was the first to strike a blow against this: he awoke the spirit of English imperialism, the English sense of power, the English policy of battle, from the half-slumber of recent times to a new activity. His conception turned toward the great world without; he united romanticism and realism, national tradition and the free fancy of individual genius, and lo! England stood among the nations with a sword in her hand. In 1878 by threats of war she drove Russia back from Constantinople, she resumed with more vigor the older task of protecting India. Disraeli acquired the Suez Canal shares and the island of Cyprus; in South Africa, which his predecessors had half allowed to slip through their fingers, he assumed a firm policy; here, as in the North, he secured the route to India; he set the imperial crown upon the head of his Queen. He it was who announced that England was not a European, but preeminently an Asiatic power. The fresh air of a new period swept through the land under his leadership (1874 to 1880).

Once more Gladstone and the party of peace gained the upper hand. But in 1882 Gladstone, much against his will, was forced to carry out the testament of Beaconsfield and seize Egypt. He was forced to take up the struggle in regard to Afghanistan against Russia, who, repulsed from Constantinople, turned again with renewed energy toward India, and in 1885 he came to the verge of war. Asia thus drew him also into the current of world politics. Further, Africa always demanded his attention: on all sides new Powers stretched their hands toward the Dark Continent—in addition to France—England's old rival —Italy, Belgium and Germany. In 1884-85 Bismarck gathered all these threads in his hand, strengthened the Congo State, and assured freedom of trade in Central Africa against England, acquired colonies for Germany in Africa and the South Seas, and by international pressure compelled unwilling England to

recognize her new competitor. The English colonists at the Cape and in Australia became alarmed; the motherland heard their cries. The new era was well under way; England, now plainly deprived of her previous supremacy, returned to the old principles of her former period of conflicts. Her indifference regarding the course of events continued precisely as long as she remained without a competitor: when this was no longer the case, she changed her system, and imperialism again assumed the helm, or, rather, now for the first time really grasped it.

The intellectual work of preparation was of an older date; as early as 1868 Sir Charles Dilke had referred to the unity of the Anglo-Saxons and of their world-civilizing power; his telling reference to "Greater Britain" possessed political power in itself.[1] There now began the flood of real imperialistic literature. In 1883 Seeley published his lectures on the British Empire, which in "The Expansion of England" celebrated the spirit of English history. This was a book of immeasurable creative power, comparable in its sentiments with Treitschke's writings, but plainly far more influential as regards future development than the latter's books have ever been. In his "Oceana" Froude shortly afterward depicted South Africa and Australia, attacked the disrupters of the Empire, the Little Englanders, and hoped in the future for a United British Empire in place of the United Kingdom.[2] Seeley's closing chapter (p. 312) in the same spirit called his country into the ranks of the world states, the greatest growing Powers, such as North America and Russia—"Will England sink to the level of Spain?" The new sentiment made its way in these years. The idealism of Gladstone, which threatened to disrupt the Empire, suffered shipwreck in 1886 in the Irish Question; the Unionists came into power. Beaconsfield triumphed from beyond the grave; from 1885 on Salisbury opposed the advance of Russia, and did this by means of a strengthened and independent Bulgaria. In this manner, he checkmated his ancient enemy in the Balkans; in the conflicts of the following years he stood behind Austria, Italy and the entire *Dreibund* in opposition to Russia and France; the English fleet played an important rôle as a potential factor at the time of the crisis of 1887.

From then on the system of imperialism became more firmly established, year by year. By it England sought to protect India, through rounding out its boundaries and extending them, and through its Balkan policy. Again, after a pause, the conquest

[1] *Greater Britain: a Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries,* by Sir Charles Dilke, London, 1868.
[2] *Oceana, or England and Her Colonies,* by J. A. Froude, London, 1886.

of the Soudan was resumed and the same system established in Egypt. In South Africa Britain entered upon a series of rapid conquests, by means of which it was intended to restrict the Transvaal and to limit the development of the German colonies. South Africa's importance for the Empire increased as a "way station" for India, and the connecting of the northern and southern portions of the Dark Continent, the ambitious plan for a line from the Cape to Cairo, took form in men's minds. The new system was also developed from within; the problems of imperialism were thought out, solved and carried forward by great organizations. We shall not at this point trace in detail these movements during the period from 1885 on. It was a question, indeed, of holding together the vast Empire, which before had appeared destined to disruption, and which now, with the rise of new foreign Powers, for the first time it was sought properly to strengthen. The problem was to protect English industry and its export, and to render its millions of workers secure as regards food and maintenance. It was a question of drawing together the moral and commercial, as well as the military and political forces; the unity of the race, of its civilization, commerce and power were at stake. The problems of the customs union, of the defense union of the motherland and the outlying possessions came into being, and henceforth remained in the foreground of British politics; the question arose what organization was to be given to the vast Empire which was to be created, and also what share the great colonies were to receive in determining the Imperial policy. These questions had to be answered by the social and political powers in England, by her citizenry, by the army of workers, whose influence was of such recent growth—in short, by all the industrial classes. In addition, the new money powers which were rising, together with, and above those of trade, were concerned in the solution of these problems—the Stock Exchange, the "city," the individual capitalists living from incomes, all of whom ranged themselves by the side of the industrial North of England, and whose wealth encircles the Empire and the world. The question of England's foreign policy was in the hands of these powers. The old Liberalism of Gladstone had but little understanding for this problem of force, but the new period rejected the old doctrine; the new Liberals, like Rosebery, became imperialists; the workers of Birmingham, with their leader, Joseph Chamberlain, deserted to the camp of the Unionists, and in their own interest advocated the "will to world power"; even more emphatic was the approval of the Stock Exchange. The decision was taken before all else to

strengthen the Empire, to render its world position secure through preparedness, especially as regards the navy, which was being constantly increased, and to draw closer all inner bonds, at the same time that an aggressive foreign policy was pursued.

This course of action is quite explicable. As long as no other Power interfered in those parts of the world on which England had placed her hand, she abstained from appropriating the land in its entirety; she was willing to permit peaceful development, but only under one condition: that no other state should interfere. But other states had now appeared in the arena. Hence, it was a question of grabbing everything in sight. A mania for conquest seemed to take hold upon England; the manner in which she laid hands forcibly upon all within reach was astounding. From 1883 to 1885 Germany had acquired her modest colonial empire, the most unpretentious of any of the great nations, in West, Southwest and East Africa, and in the South Seas. There is no need to name the territories and their extent; their number is insignificant, and they have been but slightly added to during succeeding years. A long list of British annexations occurs as early as the seventies, and in 1882 these are followed by that of Egypt. From 1884 on there was conquest upon conquest in Africa, year after year, in north and south, east and west, Rhodesia and the adjoining territory forming the climax. In addition, there were the South Seas and East India, Beluchistan and Upper Burma, the Afghanistan border lands—always something new, constant increase in territory, treaties on all sides, wars everywhere. The conquest of the Boer States in 1900 marks the culmination, but by no means the end, of this policy. Certain later occurrences will be mentioned as occasion offers. It has been estimated that England's colonies are approximately one hundred times the size of the motherland, and ten times the extent of the colonies of all other countries together; that Britain rules over about one-fifth of the world's territory and one-fourth of the inhabitants; that in the quarter-century since the great recrudescence of the policy of annexation, England has occupied an extent of territory approximately equal to that occupied in all the preceding centuries. She aimed at being the greatest of Powers, from every point of view, as regards the strengthening of old possessions as well as the acquisition of new ones; and the leader of this policy knew whereof he spoke when he cited the law according to which "the great states are constantly becoming greater and the small states smaller" (Lord Salisbury, 1899).

England had taken from the others whatever she was able

to take. Naturally, this was not done at random; there was a distinct plan, and the insatiability with which it was followed is shown by the facts. The plan for Africa has already been touched upon. It is identified with Cecil Rhodes, the brilliant financier and statesman, in whose veins flowed the blood of the first adventurous, piratical *conquistadors* of Elizabeth's time —"from Cape to Cairo!" The war against the Boers was planned by Rhodes, and Chamberlain inherited the policy and carried it through. It was by no means a battle for gold and diamonds alone, but for political power, for supremacy in South Africa, for a universal imperial goal along heroic lines. One may have an understanding for it, but it is impossible to deny that it was an aggressive struggle for power. It belongs to the same order of wars as those on the East Indian frontiers, which spread uninterruptedly on all sides, toward Asia, Persia, Arabia and Egypt. The ancient English impulse toward power has remained here in its primitive and unexhausted strength. In this connection it is plainly to be seen that the Liberal opposition against this tendency had never gone very deep. The British nation as a whole has regarded itself for centuries as a master nation; this feeling constantly drew fresh nourishment from the Indian Empire. The thought of renunciation did not occur to England. She was fond of justifying her own desire by the excuse: We dare not withdraw from India (nor from Egypt now) for the sake of the natives. We have no desire to deny that this foreign dominance produced beneficial results as to civilization; but against those blessings are to be reckoned great and oppressive burdens and drawbacks for the Indians and the Egyptians, while both countries have been administered and ruled over and exploited, commercially and politically, for the benefit of England, and not for that of their inhabitants. We may think this natural, but in doing so we place ourselves in opposition to the attitude which the English themselves love to assume and with which everyone is familiar— England's gain is the gain of the whole world. Every nation and country, they say, which comes under British rule should rejoice, and the rest of the world must rejoice with them, for British rule means enlightenment and civilization.

As the result of her history, England is much given to regarding in a naïve and childlike manner her interests as identical with those of the whole world, her existence as synonymous with that of humanity. In speaking of "humanity," she means England; in uttering the word "cosmopolitan," she thinks of her own nationality, of her own Empire, which enjoys the his-

torical advantage of being identical with European civilization throughout great stretches of the world's territory. She is only too ready to forget that other national individualities have grown up in the world by her side, with a longing to press outward, and that they, too, are conscious of their own worth and desire to assert their own State and their own *Kultur* in addition to the English. She has too great a desire to see the whole map of the earth painted in one color. The world to-day demands more pronounced differences. England's claim, however, and likewise her mania for the annexation of all unclaimed land, is in opposition to this; her presumption is, accurately speaking, limitless. The most cultured among the leaders of the new imperalism, a disciple of Gladstone, as Secretary of State once expressed himself on this point in classical manner, in the early days of the movement.

"The Little Englanders," said Lord Rosebery in 1893, "hold that our Empire is large enough. That would be true if the world were elastic; but since it is not so, we have no choice but to keep pegging out claims for the future. England has to consider not only what she wants now, but also what she will require hereafter. It is our heritage and responsibility that the world, in so far as we can mould it, be populated by Anglo-Saxons. We shall grossly fail if we shirk the responsibility laid upon us—we must not decline to take our fair share in the partition of the world which has been forced upon us." [1]

It is impossible to speak more clearly or in terms more exclusive of others. A more unconditional aiming at power cannot be conceived than is here expressed by the representative of the state; nor must it be forgotten that the power of the state stood behind the speaker, with its new weapons in army and fleet, especially with its fleet, which was uninterruptedly increasing. This striving was the result of the reaction against the new nations, its growth was logically organic and limitless. It was incited to increase by the dangers which constantly threatened the Empire. All the colonies and dominions of the Empire have that which England herself has not—namely, neighbors. India has the Russians and the Japanese, Australia the Japanese, Egypt has Turkey at least and perhaps others as well, South Africa has the Germans, the West Indies and Canada the United States. Even if the United States harbors no evil designs, there is a permanent and natural threat simply in the geographical conditions; the consciousness of certain antitheses

[1] *The Annual Register . . . for the Year* 1893, London, 1894, p. 68.

between the two great Anglo-Saxon states has from time to time made itself felt, and it continues to persist beyond the intention of individuals and historical periods. The force of progressive development and growing self-assertion of the individual countries continues operative, and keeps alive the question as to how long this "World Venice," with the sea for streets,[1] will continue to exist, and whether the form of a federation offers means for binding it together permanently.

How narrow is the foundation of the motherland for this maritime empire! Ireland, in unreconciled opposition, stands against the main island, and Ulster against Ireland. Classes struggle against each other within the social bounds of the motherland and the workers threaten with revolutionary measures. Discord and anxiety everywhere—will the Empire be able to conquer them? In civilization, trade, race, history and sentiment England possesses many unifying forces, and the English political leaders seized upon these and sought to unify them and strengthen them; in this the colonies assisted the motherland. But despite the strength of these forces and of these efforts, heavy clouds have during the last thirty years continued to hang above the Empire. This has been seen and realized with increasing anxiety. A final factor entered into the problem. The Imperial policy was begun under Disraeli in the period after 1874, as a foreign policy in the narrow sense; as such since the heyday of imperialism it has recorded its greatest achievements. For beside and above all future dangers of a general nature, was the immediate tangible danger: England had enemies all over the world who threatened the Empire.

We have seen these enemies; there was Russia; there was France. The troubles with France in North Africa continued through the whole of the eighties and nineties of the last century. Russia and France formed their Dual Alliance about 1890, directly against Germany and Austria, but indirectly against Great Britain, who was the common enemy of both. The nearer the end of the century came, the more clearly was the Dual Alliance seen to be directed against England. The movements on the Continent forced England to increasing caution; her far-famed "splendid isolation" constantly became more precarious. She had, however, since the Congress of Berlin never lost touch, more or less direct, with Germany and the *Dreibund*. Through the centuries Germany had hitherto been her ally, the fighter of her battles on the Continent. England's relation to Austria, of ancient date, and her relation to

[1] *The Expansion of England,* Seeley, p. 288.

Italy, which the new kingdom had inherited from old Savoy, were continued under Lord Salisbury. In the important crisis Bismarck had acted with him and with Disraeli, at the same time always emphatically upholding the independence of the German Empire. The great Chancellor, from his position at the center of Europe, had influenced all the States of the world and held all the strings in his hands; he had always been inconvenient to England and not a little disquieting. He remained unassailable, however, because world interests were not yet predominant in Germany. But following his fall, Germany took her place directly in the world arena, and after 1894 she broke with England and in a manner sought touch with France and Russia. She defended her position in Africa and acquired a footing in East Asia. Her economy became part of the great stream of the world's economy, and the government was thereby forced to provide in a political and military way for the future of German industry, for its exports, and for its human masses, in the same way as England had done under like circumstances.

Germany had no choice. If she was not to languish and starve, she had to pursue a world policy and to base her power on a fleet of her own. She forced her elder cousin on the other side of the Channel to take notice. The English nation did so grudgingly, and with evident distrust and displeasure greeted this new commercial and military Power which was in process of formation; expressions were heard that sounded harsh and threatening in German ears. The attitude of the British government was different. Public opinion in Germany during the Boer War burst out as threateningly as in the other European states, especially in France; following the clash which the Kruger telegram unexpectedly brought about, the German government maintained an absolutely correct attitude; this neutral support during the South African struggle was very valuable to England. These were England's most difficult years. English statesmen between 1900 and 1902 gave expression to their astonishment that their country was so hated by neighboring peoples; there was a feeling similar to that of 1800. England sought Germany's friendship. She desired to win Germany as her protector against Russia. For the last quarter of the nineteenth century Russia was for England the successor of Louis XIV and of Napoleon I; Russia and France were her daily anxiety during the last ten years of the century. The English standpoint was primarily dictated by the interests of her world empire; but precisely this consideration brought her into opposition to the Dual Alliance. Her safety or her danger was dependent,

as we saw from the beginning, in the narrowest sense on the division of power on the Continent, and in Europe in general.

Every appearance of a strong Power in Europe was for England an innovation which required an immediate explanation, and nearly always she regarded it as a threat. Such appearance was watched with jealous eyes. In 1912 an Anglo-American of passionate English sympathies expressed this fact as an unconditional doctrine. He warned England, as an incentive, that her position in the world depended upon allowing no Great Power to arise, especially in her neighborhood; thereby he simply dogmatized the English custom of centuries.[1] Did this system of suppression and attack drive England to oppose Germany's development? Not at the start—Russia was for England the original enemy. Between 1898 and 1903 English politicians thought that Germany might perhaps become England's ally—that is to say, her "soldier" against Russia. But Germany could surrender her freedom, make an enemy of her neighbor in the East and become dependent on England, only if England was ready to make corresponding concessions. But such was not the case. There was no English-German alliance, and Germany remained untrammeled. Instead, therefore, England turned to Japan. The military power which England needed against Russia was set in motion in the East, instead of in the West. The Japanese thrust, which it was intended should drive Russia from the Far East, resulted automatically in driving her forward in the West, which meant against Austria and Germany.

The Japanese War was an English war of attack. Russia was defeated, and collapsed internally for a while. At the very start of the campaign (in the spring of 1904) England made her Morocco Treaty with France. This was the same France whose African expansion in 1898 had run amuck of England at Fashoda, on the Upper Nile, and who at that time had given way pitifully enough before England's threats of war; since then the two former enemies had drawn together. It has been asserted that the agreement of 1904, whereby England was to receive Egypt and France Morocco as a recompense, was entered into for reasons of imperial policy, and not as a measure against Germany; England, it is claimed, desired merely to secure Egypt against France, and only as a result of Germany's opposing France in Morocco did the treaty take on an anti-German spirit. This explanation seems to me untenable in every respect. England already held Egypt securely, without

[1] *The Day of the Saxon*, General Homer Lea, London and New York, 1912.

having to recompense France; the retreat from Fashoda had shown this very clearly. Naturally, it lay within the conception of the imperialistic policy to obviate any further claim of France in the Nile Valley—to that extent the treaty was a welcome corroboration. Nevertheless, it was directed from the very start against Germany; such was its real intent. No one could doubt that a far-reaching treaty with France, with important secret provisions, and which brushed Germany aside without more ado, implied enmity against Germany—indeed, that it was aimed directly against Germany. France had at bottom always been inimical to Germany; since 1871 she had never known any other purpose than revenge; secondary objects in her colonial policy had gained only a temporary place in her program, and in a crisis had always been sacrificed to revenge. Whoever placed his hand in that of France knew the significance of such an act —knew at least, what France expected. Following Germany's refusal and the alliance with Japan, the treaty indicated England's definite turning against Germany as its fundamental intention: it inaugurated, after certain preliminaries, the first great move in the policy of Germany's isolation (*Einkreisung*).

The history of this policy does not come within the scope of the present article. It is our aim only to connect it with this general review of England's policy of force. The sole question here is whether England's attitude toward Germany since 1901 and 1904 is to be understood from this point of view. This question must be answered affirmatively. England's enmity does not spring mainly from friction in Africa and the Near East, as has been stated, from clashes between her imperial policy and Germany's expansion—although such clashes are naturally not to be denied; it results primarily from Germany's power in general, which was objectionable to England, in an especial degree after Russia had been reduced as desired. At this time Germany created her fleet. To the commercial inconvenience caused by Germany were now added her military and political power. Therefore, the old game was played again: England sought to isolate the new rival, by uniting the latter's enemies into a league; as she had done for centuries, she turned against the strongest Continental state and armed the others against it.

There followed the misunderstanding connected with the departure of the Russian Baltic fleet for the Far East and with the Dogger Bank incident, which must have held a strong danger of war not yet understood by us; there followed the complications regarding Morocco, in which from the start, before and after Delcassé's fall, England pursued a markedly un-

friendly policy toward Germany. I do not propose to relate here the Morocco Affair; nor the gradual concentration of the British fleet in home waters as a move against Germany; nor the history of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. I am concerned only with the disclosure, revealed by this second treaty aimed at Germany's isolation, of the motives of England's policy. Here again the threat to Germany, it is claimed, was the result, not the motive of action. England and Russia divided Persia into three portions: a Russian, an English, and between them a neutral sphere of influence. England thereby secured the way to the sea and to India. Did she enter into this treaty for the sake of India? Incidentally, no doubt: her policy is always universal, and it must be considered from the Asiatic angle. The treaty protects India and the routes from Cairo to India. But was England at that time in need of protecting herself against Russia? Russia was defeated, and only beginning to rise again; she was not in a position for the moment to undertake anything against India. England was strong at this time, not Russia. The understanding with England closed for Russia the southern passes, as the Japanese War closed the routes toward the Far East. The protection of India was desirable, but it was by no means imperative. The real importance of the treaty lay in the fact of an agreement having been reached between the two giant empires and in the course upon which it now definitely forced Russia—namely, against Turkey, the Balkans, Austria and Germany. It was a truce between the two great World Powers; this time again the threat was really intended for Germany. Nor was this the case merely because the German plan for the Bagdad railway encroached on the Asiatic territory which England desired to control for the sake of the connection with India. This imperialistic consideration did not later prevent England and Germany from reaching an agreement (to which the latter had always been open) in regard to the Bagdad railway, in the treaty of 1914, the carrying out of which the war prevented.

The true significance of the treaty of 1907 was the shackling of Germany, from considerations of general policy. The anti-German spirit in the Russian government and England's jealousy of Germany joined hands in this effort. Whether the aim of this policy of isolation was war or the suppression of Germany need not be discussed here. What, however, England feared from Germany, using every means in her power to prevent it, was expressed by Sir Edward Grey in a speech in the House of Commons in March, 1909, in a diplomatically negative form, although quite positive as regards intent. This was after the

first failure in the attempt to isolate Germany. England feared, he said, Germany's attempt to dominate and dictate the policy of the Continent, and to bring about thereby a complete and deliberate isolation of England. This intention existed, according to English suspicion, and he desired to prevent its realization; therefore, he acted to this end according to tradition.[1]

The ten years following the Boer War are a history of increasing English power. Settlement was sought for those problems of imperialism of which I have spoken. Chamberlain developed his great agitation for a protective tariff; imperial reform was ardently striven for, but nowhere were there definite forms or clear prospects. Success attended England's foreign policy, but not her imperial policy; yet her standing in the world advanced greatly. Her export trade increased in a corresponding manner; the anxiety regarding commercial retrogression which might have been felt between 1895 and 1900 had long been overcome. Nevertheless, the King and his diplomats labored unceasingly on the ring which was to encircle Germany. Sacrifice on sacrifice was made to Russia, to Japan and to France for the sake of this "encircling" policy; the Mediterranean front was much weakened. A great system was created for injuring the present enemy at future cost. It was unmistakable that all this converged against Germany. The danger of the sacrifices which were made to the friends of to-day, who were the probable enemies of to-morrow, was clearly perceived; peace-loving Liberalism emphasized this strongly, as also its own desire for peace, basing its arguments on ideal and economic reasoning. But the voice of the Imperialists drowned out all others; nor were the crises of 1909 and 1911 capable of silencing it.

England was in the throes of a panic at the thought of a German invasion, as she had been shaken in the seventeenth century by the "No Popery" outburst, and in the nineteenth century by the dread of the French fleet. Lord Roberts carried on his agitation for the strengthening of the army, for universal compulsory service, and he held up the spectre of Germany to frighten his countrymen. Reference has been made to Homer Lea's fanciful dissertation. The war-enthusiastic American made this announcement to the English apodictically and with cold-blooded fanaticism: In permitting the union of Germany, England lost the citadel of her European power; she dare not allow any European state to become too great. Germany desires to destroy England's power and to erect a German Empire upon the ruins.

[1] *Parliamentary Debates*, 1909, Vol. III, p. 58.

England must prepare to resist, she dare not permit such a Power to exist; the crisis is at hand, war is unavoidable. Wars have created this Empire and wars will lengthen or shorten its existence. Lea's appeal is dedicated to Field Marshal Roberts.

In the year 1913, the historian Cramb gave a series of lectures on Germany and England, which in book-form stirred the entire Anglo-Saxon world.[1] They are a consistent, eloquent exhortation for preparedness, for compulsory service, for war. Cramb, also with violent generalization, with forceful deduction, constructs a belligerent Germany, a Germany bound to be belligerent. He ratiocinates the necessity for this war. He, too, glorifies Roberts and war; he desires war for England, for her position of power. He is a war idealist. His was a thorough-going militaristic sermon, and most remarkable was the echo which it later awakened. This militaristic movement was not the only one, but success proved that it was the strongest.

Although the Liberal government rejected general compulsory service, General Hamilton, in a book [2] to which Viscount Haldane contributed an introduction, brought forward his convincing reason for a paid army. It was a most astounding and instructive argument for Germans; he maintained that only a paid army permits of what is an impossibility with a popular army: that is, wars of offense in far-distant foreign lands, and in keeping with British traditions and British Imperialism, a strong foreign policy —in other words, a policy of conquest. The army and the fleet carry on war, the other classes quietly continue their work and foot the bills. "The mass of the nation, therefore, does not find war so terribly tragic." This was the voice of English tradition; the nature of England's conquests, even those of the last twenty-five years, was accurately expressed by it, and there was no intention of abandoning this policy. Least of all was there any desire in England to renounce maritime supremacy. An irresistible wave in favor of such a policy of force, proceeding from the most diverse sources, swept over England.

Given a sincere desire, it is not difficult to understand why England, on account of her imports, if for no other reason, regards with suspicion the possibility of a strong foreign fleet in her home waters. As was previously asserted, her history, her long isolation have spoilt her. Her claims have become and remain limitless. Wherever a possible rival arises she sum-

[1] *Germany and England,* by J. A. Cramb, late Professor of Modern History, Queen's College, London; New York, 1914, p. 43 ff.

[2] *Compulsory Service. A Study of the Question in the Light of Experience,* by General Sir Ian Hamilton, with an Introduction by the Right Hon. R. B. Haldane, London, 1910.

mons the world against the new competitor, and as she has always done, reproachfully identifies her own interest with that of mankind in general. She desires once and for all to hold open for herself and for her world empire the routes to her colonies, —that is to say, the oceans; whoever seems even to threaten these routes is the enemy of England and of humanity; no growth of power sufficient for this purpose is to be permitted. The sole guarantee of this desire of England is seen in the increase of England's actual maritime supremacy, her absolute dominance of the seas. England desires also to hold open the overland routes which lead to her colonies, and she seeks to exclude all outsiders from them—the routes from the Nile to South Africa, and from the Nile to the Indus and the Ganges. She lays her hand heavily upon the offenders wherever they may be: in each case it was Germany who felt the weight of her displeasure.

England has united the world against Germany to-day, primarily for the reason that Germany's power was too close at hand and inconveniently great—she is playing against us the game of 1689 and 1813. Her procedure and her motives have in no wise changed, her policy is that of attack and alliance, as always. Her enemy, to be sure, is no longer the same. Germany's ambitions have never been universal, like those of Napoleon I or of Louis XIV, never has she exercised or attempted a European hegemony; not even against England did she assume the offensive. She was content to remain a nation like the others, striving for her portion of light and air. The universal policy existed solely in England, in no wise in Germany. Does England not also block the way of the other Powers? Does she not with her allies threateningly enclose Italy in the Mediterranean? Do not national states, national fleets arise in all parts of the world? Does not each one of them, in its effort toward development, feel the oppressive hand of this ancient ruler of the world, who lords it over the seas? Does she not embitter the life of neutrals more than ever by seeking to enforce against them her own arbitrary rules, as in 1780 and 1800? Where are the small states, the embryonic nations, which England claims to protect to-day? Her hand lies heavily upon them all. The only one which she protects, the pretendedly neutral Belgium, was from the start her ally and accomplice. England has assumed the offensive not alone toward us. Her imperialism, her alliance with Russia, her animosity towards Germany have urged her on for a number of years to a deadly attack against Austria-Hungary and Turkey, her previous friends—she seeks to destroy them also. England claims she is fighting for law

and the existing order—in truth, she is upholding her ancient supremacy. For this she sacrifices old and new states, historical Austria, the last states of Islam, the recently created power of our Empire. She protects France, because France serves her ends and has become harmless to her. But an energetic and live state must force its way against England's claim to rule the world, and fight to gain the right of existence.

If England really introduces universal compulsory service, then as regards international politics for the first time will she become a nation in the fashion of the others—a nation which measures its political responsibility, the responsibility for war, with terrible earnestness by the tribute of blood which all of its sons pay; a nation which through this responsibility learns self-control, order and patience. The history of England's past, to which she holds fast to-day and which she has striven to continue in the present, is a history of wars of conquest, of wars of attack, whose aim was to protect her growth in the outside world and to destroy every European rival; it is a history of wars, of aggressive policy, of aggressive world policy, always and at all points. It may be regarded as imposing: the cohesion of this world-nation in respect to population, territorial possessions, civilization and power is still impressive. To plead the advancement of the interest of humanity is possible for British self-assurance and British cant only owing to hypocrisy or to the infatuation of the other nations which she seeks to deceive. England is fighting for herself and for a worn-out, world-supremacy the claims of which run counter to the national life of the present and of the future. She is fighting for a universality of power, which in reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern world has seen. For this reason she has brought together under arms, true to her policy of 1904 and 1907, the nations who have for long been displeased by Germany's new manifestation of vitality. From the narrow point of view, this was perhaps clever, as she seeks to weaken one of her enemies by the others; but it is scarcely wise from the point of view of far-seeing wisdom; it was, however, thoroughly in keeping with England's history. This England has been fond of representing as a history of peace and benevolence—it has never been such. English commerce and *Kultur* have forced their way as roughly and ruthlessly as in the case of any nation in history; more deliberate almost than with any other has been her policy from time immemorial of simply exterminating every rival. Thus it has been, and thus it is still to-day—the freedom of the world demands that there be a change in the future.

CHAPTER II

FRANCE'S POLICY OF FORCE

PROFESSOR PAUL DARMSTÄDTER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN

OUR greatest historian has said that in 1870 the German army was fighting Louis XIV. This statement holds in fact a great truth; it means that the foreign policy of France during the last three hundred years has been guided by one purpose, that its aims have been pursued with absolute consistency throughout the changing periods of history. These aims consisted in the expansion of France to the so-called natural boundaries of the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, in her domination in Middle and Southern Europe, and in the founding of a great overseas empire. The execution of these plans naturally aroused the opposition of other Powers; Spain, the German states under the leadership of Austria, and especially England saw in these French efforts a menace to their vital interests. Powerful coalitions between the Island Kingdom and the Continental Powers brought about the defeat of the French plans. The great colonial empire which, in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries, had been built up in North America by painful labor, was lost in the Seven Years' War, as irretrievably as were the bold hopes of gaining the upper hand in East India. The hegemony in Middle and Southern Europe which Napoleon achieved, could not be maintained; indeed, after his fall the so-called "natural boundaries," which had been conquered in the Revolutionary Wars, had to be surrendered. But it is characteristic of the exceptional tenacity of French policy that even after the destruction of these plans, after the collapse of her hopes, France attempted, by new means and new paths, the achievement of the old ambitions—to extend France's territory in Europe and to build up a powerful world empire.

The peace treaties of 1814-15 forced France back within the boundaries which had existed under her old kings, and left her only a few scant ruins of her colonial possessions: several West Indian islands, Cayenne, a couple of East Indian cities, the Island of Réunion, and the colony of Senegal, which was at that time quite unimportant—all in all, scarcely 100,000 square kilometers, with at the most one million inhabitants.

The terrible state of exhaustion in which the country found itself after the Napoleonic Wars prevented it for the time being from contemplating expansion in Europe, but even in the Restoration period there was a beginning made toward the creation of a new colonial empire. The monarchy of Louis Philippe and the Second Empire continued to advance along these lines. The foundations for a new colonial empire were laid in Algiers on the West African coast, in Madagascar and on the Red Sea, in the South Seas and Farther India. An attempt was made to gain influence in the Levant, especially in Syria and Egypt—indeed, even in America an effort was made to continue the old tradition, although in a new form. The fact that the French world policy of this time did not achieve more imposing results was due to the opposition of England, despite the *Entente Cordiale*. It is, however, due also to the fact that France never entirely abandoned the hope of realizing the old ambitions of her European policy. In the southwest the "natural" boundary was won back in 1860; in 1870 the hope was entertained of a similar gain in the northeast. This hope, however, was not realized: France was driven back from the Rhine to the Vosges Mountains, and in addition lost a part of her Moselle territory. Her ambition for supremacy in Middle Europe was shattered by the founding of the German Empire.

The peace of Frankfort in this way destroyed the hopes which the French had entertained for several hundred years and in part already realized. No wonder, then, that all their efforts were devoted to undermining this peace, which many regarded as only a truce. No measure was spared to keep alive the memory of the lost provinces and hatred of the victor. The lost provinces, whose inhabitants had been an object of contempt on account of their faulty knowledge of the French language, became almost a cult and in schools, in newspapers and in literature the "poor" inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, "who were groaning under German oppression," were represented as martyrs, and the recovery of the lost brothers as the holiest duty of France. The legal status created by the Peace of Frankfort was recognized in no school book, on no map, and not even in scientific books and magazines. With the exception of Jean Jaurès, there was scarcely a leading politician who accepted the state of affairs resulting from 1871. Sentiment and historical recollections played their part in this—bonds of friendship and relationship, as well as here and there the honest belief that the "lost" brothers were suffering under German rule. The politico-military consideration that Alsace and Lorraine, Strassburg and

Metz represented sally ports against Germany, and that especially from Alsace South Germany might be held in continuous check, was not lost sight of. Immediately following the conclusion of peace, the way was prepared from a military and diplomatic point of view for the war of *revanche*. In 1872 universal military duty, after the Prussian model, was legally introduced into France; later it was still further developed in the Defense Law of 1889. In no country of the world has the so-called "Prussian Militarism" been more relentlessly carried through than in the French Republic. Diplomatic preparations encountered serious obstacles, as no Power indicated a readiness to enter into a treaty with the Republic, whose internal firmness as yet evoked but little confidence.

As the re-conquest of the lost provinces was out of the question for the moment, French policy again sought, as it had done after 1815, to counter-balance the losses suffered in Europe by colonial acquisitions. In this it remained true to its old traditions. But from this endeavor of French policy after 1878 resulted this remarkable situation: France encountered the stubborn and sometimes bitter opposition of England, while from Germany she met with the most uncompromising encouragement, and often with vigorous assistance. In the years 1884-85, when Jules Ferry directed the destinies of France, and again occasionally during the nineties, when Hanotaux was at the helm on the Quai d'Orsay, did France and Germany work in harmony in the field of world politics. Jules Ferry warned his compatriots against "forever keeping their eyes turned toward the blue line of the Vosges," and neglecting all else that was happening in the world.[1] At this time, and even later, many Germans may have thought that the old differences would disappear and the old wounds heal, but those who thought thus—and their number in Germany was not small—were in sad error as regards the sentiment of the French nation. French policy, it is true, gladly accepted German support in order to attain a definite goal, but never through gratitude did it lose sight of that other goal which it considered more important. So far-seeing a statesman as Jules Ferry, who desired no more than to work hand in hand with Germany in clearly circumscribed fields, encountered the most bitter opposition from many of his compatriots, and after his fall (1885), there was a violent revival of the *revanche* doctrine; this reached its height in the temporary triumph of that thoroughly doubtful character, General Boulanger. It was

[1] *Jules Ferry*, by Rambaud, p. 394.

due only to the great restraint of Germany that war was avoided at this time (1886-87).

A prominent American historian says in his book regarding the genesis of the World War in 1914: "The French have been ready for war with Germany, whenever they saw a good opportunity, for the last forty years." [1] French diplomacy has for forty years striven to create such a favorable opportunity. It was apparent to French statesmen that, in view of the increasing population of Germany and of the stationary French census, there was no prospect of success so long as France was dependent upon her own strength. The efforts of French diplomacy were, therefore, turned to bringing about the strongest possible coalition against Germany. As Austria, upon whose support she had based her expectations after 1870, showed signs of reaching an understanding with the new German Empire, Russia presented herself in the first line as a possible ally of France. As early as 1872 the *Temps* suggested an alliance with the Empire of the Czar. German diplomacy early recognized such a possibility, especially after the Russian Chancellor Gortschakov, in 1875, boastfully claimed the credit for having saved France from a new German attack. After the relation between Germany and Russia, following the Congress of Berlin, had become plainly less friendly, and especially after the signing of the treaty between Germany and Austria, an alliance between Russia and France was advocated as a countermove by Russian, as well as by French politicians.

It must not be forgotten that the opposition which existed at this time between the two Powers and England in regard to world politics was a further important factor in making the signing of the treaty seem desirable. Nevertheless, for a long time there was hesitation on grounds of principle in Petrograd at entering into an alliance with the Republic. But this scruple was finally overcome, as many believe, on account of the pro-English turn which German politics took and on account of the non-renewal of the so-called Mutual Guaranty Treaty (*Rückversicherungsvertrag*) following Bismarck's fall. There can, however, be no doubt that had there been a war between Germany and Russia previous to 1890, French muskets would have "gone off by themselves." In addition to the plainly existent community of political interests between the two states at this time, the close financial relations which bound them together must not be forgotten. As an outward sign of the agreement, in July, 1891, a French squadron proceeded to

[1] *The War in Europe,* by Albert Bushnell Hart, p. 139.

Cronstadt, on which occasion the proud autocrat of Russia listened, standing, to the Marseillaise. On August 27, 1891, notes were exchanged between the two governments sealing the understanding, which was extended by a military convention, and in 1894 changed to a formal alliance.

The Franco-Russian alliance was, according to the intent of French politicians, primarily directed against Germany, and was intended at a favorable moment to lead to war and to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. It is easy to understand that Alsace-Lorraine was a matter of entire indifference to Russian statesmen; they desired to use the alliance for exploiting France financially and for advancing Russian politics against England in the Near and Far East—in case of necessity of course also against Germany. Those French politicians who saw in the extension of the colonial empire an important task for the French government, counted upon making use of Russian support against England. According to the change in the relation of France and Russia to England, their own relation to Germany became now more friendly, now less so. In 1894 France and Germany together opposed England when she seized upon a strip of the Congo State. In 1895 Germany, Russia and France joined hands in East Asia. But when the German Empire, as the result of the telegram which the Kaiser sent to President Kruger, on the occasion of the repulse of the Jameson Raid, appeared on the verge of a serious conflict with England, the French government let it be announced in London that France had only one enemy, and that was Germany. Thus, despite all colonial rivalries, France was ready to support England in a war against Germany; or, in other words, at that time also she placed Continental above world politics. This attitude of France had naturally marked effects on Germany's policy, while France herself was thereby brought to suffer the greatest humiliation she had known since 1871—the "Fashoda" episode.

The improvement in the relations between the two Western Powers dates from the very same year, 1898, the year of Fashoda. Delcassé, who directed France's foreign policy after this year and who doubtless perceived the growing hostility between Germany and England, made it his main object in life to bring about a close understanding between England and France, and to carry through the idea of *revanche* by means of this alliance. This plan of the clever Southern Frenchman gained in probability of realization when, with the accession of King Edward VII (1901), a decided shift took place in British policy—England, like France, now saw in Germany her chief

opponent. Indeed, England was even ready to pay a high price for French friendship and to fulfill France's dearest wish on the stage of world politics: in payment for the recognition of her *de facto* supremacy in Egypt, England granted a free hand to France in the greater portion of Morocco. Thus, by the agreement of April 8, 1904, the chief goal of French policy was achieved, the ancient opposition to England was checked, and the possibility created of carrying through to realization, in alliance with Great Britain, French wishes as regards Europe. It remained only to bring the understanding with England into agreement with the Russian alliance. The differences which existed and still exist between England and Russia are undoubtedly more fundamental than those between England and France —more so, probably, than those between England and Germany. Nevertheless, English and French diplomats, working together, were able in 1907 to bring about an understanding between Russia and England, which did not remove the antipathy between the two Powers, it is true, but merely bridged it over. It is not possible to-day to decide who deserves the greatest credit for the creation of the Triple Entente, but the chief gain from it undoubtedly accrues to France. The three Powers were held together by their common hatred of Germany. According to the intention of the French—and with that alone are we concerned at this time—the Triple Entente was to serve for the realization of the *revanche* idea, in the manner of the previous alliance with Russia. The Entente was still further extended by military agreements with England, which were primarily directed against Germany, and through an exchange of notes (1912) which was not formally a treaty, but which in reality bound England, as the Military and Naval Convention had done, to support France. French politics had at last been successful, after nearly forty years of effort, in bringing about the powerful coalition with which it was intended to destroy the German Empire.

There was, however, much more to the European policy of France than the forming of treaties with Russia and the understanding with Great Britain. It was, to be sure, out of the question for France, after the occurrences of 1870-71, to resume plans for a Confederation of the Rhine, such as Napoleon had undertaken. But ardent encouragement was given to the anti-German propaganda in Alsace-Lorraine. It is not known to what extent other disruptive movements within the German Empire and within the allied Hapsburg Monarchy received

encouragement from French sources. The manner in which intelligent Frenchmen, even in private conversation, threw doubt upon the unity of the German princes and races was astonishing; they were inclined to overestimate the importance of occasional separatist expressions of individuals and newspapers. This was still more pronounced in respect to the disagreements of the peoples of the Monarchy on the Danube, among whom the Czechs especially enjoyed the sympathy of the French.

The principal aim of French diplomacy, particularly in the last ten or fifteen years, was at all points to undermine German policy, to weaken Germany's position in the world, to destroy her alliances with other states, and to draw the latter within the sphere of France's influence. French statecraft in these efforts, in which it was naturally encouraged by Russia and England, made skilful use of two weapons whose power we must not underestimate: French *Kultur* and French capital.

French *Kultur,* and especially its chief organ of expression, the French language, has something quite irresistible for many peoples. If it possessed for those of the Germanic race at times a decisive influence, it is only natural that its attraction was even stronger for the Romance nations, who not infrequently regard it as the only *Kultur;* from the superiority of the French article to their own they draw the easy conclusion that in the political sphere also France is entitled to stand as the leading representative of the Latin peoples.

Not less important was the extremely adroit use of French capital for the increase of the political influence of France. French capital is invested in government loans, railways, industrial undertakings and newspapers of other countries, and thus made serviceable, not only for the commercial, but for the political aims of France as well.

The influence of France is naturally greatest in French-speaking countries, such as French Switzerland and Belgium. For a time it seemed that united Italy would be permanently removed from the French sphere of influence. The occupation of Tunis by the French (1881) impaired the political relations between the Italian kingdom and France and brought about Italy's union with the Central Powers. Italy was successful also in freeing herself from the economic tutelage of France, and the hope did not seem without foundation that Italy would create for herself a system of *Kultur* independent of France. In spite of the unfriendly attitude which for many years France had manifested toward all Italian efforts to achieve power—reference need be made only to the support which France gave to the

Abyssinian Chief, Menelik—French diplomacy was, nevertheless, successful in making its influence again strongly felt with the "Latin sister nation." Here again Delcassé was the guiding spirit: in order to make the Italians forget Tunis, he offered to them the much less valuable Tripoli as recompense. The minister was seconded in his efforts by the French ambassador in Rome, Barrère, who understood the art of influencing Italian public opinion in favor of France. The unremitting emphasis on the Latin relationship, the encouragement of "irredentist" and republican movements, the activity of the Freemasons, who were encouraged by France, and the attraction of French *Kultur*, which is for many Italians irresistible, caused wide circles in Italy entirely to mistake the true interests of the country and to ally themselves politically with France.[1]

The argument that France was the leading Latin power was of course made use of in Spain. Although French capital there plays a much greater rôle than in Italy, there are in Spain powerful factors against the dominance of French influence. Old traditions, as well as recent experiences of the Spaniards in the Morocco affair, operate against France's propaganda along the lines of civilization and finance. Catalonia, however, is entirely under French influence. Portugal is dependent on France culturally, but politically and economically on England.

In the eastern part of the Mediterranean French propaganda can look back upon a tradition extending over many hundreds of years. France claims the protectorate over the Roman Catholics in the Orient. The *Alliance Israélite* is active in working for France, and large amounts of French capital are invested in Turkey in all sorts of undertakings. Although France has in the Orient very important material and cultural interests, nevertheless she has made her policy as regards Turkey quite secondary to the wishes of her Russian ally, and thereby lost her traditional influence in the Ottoman Empire. Indirectly, the *revanche* policy stood here in the way of the realization of other important French interests. The policy of France as regards the Balkan States has also of recent years mainly served Russian purposes. Worthy of mention is the fact that in Greece and Rumania France has been able to awaken sympathies which in great part are traceable to cultural propaganda; and the further fact that Greece is also financially dependent on France.

France's greatest success since 1871 in the field of world

[1] In the meanwhile Italy has broken with the Central Powers and joined the Triple Entente.

politics has been in the building up of a new colonial empire of vast extent. Her traditions here lead back to the time of Richelieu and Louis XIV. The desire to increase France's power and greatness, to find a recompense for lost territory and to reap military laurels, have all been determining factors for the French imperialism of early and modern times; but it would be unjust were we to fail to give due weight to the fact that other important considerations of an economic and politico-military nature also influenced the men who built up the modern French colonial empire. France possesses no superfluous population, and she has therefore no need to-day for settlement colonies. On the other hand, territorial markets removed from competition are for France all the more valuable, since in many branches French industry is no longer able successfully to meet competition in the free markets of the world. The import of raw materials and food stuffs from her own colonies is also a matter of moment. It is very important for a country with so large a capital at its disposal to be able to invest it advantageously in colonies. A great colonial empire must be protected by obtaining footholds at certain points along the important routes of international trade. Finally, there is a connection between France's world policy and her *revanche* policy; the French endeavored more and more by the enlistment of the inhabitants of their colonies to fill out the vacancies resulting in the ranks of their army through the falling birth-rate. New colonies represented, therefore, the strengthening of France for her European task.

The resumption of the French colonial policy has been influenced by the general tendency of the times toward colonial expansion. France, who possessed a chain of colonies on the Dark Continent, felt naturally the greatest interest in an occurrence of such historical importance as the division of Africa.

Although in this manner ancient traditions, sentiment and important interests forced France to take part in world politics, public opinion at the start was without enthusiasm for colonial expansion, in part even inimical to it. Great political parties, such as the Radicals and the Monarchists, often offered the bitterest opposition to a colonial policy, whose supporters numbered statesmen belonging to the moderate party. The opposition stood out against this world policy partly on grounds of principle, but chiefly because the country was thereby turned aside from its real task, the preparation for the war of *revanche*. The greatest successes which France has to show since 1871 were achieved in conscious opposition to the *revanche* policy, in coöperation with Germany and against England.

From the collapse of her American colonial empire, France had saved certain fragments: the small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as French Guiana. The Monroe Doctrine barred the way to an expansion of the French colonial possessions. It is worthy of remark that France is the sole European power which has endeavored to violate the Monroe Doctrine (at the time of Napoleon III). It is also remarkable that even after 1871 the French colonial empire in America gained by expansion, although the gain was unimportant in size: in 1877 France acquired from Sweden the little Island of St. Barthélemy, without protest from the United States. Not without justice does an American historian call attention to the fact that this occurrence is of the same significance as the sale of St. Thomas to Germany; yet against such an act, when only suggested, the American press violently protested.[1] In this connection it must also be mentioned that a French company first undertook the building of the Panama Canal, an undertaking which, as is known, came to grief, but which nevertheless shows the ambitious French world policy. The American journalists and scholars, who are never weary of talking of the "German danger," which is supposed to threaten America also, should glance at the map of the West Indies, and then ask themselves the question from which direction the United States, and especially the Panama Canal, might have to expect an attack.

France has been able to awaken for herself in the United States widespread sympathy, which is in part traceable to the ancient brotherhood in arms during the American War of Independence, in part to the similar republican form of government. The French have recently undertaken a very active cultural propaganda both in North and South America. Latin America, even more perhaps than Latin Europe, regards France as the leading Latin nation and Paris as the center of culture of the whole Romance world. South Americans who have gained wealth delight to spend it on the Seine, where they are honored by the nickname of "rasta." In addition to the cultural propaganda, we must not overlook the important part played by French capital in South American undertakings. In the South Seas, since the thirties of the nineteenth century, France has controlled a number of islands, of which the most important is Tahiti; under the Second Empire, New Caledonia was ac-

[1] *The United States as a World Power,* by Archibald Cary Coolidge, New York, 1908, p. 110.

quired, and under the Third Republic several further groups of islands, which, however, are of no great importance.

Far more important has been the French expansion in East Asia. In the face of England's great superiority, the increase of France's ancient East Indian possessions was not to be thought of; in compensation, however, she was able to acquire a great colonial empire in Farther India. Here Napoleon III laid the foundation through the acquisition of Cochin-China and the protectorate over Cambodia. Under the Third Republic French rule was extended, especially through the initiative of Jules Ferry, over Annam and Tonkin, and from these varied elements the great and promising colony of Indo-China was formed. French diplomacy was able to secure "spheres of interest," in the neighboring countries of Siam and China, which represent far-reaching opportunities for the capital and industry of France. In South China France has possessed since 1898 a point of support in the harbor of Kuang-chow. As for the rest, the Far Eastern policy of France has had to show the greatest consideration for the interests of her Russian ally.

France's expansion in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean stands in close connection with her East Asiatic policy. She sought to follow England's example in obtaining stations on the route to East India. On the old route around the Cape of Good Hope, France possessed, as an inheritance from former times, the Island of Bourbon or Réunion; from the days of Louis XIV, she had laid claim to the great Island of Madagascar, and at the time of the Restoration these had been revived and had led to the acquisition of the small island of St. Marie, on the east coast of Madagascar. At the time of the July Monarchy certain islands to the northwest of Madagascar were occupied. During the eighties of the nineteenth century memories of the old claims and traditions were awakened. After a bloody war a protectorate was established over Madagascar in 1885, and after a second war the island was declared a French colony in 1896. Even before the opening of the Suez Canal, Napoleon III had laid claim in 1862 to Obok on the Red Sea, on the new route to India. This small colony was further extended during the eighties of the nineteenth century; it acquired considerable importance through the seizure of the harbor of Djibuti, and especially through the relations which were established with neighboring Abyssinia.

By far the most important field of French expansion, however, in recent years was in the northwest of the Dark Continent.

France pursued various aims, all of which were not fully realized. In the Mediterranean, where Algeria and Corsica already belonged to France, an attempt was made to bring the whole northern coast line of Africa from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Suez Canal under her rule.

As an Atlantic power, France, who possessed various colonies at the west coast of Africa from Senegal to the Congo, aimed at occupying the greatest possible extent of territory on the Atlantic coast-line, at providing as great a *hinterland* as feasible for the coast colonies, and then at binding these coast colonies to each other through the *hinterland,* where this was not possible on the coast itself.

Finally, the plan was entertained of effecting a territorial connection between the Atlantic possessions and those lying on the Mediterranean. We need not decide the question whether, and to what extent, the attempt was made to create an empire through Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Ever since the French had gained a firm footing on the soil of Algeria, their aim had been to win political and economic influence in the neighboring states, Tunis and Morocco, and to incorporate these territories at a favorable moment into their North African empire. The possession of these two commercially valuable countries was, according to the French view, absolutely necessary for the security of Algeria. Tunis, as well as Morocco, holds a supremely important position as regards world politics, the latter lying at the Straits of Gibraltar and the former at the narrow dividing line between the western and eastern halves of the Mediterranean. But precisely for this reason England, who had watched with the greatest displeasure the conquest of Algeria by the French, opposed their occupation of further territory on the North African coast. Italy also desired possession of Tunis, to which, aside from geographical and historical reasons, she thought she possessed just claims, since great numbers of her sons had emigrated to the country and were there active in all branches of life. It appears that England was at first inclined to support the Italian claims. Offers of a like nature were made in 1876-77 to the Italians from the German and Austrian side. But the irresolute Italian government failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and Britain preferred to reach an understanding with France in regard to the protectorate of Tunis. It may be that it was more to the advantage of Britain's maritime interests if Tunis, Sardinia and Sicily were not in possession of the same state; a misunderstanding between the two sister nations was at that time entirely

in line with Britain's policy. The controlling consideration, however, was the desire to bring France under British influence and to prevent the threatening alliance with Russia. At the Congress of Berlin (1878) the British delegate, Lord Salisbury, offered to the French delegate, Wadington, Tunis as compensation for Cyprus, which England had at that time received from Turkey. "How long are you determined to leave Carthage in the hands of the barbarians?" the English statesman is declared to have asked. Bismarck also agreed, since he hoped, but as events proved falsely, that the colonial activity of the French would draw them away from the *revanche* idea. The French government, however, hesitated a number of years before making use of the authorization, as many statesmen feared a breach with Italy; moreover, public opinion was unfavorable to plans of colonial expansion. Meanwhile the Italians sought to strengthen their economic influence in Tunis by all possible means, in the manner later characterized as *pénétration pacifique*. The French government, with Jules Ferry at its head, seized upon boundary violations by a Tunisian tribe as an excuse for occupying the country. In April, 1881, French troops entered Tunis, and on May 12 of the same year the Bardo Treaty was concluded, whereby the country became practically a French colony.

It appears that in France in the eighties the project was entertained of extending French rule to Tripoli, but to these plans the British government is said to have offered the most determined opposition. Later (1900, or perhaps earlier) the decision was reached to surrender Tripoli to Italy, together perhaps with other concessions, in return for the recognition of the French claims to Morocco. This decision was all the easier since France had definitely renounced claims to Egypt.

If France was able to proffer well-founded claims, from a historical, material or cultural standpoint, to any country in the world, it was Egypt. As early as the eighteenth century various statesmen had contemplated the conquest of the country of the Nile and the cutting of the Suez Strait; the bearing of the tricolor to the land of the Pharaohs by Napoleon meant only the carrying out of plans that had long been in incubation. Even after the failure of the Napoleonic expedition, French influence had remained dominant in Egypt. The Suez Canal was a French undertaking. It is not without its tragic side that precisely this work, which was a triumph of French capital and of French intelligence, should have destroyed French influence in Egypt. England followed the building of the canal with the greatest

distrust and disapproval; after it was once completed, Great Britain sought to gain control of the canal and of Egypt. The history of the occupation of Egypt by the English, which need not be related at this point in detail, was the result of many shady intrigues and of a not always consistent policy on the part of British statesmen. France had several opportunities to maintain her old influence, or at least to prevent the one-sided occupation by the English in 1882. It is possible that an Anglo-French occupation of Egypt would have had the same results as the Prusso-Austrian action in Schleswig-Holstein in the years following 1864. At all events, the French parliament, which on July 19, 1882, refused by a large majority the credit demanded by the Freycinet Ministry for the occupation of the Suez Canal, missed the last opportunity to secure for France a voice in determining the destiny of the Nile country. In reaching the decision, for which Clémenceau as leader of the opposition bears the chief responsibility, the controlling motive was the fear lest France's military position in Europe be weakened through sending troops to Egypt. Thus here again the policy of *revanche* stood in the way of a world policy: the French would not have been forced out of Egypt, if they had not placed greater value upon the possession of Alsace-Lorraine than upon all territorial acquisitions.

Only with difficulty and most reluctantly did the French reconcile themselves to the accomplished fact of English supremacy in Egypt. The result was a long-continued unfriendliness between the two Western Powers. France sought in other latitudes a recompense for the lost Land of the Pharaohs, and as England possessed interest in these districts, the antagonism between the two countries grew bitter. It was in this situation that Germany and France began the coöperation already referred to, which, it is true, lasted only a short time but which greatly assisted the expansion of the French colonial empire.

Beside Indo-China and Madagascar, the chief scene of this expansion was West Africa. From the seventeenth century France possessed settlements on the Senegal; with the beginning of the eighteenth century the idea had been broached of penetrating into the interior by following the course of the Senegal River and thus founding a great African empire. General Faidherbe, in the middle of the nineteenth century, revived these plans and by force of arms subdued the territory drained by the river; in addition, in the period from 1830 to 1870, the French acquired a series of settlements on the West African coast, on the *Rivières du Sud,* on the Ivory Coast, in Dahomey and in

Gabun, which, however, were without connection and without *hinterland,* and hence of but small worth. The zealously prosecuted exploration of the Dark Continent, in which numerous Frenchmen took part, showed that the interior of Africa was of much greater value than had previously been assumed. It was, therefore, quite natural that the Powers possessing colonies on the African coast should seek to expand them toward the interior. From the end of the seventies, the French, following the plans of Faidherbe, sought to extend their rule toward the Niger.

Gradually, the idea was conceived of conquering the entire basin of the Niger, of uniting it on the one hand with the colonies of the Gulf of Guinea, and on the other with Tunis and Algeria, passing through the Desert of Sahara. Starting from Gabun, the French explorer, de Brazza, had undertaken an expedition into the interior and planted the French flag on the Congo (1880). French expeditions traversed the Desert of Sahara, the Niger territory and the territory lying north of the Guinea coast, and the diplomats sought to make use of the results of these expeditions, which consisted of treaties with native chieftains covered with the latter's "crosses," as legal titles in their dealings with other states. For from 1880 competition for African colonies became very keen. The mysterious "International Association," behind which King Leopold II of Belgium concealed himself, signed a great number of treaties in the Congo Basin; in 1884 Germany raised her flag at numerous points on the West African coast, and Portugal and Spain revived ancient claims. England, however, opposed French ambitions on the Niger and the Congo. The British were successful in 1884 in bringing the coast line of the Lower Niger under their rule and in excluding the French from the extremely valuable territory along the mouth of that stream. By cunningly recognizing Portugal's historic claims, they sought to bring the Congo Territory practically under their own control. But at this point Germany and France, Bismarck and Jules Ferry, joined in opposing them. Through this united action of the two Powers the British-Portuguese intrigue was defeated, and the work of the Belgian king was rescued.

By the treaty of February 5, 1885, France acquired the broad territory between the coast and the lower stretches of the Congo, which was later greatly increased. Further, she succeeded in securing a preemption on the new Congo State. The boundary division between the German and French colonies caused no difficulty. Bismarck had impressed on those who

crossed the seas to found colonies the duty of treating the French claims with the greatest consideration, or, as he once expressed it, of regarding them as "taboo." If this close understanding between Germany and France, as it existed in 1884-85, had been of longer duration, presumably both Powers in their negotiation with England would have achieved far more favorable results. But after the fall of Jules Ferry, a marked estrangement occurred between Germany and France. Germany found herself thus forced to approach England again and to limit the aims of her colonial policy far more than would have been necessary had the pleasant relations of 1884-85 continued. After 1885 there occurred a marked relaxation in colonial expansion in France also. The negotiations with England regarding the limitation of mutual spheres of interest in West Africa led to the agreement of August 5, 1890, which in French colonial-political literature is regarded in much the same manner as the treaty of July 1, 1890, in German writings. The causes for the two treaties are probably to be sought in the international grouping of states, which at that time was very favorable for England—that is to say, in the unfriendly relation between France and Germany.

The agreement of August 5, 1890, fulfilled a desire of the French colonial party: it secured for France the territorial connection between her possessions on the Senegal and the Niger and those on the Mediterranean; but on the other hand, it surrendered to England the broad stretch of territory between the mouth of the Niger and Lake Tschad, to a line corresponding approximately to the southern boundary of the desert. Reckoned in square kilometers, France obtained a vast stretch of land, but most of it was desert. "The Gallic cock," Lord Salisbury is said to have remarked mockingly, "has obtained a lot of sand in which to scratch." England gained on the map a much smaller territory, but it was fertile and thickly settled.

Even after 1890 many boundary questions were still unsettled; it was still uncertain whether the French Dahomey district would maintain its territorial connection with the possessions on the Niger, and whether the French Congo district would obtain a connection with the possessions on Lake Tschad. Germany, who from her Cameroon colony would have been able to break the connection between the French Sudan and the Congo colony, again showed herself most friendly: In the treaty of February 4—March 15, she abstained from the extension, accorded to her by England in 1893, of the Cameroons to the boundary line of what was then the Egyptian Sudan. In the

treaty of July 23, 1897, Germany regulated the northern boundary of her Togo colony in a manner most favorable to France. The settlement of the boundary between their mutual possessions at the bend of the Niger led to extremely delicate negotiations between France and England. An understanding was reached in the treaty of June 14, 1898, by which the Dahomey colony obtained a union with the possessions in the Sudan. The West African colonies of the Germans, English and Portuguese were henceforth merely "enclosures" in the vast French colonial empire.

The ambition of the French colonial party, however, which in 1895 in the person of Hanotaux had again won an important influence in political matters, looked even beyond this. It is not possible to determine with absolute certainty the extent of their ambitious plans in detail, whether they aimed merely at the extension of the French colonial empire to the Upper Nile, or whether they wished to extend the French sphere of interest as far as the Red Sea; certain it is that it was desired to open up "from above" the entire Egyptian question anew. The time seemed favorable for this: England had serious difficulties in South Africa, and appeared, moreover, to be at odds with Germany. France had assured herself of aid from the Congo State and Abyssinia. In this connection, as a link in the chain of far-reaching undertakings, is to be considered the Marchand Expedition, to which a much more innocent interpretation was sought to be given after its failure, and especially after the formation of the *Entente Cordiale* with England. England was successful in her attempt to defeat the whole French plan. The British government, on March 28, 1895, through Sir Edward Grey, declared most emphatically that it considered the whole territory of the Nile as its sphere of interest and that an advance by France on the Nile territory would be regarded as an "unfriendly act."

In 1896 England undertook the reconquest of the Egyptian Sudan; and when in July, 1898, Marchand finally reached the valley of the Nile at Fashoda, the greater part of the Sudan was already in the possession of the English. On September 2, 1898, the English entered Khartum, and the victor (Kitchener) proceeded to Fashoda and ran up the British flag. France's position thus became untenable. Marchand found himself facing a greatly superior force. More important still, however, was the fact that France lacked all support in Europe. As a result of the policy pursued by France, Germany had again come to an understanding with England, and Russia was not inclined to

support France in an African dispute. The French government, therefore, saw that it would be forced to yield, unless it was willing, single-handed, to enter on a hopeless war with England. Marchand was ordered to retire from Fashoda. The plan of extending the French colonial empire to the Nile had suffered final shipwreck. In the treaty of March 21, 1899, which set the seal upon the defeat at Fashoda, France was forced to renounce those territories which had previously belonged to the Egyptian Sudan, especially the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal. In compensation, the territories of Wadai, Borku, Tibesti, Kanem and Baghirmi were added to the French sphere of interest.

France had thus, it is true, not achieved all the aims of her African policy, but she had been successful in acquiring a vast connected territory, which extended from the Mediterranean to the Congo and to the Gulf of Guinea, from the Atlantic Ocean to the western border of Egypt.

There was lacking to the great French colonial empire in the North and West of Africa only the final cornerstone to complete the colonies lying on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean—namely, Morocco. Many diplomatic negotiations were undertaken from 1889 to 1902 in regard to the countries grouped under this name, but as yet little is known with certainty regarding their nature. In 1900 France purchased Italy's agreement to a protectorate over Morocco by granting her a free hand in Tripoli; she conceded two zones of influence to Spain, which announced historic claims to North Morocco and new claims to the coast lying opposite the Canary Islands;[1] negotiations are also said to have been undertaken between Germany and France. England's opposition, however, to the complete occupation of Morocco by the French had hitherto been most stubborn. It was a traditional guiding principle of England's policy to allow no foreign colonies in the neighborhood of the Straits of Gibraltar. But this principle, like many other maxims and traditions of the older British policy, was sacrificed to higher considerations—that is to say, to the enmity toward Germany. The British government decided to permit France to seize Morocco. This was the essence of the agreement of April 8, 1904, which in addition regulated a series of other disputed points. In this connection, the recognition by France of English supremacy in Egypt, which had already been implied by the agreement of 1899, was not of great importance. Although the agreement contained the customary phrases, as, for example,

[1] In the end, however, the treaty was not ratified by the Spanish Government.

"that France has no intention of changing the *status quo* in Morocco," no one could entertain any doubt that France had now a free hand there—with one important limitation: the northern part of the Sultanate, the territory lying on the Straits of Gibraltar, was apportioned to Spain. By the treaty signed on October 3, 1904, the Spanish sphere of interest was more clearly defined, and in addition to the district in the north, another in the southwest of Morocco was surrendered to Spain.

The Franco-English agreement of April 8, 1904, contained provisions regarding Morocco, Egypt and various other parts of the world; but it was undoubtedly, according to the intent of its creators, an attack on the position of the German Empire as a World Power. The land which lies on the Atlantic Ocean at the entrance to the Mediterranean is one of the most important districts of the world from the international point of view. It is rich in undeveloped natural resources, and if German trade with the Sultanate was not yet very important, nevertheless the future held out glittering prospects. Morocco was, moreover, one of the few remaining independent Mohammedan kingdoms, and it lay in the interest of German policy as a whole to maintain them as far as possible. Prince Bismarck, it is true, had once said: "We should be glad to see France take possession of Morocco; she would then have her hands full, and we should not grudge her the increase of her territory in Africa as a recompense for Alsace-Lorraine."

This statement, however, was made in the year 1880. France had since then acquired many districts in Africa, and Bismarck had not been able to foresee that she would ruthlessly shut off this territory from the free competition of other countries, in so far as this was not prevented by definite agreements. The international position of the German Empire had, moreover, completely changed since 1880. But even if this had not been the case, the manner in which the agreement of 1894 between France and England, with the approval of Spain, Italy, and Russia, had disposed of a great country was necessarily calculated to arouse the protest of Germany.[1] The Convention of Madrid of 1880, in which Germany as a signatory Power took part, offered the opportunity for interference. The German Emperor declared on March 31, 1905, in Tangiers that he considered the Sultan of Morocco an independent ruler, and

[1] *Le Conflict Franco-Allemand en* 1905, Guilbert and Ferrette, p. 84: "There is nothing so vile and so contrary to our traditions as that attitude of bluster and brag in ignoring Germany and treating her as a negligible quantity."
See also the private utterances made by M. Delcassé as quoted in the same book, p. 83.

the Imperial Chancellor protested openly against the contemplated and already begun "Tunification" of Morocco. As France at this time—the time of the Russo-Japanese War—was deprived of Russian support, she declared herself ready, after some hesitation and following Delcassé's resignation, to discuss the Morocco question in an international congress. This was held in January, 1906, at Algeciras. Thanks to the diplomatic support which the majority of the Powers gave to France, the latter country was able, despite the formal declaration of Morocco's independence, to obtain a controlling position in the Sultanate, which made it possible for her to carry through her program without directly offending against the decrees of the conference.

In the following years, with various excuses, France continued to occupy by military force other portions of the Sultanate. The extremely peaceful procedure of the German government, which often went too far in the opinion of one portion of the public, suffered these encroachments with great restraint; indeed, in the agreement of February 9, 1909, Germany expressly recognized "the special political interests of France" and asked only for consideration of the economic interests of Germany. The expectations which were entertained on the German side, and which did not concern Morocco alone, were not fulfilled. The French continued to extend their power in the Sultanate, and finally, in May, 1911, they occupied Fez. The German government therefore dispatched a warship to the harbor of Agadir, in order to cause France to enter upon new negotiations regarding Morocco.

The Algeciras Act, which was based upon the sovereignty of the Sultanate, could no longer be upheld. Morocco was in complete disorder, and there was nothing left for Germany but to bring about a reconsideration of the whole Morocco question. It has always been alleged by the French and English that Germany desired to obtain a portion of Morocco for herself. This view has been at all times categorically denied by those in authority in Germany. It was the intention of the German imperial government to obtain a compensation, after the precedent set by the other Powers, for the surrender of Morocco to France—such a compensation was sought for and obtained in Central Africa. France was forced by the agreement of November 4, 1911, which moreover guaranteed the free competition of all nations in Morocco, to surrender a portion of her Congo colony to Germany. In return, Germany recognized the French protectorate in Morocco. The final demarcation of the two Spanish spheres of interest, which were considerably re-

duced, took place in the treaty of November 27, 1912. So far as is known, no agreement has up to the present been reached regarding the city of Tangiers.

Thus, in these long drawn out negotiations, France has in the main been successful in enforcing her will. She was compelled, it is true, to agree to the surrender of considerable territory, which, moreover, divided her Congo colony at two points, but she obtained what was far more important—namely, supremacy over the greater part of Morocco. France's African empire was now complete.

The French world policy of the last generation has been extremely successful. A territory of over ten million square kilometers, with a population of about forty million, is to-day subject to France; by far the greater part of this territory has been acquired since 1880. The Sahara Desert, it is true, occupies a very large portion of the French colonial empire; the number of Europeans in this entire empire amounts to a million at the most, and many of these are not of French nationality. But broad districts in North Africa, on the Niger, on the Guinea Coast, in Madagascar and in Indo-China are fertile, rich in resources, already valuable to-day, and capable of great development. The commerce of the French colonies has recently advanced with great strides. France's own trade with them in recent years has been estimated at one and one-half to two billion francs. France manifests the desire to exclude the trade of other nations from her colonies, and indeed in such a manner, according to the view of clear-sighted Frenchmen, as to have done serious economic harm not only to the colonies but also to France herself. Is France, with her stationary number of inhabitants and her industries, backward in many branches, in a position to develop along all lines so great a colonial empire?

The hopes which Bismarck once entertained from his encouragement of France's world policy have been in no sense fulfilled. Despite this world-political success, the French have not ceased to keep their eyes fixed on "the blue line of the Vosges Mountains." On the contrary, the *revanche* idea has become more pronounced, especially of late years. The Morocco question revived the animosity toward Germany, and the manner of its settlement, which brought about a surrender of French territory, left a sting in the minds of many Frenchmen; but there were other important factors which led to the resumption of France's Continental policy. The alliance with Russia and the *entente* with England set narrow limits to French policy in all parts of

the world. There was neither in the Near nor in the Far East, nor in Africa, further territory in which France could undertake conquests without trespassing on British or Russian interests. The union of the "Bear" and the "Whale" in common hatred of Germany seemed to offer the most favorable, and perhaps the last opportunity for the recovery of the lost provinces on the eastern border; for it was plain to be seen that this union promised to be of short duration. All the more important was it, therefore, to make the best of the opportunity.

It is extremely difficult to-day to lay the responsibility on any one individual or group of individuals, but there is no doubt that from 1912 on public opinion in France was systematically incited. Much of this may be ascribed to the agitation for the revival of the three-year period of service; but this measure itself was, we may assume with certainty, a preparation for war. The feeling of France, as reflected in her press and literature, became pronouncedly more warlike than it had been since 1887. Glorification of war, descriptions of alleged oppression of the Alsace-Lorraine inhabitants, venomous attacks on leading German citizens, contemptuous references to German conditions and institutions, especially as regards the German army—these comprised the daily reading of the French. The future will have to determine to what extent this policy of inciting feeling against Germany practised by the French press was influenced by Russian and English efforts, and by English money, and whether the English and Russian press received their inspiration from French sources. It would be unjust to deny that there were currents opposed to this excess of jingoism. Up to the time immediately preceding the war, men were not lacking who raised a warning voice and urged an understanding with Germany. The essentially unimportant occurrences in Luneville and Nancy showed how thoroughly unfriendly the feeling of the nation had become, as the result of the conscienceless campaign of the press. The belief in France's great superiority in aviation intensified the self-confidence of many to an extreme point; numerous pamphlets were already busy with the "destruction of Germany"; the leading men were entirely in the grip of the new nationalistic tendency, which was celebrated by word and pen as the "new spirit." And when Russia prepared to seize the sword in an affair quite foreign to French interests, France did not hesitate a single moment to begin the war of revenge against Germany.

CHAPTER III

BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS

PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG

BELGIUM is, according to the opinion of her first king, Leopold I, "the most threatened country in the world"; she has, as Banning, the clever henchman of Leopold II, writes, "nowhere political or military boundaries." She turns the sides of her triangle directly toward the Great Powers, who from time immemorial have disputed with each other for predominance within her boundaries. Nor does she contain within herself the firm kernel of ethnological unity. Were her fate to be decided according to the rule by which our enemies seek to dazzle the whole world—namely, freedom and independence of even the small nationalities[1]—Belgium, like Switzerland, would immediately be broken up into fragments, for, in the oft-quoted words of a Belgian, Pol de Mont, director of the Antwerp Museum, "there is no Belgian nationality." The Flemish-Germanic majority and the Walloon-Romance minority stand in such sharp contrast that one can scarcely speak of cultural unity; even this "artificial" nation seemed recently seriously threatened with disintegration. Thus in the Belgian microcosm the great European contrasts have for a long time met in conflict.

Under such conditions, how was the continuance of an independent small state in any wise possible? As is known, the state, together with its neutrality and its "antiquarian" name, is mainly the creation of the Great Powers at the Conference of London in 1831—an "experiment," as it was styled by its first king and again by a Belgian minister at the national celebration of 1880, an experiment to which at first scarcely greater vitality was ascribed than in our own days to Albania, that creature of the Great Powers called into being in a moment of desperation. If, nevertheless, Belgium did not only continue to exist for more than eighty years but developed in an astoundingly successful manner, are we justified in assuming that in this she was protected exclusively by the continuing force of the treaty which called

[1] This rule, of course, may by no means be applied to Ireland, India, French Flanders, Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Finland, Russian Poland, the Ukraine, etc.

her into being? To think thus would be to exaggerate the importance of such an agreement. Rather did the Belgian state show unexpected powers of life, in the first place, because its roots struck more deeply into the past; and in the second, because the same conditions continued as had called it into existence. In other words, the nature of the Belgian state is to be understood only historically, and in order to grasp many manifestations of the most recent time one must go far back into the past.

The Southern Netherlands have from time immemorial been a frontier territory, important in war and for the spread of civilization. When from the third to the fifth century, A.D., the Salic Franks pressed forward at this point against the Romanized Celtic-Germanic Walloons, the manner of their settlement determined for all time the destiny of the country. For it was in the great northern marsh districts, and in a portion of the neighboring hilly land, that the invaders advanced without serious opposition into the neighborhood of Boulogne. Meanwhile, as the southerly forests and hilly districts offered protection to the aborigines, the latter maintained themselves in the main unmixed. Thus at this period those ethnographic and linguistic divisions became marked which for almost fifteen hundred years, with unexampled tenacity, have maintained themselves without material changes. A line from west to east, running somewhat north of Armentières to a point south of Maastricht, divides the Flemish-Low-German district in the north from the Walloon-French district in the south.[1] With passionate stubbornness, the struggle has been carried on for many hundreds of years about this ethnological and linguistic boundary; the Germanic portion, it is true, has suffered some losses, even in addition to the capital city of Brussels. If we Germans of the Empire have been guilty of any mistake, it is that we have remained too unsympathetic, in justifiable consideration for national susceptibility, while in France there has been absolutely no reserve on this account.

The World War has torn the bandage from our eyes and relaxed this unduly great restraint. The struggle of our Germanic brothers, although they may at times manifest distrust

[1] It is generally believed that Belgium is more French than anything else, but statistics show that at the close of the year 1910 the population was divided according to the languages spoken as follows:

Flemish (Low German)	3,832,193	or 54.05 per cent
High German	77,395	or 1.1 per cent
Walloon-French	3,180,003	or 44.85 per cent

In round numbers, of 100 Belgians 55 speak the Germanic, 45 the Romance or Latin tongue.

toward us, is from now on *our* struggle; the Flemish speech, which seems rustic and unpolished to the Celt, sounds, at least to such of us as are accustomed to the *Platt-Deutsch* of North Germany, homely and familiar, refreshing in its unspoiled picturesqueness and expressiveness, and in its vital force that springs from the depths of the popular soul. It deserves protection against being engulfed by other languages.

The older history of the Belgian Netherlands has little to say of such linguistic struggles; undoubtedly, this peculiar north-and-south division, which left the Romance districts in the East bordering on the German Rhine country and carried the Germans to the extreme West, was an element in preventing the complete absorption of these national remnants by Germany and France, respectively, and in giving to them at an early date a certain individuality; this rendered them valuable cultural intermediaries between the two great nations. This individuality, however, down to the year 1830 never developed into complete political independence; never, despite notable struggles, were these Southern Netherlanders able, like the Dutch and the Swiss, to maintain themselves permanently against a world in arms—their position did not render this possible. Dependence was the historical form of their existence.

When the central kernel in the world empire of Charlemagne, through the discord of his grandsons and the unfortunate Treaty of Verdun, had shrunk to the small disorganized Frankish Middle Kingdom, which was destined in rapid disintegration to be swallowed up by its eastern or western neighbor and which became for both of these neighbors a source of endless disputes down to the present World War—at this early date the attempts to maintain an independent buffer state could not possibly prove a permanent success. As soon as Germany overcame her internal disunion, her established strength acted upon the Belgian Netherlands like a strong magnet on loose pieces of iron: from 925 on they became, together with the whole of Lothar's state, a settled German possession. The German imperial boundary included from that time on the greater part of present-day Belgium, extended in the south with the Bishopric of Cambrai even far into French territory, followed the Scheldt to Ghent, and from that point turned northward toward the coast, leaving the purely German Flanders on the west of the Scheldt in French possession. German rule was here quite dependent on the destinies of the German Emperors. As long as the latter remained in full power, German sovereignty was energetically upheld. With the weakening of the Imperial

authority, from the beginning of the thirteenth century on, the Imperial administration began to disintegrate and to become a mere over-lordship. When in the sixteenth century the Imperial power and sovereign authority over the Netherlands were united in the House of Hapsburg, it appeared at the start as if in the Burgundian County (1512) the reins were once more to be drawn tighter. But the dynastic interests of the Hapsburgs ran counter to those of the Empire, and in the final regulation of Charles V, in 1548, the separation from the Empire was continued in favor of sovereign independence. Nevertheless, the fact that those parts legally belonged within the Empire remained for the future unchallenged. The archbishopric of Liège, which was in the Westphalian district and was generally ruled by Bavarian princes, remained as strong a member of the Empire as the other principalities. Not until the period of the Revolutionary Wars, in the years from 1792 to 1794, was the separation of the Belgian Netherlands from Germany completed.

These facts are only too likely to be left out of consideration. Certainly, we do not pine for a return to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Nevertheless, it would be foolish were we to seek to underestimate, in our relations to our Germanic relatives on the other side of the present-day boundaries of the Empire, the strong ideal value of a common past and a one-time common governmental allegiance. What, then, would become of the Belgian people without the tie of historical memories? It was discovered in the recent Balkan Wars that in the case of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs, modern claims to power were based upon, and inspired by, causes lying far in the past. We, for our part, have refrained at all times from attempting to press such historical rights, but when the Frenchman treats it as a matter of course that he should found the boundary claims of his country on ancient Gaul, surely, our nearly nine-hundred-year-old possession may also count for something in our favor.

These memories touch the Belgian but little, it is true. For him, at least in former times, local autonomy has always possessed more value than independence as a state. Subordination to a higher state power, if not all too oppressive, has been generally held by him as quite bearable, if only local independence, traditional customs and freedom were protected, and his commercial prosperity secured. When these possessions were attacked, he protested stubbornly and energetically; but the heroic period of his history, which was also the epoch of splendor of

his cultural development, did not begin until the German imperial power was already on the decline. The independence of his state was a matter of little moment to the Belgian; he found himself in the midst of the great world conflicts, dependent in the main entirely on himself, and like the hero of his ancient popular epic, Reineke Fox, in dealing with the Bear and Wolf, he was forced frequently to maintain himself with cunning and prudence against superior enemies, against France's desire of conquest, and against England's selfish interference. Since he was always able to profit by the rivalry of these two nations, their hundred-year struggle, together with the complete paralysis of the German imperial power, was the basis for the upgrowth and bloom of the quasi-independent neo-Burgundian state, which united for the first time the separate territories of the Netherlands. The present-day Belgian proudly looks back to this state, despite the character stamped upon it by foreign dominance, as the precursor of the modern state. As soon as the condition of impotence had been overcome, both in the East and West, Burgundy's neutral position, it is true, was at an end. In the titanic struggles of the Hapsburgs with the Valois kings, in the presence of the immediate French danger, Burgundy succumbed to the superior powers of attraction of the Hapsburg state. For a small state, which was not in a position to protect itself by its own strength against superior enemies, this connection was by no means the worst imaginable condition, provided the protecting Great Power was not too far distant nor too different in spirit, and provided it did not make its motto the suppression of justifiable individuality and the exploitation for its own purposes. This was not to be feared from the closely related German Empire, in which there was always more than enough readiness to respect individuality. Unfortunately, the union took place at first with the absolutely foreign and uncomprehending, stiff-necked and intolerant World Power represented by the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs. The Southern Netherlands, after brave attempts at independence, let slip, under the pressure of religious disagreement, the final opportunity of the year 1579, and withdrew from the heroic struggle of their northern Protestant brothers. They, therefore, remained bound to the Spanish Empire, and the coldness and rigidity of this moribund organism soon penetrated their inner being. The sombrest period of their history followed the Peace of Westphalia. Belgium, paralyzed by the closing of the Scheldt and the cutting off of her sea trade, was henceforth, to use the expression of Pirenne, "a body without a soul, a cause for dis-

pute in connection with treaties, a barrier, a battlefield." Finally the reversion to the German line of the Hapsburgs (1713) slowly brought to the exhausted country once more peaceful recuperation.

Meanwhile France had taken up again with great energy the expansion toward the Rhine boundary which she had systematically begun as early as the thirteenth century. For two hundred and fifty years she kept the Belgian Netherlands in a state of uncertainty. There lies before me a recent book by the Flemish historian, Josson, which I should like to see widely disseminated.[1] France's aim is pictured vividly on the title-page: *La France* places her foot triumphantly on Belgian soil and plants the blue-red-white tricolor in Brussels. This, indeed, has always been France's aim. Time and again, under the self-delusion of a natural right to the Rhine boundary, has France sought to conquer the country. During the two hundred years following the Peace of Westphalia, Josson counts not less than fifty-two French invasions—an average of one every four years! The intermissions were filled out by an ardent propaganda for French civilization, which prepared the ground for the inevitably following military attack. This aggressive tendency survived every change in the form of government. It manifested itself under Louis XIV, violent, lawless and destructive; only the united strength of affrighted Europe, under England's leadership, was able in the end to check it. Under the feeble rule of Louis XV the lust of conquest was only suppressed, not extinguished; and in the epoch of the Revolutionary Wars and of the Napoleonic Empire it reached its highest imaginable point. Far more dangerously even than a century before was the balance of power on the Continent threatened, and once more England, for her own advantage, sprang into the breach.

British interest in the opposite coast line of Flanders had been very keen even toward the end of the Middle Ages, and had led to the Hundred Years' War with France. Flanders was the centre in the great struggle between Philip II and Elizabeth. Cromwell's policy was governed by opposition to Catholic Spain and to the rival sea power of Holland, and this led to the occupation of Dunkirk (1658). Following the uncertainties of the British policy under the last Stuarts, William III of Orange finally turned back to the historical straight line in recognizing the attacks of France against the Netherlands as

[1] *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), by Josson, Breda, 1913.

the chief danger for England as well as for Holland; through his action the European balance was re-established. This was the grouping for one hundred and fifty years: England allied with the eastern enemies of France, generally with a small personal stake in the Continental wars, for even at that time she preferred to fight her battles with foreign troops. Her gain was on that account all the greater, since frequently at the eleventh hour she left her allies in the lurch, in order to make sure of her booty without loss of time.

While France's attacks were again and again repulsed, steps were taken to prevent any other Great Power from gaining a dangerous hold on the Flanders coast, or even from developing peacefully its maritime strength. When, therefore, Austria's claims to the Spanish inheritance in the Netherlands could not very well be disputed, England took measures not alone for a permanent suppression of Belgium's sea trade, but also crippled the Hapsburg supremacy in a military sense through a provision made in the Boundary Treaty granting Holland the right of occupation of important fortresses on the Belgian southern frontier and on the sea coast. According to the expression of Ed. Descamps, "Belgium was between the Dutch anvil and the English hammer." This was the first attempt to transform this part of the Netherlands, for British purposes, into a species of neutral bulwark against France's desire for expansion. This attempt failed miserably within a generation, for, in 1745, neither the Dutch garrisons nor English assistance were able to protect the country against the attack of French troops. Subsequently the fortresses, which were occupied only as a matter of form by the Dutch, fell to ruins, until finally Joseph II forced their evacuation. All protection was lacking when the French Revolution threw all diplomatic safeguards to the winds. Shortly before, England, as well as Prussia and Holland, had guaranteed to the House of Hapsburg its Belgian possessions "in eternity." England, however, did not enter the world war on account of this paper treaty, but because the danger threatening the Netherlands and the opening up of the Scheldt River imperilled her own military and commercial interests. Despite her active participation with her Continental troops, she was not able to prevent the incorporation of Belgium in the French Republic, nor later in the Napoleonic Empire.

The foreign dominance, continuing for twenty years, which now began for the country, did not fail to leave its imprint on Belgium, although the oppression was deeply resented. The definitive breach with the past of the Middle Ages, the central-

izing tendencies and democratic ideals, French law, civilization and feeling for the state, exercised a deep and lasting influence, especially on the kindred Walloon portion of the population, which explains their later actions.

Outwardly, the violent enmity of France and England continued to control the destiny of Belgium. While thirty fortresses on the southern border were finally dismantled, Napoleon devoted unremitting attention to safeguarding the sea coast and the Scheldt. We are familiar with the gigantic plans which aimed at making Antwerp the strongest fortress and the greatest naval port of the Continent, the most powerful arsenal of the French fleet—"a pistol leveled at the heart of England." We are also familiar with the counter-measures of England: The ill-fated Walcheren Expedition in the summer of 1809, and the siege of Antwerp (1814), which was so brilliantly conducted by Carnot. At this period, when the Emperor's star was already in decline, all peace negotiations came to naught principally owing to England's demand for the abandonment of Belgium, which Napoleon stubbornly refused; nor was it due to chance that during the Hundred Days the last great decision was fought out on these battlefields.

It was now necessary to find a new solution for the security of the Belgian territory, without allowing it to fall into the hands of a Great Power inimical to British interests. England believed that she would best meet both conditions of the problem by advocating the country's union with Holland, under the monarchy of William I of Orange. She insisted all the more emphatically upon Holland's gaining Belgium, since she herself appropriated the valuable Dutch colonies of Ceylon and Cape Colony, and despite this fact reckoned upon the compliance of her one-time rival. The new English creation, however, was destined speedily to show itself as incapable of life. Adequately to protect Belgium against France was far beyond the power of the little Dutch army, which was not even able to garrison the fortresses which had been developed on the southern frontier under Wellington's direction with the so-called French "contributions," and which were intended to transform the country into an immense bulwark against France. The Powers were forced to hold themselves ready for any emergency, and in the secret treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, of November 15, 1818, they apportioned, for the event of war, the occupation of Belgian frontier fortresses between England and Prussia.

The old Boundary Treaty was thus in a sense revived under a new form. But the boundary was that of a state at odds with

itself. The religious and economic differences of the north and the south were irreconcilable. Serious mistakes of the intolerant Dutch Protestant government led to neglect of the favorable opportunity for throwing the balance permanently in favor of the Germanic element and the native Netherland speech throughout the entire state, and drove the Flemish clericals and the Walloon Liberals into each others' arms. The downfall of the Dutch rule came about through the influence of the July Revolution of 1830. The rebels, it is true, would never have been able to maintain themselves by their own strength. France stood behind them. Napoleonic memories had become stronger from year to year; "revenge for Waterloo," reëstablishment of the "natural boundaries"—such was the violent demand. French agents encouraged the Belgian revolt; French volunteers by the thousands filled the ranks; France threatened invasion with her troops; a French prince, Louis Philippe's second son, the Duke of Nemours, was chosen by the Belgian Congress as king, which meant a younger French branch on the throne, as in the Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions; and this amounted to nothing less than a disguised annexation. Only owing to fear of a threatening European war did the Citizen King refuse his consent. But the French army marched twice into Belgium, nevertheless, rescued the defeated revolutionists from the Dutch troops (1831), and forced the surrender of Antwerp (1832). It is plain that under the mask of European politics the Belgian revolt was a new phase of French expansion toward the Rhine; but in keeping with the bourgeois-capitalistic character of the Orleans monarchy, it was carried out with milder methods, according to the principle announced at that time in the *Journal des Débats,* that there is another way of destroying states than by war—namely, by protecting them. Under such circumstances France, it is true, had to be content with a partial success; for the opposition of Europe, which was still united, was too pronounced against a new expansionist move by France.

That Power which had created the kingdom of the United Netherlands as a bulwark against the southwest could, least of all, calmly contemplate its destruction. Wellington had at one time thought of throwing English troops into the reconstructed frontier fortresses, but Lord Palmerston, in unison with the representatives of the three Eastern Great Powers, at the Conference of London, in 1831, preferred another solution. On that occasion, for the first time in the whole course of history, the attempt was made to place the Belgian Netherlands on their

own feet, free of all connection with any other power. Without the creation of some new method of protection, this would of course have been tantamount to surrendering the country to France. For Belgium was entirely incapable of defending her numerous fortresses. The decision was therefore taken at the Conference of London to raze a part of them at once, so that at least the remainder might be kept up. Even of these Talleyrand remarked: "If peace continues, the Belgian fortresses will fall of themselves, since no one will repair them; in case of war we shall take them." The new protection which was to render them superfluous was the neutralization of the country. The dependence on any single state was to be replaced by dependence on the five European Great Powers, in the form of a guarantee of neutrality. To continue our previous figure, the country was no longer to be subjected to the irresistible attraction of any one magnet, but was to be kept under equal influences from all sides, in a state of apparent freedom and independence. This was a *pis aller* for the sake of avoiding, or at least deferring, a settlement by arms with France; for "all prerequisites were at the time lacking for a final settlement of the thousand-year-old War of Succession between the Gauls and the Germans for the ruins of the ancient Middle Kingdom of Lothar, the grandson of Charles the Great." The attempt was watched on all sides with mixed feelings and with but slight confidence; in the Belgian National Congress the neutralization was attacked as prejudicing the independence of the state, as reducing it to the condition of a hermaphrodite; even Wellington in the House of Lords declared that it was absurd to regard this guarantee of the Powers as sufficient protection. Twenty-five years later (June 8, 1855), Lord Palmerston, the real father of this neutrality, and who benevolently characterized Belgium as a "daughter," was not inclined "to attribute great importance to that kind of obligation." After long and difficult negotiations, the Belgian state was thus called into being, and finally recognized by the Dutch King, as the one most concerned, following stubborn opposition and renewed explanations.

What was the reason that this "experiment," in spite of all doubts, succeeded beyond expectations? It was primarily owing to the fact that the system of balance of power on the European continent, which allowed no single state to advance its boundaries into the Belgian territory, was so important from a military point of view. England, which was the strongest World Power at the time, would merely have robbed herself of her insular impregnability by occupying the coast of Flanders, and

she was able to carry out her plan of excluding every Continental Great Power from the country in no more convenient manner than by maintaining Belgium's neutrality. The smoothing of the course of the young state was, moreover, greatly helped by the personality of the first king, the cautious, far-sighted Leopold I, of Coburg, despite the limitations placed upon him by the constitution. In a certain sense, one may even declare that it was owing to him that Belgium immediately succeeded in emerging again from the state of isolation which so little corresponded to her position and past. For the extremely active house of Coburg, which was scattered throughout nearly all the European countries, was, in itself, a little World Power. Leopold I was from the start England's candidate, owing to his tendencies and connections. Accordingly, he continued to strive to preserve the closest touch with the great Sea Power across the Channel, and chiefly by this means did he save Belgium from entire submersion by French influence, at a period when the middle European states were entirely occupied with their own internal affairs and their mutual relations. Under the pressure of the four Great Powers, he even agreed to renew with them the secret treaty once entered into with the King of the Netherlands against France (December 14, 1841), with the result that measures were taken against a possible threatening of the fortresses, Prussia, for example, obtaining the right of entering and garrisoning them. There have been disputes as to the interpretation, the legal and practical significance of this treaty, for which the constitutionally provided approval of the Chambers was never obtained. This, however, is certain, and is admitted by Descamps, who so ardently represents the Belgian point of view, that in its intent it was a breach of the neutrality that had been so recently solemnly announced.[1] The Belgian delegate at that time likewise designated it as "compromising."

France, nevertheless, had no need to be dissatisfied with the course of events. She had gained all that was to be gained without fighting. While the Eastern Powers had made no secret of favoring the rights of the Dutch King, France repeatedly assumed the attitude of the seemingly disinterested and noble rescuer of the new independent Power, thereby arousing long-continuing sympathies, which gave birth to a legend directly counter to the truth. The inordinately praised Belgian constitution was thoroughly French in spirit; the language of the government, of the administration and of the army, trained by French officers, was that of France. "Every endeavor of our

[1] *La neutralité de la Belgique*, 1902, p. 282 ff.

government," the influential leader Rogier, a man of French extraction, ventured to write to Lord Palmerston, "must look to the destruction of the Flemish race, in order to prepare the way for Belgium's union with our great fatherland, France." King Leopold himself, through his marriage with Louise, the daughter of Louis Philippe, protected himself against any future attacks of the Orleans Court; but by so doing he further strengthened the French influence. Nor did he hesitate on one occasion to make use of the threat against the Eastern Powers that he did not fear war with them, as in such an event he would throw himself unreservedly into the arms of France—a course which was plainly irreconcilable with his duties of neutrality.

In France, which was weakened in a military way, a period of quieter and more peaceful propaganda had followed upon the determined attacks made by the Revolution and Bonapartism. He who possessed patience might well, with Guizot, call the new order of affairs "a brilliant solution for France of the Belgian question," or with Talleyrand give expression to the conviction that the future would bring about union, at a cheaper price than seemed possible at the moment. On November 16, 1834, however, *Le National* of Paris said: "The day will come when, in case of a European war, Belgium's neutrality will disappear, at the desire of the Belgian people themselves. Belgium will as a matter of course place herself at France's side."

The year 1840 threatened to involve France in the whirlpool of war, when, as compensation for her diminished prestige in the Orient, she sought to obtain the Rhine boundary, and her statesman, Thiers, let it be understood that France "would not allow herself to be blockaded by neutral powers." At this time the French government had already informed itself as to the defensive strength of Belgium. In case that was not sufficient, it was said, to prevent the passing of an army corps through her territory for the purpose of threatening the French border, France would regretfully see herself forced to send troops into the country for this purpose. The "bourgeois monarch," however, did not in the end venture on this occasion to carry his words to a military conclusion. This lack of a boldly expanding policy was undoubtedly no small factor in his final fall.

As regards the Second Republic, the aged Prince Metternich was of the opinion that from France, shaken as she was, her neighbor need not fear a political war, but only a war of propaganda. The two kinds of warfare were scarcely to be distin-

guished, however, when in the Spring of 1848 hundreds of armed volunteers pressed across the Belgian frontier, in order to stir up the population and to enforce incorporation with France. Only through the cautious measures of the Belgian government, and through the bold act of an engineer who drove the railway train of the revolutionists directly into the midst of Belgian troops, was it possible to stifle the movement by the trifling skirmish known as that of *Risquons-Tout.*

Scarcely was the sky cleared of this and similar clouds when the situation was completely changed by the *coup d'état* of Napoleon III—for the moment to Belgium's advantage. It was the universal belief that the country, to use the expression of King Frederick William IV, "would be the next victim of the crowned bird of prey." In fact, Napoleon III, according to the testimony of Ollivier, considered Belgium "as an artificial creation erected in the path of France's greatness, which had no right to inviolability." If, at the start, despite many signs of unfriendliness and threats, he held himself in restraint, this was in the main due to consideration for England, whose friendship, so long as he did not feel himself firm upon the throne, could not fail to seem more valuable to him than a premature gain of territory. During the Crimean War the Belgian government, in the same manner as Sardinia, properly refused the invitation of England and France to enter the war on their side against Russia, basing its refusal on Belgium's duty as a neutral. But the more fortune smiled upon Napoleon and the more France again raised herself to the position of arbiter of Europe, the more plainly in speeches, newspapers and pamphlets was the French desire for annexation expressed. Leopold I, it was said, was merely "a sentinel of the Holy Alliance against France," "a kind of English prefect," who prevented Belgium "from returning to the motherland"; neutrality was "a chimera and an impossibility"; "France would not feel herself freed from the stain of Waterloo until Waterloo itself should have become French."

To reconcile the annexation of Belgium with the freedom and independence of the various nationalities, which he had found it to his advantage to advocate, was for Napoleon evidently not a difficult task, since in a note found among his secret papers he "proved" that there was no such thing as Belgian neutrality. In his circular of September 16, 1866, he announced: "An irresistible power . . . forces the nations to unite into great bodies and causes states of the second class to disappear. . . . The Imperial French Government . . . has

recognized annexation as demanded by an absolute necessity."

Since the historical opposition of Great Britain had to be reckoned with, Napoleon hoped to seize his prey in union with Prussia. After the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the English Prince Consort Albert remarked (October 6, 1861) that in the same manner Belgium would soon be the price for German unity. As early as 1862, the secret negotiations with Bismarck began, in which the latter, despite apparent agreement with the Emperor's longing for annexation, nevertheless in the end left him in the lurch. Anyone familiar with the course of events can only smile at the statement that Bismarck treacherously suggested the annexation plan to Napoleon, in 1865, in Biarritz. He did not, however, wish to lose the benevolent neutrality of the Emperor before he had made a reality of German union; therefore, on August 20, 1866, he made Benedetti draw up under his own eyes and give to him the proposition for an alliance which was to bind Prussia to assist in France's assault on Belgium and her conquest of Luxemburg. He then proceeded to systematic delay in the matter.

While the Central Powers of Europe continued to grow stronger year by year, without France's receiving the hoped-for compensation, the old cry of "revenge for Waterloo" was changed into the new demand, "revenge for Sadowa"; and Napoleon III, whom his early luck seemed completely to have deserted, saw himself compelled, almost against his will, in order to maintain his throne, to continue the pursuit of the elusive prey, stealthily, by paths which promised to lead him to success without danger of war. Owing to this, Belgium in the succeeding years was repeatedly brought to the verge of destruction. The first route led through Luxemburg. "Once there," said Benedetti, on January 7, 1867, to Ollivier, "we shall be on the road to Brussels; we shall arrive there all the sooner." We are familiar with the plan of purchase which was negotiated with the King of Holland, and also with the masterly skill with which Bismarck succeeded in frustrating it, so that the Emperor was forced to be content with a scant apparent victory—the Prussian evacuation of the federal fortress of Luxemburg and the declaration of the little country's neutrality, under the united guarantee of the Powers. This guarantee, however, according to the construction put upon it by the British government in Parliament, at the most gave to the individual guarantor the right of interference in the case of a breach of the neutrality, but did not impose this as a duty; moreover, it automatically ceased when one of the guarantors violated the neutrality.

The second attempt bore an even more friendly appearance. This was the resumption of former plans to unite Belgium with France in a customs union, by way of preparation for a later political union. Informed by Bismarck concerning Napoleon's intentions, the British government despatched a confidential note to Paris, in which it declared a customs union or a military convention as irreconcilable with Belgium's neutrality.[1] Thereupon the Emperor sought to obtain the end which he tenaciously held in view by a third course, which was to place the world face to face with an accomplished fact. This was the purchase of the railways of the Grand Luxembourg Company by the French Eastern Railway Company, immediately behind which stood the imperial government. This was not conceived as a means merely for enforcing a customs union: the aim, above all, was the military control of these important railways leading to Brussels, Liège and the Dutch boundary. When the Belgian government, determined to defend its independence, through an emergency ordinance made any such disposal of the railways conditional on its approval, thereby voiding the contracts of sale which had already been perfected, for a while the most serious consequences seemed unavoidable. "Belgium opens the gateways into Germany for us," wrote Napoleon to War Minister Niel, on February 19, 1869, "we can advance from there over the lower Rhine to any point desired."

Le Moniteur Diplomatique wrote on March 11: "It is a mistake to believe that the neutrality of Belgium would be irreconcilable with the passing of a French army through her territory. The most authoritative publicists admit that neutral states may permit the passing of the army of a foreign state."

Niel drew up a plan of mobilization for the conquest of Belgium. Despite all this, extreme measures were again avoided and a compromise brought about in no slight degree through the skill of the Belgian Minister, Frère-Orban, and as a result of the political situation, which portended an interference on the part of England.

If one reviews these constant attacks by Napoleon in the sixties, there can be no doubt that the Franco-German war was destined to decide the question of Belgium's existence. For only the fear of an alliance between Prussia and England had hitherto caused Napoleon to hesitate. If the Continental enemy had been disposed of, England would never have checked the

[1] This recalls the "Conventions anglo-belges" of 1906 and 1912, discovered by the German authorities in the archives of the city of Brussels. They would have constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality, according to the opinion of the British government of 1868.

victorious French advance into Belgium. The most clear-sighted observers of the events of those days agreed on this point. "Were Germany defeated," said Bismarck to Moritz Busch—"a catastrophe I pray to God to prevent—the English could be of no assistance to the Belgians; they themselves would be glad to remain safe in their own country." And in the House of Commons, Disraeli referred to the Rhinelands, which had been guaranteed to the Prussian state in 1815, as if to indicate that through their conquest by France, Belgium's independence would be irrevocably lost.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Franco-German war, while the strength of the enemies may have seemed approximately equal, England, outside the scene of action, was able to play the pleasant rôle of casting the decisive vote in favor of preserving Belgium's neutrality. Gladstone's attitude, it is true, betrayed great fear of being drawn into the whirlpool of war. He appeared at first to be satisfied with the declaration of both Powers that Belgian neutrality would be respected until violated by the enemy. When finally Bismarck published Benedetti's treaty offer of 1866, Gladstone took a further step, as the result of aroused public opinion in England, and doubtless also because he feared lest the two enemies, following an indecisive battle, might reach an understanding at Belgium's expense.[1] He denied expressly in the House of Commons, on August 10, England's compelling duty to protect Belgian neutrality, irrespective of existing circumstances, and declared this view, referring to Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, to be "a rigid, impracticable construction of the guarantee." In the interest of England, however, he had on the day before considered it necessary to effect a separate agreement with each of the two belligerent governments to continue for twelve months after the end of the war; according to these agreements, in case of violation of Belgian neutrality by either France or Germany alone, England's military forces were to proceed on Belgium's soil against the offending Power, together with the troops of the other state.[2] Although the revival of the guarantee of 1839 was contemplated at the expiration of the specified period, nevertheless a diminution of its importance was inevitable, since such separate agreements were considered to be necessary in extreme circumstances;

[1] This fear existed among the better classes in England, according to Sir Robert Morier. See his statement of August 9, 1870: "Do they not see that it is Germany that is with its best blood defending the integrity of Belgium, whilst we are making speeches at the Mansion House?" (*Memoirs,* II, 164-167).

[2] Sir Robert Morier (*Memoirs,* II, p. 208) remarks that this excludes any activity of the only valuable factor, viz., Britain's naval forces, and he calls it "monstrously absurd treaty."

important personages, such as the French historian Sorel and the oft-mentioned Belgian Major and later Chief of Staff, General Ducarne, considered the treaty of 1839 as entirely abrogated in consequence.

Without her own mobilization and frontier guard, Belgium, it is true, would have been the scene of bloody battles, despite the treaty. In the French council of war, before the battle of Sedan, it was earnestly debated whether the surrounded army should not force a passage into the *Département du Nord* through Belgian territory; fear of the seventy thousand Belgian troops on the frontier alone caused the plan to be abandoned.

"I can assure you," declared General Chazal, who was Belgian Commander-in-Chief in the military commission of 1871, "that General Wimpffen and the officers of his staff, who came to my camp after the battle of Sedan, made no secret of the fact that this plan would have been carried out if our frontier had not been well guarded and if they had not considered us strong enough to resist every attempt of this kind." [1]

The few thousands who nevertheless fled over the frontier after the capitulation of Sedan were easily disarmed.

As regards the preservation of her neutrality, Belgium owed most to the German victories. This was clearly appreciated in the country, especially in Flemish circles, in which a feeling prevailed as if an evil dream had been dispelled. At this time the Flemish poet, Emanuel Hiels, sang thus:

How shall we, German brothers, our gratitude express
To you, whose brav'ry saved us when sore was our distress
From Frankish bands of robbers, who came with this design:
O'er Meuse and Scheldt to lord it, and o'er the German Rhine?—
How shall we prove we're grateful? Your death heroic saves
Our Flanders, too, from danger, from peril's rushing waves.

King Leopold II, who in the dangers of 1867 had sought to secure support in the east by the marriage of his brother with a Hohenzollern princess, declared, on September 18, 1870, in a letter to Crown Prince Friedrich, that he expected great things of the new German Empire, which he regarded as representing the revival of order and justice in Europe; and in the Crown Prince's reply, written under Bismarck's influence, attention was called to the guarantee which Belgium gained through a strong Germany; the country had nothing to fear either from Germany, he declared, or from France, so long as the former remained strong.

[1] *La neutralité belge*, Woeste, Paris, 1891, p. 58; *La défense de la Belgique*, Brussels, 1907, p. 200 ff.

The history of more than forty years has proved the truth of these words. The period of unceasing danger to her existence was followed by an epoch of peaceful security for Belgium, in which she was able to develop her strength, in the main in close connection with Germany's economic rise. During this long period there seems to be only one moment mentioned in the enemy war literature when Belgium's existence is claimed to have been threatened by Germany. In the spring of 1875, Bismarck, in the warlike state of mind attributed to him in view of France's increasing military strength, is said to have been determined upon the destruction of Belgium and ready to divide the country between Holland and France. As a matter of fact, conditions were quite the reverse. As I have been able to convince myself by documentary proof, France was the state in which plans for such a division as a compensation for Alsace-Lorraine were entertained, not alone in the peace negotiations of 1871: in the following years the French minister repeatedly suggested to Prince Bismarck that such an equivalent might be found in Belgium. The Third Republic, then, by no means abandoned the historically consistent French tendency toward expansion; weakness and isolation imposed merely a temporary restraint upon her. From time to time, however, the old desires gained definite expression. Nor are we dealing here only with the words of irresponsible writers like Victor Hugo, Girardin, Lepelletier, Cassagnac, Jouet, who demanded as compensation for Alsace-Lorraine the advance of the northern boundary to the Rhine and the annexation at least of the Walloon provinces of Belgium, but also with the utterances of generals and ministers of war, like Zurlinden (1887) and Etienne (1906), who have unreservedly proclaimed such ideals.[1]

The more France pushed her preparations for carrying out the *revanche* idea, the more threatening became the danger to Belgium of being again surrounded by the waves of the titanic struggle and perhaps of being drawn into the maelstrom. So long as weakened France, single-handed, faced a powerful, satiated and indisputably peaceful Germany, this danger was small; it grew when in the eighties the Republic acquired increasingly strong support from the Russian Empire. Belief in the efficacy of neutral guarantees has never been very great in the minds of serious politicians and officers of Belgium; on the contrary, the vital needs and the relentlessness of military necessities control-

[1] For details see *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), by Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 650 ff.

ling a Great Power met with an understanding that to-day seems suddenly to have been lost.

"We are convinced," for example, says the military writer, Navez, "that the states guaranteeing our independence fully intend to stand by their obligations. But this intention does not bind them very strongly. Their leaders consider, not without justice, that their primary duty is to their own nation, which has placed its destinies in their hands. The law of self-preservation, the fear of becoming the helpless prey and victim of another Power—this overrides for a state all other considerations: *salus populi suprema lex esto.*"

And the Belgian general, Dejardin, remarks: "In war situations occur the demands of which are more imperative than the most solemn treaties."[1] Again and again, clear-sighted men have emphasized the fact that for her complete security Belgium could depend only on her own strength. During the German-French crisis of 1887 the Belgian system of defense was subjected to new examination and reform.

It had already at that time deteriorated far enough from its original purpose. For a long time nothing had been left of the bulwark created by the Great Powers against France. The numerous fortresses on the southern frontier, which required more than a small mercenary army to hold them, had fallen to ruin at the middle of the century and become useless. Although during the time of the weak and isolated monarchy of Louis Philippe, reliance could be placed, for lack of better help, on the counter-efforts of other Powers, in the fifties there was need of taking measures in keeping with the new conditions resulting from the rise of Napoleon III. At this time the plan of making Antwerp a strongly fortified military camp, which would offer the army in case of foreign invasion a place of refuge and the chance to maintain itself until the coming of outside help (especially from England), was adopted after long preparations and disputes (1859). Compared to the previous neglect of all protection, this was a definite step forward for Belgium; and that was the reason why France, where it was customary to regard the little neighboring state as certain prey, viewed the change with highly unfavorable eyes and attributed it to British or Prussian influence. Napoleon III even resented the razing of the fortresses on the French frontier, and had the audacity to protest to the Belgian minister, Rogier, at the dismantling of some of them, on the ground that in the event of an invasion of the imperial troops becoming necessary they might have served as

[1] *La défense de la Belgique,* by Navez, pp. 285-287.

points of support.[1] The French protests at the strengthening of Antwerp must be viewed in the light of such pretensions. As a matter of fact, the absolute stripping of the extensive southern frontier represented a considerable yielding to France compared with previous times.

In the sixties the first construction of the Antwerp fortifications was undertaken, and after the Franco-German War further improvements were carried out in the light of these experiences, and again extended after 1906 on a still greater scale, in keeping with the development of technical knowledge. This system of defense, it is true, was the merest minimum with which to maintain independence: it was not sufficient in case of a new European conflict to prevent the passage of an enemy army from either direction, an eventuality which was becoming constantly more probable on account of the mutual strengthening of the Franco-German border. The plans of Brialmont, proposed in the period after 1882, had that eventuality in view and were therefore directed towards perfecting the Meuse fortresses. Liège and Namur were intended as main bridgeheads to serve as points of support of the field army and to form, together with Antwerp, the great protective triangle which, it was hoped, would close the country on both sides. At the time of the war alarm of 1887, sanction was obtained for the immediate carrying out of these plans, advocated with especial warmth in an anonymous memoir later attributed to C. Banning, director of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stood very close to the King.

Again we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the outcry raised in the French camp. In the succeeding years a press campaign was carried on systematically against the Belgian throne and government, based on some genuine documents stolen from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, Banning's memorial among them, and on spurious and counterfeited papers. This culminated in the direct accusation against King Leopold II of having violated the obligations of Belgium's neutrality by entering into a military convention with Germany, which was represented as providing in certain eventualities—namely, a threat from the French side—for the entrance and occupation by German troops, in a manner similar to the secret treaty of 1831. The strengthening of the Meuse fortresses, it was claimed, had been in the interest of Germany and Belgium, which, according to an article in the *Figaro,* was now to be regarded merely as a German province. The accusation

[1] *Frère-Orban,* II, by Hymans, pp. 7 and 71.

was false. It was emphatically denied in Belgium by those persons best in a position to know, such as Woeste and Beernaert. In a sitting of the Chamber on February 5, 1890, de Chimay, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Belgian government appreciated its obligations of neutrality: "to assert that it has violated these obligations by treaties, that it has bound itself to one or the other of its neighbors—this is to invent a ridiculous fable."

What is interesting to-day in these happenings is that the existence of a one-sided military convention on Belgium's part, as protection against a threat to her neutrality, was regarded, not alone by French complainants, as an inexcusable breach of her obligations of neutrality, but also by authoritative representatives of the Belgian government as well.[1] The attitude which in 1887 was taken in England as regards the possibility of a German (or French) passage through the Belgian territory is also remarkable. In *The Standard,* the official organ of the government at this time, on February 4, 1887, a sharp distinction was made, in the letter of an unnamed diplomat and in the leading article, between "the merely temporary exercise of the right of way and the permanent illegal occupation of territory." Only in the last case, not in the former "trifling breach of law," it was said, did England's honor and interest call for interference.

The leading article, which is, of course, more important, says: "If one or the other were to say to England, 'All the military approaches to France and Germany have been closed; and only neutral approaches lie open to us. This state of things is not only detrimental, but fatal to our military success, and it has arisen since the Treaty guaranteed the sacredness of the only roads of which we can now avail ourselves. We will, as a fact, respect the independence of Belgium, and we will give you the most solemn and binding guarantees, that at the end of the conflict, Belgium shall be as free and as independent as before.' If Germany (and, of course, our hypothesis applies also to France) were to use this language—though we trust there will be no occasion for it—we cannot doubt what would be the wise and proper course for England to pursue, and what would be the answer of the English government. England does not wish to shirk its true responsibilities. But it would be madness for us to incur or assume responsibilities unnecessarily, when

[1] See "La neutralité belge violée par l'Allemagne," by Juliette Adam, *Nouvelle Revue,* 54 (1888).

to do so would manifestly involve our participation in a tremendous war."

The similarity with the occurrences of 1914 is striking. The German Empire acted at the latter date precisely according to the English suggestion of 1887; but that which was previously a "trifling," and hence bearable breach of law, now became (since England desired a break and welcomed a cause of war that would lend itself to propaganda) a crime, to suffer which would have besmirched England's honor.

An unprejudiced appreciation of the Meuse fortresses shows that far from representing a threat to France, they amounted to a further strengthening of the defense system against Germany. This resulted rather from the geographical conditions than from the intention of the Belgian government, which at that time undoubtedly earnestly desired protection on both sides. For Liège, which was not only stronger but also nearer the outer circle, could not but be regarded as a more efficient check on the short German border line than the weaker Namur, which was situated further inland and commanded only the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse. Moltke declared in 1890 that at least a part of the fortifications on the Meuse seemed to be directed against Germany. In view of her thoroughly peaceful intentions, Germany might, nevertheless, have been satisfied with the new system, if this had offered genuine protection against a French advance. But, according to the opinion of all Belgian and foreign experts, it possessed one great weakness: after deducting the garrison forces necessary for the extensive fortifications, the remaining field army was much too feeble to be able to operate successfully.

"The fortifications on the Meuse," declared Moltke further, "will be a burden to Belgium as long as she cannot mobilize 70,000 additional men, and this she will be able to do only with a system of recruiting which meets the demands of our epoch."

Neither the Crown nor the military leaders in Belgium were lacking during the following years in correct appreciation of the situation.[1] This was especially true of the War Ministry. Laws

[1] From among the numerous Belgian writers, I quote only Navez, *La défense de la Belgique,* p. 288: "After the war the victorious state would say to us: 'Since you have proven incapable of protecting my frontiers by an adequate defense of your own territory, as you were bound by the treaties to do, I shall henceforth take care of the matter myself, and therefore I shall occupy your country. Your carelessness in the question of national defense entitles me to do so.'" A similar standpoint was taken by M. Lebeau, ex-Minister of State, a man who was instrumental in the foundation of the Belgian state, in a speech delivered before the Brussels Chamber on February 16, 1855. He said: "History teaches us what becomes of neutralities which are supposed to be sufficiently guaranteed by what is sometimes termed 'a scrap of paper.'

were constantly proposed which were intended to lead by gentle degrees from the antiquated mercenary system to the universal duty of bearing arms. The clerical legislative majority, by its determined opposition, was guilty of the crime of serious procrastination, and the government was also frequently weak enough to leave its own party in the lurch.

Might not this evil condition easily lead to a secret understanding with a foreign Power, in violation of neutrality, in order to provide in case of necessity the protection clearly recognized as needful but hitherto neglected? Germany did not fail frequently to urge Belgium to strengthen herself defensively. From Bismarck's much-discussed saying in 1887 that Belgium's neutrality would be best protected if she provided herself with a good army, there is a chain of similar opinions down to the statement of Emperor William II, when in 1912 he was able personally to convince himself of the admirable reorganization of the Swiss army: "I wish that I were as well protected on my right flank as I am on my left." These are plain warnings, which give the lie to the long-contemplated plans of conquest that our enemies attribute to us. When at last by the adoption of the military program of 1909, and especially that of 1913, the desired goal seemed nearly attained, it was too late for the events of 1914, since the last military law would not have been fully enforced until three years later.

During the armed peace of the nineties between the Dual Entente and the *Dreibund,* as long as on both sides there was still hesitation in bringing about changes in the actual condition of Europe, and while Russia acted as a restraint on France, Belgium had reason to feel safe to a certain degree; indeed, so strong was this feeling that a remarkable capitalistic and imperialistic development took place at that very time in the little state.

The man who for his own advantage guided the country into these new paths was its King, Leopold II. He united in himself the business sense of the Coburgs and Orleans in an uncanny manner—indeed, in the end, this degenerated almost into

Undoubtedly, owing to the power of public opinion, such neutralities exert in our present day a much greater force than in former times. However, we should not commit the error of believing that no duties are connected with this neutrality, or can grow out of it. We must be able to safeguard ourselves, at least to a certain degree; and if ever we were to neglect such an important interest and forget so great a duty, we should thereby expose ourselves to the eventuality of the other side declaring to us what the First Consul of the French Republic declared to the Republic of Venice: 'If you had known how to protect yourselves against a *coup de main,* if you had known that the enemy could so easily gain entrance to you and that he was on the point of occupying a strategic position detrimental to my army, I would not have entered your territory.'" See also *Frère-Orban,* II, by Hymans, p. 27 ff.

monomania. He was through and through a ruler of the great merchant type, with a world-embracing outlook, a cool, calculating imagination and ruthless determination, of absolutely worldly disposition—in the one-sided development of his character a peculiarly striking figure, who in many respects gave to Belgium her modern stamp. It is sufficient at this point merely to recall the manner in which, in the face of British opposition but with Bismarck's benevolent encouragement, he developed the Congo State in the eighties as his exclusive, personal creation; how, since 1890, already involving the state in his undertakings, he carried through that extreme capitalistic system which combined the most successful financial exploitation with the darkest social defects; how the desire for Belgium's greatness was strangely mixed in him with the most arrant selfishness, so that finally his own people were forced to take the Congo from him as a Belgian colony, as the result of painful and costly negotiations. The final result is of importance: The Belgium of 1908, who ruled over an immense colonial empire eighty times as large as herself, was no longer that little state which had once been created as a European bulwark against France and which later, in the system of the balance of power, with difficulty maintained its place in the scale. Whatever her writers on constitutional law may say in theoretical justification of her colonial acquisitions, the fact remains that the basis of the neutrality treaty of 1839 had been thereby seriously disturbed.

Permanently guaranteed neutrality demands in return a self-denying regard for the prescribed limitations. This small state, however, without a merchant fleet or vessels of war, had entered the field of broad world politics. Able to maintain herself only by the guarantee of her creators, not by her own strength, she had adopted in Africa the imperialistic policy of a Great Power, in the last analysis at the expense of others. Her neutrality, which was always a delicate and fragile thing, through the connection with the vast African empire, was subjected to a test of strength to which, in the long run, it was scarcely likely to prove equal. The position is not tenable that this colonial empire, together with the entire Basin of the Congo, has been neutralized since the Berlin Act of 1885, that only peaceful cultural tasks here came into question, and that for the settlement of differences of opinion there were other than warlike means. For a colonial policy always remains a policy of force, and the policy in the Congo State was of this nature in an especially marked degree, despite the humanitarian mantle which was at first so readily used as a disguise. In view of the primitive

stage of civilization in the colonies, misunderstandings and clashes were inevitable, as experience had already amply taught under the rule of Leopold II. Even if, as was of course possible, they did not lead to armed conflict, there nevertheless resulted manifold questions of common interest, of dependence and dispute which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon the neutral position of the motherland. Did not France's right of preëmption, guaranteed by the separate treaties of 1884, 1894 and 1908, contain the germ of favoritism which, as the Franco-German negotiations of 1911 have shown, might become a source of serious inconvenience for Belgium? In addition to Portugal, England for the first time had become the immediate and deeply interested African neighbor of the Belgian territory (*Katanga*), a neighbor upon whose favor or disfavor the development of the Congo colony depended to an important degree. It is not yet possible to determine to what extent the outburst of indignation in England over the Congo atrocities, which in its essence was no doubt sincere, was made use of by the British government, which took a hand in the affair and long deferred the recognition of the Belgian colony, as a means of political pressure to support counter-demands in Europe. That in Belgium serious fears were entertained along this line is undoubtedly shown by an article in the influential clerical publication, *Bien Publique,* of November 20, 1907, which characterized the British consular agents who were gathering material in the Congo State for new accusations as heralds of a future annexation, and declared that the independence of Belgium herself might be endangered through such occurrences. The Brussels Socialist, C. Huysmans, was not so far wrong when he declared at the Socialist Congress in Nuremberg in 1908: "Belgium has not annexed the Congo State; it is the Congo State which is annexing Belgium. Belgium has become involved in the Anglo-German dispute, and our happy neutrality has thereby been seriously impaired." [1]

Finally the far-reaching concessions for exploitation of the country and for railroads in the interior of the Congo colony, which Leopold II had granted as late as 1906 to English, French

[1] A similar opinion was uttered immediately before the war by the Belgian deputy, de Brouckère (*Neue Zeit,* July 31, 1914): "The annexation of the Congo State was decided on and it was believed that we would rule the colony. To-day, it is recognized that the colony is ruling us. We have entered the circle of the World Powers without expanding our little territory, and the great ones will not let go of us again. . . . To-morrow perhaps England, who considers military duty a burden only within her own boundaries, will again call on us to observe our obligations. What will the Government do? Will our big money interests permit the Government to offer a resistance which sooner or later must lead to our renunciation of the Congo?"

and American syndicates, involved manifestations of favoritism which were apt, in certain circumstances, to involve the governments in question. On the other hand, Belgian capitalism, which had waxed fat on the temporarily unheard-of Congo earnings, had long since expanded beyond the boundaries of the state, and everywhere, in European foreign countries, had built railroads and street railways, exploited mines and called numberless other commercial undertakings into being, without, in time, taking precautionary measures to insure the financial stability of the great banks.

A capitalistic expansion of this kind, of course, could not be forbidden to the business men of a neutral state. Nevertheless, the vast scope of these international activities, which King Leopold continued to encourage by example and precept, were not without their serious aspects. They created a large number of connections and opportunities for disputes, and in view of the interlocking of modern economic and political affairs, this might easily lead the Belgian state into an attitude of partiality among the groups of Great Powers. In truth, Belgian capital was more and more used in ways advantageous to France and members of the Triple Entente: her investments, for example, in Russia, exceeded by nearly a half-billion francs those in other countries, and the number of joint-stock undertakings preponderatingly financed in Belgium was exceeded only by those capitalized in France.[1] This fact could scarcely fail to be of influence on the policy of the state as a whole in critical times, and was apt to lead to an internal jeopardizing of its neutrality, which, as the Belgian statesman, Frère-Orban, once declared "demands a certain balance of influence in the field of material affairs."

Belgium's neutrality in Europe had for a long time found its strongest support in England. Not, however, that this state regarded the sanctity of treaties with especially great respect! This pretence, which the article in *The Times* of March 8, 1915, frankly abandoned, was industriously made use of in England only during the first months of the war for purposes of propaganda. Previously such pretenses had by no means always been regarded as necessary; on neither side of the Channel was it considered possible to disguise the fact that England's attitude toward Belgium was determined not by noble, unselfish feelings, but by pure self-interest. In a speech recently rescued from oblivion by A. Schulte, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs,

[1] See *Annuaire de la Vie belge á l'ètranger*, 1912, p. 213 ff. Belgian capital invested in Russia is given as amounting to 441,000,000 francs, and the Belgian companies in France are said to number 172, as against 112 in Russia and 50 in Germany.

de Favereau, declared in the Senate, on December 8, 1909, in speaking of the guarantor Powers in general:

"You see, gentlemen, that if one weighs the value of this guarantee, one becomes convinced that it was not dictated by magnanimous feelings toward Belgium, but by considerations which affect the Powers personally. And one comes to the conclusion that their intervention in our favor, when the moment comes, will be controlled by the demands of their own interests."

An article in *The Times* of January 29, 1906, had raised this question with special reference to England. Voices, however, were to be heard which spoke in quite a different key. In his strange book, "The Day of the Anglo-Saxon" (1912), which is dedicated to Field Marshal Lord Roberts, the American Anglo-Saxon, Homer Lea, declares (p. 226) English opposition to the violation of neutral territory to be wrong, "for the British Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is only a means of evading responsibility and shifting it upon those nations which delude themselves with the belief that such declarations are inviolable; whereas no nation has violated neutral territory and denied their obligations more frequently than the Saxon." Let us read, in addition, how the Englishman, Major Stewart Murray, speaks in his essay, "The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons" (p. 40), of Britain's breach of neutrality against Denmark in the year 1807, which George Canning also sought to justify on the ground of necessity: "Nothing has ever been done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the agreements of so-called international law; we considered it advisable and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it; therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of having done so? No, certainly not; we are proud of it—for people of this country to talk of the sanctity of international law is nothing but hypocrisy or ignorance."

As far as the Belgian state is concerned, it is immaterial whether England was impelled to protect its neutrality through respect for the treaty or through selfish interests. But an effective protection was to be expected only as long as in Europe's discordant camps Great Britain maintained an impartial, isolated position, enabling her to prevent either side from a violation of Belgian neutrality, for fear of arousing her enmity. As soon as she made an end of her isolation and took sides, this barrier was removed, for if all the guarantor Powers fell to fighting among themselves, whose interference was then to be feared? It may, therefore, be stated that the decision as to Belgium's neutrality was reached ten years before the entrance of the

German troops, at the time when England, through her treaty with France (1904), established connection with the Dual Alliance and soon thereafter managed to overcome her natural aversion to Russia. The neutrality of Belgium in effect ceased to exist when it was realized that in a future world war the British power would be thrown to the side of France; when the conference of Algeciras (1906) proclaimed the new alignment of states to the whole world, and plans were hinted at regarding a military coöperation of England and France, and the landing of a British expeditionary force; when a saying of Lord Kitchener was going the rounds: "The boundary of the British Empire in Europe is not the English Channel, but the line of the Meuse"; and when Lord Roberts let it be known that in August, 1911, the fleet and the army had stood ready to interfere in Flanders. It began to be realized in Belgium that the war of the future would not halt at the boundary of the country, like that of 1870. "Will the new policy which England appears to have adopted," inquired Favereau, in the above-mentioned speech in the Senate in support of the army bill of 1909, "allow her to play in future the benevolent rôle the benefits of which we have hitherto enjoyed? Will she not, in the moment of danger, find herself bound by ties which, as regards one of the combatants, will deprive her of that complete independence that is essential to her activity in our behalf?" And he suggested the disquieting possibility of a permanent occupation of Antwerp by Great Britain. The army bill of 1913 was even officially based on the consideration that England had abandoned her position of isolation and joined one of the two groups of Powers; henceforth, it was claimed, she would no longer be in a position, as in the past, to protect Belgian neutrality.[1]

It is thus all the more to be lamented that Belgium still clung to the British power. "They would protect us even against our will," says the Brussels senator, Hanrez, in a speech on September 2, 1908. This led, as many signs indicated, but as could not be proved until the Anglo-Belgian Conventions of 1906 and 1912 were found, to a secret abandonment of the obligatory impartiality, to an important military surrender to the Western Powers, and to a premature decision regarding action in a future war. The warning of the Belgian minister, Woeste, was disregarded: "For us to become the ally of one of our neighbors, to permit ourselves to be involved in an adventure as its follower

[1] In this connection see the remarkable pamphlet of the French socialist, Francis Delaisi, *La guerre qui vient*, Paris, 1911, p. 25. (American edition, *The Future War*, Boston, 1915, p. 56.)

—this would be to transform Belgium into a battlefield, and to bring down upon us the fate of the conquered, and perhaps condemn us to be devoured by the victor."

The Belgian government is not the only one to bear the blame for thus taking sides in a manner which its position forbade; it was fully supported in this step by the influential classes of the country. Although many an individual German may have had cause to appreciate friendly assistance, and although on occasion there may have been an official exchange of courtesies, nevertheless the latest attempts at Belgian justification picturing the relationship as quite undisturbed until the war upset things in an entirely unexpected manner, give an absolutely false impression. Undoubtedly, the commercial and industrial superiority of Germany, especially as manifested since the nineties, and her great abundance of strength were not precisely pleasant for a weaker neighbor; but in the presence of the envy, distrust and hatred thereby created, it was far too often forgotten in Belgium to what extent the country was by nature dependent on this *hinterland,* which in the commercial treaties of 1892 and 1905 had made much appreciated concessions to Belgium. It was likewise forgotten that among the purchasers of Belgian export goods Germany stood first on the list, with the yearly expenditure of a billion francs, and that Antwerp had grown to be one of the most important harbors in the world solely through its German connections, without which it would be a city of the dead. Instead of appreciating these and further facts, the Belgians let themselves be more and more deceived by an inimical press campaign, which claimed to see in every German merchant the pioneer, or even the spy, of the Prussian military invasion. In the end the Belgians threw themselves so unreservedly into France's arms, "the true fatherland," [1] that in 1913 a Walloon official of calm judgment recognized the danger for Belgium, and in a pamphlet that is well worth reading sought to give his compatriots a clear understanding of German methods and ambitions—without finding great response, it is true. [2]

On the French side, of course, no stone was left unturned since the beginning of our century to push the "peaceful penetration" which the Third Republic had set itself as its immediate goal. In this field it enjoyed great advantage over the German competitor, through the adoption of the French language by the Walloons, while the separation of High and Low German had

[1] See *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 677.

[2] *Belgique et l'Allemagne,* published under the pseudonym "Integer," 1913.

made the German-speaking part of the Netherlands an isolated linguistic island. There was in France full appreciation of the powerful weapon which the language represented; it was the medium of an ancient, refined, fascinating *Kultur,* which for hundreds of years had held the ruling classes of the Belgian people captivated. "We desire to annex the free intelligence," announced the French consul, Crozier, in Antwerp, in 1909, and on the Flemish side at least it was well understood what this meant. The statement of the former burgomaster of Brussels, Karel Buls, sounds like the commentary to this: "The Belgians who assist in the annexation of their brains are paving the way for the annexation of their native soil."

Only in this connection can the tremendous expenditure be understood which government and society in France, year in, year out, devoted to propaganda in Belgium. Of primary consideration was the press, for which, in addition to a flood of honors and "ribbons," a secret fund of 200,000 francs was provided for in the yearly budget of the Republic. It was, therefore, not surprising that the hearts and pockets of the Belgian editors opened in sympathy to the "great nation." Another easy method of winning their adherence was to employ them as paid reporters for French newspapers, whereby they were in a measure reconciled to the unpleasant competition of Parisian newspapers, which were sold in enormous quantities in the streets of Belgium. The convenience of the paper-shears (which played no part in the case of German newspapers, owing to linguistic reasons) finally set the seal on this Franco-Belgian press alliance. It is an old story, the manner in which *L'Indépendance Belge,* according to the saying, was for many years only *La Dépendance Française.* During the first Morocco crisis the semi-official *Journal de Bruxelles* itself had to admit, on August 7, 1906, that a portion of the Belgian press repeated in a parrotlike manner every accusation made on the French or English side. During the second Morocco crisis of 1911 these occurrences were repeated in an even more flagrant manner. Evidently on this occasion anxiety as to the fate of the Belgian Congo was also a factor. Although it was finally established in the press that the proposal to use this territory as a compensation had emanated from France, but had been rejected by Germany, distrust of Germany nevertheless continued to undermine public confidence. The intention of economic conquest, at least, was ascribed to the Empire, and it sounded like a voice in the wilderness when occasionally the fact was justly appre-

ciated that in the Morocco Treaty, Germany, by safeguarding international commercial interests, had benefited Belgium also.[1]

The expression, the "Moroccanization" of Belgium, which was coined at that time, was not exactly a compliment to the independence of the little state. As a matter of fact, the wave of French influence was not limited to the press alone. The next important field was that of the schools. In contrast to the few German schools in Belgium, there were a large number of institutions directly supported by France, which in their textbooks proclaimed the fact that the "Rhine throughout the whole of its course" is the natural boundary of France. In addition, there was theatrical propaganda in its various forms—performances by the *Comédie Française* (at the instigation of the French government), variety theatres, music halls, moving pictures. Furthermore, there were lecture courses in the *Université des Annales,* which was founded in Brussels in 1909 on the French model; the united propaganda of the *Associations pour la vulgarisation de la langue française,* which was connected with the *Alliance Française;* the congresses which brought together all those of Gallic sympathies at Liège (1905), Brussels (1910) and Mons (1911); numberless visits from one side to the other, and fraternization feasts, especially at the international exhibitions of Brussels (1910) and Ghent (1913). French participation in the latter was undisguisedly admitted by the Minister of Commerce, David, in the Parisian Chamber of Deputies, as being a demonstration against the plan of founding a Flemish university; Belgian protests, which were published against such an interference, complained that France was showing clearly that she already considered Belgium as conquered territory.

In view of all this, it is not without its tragi-comic side to notice how these Walloons and the *Franskiljons,* forgetting their German extraction, outdid each other in their addresses of welcome, their grateful homage to French power, civilization and language, while the Parisian guests, accepting the tributes with offhanded politeness, met these Belgian *parvenus* with an air of cool scorn, expressive of their secret disgust. If the burgomaster of the metropolis, Max, imagined that he was making an especially happy remark in calling "the Brussels boulevards a continuation of those at Paris," the name "Brussels" indicated in French mouths merely a "district" of Paris, the whole of Belgium an "appendage," a "corner" of France. "Ideas, land, inhabitants, everything is miserable in Belgium,"

[1] *Belgique et l'Allemagne,* p. 59.

was the opinion of Taine; and Beaudelaire held the people to be "the most stupid in the world." When Octave Mirbeau poured the vials of his contemptuous and derisive wit over the Belgians, it was too much even for his victims, despite their long-suffering tolerance of all that proceeded from the south-western quarter of the Continent.

The propaganda extended also to the military field. In France the Dual Alliance and the *Entente* had greatly increased the army's confidence in its strength. In Belgium this feeling was given most emphatic expression by the defiant French monuments which were erected in Waterloo (1904), Antwerp (1905), Fleurus (1906) and finally even in Jemappes (1911), where now at the top of an obelisk a golden Gallic cock recalls the Austrian defeat of 1792, which led to the annexation of Belgium by the First Republic. "Another monument in honor of France," said one of the Belgian newspapers at the time; "if things continue in this fashion, in the end we shall have to present Belgium to them in gratitude for the monuments." The Walloon author, Dumont-Wilden, together with his friend, Léon Souguenet, were present at the unveiling ceremony. They had just returned from a trip through Alsace-Lorraine, the impressions of which they described in a book, "The Victory of the Conquered" (1912), in the most anti-German manner, employing the vocabulary that has since become so popular of "Attila," "barbarians," "brutality," etc.

The sight of German troops in the two provinces had awakened in their minds only one thought, "The enemy! Belgium's enemy also!" They were now taking delight in the great demonstration at Jemappes. "Here likewise in Belgium a new feeling had been born; the eyes of the people were opened to the danger from the East, and it was not an idle act devoid of courage when ten thousand coal miners began to sing the Marseillaise." They realized that "danger threatened exclusively from the East, and it occasioned a feeling of relief among the Belgians to know that in the worst event they would not have to fight against the French Republic, the liberator of Belgium and of the Scheldt."

When in 1912 funds were to be gathered for increasing the French air fleet, Belgium contributed by entertainments given to this end.

It looked as if a large portion of the Belgian population, chiefly the politically most influential part, were coming to share more and more the views of the monthly magazine, *Les Marches de L'Est,* which had been started in Paris in 1908, and accord-

ing to which Belgium was reckoned as part of the Eastern provinces of France, together with Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine and French Switzerland. The Belgian newspaper, *Réveil Wallon,* founded in 1907, already developed a regular program for Belgium's union with France, first of all in customs, post, mutual recognition of citizenship, etc., and closed with the words: "We are enemies of Prussia, and all our sympathies are with good and kind France, whose misfortune has only increased our love. We remain thoroughly Walloon when we defend French civilization." In view of such feelings, the deafening cries of *"Vive la France!"* even in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, may be understood, when in the sitting of February 6, 1913, a clerical member ventured to describe the French election laws as rotten. At this period the Walloon state official who has already been mentioned, wrote: "As things are now progressing with us, we are steering automatically in piping times of peace directly toward French annexation." [1]

Viewing all this together, one is justified in doubting whether this was an attitude suitable to the inhabitants of a neutralized state. In view of so one-sided an attitude, is it surprising from a social, economic, political and military standpoint if in Germany there grew up a deep distrust of the fairness of her "neutral" neighbor?

The Flemish were not partners in these acts, at least not such as were conscious of their racial bonds and who had not, like Maeterlinck and Verhaeren, long before the war, taken up their position in the Gallic camp. All who sympathized with the Flemish movement had, it is true, carefully avoided all connection with Germany, but they had nevertheless been forced constantly to repel the attacks of the French propagandists and their Belgian adherents. The movement was on the whole purely Belgian, yet it doubtless deserves the most whole-hearted sympathy, and in its invisible connections with the political parties, the most thorough study by Germans; but at this point it claims attention only in its ultimate aims, as affecting the nature of the Belgian state. Whoever regards this as merely a linguistic and literary movement is familiar only with its beginnings in the forties and fifties of the last century. The language was merely the most obvious expression of national individuality. To bring the language again into repute after long suppression and obscurity, to win for it a favorable position in the general cultural development—this was the chief object. To attain this end was possible only by overcoming the dominance of the

[1] *Belgique et l'Allemagne,* p. 134.

Gallic party and by giving to the Belgian state, according to the relative strength of its races, a predominantly German character, or at least one of racial equality. The continuing democratization of political life, resulting from the extension of the franchise and the proportional system, caused this phase of the movement to be constantly more strongly emphasized, and brought about from the early seventies in the legal, administrative and military fields notable legislative successes looking toward equality. In the educational field, however, the struggle continued with varying successes and defeats up to recent times; if, as regards the public and secondary schools, some results at least were achieved, although with slight guarantee of permanence, this was doomed to remain miserable patch-work unless the Flemish population were enabled to secure national university education. For in the last analysis everything depended on the attitude of the upper classes. As long as advanced education was to be obtained only with a French stamp and was valued only from that point of view, and such education alone guaranteed vocational advance; as long as the higher official positions were almost exclusively open to Walloons and *Franskiljons,* all legal successes were deceptive, for there was an absolute lack of impartial administration of the laws. In the main, although with certain enforced concessions, the ruling class stood upon the principle of government which had once been laid down by Rogier:

"An effective administration demands a single recognized language. For Belgium this can only be French, and to attain the desired end it is necessary that all positions in the civil and military administration of the country be intrusted to Walloons or men from Luxemburg; in this manner the Flemish will temporarily be deprived of the advantages appertaining to these positions and thereby be forced to learn French. The Germanic element in Belgium will thus gradually be eliminated."

To overturn this principle was the real significance of the demand for a Flemish metamorphosis of the University of Ghent; therein lies the decisive importance which this institution gained in the struggle of nationalities during recent years. The nearer success seemed along this line, the more violent became the counter-efforts. On the Walloon side this was taken to indicate the end of their supremacy, and if this result was really unavoidable, at least there was no desire to be tyrannized over by the Flemish in future as the Walloons themselves had tyrannized over the Flemish up to that time. If they could no longer be the ruling party in this somewhat stormy union, in which serious frays

were not infrequent, then preferably separation from bed and board. The idea of administrative separation along Walloon-Flemish lines, which had been proclaimed for the first time in 1897 and originally opposed as a dangerous vagary, gained strength perceptibly after the cry of Emile Dupont in the Senate sitting of March 9, 1910, "Long live administrative separation!"

When the general elections of 1912 again brought disappointment to the extreme Radicals and left them without the means of breaking the power of the clerical majority, who for over a quarter of a century had been at the helm, the Liberal Walloons declared in favor of the principle of a separation at the Congress of Liège, on July 7, 1912, thus hoping to obtain supremacy at least in their part of the country. Shortly thereafter in the Hainault provincial council, the proposer of the reform, André, declared that Belgium was suffering from Jacobin centralization. She would have to return to local autonomy.[1] Reference was made to the relation of the German Federal States to each other; there was discussed a sort of imperial parliament, perhaps after the model of the Austro-Hungarian "delegations," standing over the two districts with Brussels as neutral territory between them.[2] While Hainault and Liège had already been won over to the idea, the clerical provinces of Namur and Luxemburg opposed it for fear of a liberal majority in the future "Wallonia." The Flemish members maintained an attitude of expectant disapproval, but at the end they were not entirely irreconcilable. In both camps there were, it is true, warning voices, which characterized separation in administration as "a disastrous rending of the national unity." Nevertheless, the idea seemed to gain support and Belgium to be on the verge of dissolution. For, in the light of the whole situation, there cannot be the slightest doubt that a Wallonia with an administration of her own was merely a preparation for French annexation. Did not Jules Desirée, one of the chief protagonists of the idea, describe Wallonia as "a portion of reconstructed France," and did not the newspaper, *Flandre Libérale,* say, in its issue of June 26, 1912: "An enormous number of Walloons would at the present moment be delighted to be united to France. One needs only to have friends and relatives in Wallonia to be absolutely convinced of this." But in such a case would the little Flemish nation, overrun by French partisans, have been able to maintain its independence?

[1] *Belgique et l'Allemagne,* p. 133: The author maintains that German decentralization, which serves to multiply intellectual and artistic centres within the Empire, corresponds better with our traditions than the centralization of the French capital. See also *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 835.

[2] See *Pour la séparation,* Jennissen, 1911.

The future seemed to hold the most serious internal disturbances for Belgium, when suddenly the World War changed all this and drove the quarrelling factions temporarily together. But, looking beyond the natural bitterness and grief of the present, the Flemish should realize the importance of this hour of destiny which has rung for them. For those who wish to hear, the voices of all who hope for a victory of the Western Powers are clearly revealing a secret joy: "This is the end of the Flemish movement!" In the *Petit Journal* of Paris, on December 21, 1914, Gérard Harry, the friend of the Walloons, declared that the Flemish had now realized the uselessness of their dialect, that it was without value, like a vitiated coin, and that they would henceforth be advocates of the supremacy of the French language in Belgium. Will they be ready for suicide in this manner, or will they remember one of the co-founders of their national movement, the poet Hendrik Conscience, who called them "the advance guard of the German race"? Will they take to heart the words of one of their noblest, the historian Léon Vanderkindere, who, in comparing France with Germany, exclaimed: "Here a dying civilization, yonder a civilization full of strength and glory! Are we then condemned always to follow France and to turn our back upon the future? The Flemish population is also Germanic. Will not this poor little branch, which has been separated so long from the parent stem, at last begin to flourish anew?"

However the final decision of the Flemish may turn, the German Empire should not allow itself to be deceived in the slightest degree by a temporarily unfriendly attitude; for it is greatly to its own interest, by carefully considering racial peculiarities and religious leanings, to maintain and strengthen a Germanic bulwark against the ever-renewed Gallic attacks.

What guarantee in the world conflagration of 1914 could this inwardly disrupted state, with its insufficient army, its one-sided government, and the overwhelming French sentiment of the strategically more important southern part of the country, offer to the German Empire? During recent years talk of the coming war had constantly become more frequent and disturbing. The writings of high-placed, mostly French officers, which sought to depict its probable course, were numerous. All those which have come under my observation have assumed, as a matter of course, that Belgium would be drawn into the struggle, fighting always on the side of France, never on that of Germany. As a matter of fact, on both sides of the border strategic preparations for war had for years been under way. It is a one-

sided, partial view in the current military writings of our enemies, and occasionally also in those of neutral foreign countries, to attribute an exclusively offensive character to the German preparations, and to them alone.[1] The camp at Elsenborn had been for a long time the object of continual anxiety in Belgium, just as truly as the double-tracking of the few German railway lines leading to the Belgian border. The aim of these lines was undoubtedly mainly strategic, and the German General Staff would have neglected its duty if it had not taken all possibilities into consideration. Why defensive considerations, such as the need of quickly throwing an army to the border against a Franco-English thrust, should have played a decisive rôle in this connection must be seen by every one except such as desire at any price to find proof of a long-prepared and deliberate German conquest of Belgium. How untenable such one-sided accusations are cannot be better shown than by the printed words of a Walloon in 1913.

The German invasion, he says, is regarded "as certain, as inevitable, without any one apparently pausing to consider how insulting this matter-of-fact assumption is for Germany and her leaders. As regards the contrary case, namely a French invasion, it is hardly mentioned except as a matter of form. The construction of the railway lines is spiritedly discussed, without the question being asked what part, in case of a conflict, would be played by the French railway company whose line runs to the fortress of Namur. However this may be, can one doubt that if the French (and we, of course, in their train) are fully prepared to see the Germans break through into Belgium, the Germans on their side are not less convinced that their possible enemies have the same intention? They assert—and not without reason—that the French are already familiar with the way. If the Eiffel railway lines, as they declare, possess a strategic character, it is due to the above fact. And if the French penetrate from one side, will not the Germans enter from the other?" [2]

In this connection we must hold before our mind's eye the map of the south and west. Corresponding to the encampment of Elsenborn (47 km. from Liège), there were on the French border: Givet (35 km. from Namur); Maubeuge (67 km. from the capital city of Brussels), for which during the last ten years expenditures had been made and which, as was commonly known, contained vast stores of English munitions;[3] Lille (65

[1] See *America and the World War*, Theodore Roosevelt, 1915, p. 21.
[2] See *Belgique et l'Allemagne*, p. 28.
[3] See *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 860.

km. from Ghent), and Dunkirk (60 km. from Bruges). In addition, there were the forts of Valenciennes, Hirson, Mézières and Longwy.[1] The network of railways was naturally, in view of the active traffic on some portions, far more highly developed and provided the amplest facilities for the speedy transport of troops. "Within a few hours after the beginning of hostilities," says the Belgian general, Dejardin, "the enemy would be able to occupy Courtrai, Tournai, Ath, Mons, Manage, Charleroi and Namur." [2]

The seacoast facing England was absolutely unprotected. The German public was acquainted with the military arrangements between France and England, and with the intention in case of war immediately to land a strong British expeditionary force. Further evidence of this was given by the indignation of the French and British press at the proposition which was made in the summer of 1910 in the Lower Dutch Chamber for the fortification of Flushing. It appears that English attempts were made to bring Holland also into the military system aimed at Germany. But this state knew better than Belgium how to preserve its neutrality, and sought to provide in Flushing a new and firm support, which, by controlling the southern branch of the Scheldt, might prevent the sending of English troops to Antwerp through Dutch waters. By adopting the proposal, despite the interference of the French government, after some delays and changes, in June, 1913 (just in time), and by immediately putting it into operation, Holland acted not alone for her own interest, but within her rights. Nevertheless, the Entente press and its Belgium imitators accused Holland of favoring Germany, and tried to show by constitutional law that Holland had at least no right to refuse passage to forces which were intended for the preservation of Belgian neutrality.

During this entire dispute the entrance of the troops of the Entente Powers into Belgian territory was treated by French and English military writers as a matter of course. An article of a military attaché in the *Echo de Paris,* copied without comment on January 3, 1912, in the *Indépendance Belge,* estimated the British troops which could be landed in Antwerp, Bruges and Ostende within from eight to ten days to reinforce the Franco-Belgian forces guarding the district around Namur, at 100,000 men; it demanded a definite military understanding between France and Belgium. Arnold White, the writer for the British Admiralty, spoke of the cavalry forces which General

[1] See *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 859; *La défense de la Belgique,* Navez, p. 242 ff.
[2] Cf. *La défense de la Belgique,* Navez, p. 245.

French was to lead against the Rhine.[1] On October 9, 1912, the semi-official newspaper, *La Métropole,* was able to announce:

"The government is aware that even those states among the guarantors of our neutrality upon whom we have hitherto thought we could most firmly count, consider our protection as only relatively sufficient; nor do they conceal this fact, but on the contrary they have let it be known that in case of an international conflict in which Belgium was the battlefield, foreign bodies of troops would enter the country for the purpose of strengthening our insufficient defense."

How could the German General Staff have failed to consider most earnestly the probability of an enemy attack through Belgium? Oceans of ink have been wasted in foreign countries in the effort to twist the unauthoritative strategic schemes of German military writers, in which Belgium figured as a factor, into proof of German longing for conquests. Does not justice at least demand that the far more numerous plans of a like nature on the other side be not entirely disregarded? Reference has already been made to them, and at this point only a few especially characteristic utterances need still be cited. "The best means for the military conquest of a country," writes the French major, Boucher, "is to flood it beforehand in times of peace with one's adherents."[2] That which is here attributed to Germany had been amply provided for, as we know, by France, especially in the Walloon provinces.

The corroboration is scarcely needed which is found in Jennissen: "Reputable Walloons have, in addition to the duty of protecting the country against German imperialism, the further duty of guarding France against a rear attack, the renown and happiness of that country being an object of their desire, as the health of the whole tree is desirable to the individual branch."[3]

"We might," says Major Chenet, "content ourselves with dragging out the conflict in Lorraine, while the main attack was made through Belgium with the united French, English and Belgian forces. This plan seems the wisest if we are really determined to take the offensive. We gain touch in this manner with our allies, and a successful battle brings us within a few days across the Rhine, with the result that the German forces would be driven to a hasty retreat from Lorraine."[4]

Even *La France Militaire,* the organ of the French Gen-

[1] *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie* (843-1913), Josson, pp. 818-819.
[2] *La Belgique à jamais indépendante,* Boucher, 1913, p. 10.
[3] *Pour la séparation,* Jennissen, 1911, p. 16.
[4] *Neutralite belge et invasion allemande.* Lecomte and Lévi, Paris and Brussels, 1914, p. 583.

eral Staff, said on January 14-15, 1906, without any thought of a German violation of Belgian neutrality: "It may well be that for reasons of strategic interest, which are undeniable, a portion of the German army will seek to reach the French northern boundary by passing through Luxemburg, just as it may also be that a French army, for equally strong strategic reasons, may seek to operate on Belgian soil." [1]

We need only mention the fact that such a thrust would have been a risk of the most serious sort for Germany, at a moment when she needed all of her forces without exception for repelling the Franco-Russian attack and when she saw herself threatened by the greatest naval Power in the world. One additional fact must be mentioned: the Krupp works lie scarely one hundred kilometers from the Belgian border, in the poorly guarded industrial territory of the Ruhr district. One need only imagine a similar position for Creusot near the Franco-Belgian border—at Noyon, for example—in order to estimate the danger for Germany.

Protection in this direction was absolutely necessary. When on August 2, 1914, Germany demanded the right of passage through Belgian territory, with the promise of full indemnification, she asked only for that which had been regarded by England as admissible in 1887 and which was not plainly forbidden by Belgian neutrality. In the case of Belgium's benevolent neutrality, the German government was ready to pledge itself in addition "to guarantee after the war the territorial interests and the independence of the kingdom," and "to withdraw from the country immediately following the signing of peace." This offer was even repeated on August 10, after the storming of Liège.

The Belgian government, however, bound as it was by inclination, agreements and completely one-sided military subservience, refused the offer on both occasions. Incited to resistance by England, for her own advantage, and trusting to the supposedly superior strength of the Triple Entente, it preferred war—indeed, it allowed the struggle in part to degenerate into an irregular guerrilla conflict, and thereby brought the miseries of such a war upon the land.

There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate, for which the Belgians have to thank the perverted policy of their ruling classes. As if deceived by an ambiguous, misleading

[1] See *La défense de la Belgique*, Navez, p. 203. It surely is no mere coincidence that at the very same time (the middle of January, 1906) Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had his first interview with the Belgian General Ducarne.

and yet in the end true oracle, they thought (wrongly) to see the danger exclusively in the East; but only the one-sided hostile measures which they took to meet it and which involved them in guilt, transformed into reality that which they had mistakenly feared.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM

PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

SINCE the time of Catharine II, Russia's foreign policy has been based primarily on the fomenting of a spirit of antagonism between Prussia and Austria. Martens, the Russian writer on constitutional law, remarked that Catharine II, with wonderful foresight and political tact, had made use of the irreconcilable difference between Prussia and Austria to enforce her will against both. Although Frederick II and Joseph II recognized the danger of the enormous increase of Russia's power owing to the mutual antagonism of the two countries, they were both prevented, partly by circumstances and partly by their advisers, from directing their own policy in such a manner as to counteract it. For a whole century Russian diplomacy was able to make use first of one and then of the other of these two mutually opposed states to further Russian interests, whether in Polish, Oriental, or other questions, to advance Russia's boundaries constantly further westward, and to secure for her a decisive position as arbiter even in Germany's internal affairs. Both Austria and Prussia, through distrust of each other, and often for the sake of momentary success, have deliberately rendered aid to the Russian power. Russia, however, was all the time most careful to see that neither of the rivals should become too strong, and then, in the consciousness of victory, render impossible the policy that Russia had previously pursued with such success.

It was an axiom of Russian diplomacy to permit German unity neither under Austrian nor Prussian leadership. Nicholas I, who regarded himself as the bulwark of European "legitimacy" and who was never weary of urging Austria and Prussia to suppress with armed force every movement in Western Europe directed against such legitimacy, immediately abandoned this principle when he became frightened by the possibility of German unity and strength. When the Parliament at Frankfort, at the beginning of its activities, seemed to promise the union of Germany, the Czar immediately overcame his hatred of the Febru-

ary Revolution and of the new French government. On August 30, 1848, the Imperial Russian Chancellor, Nesselrode, wrote to Count Kiselev, who had formerly been Russian Minister at the French court, but was then in Paris merely as unofficial representative of Russia, that an absolute solidarity of interest existed between Russia and France, in regard to Germany, for the union of which the Parliament of Frankfort was laboring.

"It is unquestionably true," wrote Count Nesselrode, "that matters for serious consideration will arise, for Russia and France, if these dreams take on any degree of reality, through the creation of a strong united Power at the center of Europe —of a Power which is not provided for by existing treaties, which represents a nation of forty-five million people, which is obedient to only one central authority and which disturbs every balance, at least in the form in which it has previously existed." [1]

The government of Nicholas I showed by this that, in order to keep Germany weak and hence internally disunited, it was willing even to act hand in hand with a government owing its existence to a revolution. That the Czar also was more than ready to renounce his attitude of opposition to the revolution, if to the interest of Russia, may be shown by still another fact, which has become of special, almost pragmatic interest to the policy of Russia as regards Austria down to the present day. Under his government and with his approval, there began again that undermining work of Russia which aimed to incite the Austrian Slavs against their own empire and to corrupt them to this end by rich stipends. The first one to furnish this weapon to Russian diplomacy was Michael Pogodin, professor at the University of Moscow. He was the chief supporter of the official nationalism approved by the Czar, with its trinity of doctrines: autocracy, orthodoxy and Russian nationality. At the beginning of 1840, on his return from a trip to Austria, he rendered a report of his journey to the Minister of Instruction, Count Uvarov. The tenor of his deduction is that Austria resembles an aged tree rotten at the core, which is doomed to destruction by the Slavs who are constantly growing more conscious of their own strength. Austria, he said, feared Russia more than any other Power, because all her own Slavs down to the Adriatic Sea sympathized with Russia and looked to her for their freedom. Just as Fate seemed to offer to Poland under Sigismund III and to Sweden from the time of Gustavus Adolphus down to Charles XII the possibility of creating a world monarchy, so now the time had

[1] *Recueil des Traités et Conventions,* Martens, 15, p. 237.

come for Nicholas I, since two empires, Turkey and Austria, were at the same moment given into his hand. Pogodin did not content himself with foretelling the impending disintegration of Austria; he also indicated the means by which this process might be hastened, through modest expenditures of money and support of the various scholars and declared supporters of Russia, as well as by flooding the Slavic provinces of Austria with Russian literature and orthodox propaganda. And Czar Nicholas I, the unyielding autocrat, the incarnation of legitimacy, was so much pleased with this report of Pogodin that he caused his approval to be expressed to the writer and made him a present of two thousand rubles.

Pogodin's impressions of his travels found the proper soil for their dissemination and philosophic justification in the circles of Slavophiles which were at that time springing up in Moscow. The year 1848 aroused the wildest expectations. "Before the dawn of another day," wrote Ivan Kirêevskij, on May 2, 1848, "Austria will fall to pieces. Slavic states are beginning to crystallize out of her." [1] The greatest satisfaction was aroused in Russia by the Slavic Congress at Prague, and especially by the mass publicly celebrated in Prague according to the orthodox ritual by the ex-priest, Stamatovich, from Neusatz; in his sermon he glorified Peter the Great, Stephen Dusan of Serbia, and the Hussite leader, Zizka. Even before this historical occurrence, Fedor Tjutczev, the celebrated poet of Slavophile circles, whose influence on Alexander II was especially great, had called attention in his memorial, "Russia and the Revolution," to the Hussite traditions of the Czechs and to their importance for the future union of the Austrian Slavs with Russia. The revival of the Hussite religion and its union with orthodoxy would naturally greatly have simplified the problem of the incorporation of the Austrian Slavs with Russia. In his memorial Tjutczev calls Russia and the Revolution the two sole real powers of Europe, although standing in sharpest opposition to each other. It is indicative of his lack of scruple that he nevertheless finds it reconcilable with his strictly conservative and anti-revolutionary principles with regard to the future of Bohemia, to declare in the year 1841, in referring to a statement of Hanka, the Czech scholar and Russian pensioner of unsavory memory: "Bohemia will not be free, independent and absolute master in her own house until the day when Russia again enters into possession of Galicia." [2]

[1] *Life and Works of Pogodin,* Barsukov, 9, p. 262.
[2] Russian Archive, 1873, p. 925 ff.

In view of this attitude of influential Russian circles toward Austria, it is no wonder that Nicholas I regarded himself as Austria's special protector and assumed this rôle likewise toward Prussia. This "protectorate" was oppressive for Austria, especially after the death of Emperor Francis. At his accession to the throne, Emperor Francis Joseph found himself facing a difficult situation in this respect. The Russian assistance in Hungary, which the Czar had in a certain sense given to *himself* in order to prevent the spread of a successful revolution in Poland, had served so to strengthen his pretensions to a protectorate over Austria that a break could not be avoided. Nicholas now considered that the moment had come to realize Russia's desires in the Orient, regardless of Austria. He was so sure of himself that he did not even consider it necessary to inform the Austrian Court, and to inquire whether, without serious injury to its vital interests, it could render the assistance which the Czar held to be a matter of course. Austria herself was expected to assist in the establishment of Russian supremacy in the Danube principalities, in the Balkans and on the Bosphorus. The breach, therefore, was inevitable. The Crimean War showed for the first time what power Austria and Prussia possess as against the rest of Europe, and what influence the two may exercise on the configuration of Europe if they act together. But the time had not yet come to give to this union a permanent and settled character. The old differences seemed likely to be settled by an appeal to arms, and this appeal was made. Russia's hatred of Austria rendered this manner of settlement possible; Bismarck's genius, however, looking far ahead, by the manner in which he settled the conflict, laid the foundation for the later alliance and for the present loyal brotherhood in arms between Prussia-Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The Crimean War was, therefore, the cause of Russia's abandoning her system of balance between Prussia and Austria and of her violent hostility towards Austria. The result of the war did not permit Russia, it is true, to take immediate vengeance on Austria; but she made no secret of her enmity. Only the pressing need for the solution of a number of great problems, such as the emancipation of the serfs, diverted her attention from Austria. In addition, there was the Polish rebellion of 1863, which served in a measure to cool the sympathies of the other Slavs for Russia. Characteristic, however, of the real aims of the Russian policy is the well-known memorial of 1864, *La Politique du Présent,* which was written probably for Alexander II, at the command of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov.

Peace must be preserved, it was argued, because Russia was in need of it in order, through the development of her commerce, her system of communication and her military strength, to become better prepared for the solution of her future problems. The Slavic peoples of Austria were urged to remain quiet until they had acquired the power to disrupt the Austrian state, and the same admonition was given to the Slavs of Turkey. The danger of the Austrian Slavs becoming Germanized was represented as passed. In 1858 the so-called Slavic Charity Committee had been founded in Moscow under Imperial auspices, and its activities soon spread to the Austrian territories. This organization had been made directly dependent on the so-called Asiatic Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which had entrusted it with the unofficial Pan-Slavic agitation in Austria. A number of distinguished personages, such as the ex-Minister of Instruction, Count Uvarov, the Curator of the Moscow Educational District, A. N. Bachmetev, Secretary of State, Count Bludov, indeed even the Empress Maria Alexandrovna, who in this was acting under the influence of Countess Antonina Dmitrievna, Bludov and the poet Tjutczev and his daughter, were either active in the management or else supported the committee annually by large contributions. The Russian government acted from this motive when, contrary to its usual custom, it permitted on the occasion of the Pan-Russian ethnographic exhibition in Moscow not only a Pan-Slavic section to be attached to it but also the holding of a political congress, although this plan had given occasion for violent press attacks. The large number of Czechs who appeared were no doubt an especially pleasing sight for the Russian ruling classes. Precisely from this quarter, however, an unpleasant incident was to arise. The leader of the Czech deputation, Rieger, had given his promise to the Parisian Polish Committee to speak at the congress for the Polish cause. When he did this at the banquet at Sokolniki, in a manner calculated not to offend the Russians, and then proceeded to say that efforts must be made to grant rights to the Poles and thereby to close the circle of all the Slavs, his speech was received not only with murmurs of disapproval and whistling, but Prince Czerkasskij gave him a sharp reprimand by referring meaningly to the manner in which the Poles were acting toward the Galician Ruthenians. With ruthless frankness, unusual for an official personage such as he was, Prince Czerkasskij called attention to the oppression of the Ruthenians in Galicia by the Poles, and urged these to grant to the Ruthenians that which the Russian government in the King-

dom of Poland had granted to the Poles. He did not even hesitate to remind his hearers that East Galicia was not Russian territory, and to imply indirectly how painful it was that it was not then united with Russia, as it had been from 1809 to 1814. The Slav Congress ended with this dissonance.

Shortly after the Moscow Slav Congress, there appeared—in the winter of 1869-70—in the magazine *Zarja* that sensational series of articles by Nikolai Jakovlevich Danilevskij, which in 1871 was published under the title, "Russia and Europe," and which since then has run through a number of editions and become the gospel of wide circles of Russian intellectuals. Its influence has remained remarkably strong down to the most recent times and in the most influential circles. Danilevskij was the first to state and develop in a systematic manner the policy of the destruction of Austria and Turkey. The Oriental question is, according to him, a question of all Slavdom, and it therefore concerns Austria and Turkey in like degree. It can be solved satisfactorily only through the splitting up of both empires. Austria, to whom at one time had fallen the duty of protecting Europe against the Turks, had fulfilled her mission, he says, as early as 1740, and since that time had lost all justification for her existence. The existence of Turkey had ceased to be justified the moment that Russia became strong enough to take the Balkan States under her wing. Turkey's mission was to keep these Slavs from being Europeanized. In place of these empires, according to Danilevskij, there must be a Slavic Federation, with Russia in control, and with a Russian Constantinople at the centre; in addition, there must be joined to Russia the whole of Galicia and a portion of North Hungary, styled in Russian terminology "Hungarian Russia." Included in this federation was to be reckoned, moreover, a Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak kingdom, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia and Northwest Hungary; a Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom, consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, North Albania, the so-called Vojevodina and the Banat of South Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Carniola, Trieste, Goricia, Gradiska and Istria, two-thirds of Carinthia and a fifth of Styria as far as the Drau; a kingdom of Hungary, formed from the remaining portions of Hungary and that part of Transylvania inhabited by Magyars; a kingdom of Rumania, consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, parts of Bukovina, half of Transylvania, etc. The numerous plans for dividing Austria-Hungary, as discussed in Russia in newspapers, magazines and public meetings immediately following the outbreak of the war,

were mainly along the lines laid down by Danilevskij. One point must be emphasized: Danilevskij was more honest than the present generation.[1] He frankly admitted that Europe and Russia have nothing in common, and that they must stand opposed to each other throughout all the future.

At the same time, but independently of Danilevskij, the distinguished Russian military writer, General Rostislav Fadêev, published a brochure animated by the same hatred of Austria-Hungary; in this he argued that the Oriental question was to be solved in the Russian manner, but only after the destruction of Austria-Hungary. For Fadêev also the Oriental question is a Pan-Slavic question, the solution of which, in accordance with Russia's desires, can be permitted by Austria-Hungary only at the risk of her own existence. Hence, as Field Marshal Paskievich declared, the road to Constantinople leads through Vienna. Fadêev did not hesitate to state plainly that in the conflict with Austria-Hungary reliance might be placed on the Austrian Slavs. It was only needful to gain their confidence; but this Russia could do by freeing Galicia. Fadêev said that were one to ask any non-Russian Slav, he would reply: "What confidence can Russia's cousins have in her when her very brothers, who sigh and pine on her borders, can hope for no help from her?" In 1849, 1859 and 1866 the "unhappy" Galician Russians might have been freed without trouble. When this six-hundred-year-old captivity of Red Russia was ended, continues Fadêev, the West Slavs would be ready to listen to Russia. She would then stand geographically in the midst of the West Slavs, and in addition, by the reclaiming of Bessarabia, the connection with the South Slavs would be reestablished. Although more cautious than Danilevskij, Fadêev intimated the final goal to be a Pan-Slavic Federation on the ruins of Austria and Turkey, with the Czar at the head as the successor of Constantine the Great, and with the Grand Dukes as federal princes.[2]

While Fadêev believed that Prussia could not permit the destruction of Austria, and that on this account the former's enmity was to be reckoned with—in which circumstance he estimated at its true value the united military strength of the previous rivals—Danilevskij was of a different opinion down to the time of the Franco-Prussian War. Till that time he was still inclined to regard Prussia as the sole ally of Russia in the solution of the Oriental question—that is to say, in the destruction of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Impressed by the German vic-

[1] *Russia and Europe,* Danilevskij, p. 423 ff.
[2] *Mnenie o vostocnom voprose,* Fadêev, St. Petersburg, 1870.

tories, however, and regardless of the fact that Russia reaped immediate advantage from them, he revised his previous opinion even before the capture of Paris and declared France to be the future ally of Russia and the possible coming German Empire to be Russia's most dangerous potential enemy in the matter of the partition of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. With Machiavellian perspicacity, Danilevskij demonstrated that it did not lie in Russia's interest immediately to interfere in the conflict and to save France from the imposition of severe terms of peace. Such a peace as seemed probable would create a permanent breach between Germany and France and prevent the two Powers from uniting against Slavdom in Russia on the basis of European or Latin-German interests. Nor was a victorious France, in Danilevskij's opinion, even with a renewal of the friendship of the days of Tilsit for Russia, desirable from the Russian point of view, since the latter country could not support France's ambitious plans which might easily lead to conflicts, causing France to renew her previous Polish intrigues. Russia, also, would follow a strongly conservative policy along German lines, in view of the expected danger of revolutionary or democratic propaganda.

"On the other hand, in case of Germany's victory and the temporary weakening or even humiliation of France, all these prejudices and influences will lose their force. France, whom only Russia can support in the recovery of her political position, will, even though reluctantly, have to abandon her encouragement of supposed Polish interests, if these run counter to her own vital interests. Russia, willy-nilly, will cease to support Prussia and Germany, if they venture boldly and undisguisedly to pursue aims of their own which are opposed to the evident interests of Russia." [1]

Further, through the defeat of France, Russia, he claimed, would regain the affection of the so-called Slavic intellectuals outside of Russia who, as the result of the French Revolution and of France's services for the national unity of Italy, as well as because of the liberal expressions of French authors, politicians and statesmen and of many really sympathetic traits of the French national character, had hitherto been devoted to France and had hoped to win her support; this hope, however, had proved deceptive, since in the belief of the French, as of other Europeans, the fruits of freedom were not to grow and ripen for the Slavs. Russia, he said, would appear as the sole libera-

[1] *Rossija i franko-germanskaja Vojna*, Zarja, 1871; reprinted in *Sbornick politiceskich i ekonomisceskich slatej*, N. J. Danilevskago, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 27.

tor of all the Slavs, in view of the opposing interests of Germans and Slavs, of their century-long struggle and of the antipathy with which the German character was viewed by the Slavs and Latins, as well as in view of the fact that France after her defeat would be fully occupied in healing her wounds and looking after herself.

"No one except Russia can save the Slavs from being engulfed by Germany; no one except the Slavs can be Russia's permanent guard against the ambitions which will not delay in manifesting themselves with such clearness that only those born blind can continue not to see them." [1]

Danilevskij closes this remarkable exposition by calling attention to the fact that Russia at that moment (that is to say, before the proclamation of the German Empire in Versailles) found herself in this dilemma: "All our sympathies are with France, but political interests compel us to wish for Germany's complete victory and the weakening of France."

Thus, just as the Crimean War was a turning-point in the Austro-Russian relations, the Franco-German War of 1870-71 became a turning-point for those of Russia and Prussia. Yet it was owing to the German victories that Russia, at the most critical moment of the western struggle, was enabled to free herself from the most humiliating condition of the Peace of Paris, *viz.*, the inhibition against Russia's building and maintaining a naval fleet in the Black Sea. "The success of the Prussian arms was likewise a victory for us," says a Russian diplomat in a memorial published a few years ago.[2] With the very first German victories, which seemed to proclaim the possibility of a powerful German empire at the Russian frontier, the most influential Russian publicist of all times, M. N. Katkov, began in his *Moskovskiya Vêdomosti* a press campaign, aiming to arouse widespread patriotic disquietude at the German victories. In this effort he was successful. Although Czar Alexander II, even after the peace of Frankfort, continued faithful to the ideas expressed in the famous telegraphic exchange with his uncle, Emperor William I, expressions of discontent to the effect that Russia had unreservedly allowed herself to become Prussia's tool were not infrequent.

"This statement," says Saburov, "was repeated times without number and finally became a historical truth for the Moscow patriots, although there was not a grain of truth in it; if there

[1] *Rossija i franko-germanskaja Vojna,* Zarja, 1871; reprinted in *Sbornick politiceskich i ekonomisceskich slatej,* N. J. Danilevskago, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 29.

[2] Zapiska P. A. Saburova, Russian Archive, 1912, p. 470.

were advantages, these were undoubtedly mutual. For beginning with this period, Emperor Alexander II no longer felt himself politically restrained in Europe; he was freed from hampering ties and in a position to give to Russia her previous standing as a World Power." [1]

The visit of Emperor William I and Bismarck in 1873 seemed to strengthen this bond.

"For us," says Saburov, "this revived the memory of our position at Tilsit, but without the defeats of Austerlitz and Friedland. And our lord and master, the Czar, had only to emphasize our political understanding with Prussia in order to attain a brilliant position, without drawing the sword from the scabbard. It is not to be wondered at, in view of so important a political success, that the thought of a closer and permanent alliance awoke in the minds of the monarchs. The system had brought forth rich fruits. It would have borne still more in the future. The indicated political course would probably have served to solve the difficulties in the Oriental question, which soon thereafter came into prominence, if Czar Alexander II had been an autocrat not alone by reason of his rights but also by personal disposition." [2]

But while the Czar held fast to the alliance with Prussia, the anti-German sentiment grew stronger in Russian society and affected the leader of Russia's foreign policy, Chancellor Prince Gorczakov, whose most prominent characteristic was boundless vanity. He had sensed the anti-German wave in Russian society and hastened to adapt Russia's foreign policy to it. The Czar was too weak-willed to force his conviction upon the Chancellor, or, as would have been the most natural course in the case of such a difference of opinion, to dismiss him. And so 1875 arrived and with it the comedy of France's rescue from an alleged German attack, which Prince Gorczakov brilliantly staged. This was an unmistakable indication for Bismarck that doubt was beginning to be felt in Petrograd as to whether a mistake had not been made in 1870-71 in not interfering in favor of France. Czar Alexander II, to whom Bismarck complained about the dishonorable attitude of Gorczakov, "admitted the state of affairs, but contented himself, while laughing and smoking, with remarking that Bismarck should not take this *vanité sénile* seriously." [3] As Bismarck observes, it was a remarkable fact that Alexander II, despite his con-

[1] Zapiska P. A. Saburova, Russian Archive, 1912, p. 470.
[2] Ibid., p. 470 ff.
[3] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, Bismarck, 2, Chap. 26.

tempt for the minister, nevertheless intrusted him with the entire machinery of the foreign office. This lack of character manifested itself ever more clearly by his instability as regards the Pan-Slavic movement, which continued to grow in violence after the outbreak of the revolt in Herzegovina.

Although the Czar, on July 8, 1876, at a meeting with Emperor Francis Joseph in Reichstadt, had concluded an agreement concerning the Oriental question, and in August, before his departure for Warsaw and Livadia, had spoken to Reutern, the Minister of Finance, with bitterness in regard to the Pan-Slavic agitation, his feelings underwent a complete change in Livadia as the result of his surroundings. Even the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, the exponent of the Pan-Slavists, was astonished on the occasion of his visit to Livadia to see how the Czar and Chancellor had fallen under the influence of one of the members of the Slav Charity Committee of Moscow, Porochovczikov by name, who had gone thither on his own authority and in flaming words had pictured the warlike sentiments "of the whole of Orthodox Russia"; he had frightened the Czar by telling him that the Russian people would make war against the will of the government and without awaiting its decision. Under the influence of this feeling and without awaiting the result of the mission of his Adjutant-General, Count Sumarokov-Elston, the Czar inquired in Berlin, through General von Werder, whether, in the event of an Austro-Russian war, Germany would remain neutral, an insinuation which Bismarck rejected politely, but firmly.[1]

In view of this answer, the thought of a settlement of the Oriental question by a war with Austria had to be temporarily abandoned. But this original plan continued to exert so strong an influence that war was begun against Turkey with insufficient forces. For only four army corps were left in European Turkey in the event of a war with Austria. It is Prince Nikolai Nikolaievitch, the elder, to whom we owe this knowledge. Public sentiment in all camps, among the liberals as well as among the Pan-Slavs, was in equal degree inimical to Austria. All circles of society were in favor of the war, at least against Turkey; the radicals because, following the successful battles against the "outer" Turks, they hoped for a settlement with the "inner" Turks, whereby they meant especially the government. Despite the Treaty of Ofen-Pest of January, 1877, the Czar, who had been forced again into closer relationship with Austria-

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen,* Bismarck, 2, Chap. 28.

Hungary, because of Berlin's refusal, disregarded these treaty obligations in the peace negotiations of San Stefano. The consequence for Russia was the Congress of Berlin, the results of which, naturally, did not agree with those of San Stefano.

These results were received with bitterness by the Russian public. Ivan Sergêevich Aksakov made his celebrated Moscow speech (July 4, 1878), with its violent attacks upon Russian diplomacy and its unmistakable reflection on the Czar. As neither the Czar nor the Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov, had the courage to admit that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been surrendered to Austria-Hungary by a treaty long before the war—indeed, that without this concession Russia would not have been in a position to carry on the war—the entire weight of the public's anger turned against Austria-Hungary and Prince Bismarck, to whom Russia's discomfiture at the Congress of Berlin was unjustly ascribed. As a measure of protection against Russia, influenced by this popular movement which Alexander II with his customary weakness did not dare oppose, Bismarck and Andrassy signed the Austro-German alliance, which we have seen to-day so brilliantly justified by the severe tests of war. The increasing movement of terrorism in Russia, however, to which on February 13, 1881, Alexander fell a victim, served somewhat to distract the attention of the country from foreign politics.

The new Czar, Alexander III, whose palace on the Anitchkov Bridge, even before his accession, had been the center of anti-German intrigues and who had had no small share in bringing on the Turkish War, had seen on the field of battle the weaknesses of the Russian army organization too clearly not to desire a more or less extended period of rest and military reorganization for the country. The nihilist movement, with the numerous outrages and the danger threatening the dynasty, also compelled him to seek support from the two Emperors against this internal danger. This was the reason that the so-called Tri-Emperor Alliance continued in force, and that in 1881 and 1884 Russia even agreed anew by treaty to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this Russia, it is true, was still influenced by the hope of keeping Bulgaria in a state of absolute dependence, indeed, despite its own ruler, of turning the country into a sort of Russian satrapy. When these plans miscarried, and when, in the matter of the annexation of East Rumelia, which Russia now energetically opposed despite the peace of San Stefano, a definite break with Prince Alexander of Bulgaria occurred, leading to the abduction of

the Prince by Russophile officers and finally to his abdication against the will of the Bulgarian nation, Russia's rôle in Bulgaria was at an end. The regency under Stambulov found its chief support in England and Austria-Hungary, and a world conflagration seemed likely to result from the Bulgarian question. But Russia still lacked allies for a war against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the danger again passed. It is worthy of note that the fact was established by Russians that in the country's conflict with Bulgaria an important part was played by the Russian iron industry greedy for foreign markets, and by Russians interested in railroad building. It was on their account that the Russian government sought to influence Bulgaria to turn over the building of her railroads to Russians, in which operation it naturally strove to have those lines built which in the war of 1877 had shown themselves to be the chief lines of operation for the Russian army—that is to say, the lines from the Danube toward the South. It was construed as a betrayal of Russia on the part of Prince Alexander of Battenberg that he insisted on developing the Bulgarian railways in a westerly direction, which would connect them, not with the Russian, but with the Austrian system; all the more was this so regarded since the execution of such a plan involved but half the expenditure necessary for the southern lines. This railway question was the cause of the Prince's unpopularity in Petrograd. For according to the plan supported by the Russian general, Sobolev, who was the premier of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian railways were to be built not only by Russian *entrepreneurs* and Russian engineers, but even by Russian workmen, whom it was planned to bring from Russia for this purpose. Naturally, Russia was to receive the contract for the entire rolling stock.[1]

The conflict with Bulgaria gave the final impetus in bringing about the Franco-Russian Alliance. Efforts in this direction had been made on the French side as early as the seventies. The dissolution of the Tri-Emperor Alliance (although it is not correct to speak of a formal alliance) opened up a more favorable outlook for the French government. The refusal which the French Foreign Minister, Flourens, gave to the Bulgarian deputation that had come to Paris in January, 1887, to seek the assistance of the European Cabinets against Russia, reconciled the Russian government with the French Republic, which had once refused to surrender the revolutionist

[1] See *Vnesnaja Politika Rossij v Konce*, Pokrovskij, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v XIX veke, p. 204 ff.

Hartmann after he had made an attempt on the life of Alexander II. When, as a result of the alarming military preparations of the French Minister of War, Boulanger, a conflict with Germany seemed most probable, Russia ranged herself on the side of France and in the "Schnäbele" case her action was inimical to Germany. This happened in April, 1887, that is to say, four months after the rebuff to the Bulgarian deputation in Paris. The decisive factor, however, in bringing about the Franco-Russian alliance was the offer of the Republic to place its capital at the disposal of Russia, especially as the German government, in view of the official enmity of the Russian government and of Russian public opinion, could not possibly continue to assist Russia financially. "From the year 1888 on," says Pokrovskij, "French capital was closely connected with the destiny of the Russian autocracy." [1] Although Katkov (regarding whom a foreign diplomat stated that he did not know who was the Russian Foreign Minister, Katkov or Giers) openly declared in the columns of his Moscow newspaper that Russia could be the ally only of a monarchic France, this bitter pill was swallowed in Paris. The rejection by the Russian Ambassador, Baron Mohrenheim, of Floquet as French premier, because he had once joined in a Polish demonstration against Alexander II, was coolly accepted by the leading circles of France; and Floquet himself later renounced the portfolio of Foreign Affairs as the price of Russia's pardon. The arrest of the Russian Nihilists by the energetic Minister of the Interior, Constans, in June, 1890, gave the final proof of the French Republic's good behavior. At the close of 1890 the President of the French Republic and the Ministers of War and of the Interior were the recipients of high Russian decorations; and in July, 1891, the alliance was publicly sealed by the reception of Admiral Gervais' squadron at Kronstadt, for which France had long ardently hoped. In August, 1891, took place the first formal conclusion of the defensive and offensive alliance. In the autumn of 1892, this was supplemented by a military convention signed by the Chiefs of the General Staff of the two armies, Boisdeffre and Obruczev. In the autumn of 1893 the return visit was made by the Russian fleet to Toulon, and in the spring of 1894 the definitive treaty of alliance was finally signed, simultaneously in Paris and Petrograd, by the two Foreign Ministers, Casimir Périer and Giers.

In the meanwhile, however, Russia's attention had been to

[1] See *Vnesnaja Politika Rossij v Konce,* XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v XIX veke, by Pokrovskij, p. 174 ff.

a great degree distracted from Europe and turned toward the East by the development of her Asiatic policy, which in the spring of 1891 found its symbolic expression in the laying of the corner stone of the great Siberian fortress in Vladivostock. Witte himself in the autumn of 1892 characterized the building of the Siberian Railway as an event of world importance, such as mark the beginning of new epochs in the history of the nations and not infrequently call forth an entire change in the existing economic relations of the various states to each other.[1] The defeat of China in the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95 offered an opportunity to Russia of forcing on China her friendship and her protection against Japan. Russia's expansion toward the Far East was bound to encounter the opposition of England and Japan. A free hand, therefore, was needed in Europe. This was the reason why the ruling circles in Russia modified their plans in the Near East. According to the saying of Prince Lubanow-Rostowskij, Ambassador to Vienna and later Minister of Foreign Affairs under Nicholas II, it was necessary "to place the Balkans in cold storage until we have finished with other pressing affairs." [2] This purpose was served by the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897, which aimed to preserve the *status quo* in the Balkans and which, in the same manner as the Mürzsteger agreement of 1903, protected Russia's rear in view of the threatening complications in the East. This object was completely attained, thanks to the loyalty of Austria, who, by conscientious observance of the treaty, even sacrificed her own interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary and Germany, during the unfortunate war with Japan and the resulting internal disturbances, strove to uphold the tottering throne and the threatened solidarity of the Russian state. Indeed, it is the opinion of Russian radical parties, especially of the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionists, that the Russian revolution was defeated primarily through Germany's attitude. The Russian Minister of War, Kuropatkin, in his final report emphasized the loyal attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the following words: "The recent war has given to us the consoling conviction that our western neighbors (Germany and Austria-Hungary) entertain no plans of conquest as regards Russia, for the years 1905-6 would have been most favorable for a change in the present boundaries of the Empire in the West." [3]

[1] See *Vnesnaja Politika Rossij v Konce,* XIX veka, Granat, Istorija Rossii v XIX, veke, by Pokrovskij, p. 220.
[2] *Balkanskij Krisis i Politika Izvolskago,* P. Miljukov, p. 3 ff.
[3] *Zapiski generala Kuropatkina o russko-japonskoj vojne,* Berlin, 1911, p. 555.

This loyalty had very unfortunate results. A great change was brought about in Russian politics through the defeat in East Asia. The Russian intellectuals had absolutely no sympathy for the East Asiatic policy of the government; Slavophile influences and traditions were much stronger in all Russian parties. In order to win these sympathies, it was necessary only to direct the attention of the foreign office toward Europe and to blow into a flame the embers of Balkan hatred against the Porte, which were glimmering under the ashes. Conservative and radical parties of the newly created Russian parliament agreed that the treaties with Austria-Hungary were harmful for Russia, since the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans was not in the interests of Russia, if only because the main object of Russia's Oriental policy for two hundred years—namely the acquisition of the Dardanelles—was as little likely to be achieved in this manner as its secondary object, the liberation of the racially related coreligionists in the Balkans and their inclusion in the Russian sphere of influence.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. P. Izvolskij, who even as a diplomatic representative had believed in the Pan-Slavic spirit, was able to adapt himself quickly to this dominant sentiment. Through the understanding with England in August, 1907, concerning the division of the spheres of interest in Central Asia and especially in Persia, the way was opened for joint action with England in other questions as well. The anti-German turn which British policy had taken since the accession of Edward VII to the throne made a Russian alliance seem desirable. Conversely, it was in Russia's interest to draw England, the hitherto bitter enemy of her Oriental aims, to her side, in order, in the unavoidable conflict with Austria-Hungary in the Near East, to isolate the latter state and further to hold Austria's ally, Germany, in check by another enemy in addition to France. Besides, the two most influential political parties of Russia at that time, the Octobrists and the Cadets, were in favor of a *rapprochement* with England, which they hoped would result in a more liberal internal policy on the part of the Russian government. Both parties were, moreover, strongly influenced by Russian, and especially Moscow business interests, which, on account of the dangerous competition of the far more capable and highly trained German industry, had long demanded that the government assume an anti-German attitude.

When in January, 1908, Aehrenthal announced in the parliamentary "delegations" the plan for an active economic policy

by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and the building of the Sandjak railway, the authorities in Petrograd considered it a timely moment to make public the long contemplated change in Russian politics. Too weak, as the result of the defeats in Manchuria and of the disorganization called forth by the revolution, to be able successfully to oppose the policy of Vienna, Petrograd sought to accomplish this in two other ways: first, by an agreement with England concerning questions in the Near East (an object which was attained through the meeting of the Czar with King Edward VII in Reval); and secondly, through the encouragement of the Pan-Slavic agitation among the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The failure in the Far East and the revolution, which brought Russia to the verge of destruction and almost completely put an end to her influence in European questions (*L'absence de la Russie*) was felt especially keenly by the West Slavs as a strengthening of German influence and as a detriment to their political standing. As a result of this feeling, there began as early as 1906 a movement, the object of which was the establishment of Slavic solidarity. The Russo-Polish differences were felt as a hindrance to this solidarity, and hence to the strengthening of Russia. As a consequence, the efforts of the publicists were directed toward bringing about a reconciliation. A division of the Poles themselves declared the reconciliation possible under certain conditions, above all the autonomy of Congressional Poland. The Cracow monthly review, *Swiat Slowianski,* was the first openly to advocate this idea. In Russia this movement was well received. The Conservatives, who had been frightened by the revolution, saw Russia's salvation in Pan-Slavism. The Slavophile wing of the Russian Liberals, however, inspired by the general disapproval of the educated Russian circles of the East Asiatic policy, regarded this as a strengthening of Russia's position in Europe. The speech of Aehrenthal regarding the Sandjak railway, as indicated, caused the leaders of Russia's foreign policy seriously to take under consideration this movement both within and without the boundaries of the Empire.

"The especially self-confident tone" (of Aehrenthal), says an article in the January number, 1909 (p. 386), of the influential Petrograd review, *Vestnik Evropy,* which is published by a member of the Imperial Council, "in which this new Austrian program was announced caused marked anxiety in the Slavic states, and could not fail to make an unfavorable impression in Russia also; all the more was this the case since diplo-

macy still regarded the fiction of the Austro-Russian agreement in the Macedonian question as existing. As a matter of fact, Russian policy in the Balkans had long since lost all independence and become transformed into a passive tool (?) of the exclusively Austrian influence. Hence, it was no longer taken into consideration in Aehrenthal's plans. The Austrian minister, who was once ambassador in Petrograd, where he maintained intimate relations with the most influential personages of our reactionary parties, made use of his observations to draw the corresponding practical deductions, but he failed to consider the fact that reliance can be placed upon the feelings of court circles only with great caution, as they are in their very nature extremely changeable and subject to the influence of those familiar social elements which unite complacency with loudly proclaimed patriotism. It is not always advisable publicly to announce things which may without hindrance be accomplished by actions. The gradual expansion of the Austrian sphere of interest in the Balkans called forth a protest from no one, so long as it was not openly formulated as an official principle which implied the direct denial or ignoring of foreign interests, Slavic and Russian. This unexpected action gave a strong impulse to the Slavic movement, and the new Slavic cult found ardent adepts among us, due in part to the arrival in Russia of several prominent Czech and Serb politicians. The Slavic question in Austria herself has become extremely acute; violent street fights between Germans and Czechs take place constantly at various places, and frequently rise to the plane of sanguinary battles. Perhaps the aggressive (?) policy against the Turko-Slavic provinces was undertaken in order to distract attention from these internal conflicts and to open up new perspectives to the Slavs. The strengthening of the Slavic element, at the cost of the neighboring Balkan countries, prepares the way for the transformation of the monarchy into a federation, in which the Slavs will occupy their proper position."

However wrong this exposition is in so far as it regards Russian policy, and however maliciously it misrepresents conditions in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it nevertheless gives an excellent picture of the character of the congress to which the three Austrian parliamentarians, a Czech, a Liberal Slovene and a Russophile Ruthenian, were bound on their journey to Petrograd in May, 1908. That the National Democratic or Pan-Polish wing of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council favored this step, even though not openly, is subject to no

doubt. The Petrograd discussion took place too much as if by program to allow of any assumption but that a previous arrangement existed. It was really intended to prepare the way for a Pan-Slavic Congress. The tenor of the negotiations, however, was that the practical prerequisite of such a congress as well as of Pan-Slavic solidarity must be the reconciliation of the Poles and the Russians. Suddenly during the discussion the Polish leader in the third Duma, Roman Dmowski, arose and declared that this reconciliation was quite possible, that the Poles were ready to do their part toward it, for German civilization was the common enemy of all Poles and Slavs, and that in order to resist it, all other considerations must be put aside. Shortly after the Petrograd meeting, Dmowski announced this new program of the Poles in a small book, *"Niemcy, Rosya i kwestya polska."*

As a result of universal franchise, the Ruthenians, who had hitherto been almost completely deprived of political rights, were sent to the Vienna Parliament in relatively large numbers. The general suffrage right, however, had also had the effect on the Polish side of bringing new and especially Pan-Polish elements into the hitherto uniform and exclusive Polish Club. The appearance of the Ruthenians on the political stage was made use of by the Pan-Polish Party for a violent agitation, under the plea that the Polish landed class in East Galicia was threatened. This agitation was successful. A Pan-Polish partisan became leader of the hitherto all-powerful *Kolo Polskie* in the Vienna Parliament. Their program was openly Russophile in three of the component states of former Poland. Their first duty they considered to be the crushing of the German Empire in order to free their brothers in Posen. Until the accomplishment of this task they were ready to defer their final aim, namely the rehabilitation of Poland with her boundaries of 1772, and loyally to fulfill the duties of Austrian or Russian subjects—in which connection, Dmowski said, it must be a matter of indifference to the Russian or Austrian government what ideals they seek to realize in the future. In order to attain this first goal they were ready temporarily to abandon their claims as against Russia to Lithuania and Little Russia; they demanded in these countries for their compatriots only a status of equality; in Congressional Poland, on the other hand, they asked full autonomy and the use of the Polish language in the administration, courts and schools.

As a compensation for this, they offered the Russian government the following: Wherever the Ukrainian language was

recognized in administration, courts and schools, the Russian language was to enjoy the same standing. Frankly expressed, loyalty toward Austria ceased at the point where the existence of the state or the security of a boundary clashed with the opportunity to gain a ruble. The Russian government, however, which had always checked the Ukrainian movement in the sharpest manner, as representing a threat to the unity of the Russian race and hence to the supremacy of the Great-Russians, was now, after its experiences with the various nationalities in their efforts to obtain autonomy and with the strong Ukrainian Club of the first and second Dumas, all the more eager to suppress such a movement even beyond its own borders. This Ukrainian danger was thus the bond which united the Poles of the Pan-Polish movement and the Russian government. Shortly before the Petrograd meeting the weapon of a Ukrainian student had put an end to the career of the Governor of Galicia, Count Potoczki, who, failing to realize the essential interests of the state which he served, had encouraged the Russophile movement and its advocates.

In addition to the ancient antagonism between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Oriental question, there was now a second dangerous cause for dispute, namely that in regard to the Ukrainian question. As much as the Russian government was interested in hindering, even beyond its own borders, the cultural growth of the Ukrainian people, just so much was it in Austria's interest to encourage the intellectual and economic development of those Ukrainians who were loyal to Emperor and state. Without scruple as to its means, as it has always been, the Russian government did not hesitate to carry its campaign against the Ukrainian movement into Austrian territory. With Russian money and supported by the Pan-Polish Podolian group, which was all-powerful in the Polish Club, the Russophile movement now took up work in Galicia with redoubled strength, and prepared the way, especially through a wide-spread spy system, for a military attack by Russia.

The Slavic Congress in Petrograd in May, 1908, had brought together the radical and conservative parties in the field of Pan-Slavic politics. Soon after, it even came to a certain distribution of work between the two groups. The Conservatives, whose center of agitation lay in the old Pan-Slavic Charity Association and in the new Galician-Russian Society, prepared the way for a Russian invasion of Galicia by means of treasonable corruption through generously expended money and agitators and in the portions of Moravia adjoining Galicia by means

of Russian farmers (?) sent thither ostensibly for learning intensive agriculture. The radical parties, on the other hand, whose center was the Moscow Society for Slavic Civilization and whose mouthpiece was the *Moskovskij Jezenedelnik* of Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi, operated more discreetly. Their aim was, by satisfying Polish desires in Russia, to win over to the side of Russia, through Pan-Polish influence, the Austrian Poles, and especially the latter's representatives in the Austrian Parliament and in the Austro-Hungarian "delegation," in order that these, together with those Czechish and South-Slavic parliamentarians already "bagged" by Russia, might cripple Austria-Hungary. It was hoped in this manner to disrupt the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, and to render difficult and to delay Austria's military preparations, if not, indeed, to defeat them. These final aims are clearly revealed in the controversy between Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi and the *feuilletoniste* Mensikov in the *Novoje Vremja,* in the course of which Trubeczkoi made this noteworthy remark:

"Publicists of the stamp of Mensikov regard the *rapprochement* of Russia and the Poles as a sentimental dream. In reality it is the only practical policy. It is the sole means for paralyzing our most dangerous enemy in Europe—namely, Austria —and for rendering a conflict with her impossible. To make friends with the Poles means for Russia to draw all the Slavic races of Austria over to her side and to transform them all into allies." [1]

The Russo-Polish reconciliation was planned to take place on neutral territory, in Prague, at a Pan-Slavic preliminary congress held in July, 1908. This result, however, was not achieved. Even the Pan-Polish partisans left the Prague Congress disillusioned. Austria's hospitality, however, was taken advantage of by one of the participants, Count Vladmir Bobrinskij, a member of the Duma, to agitate in East Galicia on the journey home against the Monarchy and to form connections for a system of military espionage. The first chilling frost soon fell upon the young Pan-Slavic movement, which its prime movers in the Liberal camp were fond of calling the "Neo-Slavic" movement, since the old Pan-Slavic movement was too much discredited among the West and South Slavs as being Pan-Russian, and perhaps also because in this way it was hoped to mislead the Austrian government.

The outbreak of the Young Turk revolution was hastened by the meeting in Reval in May, 1908. In July, 1908, the

[1] *Moskovskij Jezenedelnik,* 1910, Number 27, Column 4.

Young Turks obtained the revival of the Turkish Constitution of the year 1876. Induced by false friends, they sought also to renew Bosnia's relation as vassal to the Porte, by calling representatives of that country to the Turkish parliament. The result of this was Austria's annexation policy in the autumn of 1908. Public opinion in Russia became greatly excited, as the fact had never been made known that in previous years Russia herself had several times given her consent to this purely formal act. The Serbian agitation in Russia occurred at this moment, and was an added cause of excitement. True to the principles of Neo-Slavism, the Czechs, the Pan-Poles and the Slovenes should have opposed this declaration of annexation in the legislative bodies. But some members lacked the necessary courage, and they contented themselves with discordant declarations, while others, such as the Pan-Poles, supported the Crown. This disappointment may also have been a factor in the conciliatory attitude of Russia's Foreign Minister, P. A. Izvolskij, at the end of the annexation crisis.

Although Aehrenthal, on the occasion of the meeting in Buchlau as early as September, 1908, had gained Izvolskij's consent to the annexation, in return for which Austria was to agree to the opening of the Dardanelles for Russia's warships, Izvolskij kept this secret on account of the high tide of the Pan-Slavic movement, and he immediately assumed the leading part in the diplomatic action of England, France and Russia against the annexation. His ambition was painfully disappointed by England's refusal to agree to the opening of the Dardanelles; he thus saw himself robbed of the important compensation which Aehrenthal had promised him, while the Austro-Hungarian Minister threatened to make sure of his share in the deal. Despite the fact that the director of the archives of his ministry, Gorjainow, had published in 1907 the chief points of the Reichstadt Agreement (1870) and that of Ofen-Pest (1877), in his book "Bosphorus and Dardanelles," Izvolskij went to Buchlau without knowing anything of these treaties and their contents.[1] Although later he learned of this obligation of Russia toward Austria-Hungary in connection with the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nevertheless he encouraged the defiant attitude of Serbia and Montenegro, which lacked all justification, and demanded the surrender of certain portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina to these two states. But since Russia was not in the position to back up with the sword the policy which Izvolskij had inaugurated against the Dual Monarchy, mainly in com-

[1] Zapiski Ignatjeva, *Historischer Bote,* February, 1914, p. 456.

mon with England but partly also with Italy, Petrograd found itself forced to draw in its horns following a plain hint from Berlin. At the end of March, 1909, the diplomatic campaign which Izvolskij had begun in October, 1908, ended with a painful defeat for Russian prestige. But since it was only a diplomatic defeat and the military inferiority of Russia, Serbia and Montenegro was not taken advantage of by the other side in order once and for all to render the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy safe in the South, Russia gave full reign to her enmity toward Austria-Hungary.

The great uproar caused in Italy by the annexation and the ambiguous attitude of the Italian government, which had made secret preparations for war against Austria-Hungary for the spring of 1909, drew Russia's attention to this ally. In the late autumn of 1909 the Czar paid his return visit in Racconigi, on which occasion he ostentatiously made a wide détour in order to avoid Austrian soil. A secret understanding seems to have been reached at this time between Russia and Italy against Austria-Hungary, which inaugurated Russia's betrayal of the South Slavs, whom she surrendered to Italy, and Italy's dire treachery toward her ally. Italy's open breach with her previous friends, however, was not desired, for, according to the view of a French diplomat which Prince Trubeczkoi quotes with praise, "Italy, in case she openly joined the Triple Entente, might, without becoming more useful, make demands on her new associates to which at present she has no right." [1]

Russia was angry, and was ready in any possible manner to make up for the blow to her prestige as the guardian power of the Slavs and for her failure in the Dardanelles question. The Pan-Slavic movement, secretly encouraged by the Russian government, continued its accustomed activity. Meetings in Petrograd alternated with meetings in Sofia and Prague. The Russian government even allowed itself to be officially represented in the Pan-Slavic Sokol Congress in Prague, in the spring of 1912, by Sebjakov, assistant to the Minister of Public Instruction. So certain was it of itself that on Austrian soil and in the presence of representatives of the Austrian government, it gave this support to the Sokols, who were determined to help ruin the Austrian Monarchy, internally and externally. Although warnings enough were heard even at that time, yet the world war of 1914 first revealed the importance of these organizations in the plans of Russia and Serbia. For the rest, Czech, Pan-

[1] *Russia as a Great Power,* Prince S. Trubeczkoi, p. 122 ff.

Polish and Russophile members of the Austrian Parliament saw to Russia's interests in the name of Pan-Slavic brotherhood.

In order to advance Russian aims in the Balkans, Izvolskij made another attempt to found a Balkan League, with Turkey in the lead, as the latter country at the time played a part in his calculations owing to the unfriendly attitude of the Young Turks toward Austria. This Balkan League was intended as a wall against the Dual Monarchy. In order to render the combination possible, Izvolskij demanded that Serbia and Bulgaria inform the Porte of their disinterestedness in Macedonia. As the Bulgarian government neither could nor would give such an assurance, the plan came to naught. But the idea, in another form, was taken up again two years later (1911) by Czarykov, the Russian Ambassador at the Golden Horn. In return for the opening of the straits to Russian men-of-war, Russia offered to assume, single-handed, the protection of the Porte against her own greedy protégés in the Balkans (Serbia and Bulgaria) and to guarantee the safety of the Dardanelles against a *coup* on the part of Italy.

Encouraged by the signs of internal disintegration in Turkey, as manifested in the Albanian revolt and in dissensions among the Turkish officers, Italy had considered the moment opportune for seizing Tripoli in time of peace, as the country was stripped of troops. Since the Turks could not possibly acquiesce in this act of piracy, Italy declared war on the Porte at the end of September, 1911. Czarykov considered the moment favorable for putting through a new edition of the Hunkiar-Iskelessi treaty of 1833, the acceptance of which would have been tantamount to the setting up of a Russian protectorate over Turkey. The resistance of Turkey and the disapproval manifested in Bulgaria brought about the failure of Czarykov's plans and caused their disavowal by Petrograd.

Russian politicians, however, were in no way embarrassed. The opportunity was all too favorable for Turkey's enemies to profit by the Turko-Italian War for their own purposes. Thanks to the war, Russian diplomacy was at last successful in bringing about a union of the previous rivals and enemies, Serbia and Bulgaria, which was directed equally against Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Rumania, and which was soon joined by Montenegro and Greece. The 13th of March, 1912, was for Russian diplomacy a day full of promise, as it was then successful, against all the efforts of its enemies, in creating a weapon which permitted its politicians and army leaders to await in the background the moment favorable for interfer-

ence. It was, perhaps, not the intention of Russian diplomacy to turn this weapon in the first instance against the Porte. But the fear on the part of the Balkan states, lusting for the Turkish possessions, lest the favorable moment pass without being utilized, drove them to declare war against Turkey in the autumn of 1912. The Russian diplomats were most skillful in denying all responsibility for this war and in protecting the Balkan League in the rear, on the pretext of maintaining the *status quo* and the territorial disinterestedness of the Great Powers—that is to say, primarily Austria-Hungary. The main object, of course, was to secure freedom of movement for Russia's vassal, Serbia, so as to enable her to expand freely and strengthen herself for her future task: participation in the destruction of Austria-Hungary. This part of the Russo-Serb program suffered defeat, it is true, owing to the determination of Austria-Hungary not to grant to Serbia access to the Adriatic by annexing Albania, in which determination she was upheld not alone by her loyal ally, Germany, but also by Italy, who had long had her eyes fixed on Valona and South Albania.

As Serbia now looked for compensation in Macedonia, quarrels arose between the allies in regard to the booty which they had taken from the Porte. The task of Russian diplomacy was like that of squaring the circle. It was a question of satisfying Bulgaria and Serbia at the same time. The Russian minister in Belgrade, Hartwig, knowing that thus only could he hold Serbia to her allegiance to Russia, had made promises to her a long time before which Sassonov was forced to ratify, willy-nilly. The Czar strove to preserve the Balkan League through the exercise of his personal influence, and on May 26, 1913 (O. S.), he sent a telegram proclaiming Russia as the only court of last resort for the whole of Slavdom. Austria-Hungary saw herself compelled to announce through the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, that she was not prepared to recognize this protectorate. Neither was this appeal of the Czar well received in Sofia or in Belgrade. At the end of June, 1913, war broke out between Bulgaria and her previous allies, Serbia and Montenegro, putting a final end to the Balkan League. This was an even worse defeat for Russia than her failure in the Albanian and Scutari questions, and one which deprived her of a weapon that she had prepared primarily only against Austria-Hungary. The effect was most evident in the violent attack which Pan-Slavic circles in Russia made on Russian diplomacy.

Right at the start of the Balkan War, in the autumn of

1912, the Pan-Slavic movement had begun in Russia with renewed force. The peculiar attitude of the parliamentarian representatives of the Czechs and Slovenes in the Austrian and federal administrative bodies—not to speak of the South Slavs—appeared to these circles as a sign that the moment had arrived to destroy Austria-Hungary. At this very time treatises were published by Russian military writers which sought to prove that half the Austro-Hungarian army might be regarded as negligible, since it consisted of Slavs who had no interest in fighting against Russia. Austria-Hungary, they said, was the most helpless state next to Turkey. Russian diplomacy, therefore, need not show the least consideration for Austria-Hungary.[1] Even before this the Russian senator, Grigorij Evreinov, had prophesied in a brochure the early disintegration of the Dual Monarchy as an anti-national state, and had demanded that Russia announce, in addition to her unshakable solidarity with the great Slavic world, her intention to utilize every opportunity of an international nature to unite Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandjak with Serbia and Montenegro.[2]

"For the removal of the anti-national state, Austria-Hungary," says Evreinov obscurely, "there are at work for Russia the providential forces of the progressive evolution toward a union of racially related people."

He becomes clearer when he says that he cannot enter into details as to how Russia can hasten this process by clever policy. Evreinov seeks also to prove that the Triple Entente is from a material standpoint stronger than the *Dreibund,* quite irrespective of the position of Italy, which in case of armed conflict intends to play the part of a *tertius gaudens.* The most violent instigation against Austria-Hungary was indulged in at the Slavish banquets in Petrograd, which were presided over in person by General Skugarevskij and at which the editor of the *Government Messenger,* Basmakov, an official personage, played a prominent part. The government, however, did not lose sight of its own interest on account of this Pan-Slavic movement, which outwardly pretended to be so altruistic. The Galician Russian Society, with Count Vladimir Bobrinskij, one of the most prominent nationalist leaders of the Duma, at its head, with the assistance of certain dignitaries of the Russian church, such as Archbishop Antonij of Volhynia, who were

[1] "The Military-Political Position of Russia," by General Parensov, in *Slavanskija Izvestija,* No. 8, of January 6-19, 1910; "The Austro-Hungarian Army," by Colonel Potockij, in *Okrainy Rossij,* No. 45, November 10-23, 1912, p. 640.

[2] *Ideologija bliznevostocnego voprosa,* Petrograd, 1911.

eager to proselyte, began to speak of the oppressed condition of "Russian Macedonia"—that is to say, Galicia—in which the non-existent Russians were alleged to be exposed to the greatest maltreatment.

The real reason was, as a matter of fact, that the Russian government and nationalistic circles had for years noted with disapproval the Ukrainian population of Austria making notable advance and the Austrian government aiding its efforts, although not adequately or consistently. If the unity of the Russian race in Russia, which was outwardly maintained only through the most ruthless oppression of the White Russians and the Little Russians (Ukrainians) as regards their national characteristics, was threatened with destruction through the upgrowth of a powerful cultural Ukrainian nucleus on Austrian soil, there was only one way in which to stamp out this danger, and that was through the annexation of this territory by Russia. More than once during the course of the Balkan crisis it appeared as if Russia was about to declare war on Austria under the pressure of this movement. But, although Russia, before the outbreak of the Balkan War, under the pretense of a trial mobilization, had drawn together large masses of troops on the Galician frontier, she nevertheless did not feel herself well enough prepared for this difficult task. Moreover, France and England did not yet seem ready to coöperate in the task. Russian preparation for so serious an undertaking was probably not considered sufficient in Paris and London. In Pan-Slavic circles, however, this abstention of Russia was regarded as cowardice on the part of Russian diplomacy.

Under these circumstances, it is explicable that the peace which came to Europe late in the summer of 1913 through the Treaty of Bucharest, proved only a preparation for war. Although Russian diplomacy—that is to say, Sassonov—had sought as early as 1910 in the Potsdam agreement to renew the friendly relations with Berlin which Izvolskij had scorned, the efforts were soon abandoned. Perhaps this was only a hint to London and Berlin, and at the same time a paying out of France for her attitude during the annexation crisis, which may not have sufficiently met Russia's expectations of what was incumbent on an ally. Sassonov changed his attitude toward Germany, however, when the latter country called a halt on Russian diplomacy, which, with its customary willful interpretation of the Peace of San Stefano and of the Congress of Berlin, sought to secure a firm footing in Armenia, or at least

to make use of the Armenian question as an excuse for interference at any time, as in Macedonia.

The mission of Liman von Sanders, late in the autumn of 1913, gave Russia the opportunity to let loose all the latent anti-German animosity of the Russian press. Any strengthening of the Porte, and especially of the defenses of the Straits, ran counter to the plans of Russian statesmen. It was well known that the English Naval Commission would take no measures to improve the Turkish fleet, but on the contrary was expected to serve as a check and procrastinating force as regards Turkish naval preparedness. Therefore, the recall of von Sanders and the German officers was demanded, and as Russia's wishes did not meet with the proper response, the decision was taken, probably before the completion of the strategic railways, to attack Austria-Hungary and Germany. At all events, the preparations for mobilization in Russia began very early in the year 1914. Time was an important question, also, as France was not in condition and did not intend long to bear the burden of the three-year service. The most important consideration, however, was that England—that is to say, primarily Sir Edward Grey—expressed a readiness to fight on the side of Russia and France. One of the chief promoters of the present World War, the Russian ex-diplomat, Branczaninov, who encouraged the war sentiment in Russia through a daily newspaper and who belonged to the Liberal wing of the Pan-Slavist party, intimated in his weekly paper, after a visit to Grey, that England was ready to fight by Russia's side.

War, he said, offered for England (that is for the British government) a way of escape from the internal difficulties of the Home Rule question; a victory of the fleet under the Liberal government would secure its position for a long time to come.

"They know this, but with the peculiar hypocrisy of Englishmen they mention it only in friendly intercourse, secretly as it were, and not as naïve people like M. Sassonov might desire, officially in black and white, with their signatures and seals attached. Is it not strange to think that, on account of the Irish question, within a month and a half to two months Europe will be involved in a general way?" [1]

This was written on March 18, 1914—three months before the outrage in Serajevo. It is explicable that Russia, following this assurance of English assistance, hastened to bring on the conflict, if for no other reason than on account of her own

[1] *Novoye Zveno,* 1914, No. 13, p. 407.

internal complications that threatened a revolution, as Miljukov informs us. That the projected attack on the Austrian Crown Prince was known in Russia's official circles cannot be absolutely proved. But there are many indications that this occurrence did not find Russia's leading men entirely unprepared. In this manner it was intended to bring Austria-Hungary into a critical position, and either force her into war against Serbia, or, if she drew back, to cause her to be crushed by universal contempt. The attitude of the Serbian government and of the Serbian press immediately following the outrage showed that Russia had quieted Serbia's fears as to the results of the awful crime. When Austria-Hungary finally decided, after a display of too great patience, energetically to put an end with armed force to the Serbian intrigues on her soil, Russia had the excuse for war which she had so long sought. Her aim was, to be sure, not the protection of Serbia, but the destruction of the Dual Monarchy and the weakening and humiliating of Germany. But it was important to act quickly so as not again to miss the favorable opportunity.

England and France must not be given too long a time for consideration, nor must there be a possibility of localizing the struggle and of diplomatic settlement. This is to be read in every line of the Russian Orange Book, despite its falsity. The English, too, jealous of Germany's growing commercial and naval power, believed that the moment had come to crush Germany and Austria-Hungary. Instead of checking the Russian desire for war, as they had done before, Sir Edward Grey and his immediate coöperator stimulated it, not only in Petrograd directly but also by way of Paris. Encouraged in this manner, Russia proceeded to general mobilization, without awaiting the result of the Austro-Russian negotiations in Petrograd, and although Austria-Hungary had only eight corps mobilized against Serbia.

That this meant war with Germany had long been clearly known in Petrograd. The British Ambassador, Buchanan, had so informed Sassonov at the beginning of the crisis. But war was desired in Petrograd, because success was thought to be certain. And so the war came about. The Russian government will before long have to answer for this to its own people, beyond the circle of the Pan-Slavist fanatics, when it fails to accomplish the destruction of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. But in the consciousness of the justice of their cause, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey will emerge with increased strength from the conflict forced upon them.

CHAPTER V

SERBIA'S RÔLE

PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

WHEN in 1690 the Patriarch, Arsenije III, Crnojevich of Ipek, with 100,000 Serbs, placed himself under the protection of Emperor Leopold I, it might reasonably have been expected that the destiny of the whole Serbian nation was forever united with Austria. That this did not prove to be the case was due in part to mistakes made by the Vienna government in the religious field, but the principal reason was that before many years had passed Russia had begun her undermining work among the Austrian Serbs. Vienna drove the Serbs into the arms of Peter the Great, and the Czar immediately seized the opportunity of creating a firm basis for Russian influence in the interior of Austria. Since the use of the Cyrillic, or Slavic, alphabet in printing was forbidden, as constituting a dangerous threat to the Catholic Church, the Serbian bishops turned to Russia for teachers and books, and during the last years of his reign Peter the Great sought to satisfy their demands. Russian teachers began to work among the population in the Hungarian-Slavonian borderland. Aside from the fact that previous to Lomonosov, the Slavonian-Russian language which now began to spread by books and teachers among the Serbs, was adapted to its task neither from a linguistic nor literary point of view, this influence was deleterious in other ways to the spiritual development of the Serbs. There arose that Slavonic-Serbian literary language which, under Russian influence, became further and further separated from the living speech of the people and which created a chasm between the educated and the uneducated classes of the Serbian population.

As permission for founding a Serbian printing establishment in Austria was not to be obtained, one was set up in Venice in 1758, thanks to Russian assistance. Unfortunately, the disapproval with which Vienna regarded the sending of books from Russia did not lead it to draw the proper conclusions regarding its own acts. It continued to consider the furnishing of intellectual nourishment to its Serbian subjects as beyond the province of the state, and not until the end of the

eighteenth century was a printing establishment founded in Vienna for "Illyrian" books.

A further factor was the peculiar position of the Serb immigrants. The rest of the population assumed toward them the unfriendly attitude of a privileged, exclusive class. Previous to the Peace of Belgrade (1739), when the Pashalik of Belgrade belonged to Austria, a systematic policy in the highest court circles regarding the Serbs was altogether lacking. As a consequence, the Serbs generally succeeded only through cunning and tenacity in obtaining their desires. When, however, under Maria Theresa, as the result of political developments, Hungarian influence gained in strength, dissatisfaction increased among the Serbian population, especially among the officers of the frontier regiments formed from Serbs.

Russia, which since the accession of the Czarina Elizabeth had been notably active in the rôle of protector of the Greek Oriental peoples, and especially of the Serbs, made an effort in the early fifties—through discontented officers of the border regiments to whom the most enticing promises were held out —to induce the Serbs in Hungary to emigrate into Russia. They were to settle between the Bug and the Dnieper, in so-called New Serbia, as an advance guard against Turkey. This plan was partly successful. But as the Vienna government put a prompt stop to the emigration in the interest of the Empire's protection and as furthermore the settlers in Russia suffered bitterly, the movement came to a sudden end.

Of great importance, however, was the affection felt by the Austrian Serbs for Russia, and the strong influence of Russian teachers, Russian literature and the Slavonic-Serbian literary language. And yet to Austrian weapons alone was due Serbian freedom and the creation of a national center. The foundation of present-day Serbia was laid by the Austrian administration of the Pashalik of Belgrade from 1718 to 1739, without which the revolt of 1804 would have been impossible. When Karageorge and the other leaders of the revolt sought to place themselves under Austria's protection, only to find the door closed against them owing to Vienna's attitude on the question of Turkey's sovereign rights, the spiritual head of the Austrian Serbs, the Metropolitan Stratmirovich, turned to Czar Alexander in his celebrated appeal, in which he proposed the formation of a Serbian Turkish vassal state under a Russian Grand Duke, Austria to surrender her Serbian possessions against indemnification at some other point.

In Petrograd, despite the friendly relations with the Porte

and the treaty which was still in force, less consideration was shown for the Sultan's government than was the case in Vienna. The revolutionists received encouragement in the form of money, and when, two years later, a breach occurred with Constantinople, a military convention was entered into with them which demanded greater sacrifices from the Serbs than was consonant with the aid which they received from Russia. In addition, the Imperial Councilor, Rodofinikin, appeared in Belgrade as chief Russian agent, and soon revealed to the leaders of the Serbians, as well as to the people themselves, the most unpleasant side of the Russian protectorate. In a short time he had gained universal hatred for himself, through his ruthless advancement of Russian interests, without regard for the sufferings and dangers of the Serbian nation. Rodofinikin was the type of the majority of Russian agents in Serbia. He also was the first, in his memorial of November, 1808, to lay down the lines of Russian policy for the future.

Russia, he said, must strengthen her position as sole dominant power in Serbia for all time to come, in order, in case of attack by Austria, to strike the Dual Monarchy in the flank through Serbia and through the revolutionary element in the adjoining South Slavic Austrian districts. The representatives of Russian policy in Serbia, from Rodofinikin to Hartwig, have held true to this principle, quite independently of the relations between Austria and Russia at any given moment.

Serbia, however, was betrayed and sacrificed by Russia whenever Russian interests demanded it. This happened in the Peace of Bukharest in 1812, when Karageorge was forced to flee from Turkish vengeance. When two years later (1815) Milos Obrenovich again unfurled the standard of revolt and national defense that Karageorge had been forced to abandon, he turned for help to Vienna. The Congress was then in session, and Czar Alexander present. Emperor Francis received the deputation, and one of the Serbian delegates, the High Priest Matthias Nenadovich, relates in his memoirs the following characteristic dialogue:

"Have you seen the Czar?" suddenly demanded Emperor Francis.

"We have requested an audience, but have not yet been received," replied Nenadovich.

"Ah, that diabolic policy!" sighed the Emperor. "He believes that no one knows the Russian government's activity among the Serbs! And why will the Czar not receive you?

Perhaps because he is a guest in my castle? That would make no difference to me." [1]

When Milos Obrenovich, by his own strength and without foreign help, defeated the Turks, and the grateful nation proclaimed him hereditary Prince of Serbia, the Russian Minister at the Porte, Baron Stroganov, immediately protested. Russia was decidedly opposed to the creation of a hereditary principality in Serbia, since such a form of government might more easily escape from Russian influence. Indeed, Russia, the prototype of autocratic power, after the principle of hereditary sovereignty had become an accomplished fact in Serbia, aimed through the creation of a senate to limit the ruler's power. At the request of Russia, the Porte agreed in the Constitution of 1830 that the members of this senate could not be removed from their office by the Prince unless it was proved that they were involved in guilty actions against the Turkish government. Russia had calculated cleverly; it was clear from the beginning that a senate whose members enjoyed such rights could not fail to live in constant conflict with the Prince. With the help of the senate, Russia has always been able to enforce her will in Serbia. As Petrograd never forgave Milos for acquiring the hereditary princely power, everything was done to destroy his standing with the Serbian people. Russia created her own party by means of gold, and constantly sought, through intrigues and force, to have the senate made up of men who were her unquestioning tools. She did not even hestiate to stir up the Serbian people against their ruler by means of a Russian Consul, Vasczenko, who traveled throughout the country, carrying on his work of instigation. The new Constitution of 1839, which deprived the Prince of all power and gave it into the hands of the seventeen senators, was Russia's work. There was no other course for Milos Obrenovich than to abdicate in favor of his eldest son, Michail (June 13, 1839), and to leave the country. Nor did Russia rest content until the Obrenovich dynasty had been entirely driven out.

When the Serbian senate elected Alexander Karageorgevich, Russia did not recognize the election because it had not taken place in the presence of the Russian representative, and it had, therefore, to be repeated in the presence of this representative. The new dynasty, however, could not meet Russia's constant demands and soon lost the Czar's favor. When through the Treaty of Paris (Article 28) Serbia, as a vassal state of Turkey, was placed under the collective protection of the European

[1] *The Serbian Question,* by Vladan Georgevitch, p. 19.

Powers, Russia's reply was to expel Prince Alexander Karageorgevich. The Serbian National Assembly again placed the dynasty of the Obrenovichi on the Serbian throne, and Prince Milos returned from exile. After his death, which soon occurred, his son Michail succeeded him. But Michail, likewise, did not long enjoy Russia's favor. On June 3, 1868, the Petrograd newspaper *Golos* said:

"The Obrenovichi dynasty is incapable of carrying out the plans for a Slavic future in the peninsula. There is only one candidate who is worthy of mounting Serbia's throne, namely Peter Karageorgevich, the son of Alexander Karageorgevich. He must be elevated to the throne of Serbia for the sake of the Serbs and of the unhappy inhabitants of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro."

A week later, on June 10, 1868, Prince Michail was murdered in the park of Topchider.

Thanks to the presence of mind of the ex-President of the Council of Ministers, Ilja Garasanin, and the other Serbian officials, Russia this time did not enjoy the fruits of the murder. Michail's nephew, Milan, not yet of age, was proclaimed Prince by the Serbian National Assembly. From the very beginning of his reign he had to reckon on Russia's ill will. The memoirs of General Georji Ivanovich Bobrikov, who as Russian military plenipotentiary was active at Milan's side in 1877, give a clear impression of the manner in which Russia ventured to use Milan, when, as a result of the disasters at Plevna, Serbian assistance against Turkey was badly needed. At this time Russia formed her connection with the Serbian Radical party, which since Milan's time has remained the representative of Russian interests. Only on Andrassy's intercession did Serbia receive Nish and the district of Pirot from the Congress of Berlin, Russia not concerning herself either about her Serbian or her Montenegrin ally.

Petrograd's tactics, however, soon after led to directing Serbia's attention toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, which since 1876 had so often been offered to Austria-Hungary by Russia and with the occupation of which, on the basis of the Congress of Berlin, Russia had been thoroughly satisfied. As Milan sought support from Austria-Hungary, Russia incited against him the politicians of his own party, and they brought about a series of revolts. Like his uncle, Michail, Milan up to 1878 was in favor of the idea of a Serbian Piedmont, but his experiences with Russia forced him to abandon this idea, as only Austria-Hungary supported him and his house. When King

Milan, after the unfortunate day of Slivnitza, saw himself forced to abdicate in favor of his minor son Alexander, Russia had reached the goal for which she had so long striven. King Alexander lost favor with his people through his marriage with Draga Mashin, which was engineered by Russia. The Russian legation was undoubtedly not without responsibility for those terrible murders during the night of June 11, 1903. The bloodstained throne was now occupied by that Peter Karageorgevich, who had been Russia's candidate in the year 1868. With him the Radical party, which was the Russian party, gained full power. The chief aim of Serbian politics since that June day has been the national liberation of the "unredeemed" Serbs in Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

"To quiet the unattainable demands of social freedom proclaimed by Serbian Radicalism and in the interest of order in the course of internal politics, the government saw itself practically forced to make use of the national liberation of the 'unredeemed' Serbs as a political narcotic." [1]

In a memorial which the Minister of Foreign Affairs caused to be written for King Peter after his accession in March, 1904, by the then head of the Propaganda Section of the Ministry, Sveta Simich, the program of the immediate future was outlined in the following manner:

1. Alliance with Montenegro. The Prince must undertake to carry out a common foreign policy directed by Belgrade.

2. Agreement with Bulgaria in regard to reforms in Macedonia and Old Serbia. Formation of a customs union for the purpose of extending the Serbian economic area.

3. Economic emancipation from Austro-Hungarian markets; definite advancement of the commercial-political interests of the Western powers, Russia and Italy, as the best means for rendering the Greater Serbian idea popular in Europe.

4. Advancement of the coalition idea of the small Serbian and pro-Serbian parties in Croatia, for the purpose of supporting the Hungarian party of independence in its battle against the Throne and Dualism.

5. Agitation in Bosnia for a union with Serbia. Discrediting the Austro-Hungarian administration through systematic propaganda and encouragement of the discontent of the Orthodox and Mohammedan population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[2]

This program meant open warfare with Austria-Hungary. The fact that at the moment Russia was involved in the Far

[1] *Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien*, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 12.
[2] Ibid., p. 15 ff.

East was a cause of serious disquietude. As the result of the loyal attitude of Austria-Hungary, however, that which Peter's Prime Minister, General Savva Gruich, had feared before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War did not come to pass.

"The relations between Russia and Japan have grown so strained recently," he wrote on December 27, 1903, "that war is now inevitable. I hope, nevertheless, that the Czar, in his love of peace, will avoid war, for it would be a disaster not only for Russia but also for us Slavs of the Balkans, whose sole hope is in Russia's help. There is something disastrous in your foreign policy! We fear that Austria, as soon as Russia is seriously engaged in the Far East, will finally annex Bosnia and Herzegovina and proceed to absorb Old Serbia—beyond the Mitrovitze."

Meanwhile, especially after the tariff war with Austria-Hungary, an active campaign had been started from Belgrade to stir up dissatisfaction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the other South Slavic territories. The Young Turk Revolution (1908) seemed to simplify the problem. On the ground of its transformation into a constitutional state, the Porte might demand the return of Bosnia and Herzegovina; that would later offer the possibility of taking these states more easily from Turkey than they could be taken from Austria-Hungary. This was the opinion in Belgrade circles. But when Emperor Francis Joseph announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian hopes suffered a collapse, and indignation ran high. Not for an instant was it admitted either by Serbia or by Russia, the latter's protector, that Serbia had no right to interfere in this act, and that in any event only the Porte and the signatory powers of the Treaty of Berlin were in a position to protest. Through his reception of the Serbian Crown Prince George, the Czar gave the Serbians plainly to understand that he was on their side and that they might rely on him. Only in the light of this encouragement can one understand the following speech in the Skupshtina by Stojan Protich:

"As long as Austria-Hungary remains what she is to-day, it will be impossible to entertain friendly relations with her. Austria-Hungary desires to remain a Great Power, but her composition renders her the fatherland of a whole series of different nationalities with pronounced individuality. Peace and neighborly relations can exist between us and Austria-Hungary only if Austria-Hungary gives up her claim to be a Great Power and resigns herself to the rôle of an Eastern Switzerland." [1]

[1] *Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien,* by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 15.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Milovanovich, indulged in no less unsuitable language in regard to the Dual Monarchy:

"The freedom which the Balkan peoples gained from 1812 to 1876 was achieved through Russia, while Austria-Hungary's first act in the Balkans was to make slaves of the people of two Serbian countries. Danger for the Balkan countries is to be apprehended only from Austria-Hungary, and the balance must be maintained against Austria-Hungary. The road to the Ægean Sea must be blocked for Austria-Hungary. She must cease to be a Balkan state."[1]

The tone which the Serbian press permitted itself toward the Monarchy may be guessed after these attacks by responsible men.

Since Russia was not in a position to protect her protégé against well-deserved punishment, Serbia was forced to beat a retreat and to admit in an official declaration, first, that her rights were not affected by the annexation, and second, that she pledged herself to change the course of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and that in the future she would maintain a friendly attitude. This was on March 13, 1909. But this act of penitence was forced and purely outward. As Serbia was sure of the support of Russia, who, as Rodofinikin had often said, stood in need of her for the destruction of Austria-Hungary, she was able quietly to carry out her former plans. The Serbian Prime Minister, Stojan Novakovich, during the last weeks of the annexation crisis did not hesitate to say in a brochure that the Serbian state "must reach from Timok to the Adriatic Sea and from Vardar to Crain among the Alps."[2] Russia was the godfather of the Balkan League, the foundation of which was laid on March 13, 1912, in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. According to Russian plans, this Balkan League was to give proof of its efficacy in the struggle against Austria-Hungary and by severing the South Slavic districts from the Monarchy. It happened otherwise, however. Bulgarian interests demanded war against the Porte on account of Macedonia, out of which she was later so disgracefully cheated by her allies.

The conflict was still raging; the first disillusionment had been experienced through the refusal of Austria-Hungary and Italy to grant Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea, in which act Russia acquiesced. P. Miljukov, certainly an unimpeachable

[1] *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866,* by Sosnovsky, 2, p. 205.
[2] *Najnovija Balkanska Kriza i Srpsko Pitanje,* by Stojan Novakovich, 1910.

witness, after a visit to Serbia, wrote that there was no need to fear that Serbia would turn to Austria-Hungary as the result of Russian acquiescence in the question of the Adriatic harbor. The Serbian peasants, who controlled seventy-three seats in the Skupshtina, were all Russophile, since the love of Russia had not been tested so severely among the Serbian people as in Bulgaria. Serbian intellectuals realized that they could do nothing but remain Russophile, largely because of their ineradicable hatred of Austria. Logically and politically, Serbian politicians regarded a *rapprochement* with Austria as possible, but, psychologically, for the Serbian democracy to side with Austria was quite out of the question. No one was afraid of a war against Austria, as the Serbs were conscious of their own strength. War was not desired at the moment only because time was wished for in which to complete the preparations which had been successfully begun after 1909. Encouraged by success, the Serbs would proceed to even bolder schemes. No one could tell when this struggle with Austria would come, whether in five or fifteen years, but that it would come every one was convinced. The question of "war or peace" was answered for Serbia by "Peace for a new war." [1]

The restive forces of Belgrade gathered around the Crown Prince and in the "Narodna Obrana" precipitated this war. The outrage of June 28, 1914, against the Austrian heir apparent and his consort was intended to furnish the prerequisite for the favorable outcome of the struggle, toward which Russia, well prepared for war, lent her influence. In 1910 the Russian ex-Minister of War, Kuropatkin, in his work, "Tasks for the Russian Army," had written the prophetic words:

"On the basis of the estimate of Austria's interests in the Balkan Peninsula, in Chapter XV the conclusion was reached that, as early as the second half of the eighteenth century, it became apparent as regards Russia's plans in the Balkans that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russian sphere of action and influence must be limited to the eastern half of the Peninsula; this was tantamount to an acknowledgment that the western half of the Peninsula, which is inhabited by the Serbian race, belonged to the Austrian sphere of influence.

"These lessons of history, however, were quickly forgotten by the Russian government, and in the early years of the nineteenth century Russia's interference began in the affairs of the Serbian inhabitants of Turkey, which has not ceased even

[1] *Retschj,* No. 5, January 6-19, 1913.

to-day. This interference in the course of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth century is the chief cause of the distrustful and at times inimical relations between Russia and Austria. If Russia does not cease this interference in a matter foreign to her and which at the same time touches Austria's vital interests, a war may be expected between Russia and Austria in the twentieth century on account of the Serbian question." [1]

Kuropatkin has been proved to be right. Since the Czar did not think it necessary to condemn the infamous outrage, responsibility for which in Belgrade was laid by the judicial investigation on circles near Crown Prince Alexander, it cannot be surprising, in view of this attitude, that he considered the reparation "disgraceful" which Austria-Hungary found herself forced to demand, sword in hand. He held his protecting hand over the Belgrade ruling classes, who were implicated in the royal murders, and prepared for the attack on the Dual Monarchy.

[1] *Zadaczi russkoj armij,* Vol. 2, p. 334 ff.

CHAPTER VI

THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA

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IN order to understand rightly the position of the Great Powers in East Asia before and during the war, it is necessary to study them in connection with the developments of the last twenty years. The year 1894, the beginning of the Japanese-Chinese War, is the natural starting-point, for this date marks the opening of the latest period in the history of the international relations of the countries of the Far East among themselves and of other countries to them. Up to that time the interests of the Occidental Powers in China had been regarded as directed toward one identical aim of commercial policy and had consequently been handled in common. But from that period on, there is a parting of the ways by which the Powers, singly or in groups, tried to attain their goals. These goals were as divergent as were the nature and extent of the possessions of the various Powers from which they had resulted. England's sole colonial possession on the East Asiatic coast was the island of Hongkong, which she had acquired, together with the desired control of the opium trade, by the Peace of Nanking in 1842, but in addition she possessed in all the more important cities of China, national settlements in which her officials not only conducted the administration but exercised, in a limited degree, legal jurisdiction over the Chinese. Further, thanks to her dominant position, she avowedly regarded herself in East Asia, more even than elsewhere, as the real arbiter of nations.[1] Although in China proper up to that time England had given no hint of other plans than such as concerned her commercial interests, in the Chinese vassal states toward the west she had operated all the more energetically from India as a base.

In the year 1885, the Viceroy of India sent a military force to Burmah, which was under Chinese suzerainty. In reply to her protest, China received the customary answer that her rights would be fully respected; yet at the same time the King of Bur-

[1] See *The Far Western Question*, Valentine Chirol, p. 3 ff.

mah was sent as a prisoner to Calcutta and the country declared by the Viceroy as "incorporated into the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty." In the Agreement of Peking, 1886, England undertook to see that the embassy bearing tribute due to China every ten years be regularly sent. The members of the embassy were all to be Burmese! Yet a considerable time previously the Anglo-Indian government had stretched out its feelers toward the north, in order to bring the border states of the Himalayas under its control and thus gain possession of the Thibet plateau, which, as Lord Curzon later characterized it, is "the glacis of the Indian fortress." Every step here was an encroachment on the undeniable sovereign rights of China; this was done with less hesitation, as China's military weakness prevented her from defending her possessions.

Nepal—the home of the Gurkhas—had become a dependency of India since the war of 1814, although, in order to preserve a semblance of China's suzerainty, embassies were still allowed to proceed thence to Peking to pay tribute—the last of these embassies from Nepal appeared in China in 1887. In the year 1835 the Indian government had taken over the district of Darjeeling, east of Nepal, by pensioning the prince; and in 1861, Sikkim, which adjoined it on the east, was incorporated, partly at first, into the Indian possessions, since "the fact of British ascendency and the situation of Sikkim in a direct line between Calcutta and Lhassa could not but suggest its adaptability as a highway for trade between the two regions." [1] Not until the Calcutta Agreement of 1890 was the British protectorate over Sikkim recognized, but the regulation of the Indo-Thibetan "trade" —and this was the important point for the Indian government in the development of its further designs on Thibet—was reserved for later negotiation. For the time being Bhutan, a dependency of Thibet and hence of China, and which adjoins Sikkim and controls the passes to the highlands, was left undisturbed.

In the manner of England in the southwestern borderlands of China, France, in the course of the nineteenth century, had formed in the southern districts on the peninsula of Farther India a broad foundation for her policy of force. As early as 1787, under the stimulus and with the assistance of the Catholic Mission at Versailles, a treaty had been made with Annam, according to which certain strongholds in Cochin-China were to be ceded to France for assistance given. From this point as a basis, although seventy years later, the expansion of the French power toward the north was made, "in the interest" of the king-

[1] *China and Her Neighbours,* R. S. Gundry, p. 395.

dom of Annam and of its "rights"—after the territory of Saigon had been conquered in 1862 and Annam thereby reduced to the position of a helpless tool. In 1867 Cambodia, ostensibly a vassal state of Annam, was "protected" against the claims of Siam and placed under French protection; in 1874 a treaty was made with Annam itself in which the French protectorate was not yet clearly announced, it is true, but at least foreshadowed. These measures called forth energetic protests, not only from China, to which country Annam stood in a tributary relation, but they also caused a great outcry in England, who then as now considered the disregard of the rights of others as her exclusive privilege.[1] The relations with China became more critical in the year 1882, when France proceeded with military force against Tonkin, in the extreme north of Annam, and took possession of the country. The following year the entire kingdom of Annam was declared under the protection of France. In order to put an end once and for all to China's resistance to these infringements of her rights, France decided on military measures: in 1884 war resulted, and in the peace of 1885 China gave the assurance that she would withdraw her troops from Tonkin and recognize all French treaties with Annam. France in return promised "to respect the southern boundaries between China and Tonkin and to protect them against the attack of any other nation and under all conditions." [2]

Therewith France had created for herself the desired great colonial empire, which left Siam as the only independent state on the peninsula of Farther India. But at the same time France had become the immediate neighbor of China proper, and this fact may not have been without influence on the decision which the Indian government reached at this time in regard to Burmah. Both European Powers had now a Chinese frontier, in each case in the Province of Yunnan, and they were neighbors; both saw the possibility of advancing their interest at this point, in the same direction toward the rich district of the upper Yangtse, and thence farther east; and both were aware that their ambitions might lead to dangerous clashes.

The American minister, Colonel Denby, who in 1889, soon after these events, undertook a journey through southern Manchuria, declared after his return that "the extensive borderlands in the north and west of the Chinese Empire would some day

[1] *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales,* H. Cordier, Vol. II, p. 299: "Les criailleries du gouvernement anglais."
[2] Ibid., pp. 435 and 523.

in all likelihood suffer the same fate as Burmah and Tonkin." Russia was at that time the cause of such fears.

Russia's desire for expansion into Chinese territory was also of ancient date. The conqueror of Siberia had pressed forward in the seventeenth century into the Amur regions and northern Manchuria, till through the treaty of Nerchinsk, in the year 1689, an end was put to further conquests. Not until one hundred and seventy years later did a new active policy begin at this point. In 1858 advantage was taken of the Franco-English war against China to bring the northern bank of the Amur River, and in 1860 the entire coast district as far as the Tumen River and to the borders of Corea, into Russian possession; thus entire northern and middle Manchuria was surrounded by the territory of the Czar. In 1872 the Russian naval port was transferred from Nicolaievsk to the more southerly Vladivostock. But Russian activity was not limited to the Amur territories. The great Mohammedan revolt under Yakub Beg in Turkestan at the middle of the nineteenth century induced Russia in 1871 to occupy the so-called Ili district, together with Kuldja. In the treaty of Livadia in 1879 Russia took advantage of the incapacity of the Chinese negotiators in order to gain possession, not alone of the entire Ili Basin, but in addition to obtain extraordinary commercial privileges, such as absolutely free trade in the whole of Mongolia. The treaty was, in fact, a monstrosity, and was rejected by Peking, as was to be expected; in 1881 it was replaced by another treaty, by which the greater part of Turkestan, inclusive of Kuldja, was given back to China, but extensive rights of a commercial nature were nevertheless left to Russia, such as free trade in Mongolia and certain parts of East Turkestan, consular representation in a great number of cities in this territory, which were otherwise closed to trade, etc. By this treaty Russia obtained a highly favored and unique position in the northern and northwestern outlying districts of China, from which she was in a position at any time to make her influence felt in the adjoining provinces of Kansu and Shensi.

While thus in the second half of the nineteenth century, France, England and Russia had laid a foundation in the southern, western and northern outlying districts of the Chinese Empire for their political power, reaching as far as the border of China proper, and which at any suitable time might be extended beyond these limits, Japan, the only other Asiatic state concerned beside supine China, was forced for the moment to remain without a share in this development, as she was entirely occupied in strengthening herself internally and did not

yet understand the far-reaching ambitions of the European Powers. In Japan, too, however, the impulse toward expansion was soon felt in the interest of strengthening her internal condition. In order to give occupation to the *Samurai* (the noble warrior class), who were in a state of unrest, the government undertook in the year 1874 a military expedition against the Island of Formosa, whose savage inhabitants, it was claimed, had murdered Japanese merchants in the previous year. The island belonged to China, and had been settled by Chinese in the seventeenth century. The government at Peking, therefore, protested, and the result was that the families of those murdered received an indemnity from China, and Japan's occupation of the island was not carried out. Japan then turned to the Liu-Kiu Islands, of which she took possession in 1879, on the basis of a pretended tributary understanding dating from the year 1609, although the islands acknowledged themselves to be vassals of China. China's protest remained unnoticed. The real object, however, of Japan's desires was now, as it had been for centuries, Corea, a tributary state of China by its own acknowledgment. The Chinese government, it is true, had acted in a degree contrary to its own construction of the situation by allowing Corea to conclude commercial treaties with several foreign Powers, among others in 1876 with Japan, who had obtained this end by military pressure.

According to occidental legal principles, the inevitable logical conclusion was that Corea was an independent state and that it had been tacitly recognized as such by China; the latter country, however, persistently refused to allow such an inference to be drawn from these treaties. At all events, in the treaty of 1876, Japan succeeded in having Corea designated as an "independent state" which "enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan." As the result of Japanese intrigues, a series of murders and disturbances took place in the Corean capital in 1884, so that finally Chinese and Japanese troops had to interfere. In the following year, in a special treaty of Japan with Corea, normal relations were reestablished, and a few months later (1885) an agreement was reached with China, according to which in future disturbances neither China nor Japan was to send troops to Corea without a previous mutual understanding. The question of China's legal relationship to Corea was not discussed and remained open to dispute as before. Japan's plans, however, in regard to the Asiatic Continent, which were an inheritance from the past, became more ambitious as the empire grew stronger and more conscious of its position in the political development of the East.

Matters stood thus in the year 1894, when Japan, in furtherance of these plans, took advantage of the outbreak of new disorders in Corea, and of the sending thither of Chinese troops, in order to declare war on China. The entire question of the division of power and the aspirations of the foreign states in East Asia was hereby opened up; the revelation by the war of China's absolute helplessness hastened the march of events. England, who at first underestimated Japan's strength, openly took the side of assaulted China, and her aversion to the victorious Island Empire led her at the beginning of October, 1894, to make an appeal to the European Great Powers to unite in a protest and to check Japan's victorious course. The proposal was refused as untimely. But when, in the further course of the war, it became clear that in the peace negotiations Japan intended to make extensive territorial acquisitions in China proper, and thereby to go far beyond her original goal, which was the recognition of Corea's independence, the European Powers became seriously disturbed, lest in this manner the seed of permanent disturbance be planted in East Asia. That these fears were only too well founded was proved by the results—one needs only to ask British merchants in East Asia. When, therefore, in the spring of 1895 Russia revived the English proposition, France and Germany this time showed themselves to be receptive; whereas England at first hesitated, and finally, to every one's surprise, declared that she saw no cause for objection to the Japanese conquests. The French historian, H. Cordier, says in regard to England's action: "The attitude of the British Cabinet led to the belief that it was bound by a secret treaty with the Tokio Cabinet. This, however, was a mistake, as events later showed; but it is certain that Albion at that time was already seeking to win the gratitude of the conqueror, who, however, did not allow himself to be at all deceived by England's change of front." [1]

Germany, who regretted this first serious breach in the European solidarity of action in East Asia, made an effort, after Russia and France had decided upon a protest against Japan's peace conditions, to make use of her participation in the interests of restraint and moderation. Almost two months before the protest was made, in March, 1895, she confidentially informed the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu, of what was about to occur, and advised him, since opposition to the three Powers was out of the question, to forestall the whole proceeding by a

[1] *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec des Puissances Occidentales,* Vol. III, p. 289.

voluntary modification of Japan's conditions of peace and thus to avoid even the semblance of any humiliation of the victorious country. Unfortunately, Count Mutsu did not follow this friendly advice—indeed, it even appeared as if he had not brought it to the knowledge of his colleagues in the cabinet; at all events, it has remained unknown to the Japanese down to the present day. When in May, following the Peace of Shimonoseki, protest was actually made, it was again Germany who (at the request of Japan) insisted that China should first of all ratify the treaty as had been originally agreed; afterward, the Chinese government was given to understand, China might make the proposition to Japan of substituting an increase in the war indemnity in place of territorial cessions on the Asiatic continent. China was assured that Japan would be ready to accept the proposal. In this course Germany's sole aim was to save Japan from all appearance of submitting to force. It is evident that, when once the protest had become unavoidable, Japan had every cause to be thankful that Germany took part in the intervention in the interest of moderation. Unfortunately, the malevolent British press, systematically copied by that of Japan, kept the Japanese nation from understanding the real situation.

In the Peace of Shimonoseki, Japan obtained the final recognition by China of Corea's independence and the surrender of the Island of Formosa, as well as of the Pescadores Islands, lying between Formosa and the continent, while the Peninsula of Liaotung, which had also been ceded, was given back to China, together with Port Arthur, according to agreement, in return for a money indemnity. If Europe had believed that through this restitution the dangers which might result from the Japanese conquests in China proper were obviated, such a supposition could not fail even at this time to be recognized as unjustified by any one familiar with political conditions in Corea and with the history of Japan's relations to that country. For centuries Corea had enjoyed no independent existence, and under the political conditions of the nineteenth century she was less capable than ever of attaining such a position. The "independence" of this entirely unorganized state which Japan had fought for, could have no other meaning for the initiated than as being the first step toward the incorporation into the empire of the victor. This aim was thenceforth systematically pursued by Japan and quickly achieved.

The whole political development in East Asia, however, now struck into paths which in no wise suited German aims. In view of Germany's European position, it was self-evident that

she could never hope to obtain territorial acquisitions in the Far East, such as England, France, Russia and Japan possessed. She was, however, determined to develop to the limit of her ability her already important commercial interests in China, which clearly offered great possibilities for the future. Such aims required that Chinese territory remain open to free competition in trade and that a strong, enlightened native government preserve order and repel illegitimate interference from outside. The German manufacturer and merchant need never fear an honest competitor, although they do fear the political oppressor and conqueror. The inviolability of China's territory, the open door for trade and the firm establishment of the Chinese government have therefore formed the guiding principles of Germany's policy during the last twenty years—not from disinterested motives, but from proper appreciation of her own interests. If there was a time when doubts were entertained in Germany as to the practicability of this policy, this was due primarily to the greed for power of the four other Great Powers, in contrast to whose gigantic plans the German aims sank into utter insignificance. The following exposition will make this clearer; it will also show that this greed for power, despite vociferations to the contrary, was irreconcilable with the principle of the open door and with China's inviolability; in addition, it will furnish proof that England, France and Japan, as the result of a common plan, sought to prevent all further development of Germany's position in the Far East and to exclude German competition.

Immediately following the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia and France began to advance their broad front in the north and south on China's borders in such a manner that Germany (and England in even more marked manner) was filled with increasing apprehension. In June, 1895, France, despite her promise of 1885, succeeded in securing from China, not alone the advancement of her Annam boundary into Yunnan, but also the opening up to French trade of several places in Yunnan and Kuangsi. But especially valuable was China's agreement to the extension of the Annam railways into Chinese territory, and the exclusive privilege of mining undertakings in the provinces of Yunnan, Kuangsi and Kuangtung; as a result of this, these three provinces were practically transformed into an exclusive sphere of French influence. These agreements were extended in 1897 and 1898 by concessions for the building of certain railway lines through Yunnan and Kuangsi.

Similar steps were taken in the north by Russia. In the year

1891 the building of the great Siberian Railway had been begun. It was originally planned to pass exclusively through Russian territory. For this reason it would have been forced to make a wide détour in order to reach Vladivostock, and would have had to traverse the wild, uninhabited mountain districts on the northern shore of the Amur River, instead of tapping the fruitful plains and prosperous cities of Manchuria. A way out of the difficulty, however, was gained by an agreement with China in the year 1896. According to this, Russia obtained the right to build the road from a point in southern Transbaikalia, through northern and middle Manchuria in a straight line toward Vladivostock. In addition, another line was to be built with Russian capital from a point on the Manchurian line in a southerly direction, reaching the sea at the harbors of Ta-lien-wan (Dalni, Dairen), Port Arthur and Newchwang, and connecting with a further line to Tientsin and Peking. For general purposes of safety, Russia was to be allowed to protect her railways by military guards; further, she acquired the right to adopt certain military measures in Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, the conditional surrender of the Bay of Kiaochow, on the coast of Shantung, as a base for the Russian fleet, and concessions for the exploitation of mines in Manchuria. Russia thus obtained an important extension of her northern sphere of power throughout the whole of Manchuria, and if we regard the Bay of Kiaochow as marking the southern boundary, far into the territory of China proper as well. In this manner Russia acquired the much-coveted possession of ice-free harbors on the Pacific Ocean. There remained only the inclusion of "independent" Corea to round out the immense territory. Here, however, Russia's plans came into conflict with Japan's well-advanced interests.

It was self-evident that such concessions on the part of China had been obtained by Russia and France only through the exercise of strong political pressure, and the helplessness exhibited by the Chinese government filled Germany with anxiety concerning her own interests. It was no longer possible to count on protection against the encircling and constricting efforts of the politically more favorably placed oppressors of China; the division of China into "spheres of influence" seemed on the point of becoming an actuality, and whoever did not undertake to protect his own position ran the risk of being smothered. It was these considerations which decided Germany, in the year 1897, after having repeatedly called China's attention to the situation and after an especially marked slight by the officials of Shantung, to occupy the Kiaochow Bay district, in order to

make it a base for her fleet and trade, without regard for the pretended Russian claims, of which she had not been notified. England, who, as we have remarked, was much more disturbed than Germany, compensated herself for the French increase of territory by a corresponding frontier adjustment between Burmah and Yunnan, which she obtained from China in the year 1897. The acquisition of Kiaochow by Germany was not regarded by England at the moment with unfriendly eyes; for one reason, because, as Lord Salisbury remarked to the German Ambassador in London, on January 12, 1898, he "thought it probable that no great injury had been inflicted upon England," [1] and further because Russian interests were seemingly impaired, and the probability was thus increased of gaining Germany's help against Russia. There was still another consideration. After Germany had acquired certain rights to particular railway lines and mining undertakings, and was thus, in the English view, definitely indemnified in China, England determined to carve out for herself the "spheres of interests" which she thought were due to her.

On February 9, 1898, the British Minister in Peking handed a note to the Chinese government, in which he demanded the assurance that "China would never alienate any territories of the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power." The government, which was doubtless somewhat astonished by this strange demand, of course gave the desired assurance without delay, especially as the expression "any other Power" naturally included England also.[2] In this remarkably simple manner, England brought the "Yang-tsze valley" into her sphere of influence, and a telegram from Lord Salisbury, of September 24, 1898, to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, shows what we must understand by this somewhat indefinite expression. According to this, it includes "the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze River, as well as Honan and Chekiang" [3]—that is to say, not less than nine of the eighteen provinces of China, precisely the largest and most fertile, a territory which extends from the frontiers of Burmah and Thibet to the Pacific Ocean. This action is characteristic of the way in which England acquires "interests." It is self-evident that a claim of this kind to the "Yang-tsze valley," which rests purely on a one-sided declaration by England, has been recognized neither by Germany nor, so far as known, by any other Power, nor can it be recognized. An

[1] British Blue Book, 1898, China, I, No. 49.
[2] Ibid., China II, Nos. 1 and 2.
[3] British Blue Book, 1899, China II, No. 46.

explanation to that effect by the German Ambassador to Lord Salisbury, on May 13, 1898, leaves no doubt on this point.[1]

Through this advancement of their political interests by the Great Powers in the territory of China, the points of possible conflict were naturally multiplied in the south and the southwest between England and France, in the north and northeast between Russia and Japan, in a slight degree also between Russia and Germany. Even America, who had hitherto held quite aloof, but who after the war with Spain in 1898 had acquired the Philippines (in which consideration for the developments in East Asia had doubtless not been the least important factor), was thereby drawn into the larger Japanese sphere of interest in the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Germany and Russia soon came to an understanding, as the claims of the latter state did not extend beyond Manchuria. This was a disappointment to England, who felt, despite her vast sphere of interest, that she was interfered with on all sides, as she was unable to free herself of the delusion that any overseas success of another Power is a derogation of her rights. She seemed temporarily uncertain as to her plans, but considerations of general policy were finally decisive for her attitude in East Asia. Russia appeared for the moment the most annoying opponent, first because she cut off from England's exploitation long stretches of territory running to the sea, and second because her activity in the East precluded her from similar activity in the West, where it was more desired by England. The latter country's uneasiness had been increased following the leasing by Russia, in the spring of 1898, of the harbors of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (Dalni) from China, When England decided to occupy the harbor of Wei-hai-wei, lying opposite on the coast of Shantung, for so long a time as Port Arthur should remain Russian, the British government explained that the sole object of this action was to maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, menaced by Russia's occupation of Port Arthur.[2] Immediately thereafter France took possession of the Bay of Kuang-chow wan on the south coast of the Province of Kuangtung.

Once more, during the Boxer troubles (1900-01), the common danger drove the Powers to concerted action, but their rival interests quickly brought them again into opposition. Almost does it appear as if the critical state of affairs in 1900 had temporarily moved England to accept the condition of things in China as they had shaped themselves, and earnestly to devote

[1] British Blue Book, 1899, China I, No. 96.
[2] Ibid., No. 2.

her strength to preserving the further inviolability of Chinese territory and to securing the open door for trade. Only thus can the fact be explained that on October 16, 1900, she made an agreement in London with Germany, the Power most interested in both of these principles, whereby the two states proclaimed their firm intention to uphold the above maxims "for all Chinese territory, in so far as their influence extended." All the Powers were to be invited to join in the agreement, and as a matter of fact, all of them—including Russia, France and Japan—did so, with the proviso that the *status quo* should remain unchanged in the future.

But the hope proved to be vain; the decisive factors in England's European policy soon crowded all consideration of individual East Asiatic questions into the background. The most important among these factors was the conviction that the German sea trade and the German fleet were increasing in an undue manner, and should therefore be suppressed. The oft-quoted articles in the English newspapers and magazines, such as *The Spectator, The Saturday Review, The National Review,* etc., in many cases written by naval officers, and dating back to the year 1896, reveal this growing enmity toward Germany, which finally overshadowed all else. The gradually developing idea of encircling and isolating Germany made it necessary that Russia's energy be turned back toward the West, especially as she was beginning to become dangerous in the East. While down to 1898 it had been thought necessary to weaken Russia, on account of her Asiatic policy, and that to this end German assistance might be enlisted, the ultimate aim now changed, and with it the method of procedure. Russia was to be forced out of East Asia, but without thereby having her usefulness against Germany permanently decreased—that is to say, her strength must not be unduly weakened, and her expectations in West Asia, in Turkey and in the Balkans were to be increased.

For the solution of this new problem England made use of the Russo-Japanese antagonism which, as explained above, had grown up in Corea. At the beginning of the year 1902 she concluded for five years the alliance with Japan, regarding which negotiations had been carried on since 1898, and which had been first conceived of as a triple alliance to include Germany. In the treaty the contracting parties mutually recognized "the independence of China and of Corea," and furthermore the special interest of Japan in Corea was acknowledged, and protection against "the aggressive action of any other Power" agreed upon. The *casus fœderis* was not to arise in case of war with

a single Power. By unduly extending her undertakings, which included not only the whole of Manchuria but had also encroached on Corea, by contemptuously repelling the Japanese efforts toward compromise, and by overestimating her own capacity, Russia substantially aided England in promoting her plans.

In the year 1904 war broke out with the well-known results: Japan obtained a free hand in Corea; Russian rights in South Manchuria, especially as regards the harbors of Port Arthur and Dalni (Dairen), as well as the corresponding portion of the Manchurian Railway, were transferred to Japan. But—and this was important in its results for Japan's internal economy and hence for the independence of her policy—she received no indemnity for the cost of the war. England's first goal had been attained; Russia was excluded from the sea coast south of Vladivostock, while her possibilities of development remained untouched at other points, and ample room was provided for them in the West by England's Persian and Turkish policy. In addition, Japan, owing to her need of money, remained chained to England for further undertakings.

But this was not all which the year 1904-5 brought to British politics in the way of success. Advantage was taken of Russia's war—perhaps more in response to the pressure of the "go ahead" Indian party than from the voluntary decision of the government at London—to carry the plans for the acquisition of the "Indian glacis," namely Thibet, a step nearer to development; especially as there was reason for fearing that Russia might forestall England by putting herself in possession. On the plea that the Lama authorities had failed to carry out the agreement of 1890 in regard to the India-Thibet trade, a military expedition was undertaken in the autumn of 1904 to Lhassa, and a treaty extorted which made the position of Thibet, to say the least, very like that of a British protectorate. This treaty, moreover, entirely put an end to China's sovereign rights, since it dealt with Thibet as an "independent" state. The case of Corea had shown the advantage of recognizing the "independence" of such states for purposes of more ambitious undertakings.

The aroused Chinese government, however, brought about the repudiation of the treaty of Lhassa, and in 1906 on its own initiative entered into a new one with England. The provisions of this latter treaty, however, are so elastic and ambiguous that England is in a position at any time to open up the Thibet question when conditions seem favorable for so doing. Later

developments—the action of China against Thibet, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, the fall of the Chinese dynasty, and the effort of the Lama hierarchy to obtain independence—would repeatedly have been taken advantage of by England as an excuse for interference, had not once more considerations of general policy (above all in regard to Russia) dictated "watchful waiting." In the great settlement with Russia in 1907, in regard to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, both Powers pledged themselves for the present to withhold their hands from the Thibetan booty, to acknowledge China's sovereign rights, and, further, to respect her interests. But in order to hold the door open for the future, in any event, England declared in Peking in 1910 that she found herself compelled to insist upon the maintenance of an effective Thibetan government, since the fact of Thibet having its own government was a prerequisite for the security of future English plans.[1]

For the same purpose, in the year 1910, England bought from the little Himalaya state, Bhutan, for a yearly payment of 100,000 rupees, the right to direct its external relations.[2] Bhutan has "external relations" only with Thibet, whose vassal state it is, and with China, under whose mediate suzerainty it stands.[3] The following is from the pen of an English authority on East Asiatic affairs: "'*Devant ces suzerainetés-là,*' wrote a witty Frenchman, speaking of Chinese pretensions in Annam; '*on salue et on passe.*' (One salutes and passes on in the presence of such rights of suzerainty.) Before contradictions such as these, one might exclaim, we can only hold our peace dumbfounded."[4] In place of Annam, Thibet may be substituted.

In tracing this particular course of England's struggle for power, we have meanwhile anticipated developments in China, and we must again retrace our steps to the year 1905. From this period on British politics had no further need of primary or secondary aims, there was but one task for the World Empire: the destruction of Germany, of her fleet, of her colonies and of her overseas commerce. The accomplishment of this task drove England to that feverish activity in East Asia by which she sought to influence the course of events to her own advantage. Patiently, she laid all her usual interests aside in order to press into her service all the Great Powers for her great European stroke; they follow the promptings of the strings which she ma-

[1] British Blue Book, 1910, "Further Papers Relating to Thibet," Nos. 315 and 347.
[2] Ibid., No. 346.
[3] See *China and Her Neighbours*, R. S. Gundry, p. 350.
[4] Ibid., p. 95.

nipulates, in part without being conscious of what they are doing. A criss-cross of agreements extending in all directions, binds the different Powers; they have all been entered into at England's instigation, or at least under English supervision, and are intended to eliminate the possibility of clashes in the East, in order that the collective strength may remain unimpaired and free to be used in the West. China has to bear the costs of this policy, for the wishes of each one of the states concerned must find fulfilment in the great empire in order to prevent its defection. Each such fulfilment, however, costs China a part of her possessions, either in land or in sovereign rights. And while each of those interested grabs all that is within reach, each agreement proclaims its aim to be the "inviolability of China" and the "open door for the trade of the world." There is scarcely a chapter in the history of international relations which bears so plainly the stamp of untruth.

In order to understand in the following discussion the lengths to which the English plans against the German Empire had gone in Europe, it is well to recall the agreements which were made in 1906 between the British military attaché in Brussels and the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, in regard to the landing of British troops in case of conflict with Germany. In the year 1912 these were further developed.

Even before the signing of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, in August, 1905, England and Japan substituted for their treaty of alliance that would not have expired until 1907 a new one for ten years; by this, Japan gained an absolutely free hand in Corea to secure her interests, while a like privilege was granted to England "in the proximity of the Indian frontier for safeguarding her Indian possessions." The first of these points was a concession to Japan, in return for which the alliance was to be extended to India, and if necessary, to Thibet and Afghanistan —an extension which in the year 1902, according to a statement of Count Hayashi, had been denied by Japan. This protective measure was necessary, as it was not yet certain how Russia would act in the unsettled Thibetan question. In 1907, when the provisional Asiatic understanding with Russia had been effected, and Russia had thereby become a link in the chain which was being forged about Germany, the alliance with Japan had become superfluous also in the revised form. A substitute for it could be only a question of time.

The agreement with Russia, which was perhaps the hardest to bring about, was an important step forward in the preliminary work of eliminating delicate points of friction and possibilities of

conflict, at least for a number of years. A scarcely less important factor in this connection was the proper conduct of the restless and uncertain Japanese policy. Through the "Pan-Asiatic" movement in Japan, which began with the year 1899, and whose fantastic aim was the freeing of the Asiatic peoples from the yoke of Europe, especially the elimination of Western influence in East Asia, it was realized that the new Great Power might become a very disturbing element in the British plans, if that movement were to achieve serious influence on the attitude and decisions of the Japanese government. This danger undoubtedly existed after the war with Russia, and not only England but even France was uneasy regarding her East Asiatic possessions. It was, therefore, a not unimportant result of England's efforts that at the time (1907) the Russo-English treaty was made, agreements were brought about between Japan and France, as well as between Japan and Russia, in which the contracting parties pledged the preservation of the *status quo* and mutually guaranteed each other's possessions, together with all the rights thereto appertaining. This, truly, was in strange agreement with the maintenance of the "inviolability" of China and of the "open door," which both treaties solemnly guaranteed in the preamble!

A treaty between England and France was not necessary in 1907—they had long been in agreement as to the ultimate end of all their actions. This is clearly shown by a remark of Paul Deschanel, President of the French Chamber, when on January 22, 1909, after eulogizing the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 in the course of a speech on "Asia in International Politics," he said: "This treaty is of more value in its European results than its Asiatic, as it permits both Powers to concentrate their main strength in Europe and thereby to work more effectively for the maintenance of the European balance of power and of peace."

The expression "peace" in the secret language of English-French-Russian-Japanese diplomacy is a catch-word of import similar to that of the "inviolability of China"—the initiated utters neither of them without a knowing smile. For the sake of more important interests, England conveniently turned her eyes away from the danger point in the southwest, of which mention has several times been made, while the French built their great Tonkinese railway Haiphong-Laokai into the Province of Yunnan. In 1910 they reached the capital city as a temporary terminus. They made great efforts to obtain a further concession toward the north to the Upper Yangtsze, in order to gain the rich western territory in Ssechuan; they ap-

peared to be deciding in their own favor the oft-discussed question whether trade with these promising districts and with those beyond would follow the route down the Yangtsze through the British sphere of influence, through English-controlled Burmah, or toward the south through the French colonial empire. But England noticed nothing. The previous bickerings had ceased, in spite of the warnings from British mercantile circles; there was no more talk of the much-discussed railway from Burmah to Yunnan, and thence to Yangtsze.

The unasked-for assurances of her "inviolability" and of her "independence"—which was threatened by no one except the Powers pledging it—was a source of serious anxiety to China; she saw that Japan and Russia acted in Manchuria more and more in the manner of rulers; she had before her eyes the unmistakable fate of "independent" Corea with a Japanese Resident General in control, and in consequence she drew her own deductions as to the meaning of the expression "inviolability" in the language of the treaty Powers. A further factor was that in the agreements of 1907, treating of China's inviolability, strange to say, precisely those two Powers had abstained from joining for which the inviolability of China and the open door were an absolutely vital necessity—namely, Germany and the United States. China may, therefore, have felt a certain relief when the United States, too, in November, 1908, signed an agreement with Japan in which both contracting parties pledged themselves to maintain the independence and inviolability of China, the open door and the *status quo*. The aim of this agreement is apparent. The question, however, may remain unanswered whether America, fearing for the safety of the Philippines, had suggested the treaty, or whether—and this is more likely—England and Japan, or both, desired it in order to preclude the possibility of a clash between the two rivals in the Pacific Ocean (at this time regarded as highly undesirable) and in order to be able all the more effectively to make Germany appear in the eyes of the Chinese as the sole enemy of their independence.

It was soon to be made plain to the United States that it ascribed an undeserved importance to that part of the treaties meant for advertising purposes, in which the words "inviolability of China" and the "open door" played such a prominent part. Toward the end of 1909 the American Secretary of State, Knox, proposed to the Powers the "neutralization" of the railways in Manchuria, especially of the great north and south line, which had been divided between Russia and Japan in the Peace of Portsmouth; this meant the formation of an interna-

tional syndicate for the purchase of the Russian and Japanese railway interests in order to maintain Manchuria as Chinese territory open to the trade of all. The result was, as might have been expected, the reverse of what had been aimed at. Russia and Japan repelled this interference with their proceedings in the most emphatic manner; the common danger, moreover, induced them to a union which otherwise could scarcely have come about. Again "inviolate" China footed the bill.

In July, 1910, the two Powers entered into a treaty whereby they mutually guaranteed the *status quo* in Manchuria against the attacks of all third parties. At the same time, according to French newspaper dispatches, it was agreed in a supplementary clause that Japan should have a free hand in Corea and that Russia should be equally free in Mongolia, which belonged to China. Events proved the correctness of the statements. A few weeks after the signing of the treaty, "independent" Corea was annexed by Japan. In the spring of 1911, quite independently of China, Russia, through an ultimatum, forced an important extension of her special political and commercial privileges in East Turkestan and Northern Mongolia as compared to those granted by the treaty of 1881. Japan and Russia entered a joint protest, and with success, against the projected loan to China by an international syndicate for the reorganization of the administration in Manchuria. It is doubtful whether this understanding between the two Powers "operating" in the North, with its surprising results—especially the resumption of Russian activity in the East—was according to the English programme; but official England, unswerving in its aims, abstained from all protest, and in 1911, Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament that the British government must recognize the fact that "Russia and Japan have special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." Thus, as far as England was concerned, the fate of China's Mongolian territory had been sealed.

Toward the end of 1911, in the midst of the Chinese revolutionary disturbances, the northern part of Mongolia announced its independence—scarcely to the surprise of Russia—under the Lama High Priest of Urga, and at the beginning of 1912 Russia informed Peking that she recognized this "independence" and desired to render "assistance" to the new state; that she was going to build a railway from the Baikal Lake on the Siberian line to Urga, which would later be continued toward the south as far as Kalgan and connect there for Peking. The system of "independence" in the manner of Corea and Thibet had brought forth imitators. The projected railway

line, Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan, is of such importance for Russian politics and trade that negotiations in regard to it have not been allowed to come to a standstill even during the war. According to newspaper dispatches, on September 17, 1914, Russia entered into a treaty with the Mongolian "government" in regard to the building of railways, granting of a non-interest-bearing loan and carrying through of administrative reforms, which transformed Mongolia practically into a Russian protectorate. In the sitting of the Duma, at the beginning of February, 1915, Minister Sassonov gave promise of the early announcement of "the signing of the three-cornered Russian-Chinese-Mongolian treaty."

As a result of this development, which had grown ever more pronounced since 1910 and which from year to year excluded greater portions of the Chinese Empire from general trade, Germany turned to America, at the beginning of 1912, with the request for an expression of the views of that government. The reply of Secretary of State Knox, with an optimism scarcely to be understood even to-day, expressed the opinion that all the Powers had hitherto acted in accordance with their mutual pledges to respect the inviolability and sovereignty of China. On the motion of Germany, the document was printed in the newspapers in February, 1912. It is easy to imagine the impression which it must have produced in the circle of the "knowing ones."

Even more emphatic than in the case of Russia was the opposition which the American plan of neutralization of 1909 aroused in Japan. It served to sharpen the already existing animosity against America, due to the attitude of the Western States regarding Asiatic emigration. At times, the relations between the two Powers became so strained that England was seriously concerned, not only regarding the general effect on her alliance plans in Europe, but especially as to the possibility of herself being drawn into a conflict between Japan and America through her treaty obligations. There was pressing need of a corresponding change in the treaty of alliance of 1905. In 1911, the same year in which the Belgian Minister to Berlin called the attention of his government to the danger of its understanding with England, Sir Edward Grey and Baron Kato, at that time Japanese Ambassador to London and now Minister of Foreign Affairs, agreed upon a new treaty, four years before the termination of the old one; it was to run to 1921. The paragraph in regard to safeguarding English rights "in the neighborhood of the frontiers of India" was omitted—the treaty with Russia of 1907 had rendered this superfluous. In its place was substituted a new paragraph, according to which neither of the two Powers

was required to aid its ally in a war against a third Power with which the state not fighting had signed a treaty of arbitration. There existed such a treaty between England and America—England was therefore relieved of her duty to Japan as regards America.

Naturally, this new treaty, that had apparently become quite meaningless, called forth extremely sharp criticism in Japan; and in fact the question calls for an answer: By means of what other concessions did England gain relief from the obligation of aiding against America, a relief which was especially important at that time? There can be no further doubt to-day, after Minister Kato's speech on September 5, 1914, in the Japanese Diet and in view of the whole conduct of Japan since the outbreak of war, that these concessions were made at Germany's cost. Japan had received *carte blanche* as regards the German protectorate at Kiaochow, German commercial privileges in Shantung, probably also the German possessions in the South Seas, and as regards China proper—in the last case to an extent of which we have no knowledge. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, Japan seized upon the more or less unprotected German possessions; moreover, according to a Peking dispatch to *The Times* (London), in the middle of February, 1915, she demanded from China, in addition to various other far-reaching concessions, special rights in Eastern Mongolia, in Southern Manchuria, in the provinces of Shantung and Fukien (opposite Japanized Formosa), as well as in certain parts of the district of the Middle Yangtzse—demands, the granting of which by China would bring her into a relation with Japan similar to that which existed in Corea before the annexation in 1910. These demands, it is explained, were brought to the knowledge of England, France, Russia and America, although in modified form, in January, 1915, and *The Times* found them, according to agreement, "quite justified." Whether the rest of the world will join in this view will be shown in the future.

The preceding exposition gives an incomplete idea of the far-reaching policy of force of England, France, Russia and Japan, in East Asia, as well as of the systematic effort of England, even with considerable sacrifices and denial of precisely those principles the upholder of which she otherwise claims to be, to isolate Germany in these regions also and to destroy her politically as well as commercially. To this end she brought about a chain of agreements, the pretext for which was the inviolability of China and the open door, and from which Germany alone was excluded on principle. By this means it was intended to create

the impression in China that Germany alone entertained designs against the territory and the political independence of China, and was therefore to be regarded as dangerous for the latter state, an enemy of the Allied Powers, and a menace to peace. The press of England, as well as that of China, Japan, France and Russia, to which it supplied material, prostituted itself to this end uninterruptedly for years by insults, slanders and suspicions of Germany and the Germans, of Germany's official representatives and of her merchants, in order to rob the modest but all-too-successful commercial rival of reputation and standing.

As a matter of fact, Germany and America were the only ones who honorably upheld the principle of China's inviolability and of the open door, and who never strove for territorial gains at the cost of China; they desired nothing but freedom for their trade under peaceful conditions. In view of these facts, the speech of the Japanese Minister, Kato, of September 5, quoted above, sounds strangely grotesque. According to this, it was not in revenge for the protest against the Treaty of Shimonoseki that Japan declared war on Germany, as the European world had been taught to believe, but "in response to England's request for Japan's assistance," because "the trade with East Asia, which Japan and England regard as among their particular interests, is subject to continual menace (from Germany); because furthermore, according to the view of the (Japanese) government, it constitutes a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent peace in East Asia for Germany, whose interests run counter to those of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to possess in a corner of the Far East a basis for her powerful activity, and, finally, because this is opposed to the more mediate interests of our own (Japanese) Empire."

Even Minister Kato would scarcely dare seriously to assert that Japan's participation was rendered obligatory, under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, by England's attack on Germany. In Article II of this Treaty occur the words, "unprovoked attack or agressive action" against one of the signatory Powers. No answer was given by Japan to Germany's offer to exclude the East Asiatic territory from the field of war operations, nor did she reply to a similar motion by China. For the rest, Kato's speech contains its own refutation.

BOOK IV

THE CAUSES AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR

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IN the vast mass of controversial literature regarding the World War, chief place is usually given to those causes which are close at hand and easily apprehended. Even among those authorities who desire to give more than an *ex parte* exposition there are many who confuse discussion of the final causes with an understanding of the more deep-lying ones; especially among neutrals is the superficial belief encountered that through diligent study of the Blue Books alone may the question be satisfactorily answered: What is the truth? As a matter of fact, the sequence of events leading up to the beginning of the World War stretches far back into the past, and the deeper one delves in this tangled mass the more convinced does one become that great world-historical forces must long since have been set in motion to bring about this outcome as it were in the nature of an inexorable fate. Only he who appreciates them to their full extent is able to perceive at what points those forces destructive of peace have prevailed, and, operating together, have led to such terrible results. During the years previous to the outbreak of the war, the plain meaning of many occurrences was not recognized, because we desired not to disturb the maintenance of peace by premature alarms; but now, when all these possibilities have been swept aside, the chief lines of development of the last decades stand forth so clearly that the attempt may be made to outline from a comprehensive point of view a history of the events preliminary to the war.

The central position of the German Empire results in bringing it into many-sided relations to all the Powers and in making it at all times dependent on their political grouping.

Inter-dependence and mutual consideration as regards other states, its own interests and those antagonistic thereto subject it to constant anxieties; it is forced to maintain its position under the most complicated conditions of competition operative in the case of any state. On this account, the leaders of Germany have never been able to expound their aims so clearly as the statesmen of those countries who, thanks to a more independent position, could

follow a more direct line of policy. One result of this is that serious political writing has not been developed as independently among us as was to be desired; foreign countries, therefore, owing to the necessary reserve of responsible organs on the one hand and of the absolute unrestraint of unauthoritative voices on the other, have not always been able to gain a correct impression.

As a matter of course, I shall seek to estimate the cross-currents and interplay of the policies of other nations as measured by the standard of Germanic policies. Although surrounded by an army of inimical writers of pamphlets who, in blind passion, disdain no weapon and in their ignorance eagerly seize upon every argument, I shall nevertheless maintain a dignified manner of speech, despite the difficulty at times for a German to do so in these days. Above all, it is my aim to fulfill the duties of the objective historian and to do justice to a broad, universalistic grasp of the problem, as has been most notably done among all the historians of the world by a German, Leopold von Ranke. In his spirit, I shall seek to straighten out the threads of this confused tangle and to pave the way, to the best of my ability, for an understanding of events which, although no deduction can be final to-day, may at least be traced in outline as leading to the war.

I. PRELIMINARY

French Revanche. The Dual Alliance. Beginnings of Anglo-German Rivalry

The two basic facts to which the origin of the world war is to be traced are the formation of the German Empire in 1870-71, and the vengeful determination of the French some day to overturn by force the condition of things established at that time in Europe.

The entrance of Germany into the circle of the Great Powers, which looked upon her advent with disfavor, was followed by a period of peaceful policy on her part which sternly held aloof from all Continental ambitions. Bismarck studiously observed the rule of the conqueror, not "to bend the bow too far," and took up a defensive attitude toward French *revanche.* The formation of the *Dreibund,* as the world has repeatedly had to acknowledge during the last generation, served exclusively this aim of peaceful maintenance of the existing order. Opposed to this, French *revanche,* although the result of patriotic motives and testifying to the inexhaustible vitality of the French nation,

aimed at the recovery of France's dominating position on the Upper Rhine and of the resulting command over South Germany—the key to France's former hegemony. This ambition, whether openly expressed or veiled in cautious and ambiguous diplomatic language, was of a distinctly offensive character. The sentiment of *revanche* was not always the same in its expression—in peaceful times it resigned itself to a manifestation of patience, but its intensity invariably flared up with the appearance anywhere in the world of a possibility of gaining assistance. Most significant of this spirit was the fact that death was threatened to any French statesman who had the courage seriously to oppose its demands.

Revenge thus became the invisible regulator of the whole internal French party life, and inspired the leading men during these forty-four years with such an uncompromising hostility that all the other Powers had to reckon with it as an unalterable fact. Bismarck's policy, therefore, contented itself with isolating French ambition in Europe without provoking it, and with encouraging it in friendly fashion to occupy itself with colonial expansion. This manner of meeting the danger was successful as long as Germany, fully occupied with her own problems, limited herself to a Continental policy; the situation immediately became more delicate when the modest colonial acquisitions which Bismarck had made led to tension with England, and when soon thereafter aggressive Pan-Slavism likewise raised its head in the Bulgarian question. Immediately with the mere suggestion of a new grouping of the Powers, Jules Ferry's effort toward a Franco-German *rapprochement,* on the basis of a colonial understanding, was nullified; in an instant and without inherent cause, its place was taken by General Boulanger's agitation, and many Frenchmen appeared unable to resist the propaganda of an adventurer who—for the first time since 1871—seemed to hold out hopes for the gratifying of their desires. Although Bismarck, who even then had great difficulty in holding Russia and France apart despite his gifts as a statesman, succeeded once more in checking this recrudescence of *revanche,* it was nevertheless the Boulanger episode which—even in the opinion of our enemies—gave the deciding impulse toward an era of increased military preparation in the world.

With the retirement of Bismarck, the situation, which had become more and more tense and which was now only artificially maintained, became even more delicate. Despite the friendly advances and diplomatic efforts which Bismarck had made during the last years, there was a renewal of pressure

from Russia, whose efforts to form an alliance with Austria-Hungary he had once blocked. Although we succeeded, it is true, in improving our relations with England, and in the treaty of 1890 gained certain things which were for us of vital necessity (peaceful compromise in Africa, and above all the acquisition of Heligoland), yet the unavoidable took place: our two Continental neighbors no longer allowed themselves to be held apart, but began to approach each other. That which in Bismarck's time had loomed up as a possibility, the avoidance of which had called for one political sacrifice after the other, became soon after the accession of Emperor William II a stern reality which had to be reckoned with.

Through the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891, Germany's existence became subject to a permanent and heavy burden. The immediate revival of the French idea of *revanche* showed that any one in Paris who wished to rise politically would now have to make himself completely subservient to the secretly cherished aims of the national ambition. If in the year 1871 a man like Renan had declared that the only possible future programme for France was "to strengthen the growing hatred of the Slavs for the Germans, to encourage Pan-Slavism and without reserve to advance all Russian ambitions," it was now believed that the key had been obtained which would once and for all open the gates to the promised land of revenge. The German Empire was from now on permanently exposed to the possibility of a war on two fronts, and in view of the nature of its open borders, was able only through an increase of its defensive strength toward the east and west to adapt itself to a geographic and military situation such as no Great Power in the world has to meet. Even so, in the quarter of a century during which Emperor William II has stood at the Empire's helm, our militarism has consisted in the fact that, although the German nation willingly undertook increased burdens, our policy was, nevertheless, the maintenance of peace.

The responsible leaders of this policy did not allow themselves to be betrayed into seeking alleviation of the pressure under which Germany was laboring by an appeal to arms; they did not allow themselves to be tempted into war either by favorable opportunities, which repeatedly offered themselves, or by consideration of advantages which might be gained by a "preventive war," against which Bismarck, too, had consistently raised his voice.

The condition of coercion created by the Dual Alliance was bearable at the beginning, since the Russian rulers, once they had

the treaty safely in hand, turned their attention toward Asia and began to exploit the European situation for far-reaching plans of world conquest. During the next decade, the French had to admit to themselves with bitter disappointment that their beloved ally, instead of helping them to realize their dreams of revenge, had "deserted" to the Far East, with his military forces and their capital. A further development was that Russia entered into an agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1897—the scope of which was widened in 1903—regarding the *status quo* in the Near East; this sealed for a long time the greatest source of danger for Europe and eliminated the pressure to which Germany's policy had been constantly subjected.

Although as a result Germany was able to sustain the immediate pressure of the Dual Alliance on the Continent, the Empire found itself henceforth, through the mere existence of the combination, in a difficult position as soon as it desired to extend its activity overseas. Germany was not driven into transoceanic enterprise, however, by arbitrary desire or in the effort to gain prestige, but by economic necessity and the rapid colonial expansion of the old World Powers. The last Great Power to arrive on the scene saw that if it desired to secure for itself even a modest and purely economic share in the possibilities of the future, before the world was divided forever, it would have to take part in some manner in this competition. We were at times blamed for a too noisy and a too great zeal in our new course, but it must not be forgotten that this was only the outward expression in the turning of the nation's thoughts to new tasks of inner, practical reality.

Germany's position offered no natural sphere of expansion and her past no traditions on which we could build; it was necessary at every point where we desired a place in the sun to lay the foundations on fresh ground. One need not be in all respects in agreement with the methods of this policy to admit that it remained free from the capitalistic corruption which in other countries has almost invariably accompanied imperialistic expansion; that it did not seek the conquest and destruction of small nations, and finally that it did not imperil the present peace of Europe for the sake of the future aims which it pursued. We might, it is true, have avoided all the dangers which are bound up with that which is called world politics, but only at the price of a renunciation which no virile growing people with faith in its own future would submit to. While this was out of the question, we realized that this new policy was only possible on the basis and within the limits of the restricted Continental position

of our Empire. In England this was understood—here from the start was the key to the new situation.

English statesmen boasted during the nineties of the "splendid isolation" of their Empire, and they regarded this position with equanimity, since a balance of the Continental Powers in which the *Dreibund* and the Dual Alliance mutually held each other, corresponded exactly to the traditional condition in which England had always endeavored to keep Europe, in order meanwhile to carry out undisturbed the completion of the greatest of all colonial empires. At the beginning of the nineties, England had drawn a step nearer to Germany, and was united by treaty with the other two members of the *Dreibund* in regard to common interests in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. She had even gone so far as to proclaim in a protocol "the identity of the interests of the *Dreibund* and those of England." But on that account there was no inclination to make the least sacrifice for the sake of pleasant relations with Germany. On the contrary, she considered Germany to be too securely held in check for England to see any necessity for showing great consideration for our interests; Germany's power was valued only to the extent that it was serviceable as a check to the Dual Alliance and only so long as it was subservient to England's insular policy. British statesmanship of this decade aimed, therefore, at the exploitation of Germany's hemmed-in position in the interest of England's world aims. As a Continental Power, we found ourselves called upon to avoid deadly quarrels with the members of the Dual Alliance for what were, after all, secondary colonial interests; as the latest comer among the Colonial Powers, it was to our interest to see that independent and promising trade territory was neither divided up politically nor shut off commercially, but that it remained an independent unit with an open door. England's policy, however, was the reverse in both respects.

Thus, the course of England and Germany in the world began to diverge more and more, not as regards actual claims, which at no point seriously clashed, but in the matter of future possibilities and of considerations of policy on a broad scale. We were frequently forced to oppose England's actions and to refuse our coöperation in cases of projected intervention. A difference of views became constantly more pronounced. Opportunities were welcomed by German statesmen to demonstrate the possibility of coöperation with the Dual Alliance. Thus it was chiefly from this European point of view that Germany joined in the Franco-Russian protest against the Treaty of Shimonoseki,

in order to preserve China's integrity. This step seemed to be evidence of a certain emancipation of German policies from those of England. Moreover, the Germans carried through their part in this intervention (which was later much criticized) in a manner especially mild and considerate for Japan; it remained for the English, who originally had desired the same thing, later to place upon Germany (in the eyes of the Japanese) all the odium of being the originators of this movement.

At this time the British Liberal cabinet resigned, and Lord Salisbury, the leader of the Conservatives, undertook the direction of affairs. In view of the friendly words with which in 1879 he greeted the formation of the Austro-German Alliance, it seems to have been forgotten that in the year 1864, while he was still Sir Robert Cecil, he had opposed the mere possibility of a strong Germany more violently than any one of his compatriots; as regards his attitude in later years, one may venture to say that the beginnings of a German world policy met only with opposition or misunderstanding from him. His principal object now was to prevent joint action of Germany and the Dual Alliance in world politics. With this in mind, soon after his accession to office (the occurrence did not at that time become public) he personally made to Emperor William II, contrary to all English traditions, the proposal to divide Turkey. The Emperor, however, resisted the temptation to make our policy subservient to that of England. It was to Germany's interest to uphold the political and commercial preservation of Turkey as one of the few open fields of promising activity—in other words, to carry out the program which a few years later we officially announced and which to-day we are defending as far as this is still possible, with our weapons against the greed of the Great Powers. Any pronounced coöperation of Germany in such a scheme of division would have caused Russia's interference and have thrown on us all the burdens of a resulting war. Such an endangering of world peace on the Continent was, no doubt, highly welcome to Salisbury's policy, which a German statesman of those days was fond of describing as "the chestnut policy," but it was in no sense in the interest of a Power such as Germany, which first of all had to consider its Continental position. If from this failure of Salisbury's attempt to lead Germany on, there remained a personal feeling of pique, the following year was destined to bring about a further increase in the tension. Unmistakable antagonism became apparent in respect to the future of the non-English portions of South Africa.

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the guiding principle of Ger-

man policy was not to allow a further portion of the globe to be swallowed whole by the giants. For this reason, even before the Jameson raid, Germany had declared that she would not permit a departure from the treaties of 1884 which formed the basis for the Boer Republics at that time. Several days beforehand the German Ambassador had warned the Foreign Office of the projected filibustering expedition, but a pretense had been made of absolute ignorance and, instead of taking timely precautions, there was an evident desire to profit by the accomplished fact. Hence, the congratulatory telegram of the Emperor to President Kruger was not so much a world-political act of offense from the German Empire as a world-political act of defense, for the sake of the *status quo* and of the rights of small nations. Moreover, the step was not taken against official England, which repudiated all share in Jameson's undertaking and was compelled to place the ring-leaders on trial, but against a predatory attack in connection with which English statesmen were later proved to be connected in a compromising manner. That the outraged sense of right throughout the civilized world found expression through the authority of the German Emperor was resented all the more strongly in London. As early as 1894 *The Saturday Review,* which was closely connected with South African interests, had taken an emphatic stand against the German Empire and had dismissed with disdain all thought of an alliance;[1] now for the first time its columns gave voice to the indignant cry: *"Germania est delenda."*[2] It was at this same time that we came to realize that in no question of world politics should we be able to count even on France's formal observation of neutrality toward us, while England knew from this moment that she could have an alliance with France at any time she seriously desired it.

Disputes and differences in the field of colonial politics alone would not have been sufficient to disturb the relation between two nations which had been bound for centuries by a comradeship in arms and by tradition, and which had never met as enemies.

[1] *The Saturday Review* of August 8, 1895, while acknowledging the convenience offered by an alliance with Germany, objects to it for the following reason, which has its root in the century-old tradition of British policy: "First of all, we English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and commerce; and our chief rival in trade and commerce to-day is not France, but Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and to lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the issue might be, we stand to lose heavily."

[2] *The Saturday Review* of February 1, 1896: "The biological view of foreign policy is plain. First, federate our colonies and prevent geographical isolation turning the Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Germany, as *Germania est delenda.* Third, be ready to fight America when the time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting wars against peoples from whom we have nothing to fear."

But for a number of years a new cause for antagonism had come into existence, a trade rivalry, which in England was at first regarded with astonishment, then with growing anxiety, and finally with resentment. This rivalry was felt all the more keenly, as precisely at this time there began a series of unfavorable years for England economically. The per capita figures of the English export trade, which for some time had been on the decrease, began to fall more noticeably, in the period following 1895, while the German figures advanced strikingly. From year to year German competition was regarded more suspiciously in England, from year to year comparative statistics became more unfavorable, until finally in 1903 German production of pig iron for the first time exceeded that of England, and the value of German exports to England was higher than the value of English exports to Germany.

The anxiety caused by these events, which doubtless was a factor in the above-mentioned reserve of the English government, furnished from the year 1895 on a constantly stronger reason for diplomatic coolness. Under the first sting of the new trade rivalry, the provocative articles of *The Saturday Review* were not without effect; in circles naturally by no means anti-German they fostered the thought that England's general policy called for "a new taking of bearings." Arguments were ready to hand which were familiar to the mind and the interest of every Englishman, and which the history of centuries had shown to be the basis of all political calculation. Once launched upon such a line of argument, with English consistency, there was no drawing back from the most extreme deductions. In an article in the issue of September 11, 1897, which has become celebrated, *The Saturday Review* said regarding the two irreconcilably opposed nations who had taken the whole world for their province and who demanded commercial tribute from it:

"England, with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light amongst nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India, and the East, in the islands of the Southern Seas, and in the far North-West, wherever—and where has it not?—the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the flag, the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build,

a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin—there the German and the Englishman are struggling to be the first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were to be extinguished to-morrow, there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer the day after to-morrow. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession—must they not fight for two hundred and fifty million pounds of yearly commerce?"

This calm toying with a war of prevention is carried on all the more cold-bloodedly since the mad idea is believed to be not only practicable but even easily so and without danger.

"England is the only Great Power who could fight Germany without tremendous risk and without doubt of the issue—the growth of Germany's fleet has had no other result than to bring down England's hand on her all the more heavily. The German ships would soon be at the bottom of the sea or in convoy toward English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the Baltic ports would lie under the guns of England, waiting until the war indemnity was paid. Our work over, we should not even need to take the trouble to alter Bismarck's words to Ferry, and to say to France and Russia: 'Seek your compensation. Take from German land whatever you like! You can have it.'"

One link after the other is forged, until the chain is complete which, as the result of shop-keepers' considerations, leads to the world war; it is the first conception of the Triple Entente, in the overheated brain of a journalist. With such unspeakable logic and frivolity did they dare to speak before the German fleet had become important and before political instinct had taught the necessity of modifying the language of passion and preserving appearances before the world. It was, to be sure, only an individual voice, unauthoritative and without immediate influence, but the chorus of similar voices was increased in these years by *The National Review* and *The Spectator,* and it revealed a growing sentiment, calculated to become irresistible to the "man in the street" and in the counting-house if some day, for reasons of a general political nature, England's world policy would have to be settled anew. It represented a rising wave in the country where public opinion rules which might easily become unpleasant for those statesmen who sought to oppose it, but which would quickly bear aloft the one who knew how to take advantage of it.

We touch here, it is true, on something which cannot without more ado be called an immediate cause of war. Such considera-

tions are subject to the general political aim of a government—that aim is decisive and still unweakened. It must even be admitted that the argument as regards trade rivalry had lost weight in the course of the last decade before the war, and had given way at many places to a clearer insight. It was not possible to advance it in the same sweeping manner as in the early years, since the bases for such an argument had again shifted considerably. Above all, the notable rise in English export statistics following the period of stagnation could not fail to calm the most timid spirits, and the wiser heads with time recognized the fact that in the relations of the two countries commercial interdependence held too important a place for them to bend their energies on mutual destruction. It may perhaps be stated that trade rivalry leading to the verge of war could no longer be used as an argument with such evident success by English publicists as at the start. When, however, the war broke out, the elemental forces of this abyss were perceived to be of an extent and provocative violence which was surprising.

In the latter half of the nineties, however, the forces which were gradually gathering momentum were as yet by no means strong enough to determine the attitude of the leading statesmen. Even had they desired to listen to such promptings, they would not yet have been able to accede to them, in view of the marked opposition which England faced at all points. The actual antagonism, then existing, of Russia in Asia and France in North Africa represented far greater dangers than the anxious suspicions regarding Germany.

II. THE PRELUDE

English Offers of Alliance. Boer War. The German Fleet

The impression is created that England, before definitely laying down her policy along lines opposed to Germany, had made certain attempts to solve the many-sided world problems with which she was confronted by means of more friendly relations with Germany. The further course of events and the political development of the men who took part in the *pourparlers* seem to-day to speak with unmistakable clearness as regards the meaning which was at the bottom of this tentative sounding by England. In any event, one must admit that the determination of the English to abandon their position of "splendid isolation" between the Dual Alliance and the *Dreibund* was not destined inevitably and at once and by a single possible path to lead to a

clearly recognized goal. While the great British world interests of the past and present were opposed only by the Powers of the Dual Alliance, anxiety as to the future pointed to Germany. At the period of Fashoda, of the Chinese Revolution and of the Boer War, there was doubtless, in the interplay and complexity of political interests, more than one possibility in case it was desired to exchange the unstable political condition for that of a firmer union.

Although Lord Salisbury had always replied evasively to the German tentative questionings of the eighties and nineties, it appeared as if in the later years of his leadership he was inclined to a different view. It was the opposition to Russia in East Asia (early in 1898) and the threatened conflict with France in Africa which first gave rise in the British Cabinet to the thought of a more intimate connection with Germany, or, more correctly expressed, of a treaty acting as a counterpoise to the far-reaching political influence of the Dual Alliance. At the end of March, 1898, the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, for the first time sounded the German Ambassador. The tendency of his question was revealed by his speech on May 13, 1898, in which, in the midst of a sharp attack upon Russia, he called for an alliance with England's American "cousins," and declared any war well worth the price which would lead to an alliance of the Anglo-Saxons; he laid his cards openly on the table:

"Great Britain might have declared war on Russia, but without an ally we are not in a position seriously to harm her."

An ally against Russia—that was the part which Germany was expected to play. After the matter had been touched upon several times in interviews of Count Hatzfeldt with Salisbury, Balfour and Chamberlain, in the summer of 1898 England made a move in Berlin in this connection. On July 10, 1898, Major Marchand's company occupied Fashoda, and the Franco-English crisis seemed to be leading toward war. In the ensuing negotiations the fact was not concealed from the English that Russia, for her part, entertained no desire and felt no need of supporting the French *revanche* idea so long as Germany upheld Russia's position in Asia. If, however, it was urged in Berlin, an Anglo-German alliance directed against Russia were to be formed, reaction on the Russo-German relations could not be avoided. What could England offer in the way of protecting our rear? By emphasizing the fact, moreover, that Russia had shown a more conciliatory spirit in Asia, the principle "to live and let live" was indicated as the one that would lead to a permanent improvement of the relations. In any case, assurance would have to be given that the

entire British government and Parliament would ratify such an alliance. For as soon as something of Chamberlain's plans became known, public opinion grew unsettled. *The Saturday Review* stormed against this worst of all madnesses and this bitterest of all humiliations, and repeated that as long as the economic struggle continued,[1] "a sincere understanding between the two nations would be impossible; if we have need for an alliance, why do we not make overtures to France?" Obsessed with this one idea, and with a cunning appreciation of the popular mind, the article attacked the Court influences which were behind this alliance, and even ventured to "remind the Court and Mr. Chamberlain that a nation that has dethroned dynasties before will deal harshly with the party which betrays English interests now." Even though German statesmen were willing to pass over outbreaks of this nature, they could not but ask themselves whether they were willing to lay the foundations for a new German Continental policy on such uncertain ground, which shifted with every change of party, and whether they could dare lightly to disregard the situation created by the Dual Alliance.

There thus remained only the possibility of an agreement as to individual questions which might prepare the way for a general understanding. A great deal, it is true, was not to be expected from the British Prime Minister, who on a previous occasion had declared that Germany asked too much, although absolutely no demand had yet been made by Berlin. The sole result of all the negotiations, therefore, was an agreement made in October, 1898, looking to economic exploitation of the Portuguese colonies by Germany and England, in case Portugal failed to meet her loan obligations. This was an understanding the subject of which lay beyond the real world political danger zone and which did not involve our relations with other Powers. From the English point of view it foreshadowed preparations for the Boer War, and in this respect it may have been intended to bind Germany's hands for the future as regards this question. In any case, it was for Germany a contingent agreement, in which the question whether the contingency was to arise or not, in the nature of things, depended on the good will and loyalty of the other side—that is to say, on assumptions which proved to have been unjustified.

Was this to be the prelude to a closer union? If Germany had no intention of being drawn into an alliance without a *quid pro*

[1] *The Saturday Review* of September 10, 1898: "We do not love Emperor William, neither do we love the German people. And the reason is that we have to fight the German trader, with his cheap and nasty merchandise, in every market of every country of the world."

quo, she had even less desire for a return which would have involved her, not in an understanding, but in a war with a third nation. After the outbreak of the Boer War, England continued to act according to her customary methods, which position and traditional experience had necessarily developed. We, however, were called upon to realize that we were expected simply to play the part of a Continental sentry in the Boer War, and that if we consented to assume this part at England's command, we should find ourselves threatened by the war on two fronts, which we had hitherto avoided. At this time, less than ever, could we afford frivolously to extend the antagonism with France to the colonial field (from which Bismarck had always managed to exclude it), in order, in the words of Frederick the Great, to play the Don Quixote to English trade.

In the Boer War, Germany could not have taken any other course than she did. Compelled before the war to limit herself to advising President Kruger most earnestly to yield, after the outbreak of hostilities neutrality was imperative. Public opinion in Germany, as in France and America, was in the main passionately with the Boers; for sentimental reasons, it took sides in this most heroic of struggles which a small and free people has ever carried on against a giant World Power, nor did it hesitate to call by their right name such things as the horrors of the concentration camps, which aroused indignation in all civilized countries and which brought the blush of shame to the cheek of many Englishmen. That in England this German attitude produced a painful impression is explicable; that the resulting resentment was directed solely against the Germans was due to the later basic change in the country's policy. The German Empire, despite the efforts of the Pan-Germans, maintained neutrality. Chamberlain's siren calls during the disastrous week of the Boer War, and the bait of a new triple alliance between the German race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxons were taken only at their real worth; emphatic protest was successfully made against the excesses and violence of the British maritime policy, and the sale of weapons to England by Germans was prohibited as contrary to the spirit of neutrality. But just as Germany wished to avoid becoming an accomplice in the strangling of the Boer Republics, she was also careful not to let herself be made use of by England's old enemies. At the most intense period of the war, perhaps with the desire to disrupt the Anglo-German tentative understanding, France and Russia approached Germany with the proposal to bring about in connection with them the end of the war, in

order to save the Boers and to humiliate England. Emperor William II, however, who was not guided by Machiavellian considerations as regards England, rejected the proposal, since Germany, as he said, must always abstain from a policy which might bring her into conflict with a sea power like England. In order to appreciate this action, one needs only to ask himself whether, after the experiences of January, 1896, Germany could seriously have counted on fighting shoulder to shoulder with the nation of the *revanche* against England. The Emperor more than once took steps to modify the strong current of German public opinion.

Meanwhile German statesmen profited to the full by the lessons of the Boer War. These were the years during which the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution placed the fate of the greatest empires in question, when old Powers broke like rotten reeds, and the world seemed about to be divided up among a few states; we were still under the fresh impression of what the absolute rule of the seas meant and what military capacity England, together with her great colonial white territories, was able to develop overseas by means of her fleet, in defiance of all other Powers. Germany could not close her eyes to the fact that the previous policy of freedom of action, of the open door, and of peaceful development, could not be carried through without the possession of a fleet—indeed, that even a neutral position in great crises could not be maintained save with loss; that our colonial and trade interests, which were increasing in value, were without defense in the world; that in view of our constricted Continental position, without a fleet we were exposed to being forced weakly to trim our sails to every wind and to yield unquestioningly. Moved by the course of events of the Spanish-American War, Prince Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chancellor, emphasized the fact that we must not risk exposing ourselves to the danger of suffering at the hands of England the fate imposed by the United States on Spain—for the British press evermore haughtily threatened against the youngest Colonial Power a fate such as had for good and all excluded the oldest Colonial Power from the field of competition. And during the Boer War we also learned through the stopping of Imperial German mail ships that in a naval war there is for England no limit to aggressions against neutrals, that in critical moments the *lacunæ* in maritime law are filled out by naval power—that is, to say, by England's dominance of the sea. The policy of the free hand was practicable in future only in case this hand was not powerless on the seas. The German Empire,

therefore, determined upon a new far-seeing program for the development of the fleet, which had already been strengthened in 1898, in order to gain the same undisputed guarantee of peace in the world in general that we were able to uphold on land toward the East and West—not for the sake of a future offensive, but in order to deter an enemy from deliberately assuming such an offensive by precipitating a war of prevention at a moment devoid of danger. The Secretary of the Navy, von Tirpitz, proclaimed the object of the fleet thus: The stronger it is, the more difficult and the more dangerous will it be for an enemy to defeat it.

"An enemy will find himself faced by the question, in beginning a war against Germany, whether such an undertaking will pay for the costs—that is to say, whether it is worth the risk. He will probably make a compromise with us, if we possess a strong battle fleet. Therein lies the strong guarantee of peace which is given by a powerful fleet, and this is the best protection which we can provide for our commerce."

Immediately thereafter, the outbreak of the troubles in China (the murder of the German Minister, in July, 1904) led to renewed coöperation with England, whereby we obtained a clear and illuminating perception of the limitation of possible united action with this Power. As soon as the Anglo-German Yangtsze Agreement no longer seemed capable of being used for the purpose of disrupting the German-Russian relations, London lost all interest in it and sought to becloud its meaning with a mass of misunderstanding, a proceeding which brought with it a clear interpretation in the German *Reichstag* and corresponding disclosures in Petrograd. The wind soon veered around so sharply—presumably as the result of the change of rulers—that the Under-Secretary of State, Cranbourne, in March, 1901, ventured openly to deny any curtailment of the treaty, while the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne, officially asserted the correctness of the interpretation by the German Ambassador. *The Daily News,* however, admitted with refreshing frankness that the agreement was worthless to England, since Germany could not be counted on against Russia—this was and remained for London the crucial consideration if it was to act in concert with Berlin.

The uncertainty as regards Anglo-German relations was still pending when the change of rulers finally prepared the way for the new aims of England's foreign policy. The personal influence of King Edward on the policy of his country has been variously estimated; the French, who really knew, enthusiastical-

ly praised him to the skies, while the English, in keeping with their manner of political thought, preferred to attribute to him a much smaller influence in their parliamentary life. At all events, a new factor of extraordinary energy and individuality made itself felt in the control of England's destinies: a man who was determined personally to become the sponsor for the unbroken course of foreign policy, independent of changes in party rule and beyond the limits fixed by tradition. Whether in the determination of his course, personal rivalry and sensitiveness on one side or sympathies on the other were a factor, is perhaps not so important as the repressed ambition of a personality which had so long stood in the shadow of power; now, when the close of the Boer War had prepared the way, this personality was all eagerness to assume the lead in the change that had long been seen to be gathering, and he was confident of being able to direct it into new lines.

Though King Edward may have been determined from the start to make an end of England's splendid isolation in another direction than that of Germany, the previous negotiations with the latter country were not yet on that account discontinued. The English statesmen who held the real power in their hands were not prepared for or inclined to a sudden change of attitude. But the last episode of the Anglo-German discussion regarding an alliance which began with the obsequies of Queen Victoria, revealed at the start a different atmosphere. The negotiations demonstrated anew that England was most ready to bind us with heavy obligations, and in addition to handicap us with the odium of these obligations in Russian eyes, but that for her own part she intended to maintain the understanding with Russia touching world-political questions, which had now become less difficult, and at the same time to make use of the German sword on the Continent, where more strongly marked antagonisms were again rampant. That, even in this position, we should not have been able to expect much from the British statesmen is clear—they were the same politicians who shortly afterwards decided upon the policy of isolation against Germany. We were, after the experiences of the previous years, all the less in doubt regarding England's secret intentions, as at this very time Germany's Bagdad Railway plans encountered more strongly marked opposition in London, as soon as the change of this project from a purely German into an international German-French-Russian undertaking seemed to render impossible the outbreak of Continental disputes.

If the *pourparlers* were still kept up for some time after the

close of the Boer War, this was only the shield which England used to cover her defection for the purpose of forming another alliance. The definiteness of the change which began at this time rendered it improbable that this last move toward a *rapprochement* was at all seriously meant. An indication of the coming shift was seen in Chamberlain's speech in October, in which, by way of justifying the concentration camps for the Boers, he called attention deliberately to the German conduct of war in the year 1870. This speech called forth a well-merited and sharp reply by the Imperial Chancellor. During the next months England admitted that, in view of the feeling of the Lower House, it would be hard to put the projected treaty with Germany into acceptable form. Immediately after this formal withdrawal, on January 30, 1902, the alliance with Japan was consummated, and soon thereafter the way was open for negotiations with France. The weapon against Russia which it had not been possible to gain from Germany's policy of peace had been found in East Asia.

Following this prelude of Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance, was developed the main drama of an alliance directed against Germany, the course of which did not permit of immediate determination in detail, but which could not fail soon to reveal its final aim. There began one of those great diplomatic actions which only a state of the far-reaching world connections of Great Britain can undertake, and even such a state only for the sake of a positive and dominant ultimate purpose. Unswervingly, England carried out her policy in clear perception of the goal to be attained and without scruple as to her methods.

III. PREPARATION

Steps in the British Policy of Isolation from 1902 to 1908

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of January, 1902—an unheard-of step by a European Power—did not yet form according to its wording and meaning part of the program of isolating Germany, but was directed solely against Russia's East Asiatic position. But in its effects, and especially in its extension through the negotiations with France which were entered into immediately afterwards, it was a step leading toward the conception of the "encircling" policy. Whoever with the eye of an historian views the causal connections of these twelve years is impelled to regard the decision of the British Cabinet of August, 1914, as the unavoidable outcome of a long and logical development. As

compared to the German Empire, which in its constricted Continental position must reach its decisions as each case presents itself, England enjoys the tremendous advantage of being able to operate according to a uniform and far-seeing plan prepared long in advance. This does not mean that every single step is henceforward to be explained as consciously taken as the result of a single motive and with a single end in view; such cannot be the case, since, owing to the uncertainty of many factors and to the multiplicity of the commingling interests, things do not develop in the manner in which human calculation would fain have them develop. But the new course is entered upon, and the underlying tendencies become more and more dominant at each forward step.

It is meet at this moment, before the fundamental change in the grouping of the states is discussed, to analyze the inner-European situation and the feeling of the nations toward each other. The Dual Alliance, it is true, existed in full strength, but it lacked an offensive character against the *Dreibund.* Undoubtedly, in France there was still the undercurrent of *revanche,* but in the years following Fashoda it seemed more than ever under the control of reason, and even leading men in Paris dared to dream of the possibility of permanent European peace. In the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of January 23, 1903, Jaurès openly declared that the *Dreibund* had been called into being without a distinctly offensive character as regards France, and that it was only intended to render irrevocable the results of the war of 1870, which were so painful for France; he no longer believed, he said, that any plan of attack against France had been entertained by Germany for thirty-one years. There existed on the Continent, even in the minds of those who had once been defeated, a state of relaxation; to this state England, with a single definite purpose in view, aimed to put an end. That her motive for doing so—namely, German growth and German ambition—held in fact at this time no menace for England, was later openly admitted by a leading publicist, who said: "Indeed, during the fifteen years, 1890-1904, we added to our own colonial dominions more than twice the whole area of Germany's colonies." [1] But the fact was that this new policy was not dictated by the realities of the present, but aimed to free itself in advance from future anxieties by preventive measures, for which its own past offered more than one example.

[1] Robert Crozier Long, "Germany and the Entente," *Fortnightly Review,* October, 1909.

As soon as Great Britain was safely in possession of the Japanese alliance, her ultimate aims were more clearly revealed. Characteristic was the course of the last joint action of England and Germany, which was undertaken for enforcing the German and English claims for debt against Venezuela and which culminated in the blockade of December, 1902. Accompanying developments threw an illuminating light on the seriousness of the last alliance offer in 1901, for as if at a pre-arranged signal there burst forth a storm of disapproval from leading politicians at the coöperation of the two countries. This disapproval was voiced most strongly by the opposition, who were already eagerly expectant of the Conservative inheritance and who, moreover, were close to the King. All sensitiveness dating from the time of the Boer War, which had long since vanished as regards Frenchmen and Americans, was industriously nourished as regards Germany, and the mere thought of having to bear in Washington in common with this Power the odium of an intervention made even the most sensible men completely lose their heads.

After this prelude, the official policy of England was more clearly revealed with the opening of the battle against the Bagdad Railway, a project which, although it was encouraged by German statesmen, was intended to serve purely commercial ends. At the time of the Boer War and the efforts toward an alliance, even *The Times* paid us the grudging compliment of saying that there was no Power to which England would more willingly entrust such an undertaking. Public opinion, which had been carefully manipulated, now burst forth against the plan without a dissenting voice, incited by practical interests and vague instincts. According to trustworthy information, Balfour and Lansdowne had been ready to come to an understanding with Germany in regard to the last section of the railway in Mesopotamia, and as late as April 8, 1903, Balfour advocated, although meeting with general disapproval, the coöperation of English capital in this international undertaking under German leadership. On April 23, however, he had changed his mind, and he asserted that in no event would England join in the work, as she had no guarantee that she would stand on a footing of equality in the management. With the demonstrative approval of the whole country, the *volteface* was made—a week before King Edward undertook his memorable trip to Paris. After the King's return, Lansdowne declared even more emphatically that the creation of a maritime base or of a fortified harbor on the Persian Gulf, as the terminus of the railway,

must be regarded as a serious menace to British interests, and would be opposed in every possible way. This put a temporary end to the continuation of the line beyond the first section, and from this undertaking, which had been started not even as a purely German commercial scheme, we learned what we must be prepared for in the world henceforward from the other side of the Channel.

At the same time the new policy was put into play on the Continent for the first time. The more unavoidable the war desired by England between Russia and Japan became, the more important was it to seek an understanding with Russia's ally, in order to avoid possible bad counter-effects. It was King Edward who, letting his hand be more plainly seen, in the spring of 1903 sought new connections in the familiar atmosphere of Paris. There is no question from which side the initiative came. *The Daily Graphic* later denied the "legend" that the minister, Delcassé, was the main originator of the *Entente Cordiale.* "The truth is that Delcassé became a convert to the idea of the Entente with hesitation and against his will. The credit for it belongs exclusively to King Edward and Lord Lansdowne." And on the other side, *Le Temps* proclaimed the truth by rapturously exclaiming: "For he (King Edward) acted alone. The trip to Paris in 1903, which started the Anglo-French movement, was his individual work. It was announced to Monsieur Loubet before the two Governments were informed." In his toast on May 3 to the ties of friendship which were to be drawn still closer, the King assumed the fervent tone which was still further intensified on the occasion of President Loubet's return visit to London; while at the time a German-Canadian tariff dispute increased in intensity, in October, 1903, a Franco-English arbitration treaty smoothed the way for the extremely complicated negotiations—the course of the Russian-Japanese War more than anything else made France desire to grasp the hand which was extended to her from across the Channel.

From the purely German standpoint, our policy has been blamed for not taking advantage of Russia being fully occupied with Japan in order to deal with Russia's ally at our door, who would never peacefully reconcile herself to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. The Emperor's deep feeling of responsibility led him rightly, as in the Boer War, in the interest of the world's peace, to reject a war of prevention (such as England is waging against us to-day), and in this he acted in keeping with Bismarck's testament. While England permitted the humiliation by Japan of France's ally (and openly admitted that she would not

quietly acquiesce in a Japanese defeat), she earned as the result of Russia's discomfiture the unconditional readiness of the French nation to accept the English proposals. The legend which soon made its appearance that Russia had been driven by Germany into the East Asiatic undertaking was nowhere so lovingly nursed as in that country whose statesmen had been the sole instigators of the war.

The result of one year's negotiations was the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, which put a definite end to the previous differences between the two Powers in all parts of the world. The agreement is undoubtedly not to be judged exclusively as an offensive measure against Germany; its realization was made easier through the need of the two Powers to re-insure themselves, as it were, while the struggle in East Asia was still in the balance; nor was it less to the interest of England's imperial policy to remove all causes for possible friction in New Foundland and Senegambia, in Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides, and above all to bring about the ultimate acknowledgment by France of England's position in Egypt—this meant the breaking of the last tie which had bound England to the *Dreibund* for twenty years. The unique feature of the agreement, however, was to be seen in the return made by England to her partner for recognizing the British position in Egypt—namely, the surrender of Morocco, and even more so in the double dealing with which she sought to cover up the future indemnification of France.

While France acquiesced on the Nile in the inevitable, she received in compensation an object of future value which in every respect accorded with England's world-political schemes. England had certain interests in Morocco, it is true, which she might sacrifice, but she possessed no definite rights; she had hitherto rather stood out against France for the principle of the independence and integrity of the Sultanate. France, who under Delcassé had sought to approach her prey for a number of years through treaties with Spain and Italy, had repeatedly in official manner recognized this principle; she had known as early as 1901 that Germany also was determined to uphold it, for the sake of her important trade interests, if for no other reason. Morocco could thus develop into an object of Franco-German dispute only if the ultimate object of the policy in view was carefully concealed. As a matter of fact, there was in addition to the public agreement of April 8, which ostensibly proclaimed Morocco's independence, a secret understanding which

provided under certain conditions for the division of the Sultanate between France and Spain.[1]

Thus, the two Powers, quite without authority, took steps not only for shutting off a further portion of the earth commercially for an indefinite period, but for bringing it into a relation of absolute dependence. Delcassé, who dared not reveal the secret game, neither formally consulted German diplomats nor asked for Germany's approval or even for her opinion of the public agreement. It was a double-faced treaty, a dishonest game—for this very reason its intellectual instigators in England were morally bound, in view of the obligations which they had undertaken, to guarantee the fulfilment of French hopes at any price, even in the event of a clash with Germany; they were, indeed, called upon to make the inviolability of France the chief consideration in their calculation. This they were determined to do. Precisely for the sake of such possibilities had these statesmen, who had failed in their attempt to impress Germany's sword into their service, made use of the French desire for revenge; for the same reason they made the North Sea instead of the Mediterranean the chief seat of naval power. The ball had been set rolling.

For the time being Germany maintained an attitude of watchful waiting. As Delcassé, however, continued to avoid all discussion of the Morocco question with Germany, it became clear that there was more at stake than merely Morocco. Unless we were ready to surrender unconditionally to the new combination, it was imperative to seek from the start to prevent the strengthening of England's world policy by the additional element of French desire for *revanche*. As soon, however, as we made a motion to protest in the matter of Morocco, England, unscrupulously taking advantage of every incident, assumed the haughtiest tone in order to strengthen the knees of her hesitating partner. With this end in view, no doubt, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lee, made the oft-cited speech which, as regards words at least, was one of the most arrogant cases of playing with the idea of a war of prevention which the world has ever seen. England, he said, must forbid the further growth of the

[1] The secret clauses of the Anglo-French agreement were revealed by the *Temps* of November 11, 1911, and subsequently in Parliament admitted by Sir Edward Grey. Of their meaning E. D. Morel, in his *Morocco in Diplomacy* (London, 1912), says that they "tend to involve this country in approval and diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and thereby to inevitable conflict with Germany." The French Baron d'Estournelles de Constant admits, in his speech in the Senate on February 6, 1912, that France was pursuing two irreconcilable policies, a public policy of integrity which was not the true one, and a policy of secret agreements which was aiming at a protectorate and at the partition of Morocco. (*Debats Parlementaires*, Séance du 6 fevrier, 1912, p. 161.)

German fleet; following the declaration of the naval war the British fleet would have destroyed the German before the enemy would have had time to read of the declaration of war in the newspapers (February 3, 1905). This was a well-calculated outburst in the genuine English manner, which the government did not repudiate and which was intended as encouragement for Paris, in order to make capital of Gallic excitability by means of tempting pictures at the time of the Russian defeats. If this was intended at the same time as an intimidation of Germany, it did not, of course, cause us to swerve from our course. The protest against the fate intended for Morocco, which found expression in the Emperor's trip to Tangiers, may to outsiders have had the appearance of a move of diplomatic offensive: as a matter of fact, the provocation was to be sought in the camp of the opponents, who, while ready to spring, concealed the secret treaty even from the parliaments of their own countries and thereby completely confused public opinion. The object of our tactics was to manœuvre our opponents, who had silently disregarded our rights, out of their position and to find out whether Delcassé's aim of turning the suppressed *revanche* idea into an element of offense had already taken hold of the whole French nation.

As soon as the seriousness and the justice of our procedure was recognized in Paris, the majority of Rouvier's ministry became filled with anxiety, and despite the efforts of the British press to stiffen their resistance, they seemed on the point of yielding. England then went a step further. Toward the end of May, 1905, she made an oral promise to place the British forces in the field beside those of the French, to mobilize her fleet in case of a German attack, seize the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, and to land one hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Holstein; in addition, she declared her readiness at an early date to draw up a treaty in regard to these military obligations.[1] The motive which had led to the treaty of 1904 was here revealed in its true significance, and Delcassé was so enchanted by this possibility that he was ready to agree to any condition. But common sense did not entirely desert the French statesmen at the decisive moment. A wave of dismay swept over the country when it learned that Germany was prepared to consider the formation of this alliance, the offer of which had not remained concealed from her, as a cause for war. The cabinet meeting of June 4, 1905, forced Delcassé, who had placed his cards on the

[1] See the revelations by the *Matin*, October, 1904; *De la paix de Francfort á la conférence d'Algésiras*, by André Mevil, Paris, 1909.

table, to resign. It was not Germany alone who had brought about the downfall of this most uncompromising advocate of *revanche* since Boulanger; in even greater degree it was the indignation of all conscientious Frenchmen. "This is not how we understood the agreement with England," wrote Jaurès. "Delcassé gave the British government the impression that he was ready for any step, and the British government played the part of tempter to this vain man." The question was whether this newly revived spirit of *revanche* would sink to rest after the fall of its propagandist, as in the case of the Boulanger episode, or whether the government, which now declared its readiness to bring the Morocco question before an international conference, would nevertheless continue along the same dangerous path.

England now proceeded with more caution in her policy of encircling Germany by a concentric attack, after the shipwreck of this first indiscreet attempt. It is characteristic of England's tenacity in this connection that King Edward, immediately following the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan, ventured to sound Russia, who had been rendered harmless in the Far East, on the proposition for a *rapprochement,* which the London press had approvingly discussed even during the war. When Count Witte, in September, 1904, returned from the peace negotiations in Portsmouth, he found waiting for him in Paris an invitation from King Edward, together with the written draft of a treaty between the two Powers drawn up by the King and Count Benckendorff, of somewhat the same nature as that which two years later formed the basis of the Anglo-Russian agreement regarding Central Asia.[1] The Russian was without authority (and personally would scarcely have been inclined) to respond in any manner to this offer, but the first attempt to provide defeated Russia with a new footing for an attack against Europe had been made by London; well-informed Russian papers received the suggestion with favor, with the reservation that some years of peace would be required for recuperation and preparation; but they already began industriously to spread the doctrine of Pan-Slavism. The hour, however, had not yet struck; they contented themselves with a promissory note for the future, with the redemption of which Sir Arthur Nicolson, the new Ambassador to Petrograd and one of the most active diplomats in the school of King Edward, was intrusted.

[1] Disclosed by Count Witte in the Petrograd *Rjetsch,* the organ of the Cadet party.

Meanwhile the nearer the time came for the Conference of Algeciras, the closer touch France sought with the Power upon whose diplomatic and, in the last analysis, military support as well (in view of the continuation of Russian weakness) she had been dependent since April, 1904. In the autumn of 1905, Rouvier, upon whom the disclosure in the press of the alliance offer exercised a certain moral pressure, sounded London, in his turn. Whether the Balfour-Lansdowne Cabinet ever answered the inquiry cannot be positively stated. Its retirement was imminent, but with an eye to the future, it took pains openly to announce as a new principle the necessary continuity of the whole foreign policy. The essence of this new continuity was the program of King Edward, which both parties had now adopted as their own. The Liberal Cabinet, therefore, which was formed on December 10, 1905, entered upon the unrestricted inheritance of its predecessor, especially as regards all the consequences of the agreement of 1904. But the attitude is characteristic which the new incumbent of the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey, took toward the French offer. He wished to avoid binding himself by a formal promise, and therefore did not renew the alliance offer of the Conservatives. Instead, he approved the French suggestion to hold confidential *pourparlers* of military and naval specialists. What importance he attributed to them is shown by the fact that he did not let the whole Cabinet into the secret, but only a small inner *coterie*. Thus, before the conference of Algeciras, the *"conversations d'ordre militaire"* were started, which, periodically repeated, gradually became a fixed institution of increasing secrecy and of more binding effect than political treaties. They grew into a military convention with a view to a certain definite eventuality, which could any day be brought about by continuing the policy of encircling Germany. From the first moment, Grey entered upon the course which in July, 1914, morally involved the policy and, as he said, the honor of his country—this policy of the seemingly free hand, which, while pretending always to require ratification by Cabinet and Parliament and the appeal to public opinion, was in reality prostituted to the secret ambitions of a small circle and to the accompanying military influences. It may be that the instigator of this step, who was at that time still unknown to the Continent, was himself deceived as to the freedom of his decision and that he believed himself to be operating more cautiously than the Conservatives; but, as a matter of fact, the Liberals now entered upon the downward course, on which it is difficult to turn back, and the French were well

aware why they owed "eternal gratitude" to the new Premier.

In addition to all this, the military result of the first conversations (in the last days of 1905 or the first of 1906) gave to the French more valuable guarantees than contained in the offer in May. The plan of a landing in Schleswig-Holstein, which was exclusively in England's interest, was abandoned, and for it was substituted the landing in Northern France, which was more important for the French. As a necessary corollary of a joint Anglo-French action, the coöperation of the Belgian army was forthwith included in the plan of campaign by the two General Staffs. Immediately thereafter, at the moment when the Conference of Algeciras met (the middle of January, 1906) and when there was no immediate danger of war, the British military attaché, Barnardiston, began in Brussels (in conjunction with diplomatic overtures in the same city) those confidential discussions with the Belgian General Staff, on the basis of the Anglo-French conversations authorized by his government, which his responsible superiors now falsely describe as "academic discussions"; the Belgian diplomat, Baron Greindl, has more appropriately characterized them as "equally naïve and perfidious." It is in keeping with Grey's guiding principle, that these negotiations, too, were declared not to be formally binding. While discussing the sending of English troops in the event of a German attack on Belgium—for the probability of which he offered absolutely no proofs—the military attaché went deeply into the question of the closest coöperation with Belgium's military forces; and the Belgian military authorities unconditionally entered into his plans, although they could have been as little in doubt as their government in regard to the unacademic character of these discussions. Thus the encircling policy of the "free hand" began from the very start to involve in its military and political snares a neutralized state whose inviolability the English had hitherto upheld as a dogma.

The Conference of Algeciras began its labors following this new grouping of the Powers. As events showed, the German Emperor and his advisors contented themselves with upholding the principle of the integrity of Morocco and of the open door, and decided to wait and see whether the formal, rather than practically valuable paper inhibition would prevent the "Tunification" of Morocco by France. Certain German critics have later regretted that we missed our opportunity, since in view of the openly revealed policy of isolation against us, a settlement by arms would have been the proper course, the result of which, at a moment when Russia was incapable of fighting and France

was unprepared, could scarcely have been doubtful, despite the undeveloped state of the German fleet. But it is explicable that a conscientious government nevertheless answered in the negative the question whether Morocco was worth a war, which means something else to the German nation than to British diplomats; and if one disregarded the special, to contemplate the general situation, from which the former had resulted, there was always the possibility that after the temporary solution of the Morocco question—through which she had purchased France's recognition of her position in Egypt—England would again return to more peaceful paths.

In the future, therefore, it was a question not so much as to the fate of Morocco and the results of the Conference, but rather as to whether England intended to persist in her plan of isolating Germany and to develop the forces which had been set in motion into a regular machine that would finally close about its prey. If such an intention really existed, Germany had cause to fear the worst from the unavoidable power of attraction of the new grouping of Powers and from the reaction on French *revanche,* as soon as Russia's eagerness for the offensive should have revived again. For in such a case it was a question of whether in an open or disguised system of isolation there would be room for more or less friendly Anglo-German relations. With this in mind, a German statesman, in July, 1906, frankly asked Sir Edward Grey whether he believed that openly admitted friendly relations to Germany would be compatible with England's new friendship for France. The Englishman coolly avoided the question by saying:

"That depends on German politics."

The German thereupon replied, hitting the nail on the head:

"No, it rather seems to depend on French interpretation of German politics."

From that time on England considered the unconditional upholding of France to be the best guarantee for the existence of her own world empire, and left Germany to think as she might of the fact that the Anglo-German relations in future were to be determined by the *revanche* idea. That was the new basis of the policy which, in July, 1914, was put into practice. This kind of a political community of interest inevitably creates mutual dependence, which in the long run increases in intensity and finally gets beyond control.

It became apparent that it was a question of one of the most fundamental changes of front in English history. This is seen from the answer which King Edward, in August, 1906, gave

to another German statesman who broached the question of eliminating any possible causes of friction: "There are no frictions between us; there exists only rivalry." The father of the encircling policy herewith avowed the fundamental thought which he had absorbed from the obscure instincts and the public opinion of his people and which he had made the guide of his whole policy. Causes of friction and disagreement may be overcome; rivalry has its permanent source in the nature of things themselves. It would disappear only in case Germany were voluntarily to withdraw and quietly watch England's future game, or else bring the question to a decision in open conflict.

England was prepared for either alternative. The first dreadnaught was launched during the Algeciras Conference, and England triumphed in the thought that she had checkmated Germany with this new type of vessel. But the exultation changed to depression when Germany, as she could not avoid doing, began to build the new type of ships and when it was seen that England had really dealt herself a serious blow. This competition on which the German fleet entered under almost even conditions, served markedly to increase the sense of rivalry. England pressed her preparations on land with equal energy. In July, 1906, Minister of War Haldane brought in a plan for the reorganization of the army, which was the result of the new military situation and which called for the creation of an expeditionary force of 160,000 men. In keeping with the purpose for which this force was intended, the Belgian "vassals" were immediately informed of the increased efficiency. The ultimate aims of this policy became so clear that the German Imperial Chancellor found himself, on November 15, 1906, called upon openly to say that the *Entente Cordiale* would be a menace to the peace of Europe unless its relations to Germany were friendly.

"A policy which aimed to encircle Germany—to form a ring of Powers around us, in order to isolate and paralyze us—this would be a dangerous policy for European peace. The formation of such a ring is not possible without the exercise of a certain pressure. Action creates reaction. From action and reaction there may finally result an explosion."

Despite this prophetic warning, England proceeded to an understanding with Russia along the lines which King Edward had long since marked out. New elements for the moral isolation of Germany were gathering. While the British Prime Minister greeted the Duma with well-calculated homage, the British press began a campaign of provocative attacks against German

Kultur, which were intended to create sentiment and to call forth echoes throughout the world. They seem like an anticipation of the tone of the present-day war literature. And when Russia, who required time for recuperation after the defeat in the East, proceeded to call the Hague Conference, the air was filled in all countries with projects of disarmament. This was followed by unctuous denunciations of Germany for refusing to meet an offensive policy of isolation with her own disarmament, and the odium of endangering peace was thus placed on the one who was in reality the threatened party. The German Imperial Chancellor replied at that time with truth that we had never misused our military strength, and that we should not do so in the future: "Germany cannot be placed under compulsion, not even under moral compulsion." (April 30, 1907.)

Under such auspices, the negotiations came to a close in Petrograd, where, following the death of Count Lamsdorff, Isvolski had assumed direction of the Foreign Office. The Anglo-Russian agreement, of August 31, 1907, which applied to Persia, the Persian Gulf, Thibet and Afghanistan, resembled the agreement of 1904 in that it swept aside, for the sake of a higher object, the world-political differences between the two Powers; it did not, however, represent an adjustment of all questions in dispute, but rather a truce in the future spheres of influence. Even if the agreement was not aimed directly at Germany, nevertheless the decision as to Persia's fate one-sidedly and arbitrarily closed up a further portion of the world. While the press of the two countries painted in the darkest colors the dangers of German imperialism, the countries themselves proceeded on their course of boundless conquest. This treaty also is undeniably to be understood as part of England's imperial policy, especially from the point of view of the military security of India and of the Indian "glacis." It was also from anxiety as to its own future that this statesmanship, capable as it is, thanks to its positions of strength scattered throughout the world, of far more ambitious undertakings than the German Continental Power, determined to satisfy its much-feared rival, Russia. That such great sacrifices were made, however, is only to be explained, as in the occurrences of 1904, by the recent shift in the world policy of England, which proceeded to act *without,* and if necessary *against* Germany. To this extent, in this agreement also, in which there is no mention of Germany, the indirect effects which no doubt had been calculated are more important than its actual content. In the year 1865 Palmerston had considered a strong Germany as desirable, in order to act as a check upon France

and Russia; at the present moment Earl Percy, Under-Secretary of State, interpreted the meaning of the understandings with France and Russia from the contrary point of view: "To support these two states against a union of the two Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary." Soon thereafter a leading publication openly revealed the ultimate design:

"The Persian understanding, valuable in itself as it was and remains, was less important as an achievement than as a basis for other efforts of constructive diplomacy."

The meaning of this "constructive diplomacy" was self-evident. After rendering the Russian rival innocuous in the Far East and after temporarily satisfying him in the Middle East, the aim was to guide Russian ambition, which had long desired to wipe out the Japanese disgrace and to divert internal revolutionary forces, back to the Near East, which was the most natural historical field for the newly revealed tendencies of all of Russia's political parties. That the increasingly pronounced world-political differences were transferred to this dangerous theatre, where the rivalries of the Great Powers had for so long lain dormant, produced incalculable consequences. As a result of King Edward's strategic move, the differences between Austria and Russia in the Balkans, which had slumbered for a decade, flared up anew; and since they naturally reacted upon Germany, the Franco-Russian Alliance could not fail to take on a more offensive character than it had possessed for sixteen years. Whoever seeks to fathom the causes of the World War finds himself here at the point where the decisive involution of the relentless forces of destiny begins.

Russia's new policy became apparent when she interpreted as a political violation of the Mürzsteg programme the purely economic project of a Sandjak railway, for which Austria drew her authority from the Berlin Act, and entered a sharp protest. This meant the opposing of all economic activity by Austria beyond her own boundaries, just as England had undertaken to thwart Germany's plans throughout the world. In the question of the Macedonian reforms, which had always represented a field of conflict for the rival influences of the Great Powers, Austria-Hungary and Russia found themselves progressively at odds, while in this connection England sought to institute an extension of the agreements of 1907. The meeting of King Edward and the Czar at Reval, in June, 1908, indicated, under the cloak of a far-reaching programme of Macedonian reforms, in reality the coming partition of European Turkey. In this case also England was inspired by the thought that that which she had not

been able to carry through *with* Germany she might accomplish *despite* her—that is to say, cold-bloodedly to start an era of European struggles for power, which in the language of the Island Kingdom is styled the maintenance of the European balance of power. It was seen from the start that there could not fail to be a reaction on the large and small states of the Balkans, and although for the time being the Young Turk Revolution resulted in a complete check for the original program, nevertheless the stone had been set rolling.

At the same time the effort was made to undermine the *Dreibund* from within. The position of Italy in the *Dreibund* had been growing weaker for several years. This was due to a series of agreements with the different Powers providing mutual guarantees in regard to the Balkan and Mediterranean questions —agreements that were in effect "re-insurance" against all possible contingencies. After the Anglo-German antagonism became manifest, at the conference of Algeciras, Italy's position suffered a severe blow; it was apparent that the opening up of all the Balkan questions for the future might prove a serious menace to her. And from the English standpoint the hope was perhaps entertained that under such auspices Austria-Hungary herself might be won over to the plans of the new *Entente*. Before a definite course was finally taken against the Dual Monarchy, the attempt was made to gain its friendship. And once more it was King Edward, who personally, at a meeting with Emperor Francis Joseph in Ischl (August, 1908), endeavored to entice the Hapsburger away from his German allies. He met with an uncompromising refusal. All the more determinedly did England, since Austria-Hungary would not become her tool, proceed to carry out against her the scheme of isolation, for which the foundations had been laid more than a year before.

The Imperial German Government understood thoroughly the new situation, as the result of which it was at every point forced onto the defensive and with each counterstroke laid itself open to the suspicion of taking the offensive. In an illuminating statement addressed to the Federal Governments, the Imperial Chancellor, in June, 1908, drew the following picture of the European situation:

"We must reckon with the fact that if we or Austria-Hungary should become involved with one of the Entente Powers in a serious conflict of interests, the understandings and agreements would crystallize into concrete alliances, so that together with Austria we might find ourselves face to face with a strong coalition. We cannot eliminate the fundamental causes of the politi-

cal dangers that surround us without stultifying ourselves. As far as Germany is concerned, they are due to the continued growth of her economic strength since the founding of the Empire. It is the groundless fear of a possible misuse of the economic, and hence also of the political, power of Germany and of her closest ally that drives other states to form alliances against us, and that would perhaps overcome their hesitation to attack and crush us, if they felt that they were strong enough to do so."

A period now began which was to test the strength of the opposing groups of Powers; a period which was to show whether the aim of the unprecedented diplomatic preparations, which were the work of England, was to be war or peace.

IV. THE FIRST TESTS OF STRENGTH OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Bosnia, 1908-09. Isolation Through the Efforts of Publicists and Pacificists. Death of King Edward. The Morocco-Congo Treaty of 1911.

After the preparation for the encircling policy in the years 1909 to 1914, there follows its practical application, a series of strength tests which, arising at first from questions of petty local importance, are seen to develop each time into a European crisis leading to the verge of war. These result in some cases from the after-effects of the Morocco question, while later on the scene shifts to the East, filled with inflammable material by the reopening of the Oriental question. These crises seem to the observer like the breathing of the new Europe created by the policy of Edward VII. At the start, the manifestations of life shown by the new group of Powers do not reveal the functioning of a machine whose parts easily and unfailingly coöperate; but with the lapse of time, despite, or rather because, of an occasional failure or dislocation, the unity becomes more marked. As the complicated machine begins to work harmoniously, its activity is steadily increased, and the stronger its effects are felt the stronger becomes the resistance of the threatened states, as the German Chancellor had predicted. Even when, after a crisis, a temporary relaxation sets in between individual members of the two camps, the result is merely a heightening of the accumulated tension at other points. On this account, these episodes, despite the hopeful reception given their momentary solution each time, appear in retrospect like the hasty catching of breath in the midst of a silent and desperate test of strength, each time leading only to a still fiercer struggle.

The first of these tests—the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09—came unexpectedly, and showed by its course that it was as yet too early to speak of a concerted movement in the policy of isolation.

Immediately after the meeting in Reval, the active imagination of Minister Isvolski began to work. In a letter dated June 18, 1908, which he would gladly have repudiated later, he proposed to the leader of Austria-Hungary's policy the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even of the Sandjak, in return for which Russia planned to obtain passage through the Dardanelles. A generation previously Russia had pointed the way for the Dual Monarchy into Bosnia, and thereafter repeatedly—for the last time through Kuropatkin—had suggested to Vienna to change the administration of the provinces entrusted to her by the Treaty of Berlin into an actual annexation corresponding to existing conditions. Isvolski was thus only continuing the course of Russia's policy for the previous thirty years, which, without the slightest regard for the little Serbian brother, recognized this territory as within the undisputed sphere of interest of Austria-Hungary. According to the bitter words of King Milan, Russia had hitherto "always made use of the Serbian nation in the nature of convenient small change for the settlement of her indebtedness to Austria." [1] The Russian minister, even after the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution, held fast to his program, and at a meeting with Count Aehrenthal in Buchlau reached an agreement without difficulty as to the means for carrying it through.

It is not surprising that Austria, in view of this promised support, quickly proceeded to act. For the transformation of Turkey into a constitutional national state could not fail to endanger the hitherto passable condition of affairs in Bosnia, not alone on account of the possibility of a nationalistic Turkish demand for the country's return, but also because of the danger of Serbian propaganda, which counted on the temporary nature of the Austro-Hungarian mandate. Further, it was imperative to take timely precautions at the most vulnerable spot against the danger of an opening up of the whole Balkan question through the policy of isolation, which had now become more imminent. The annexation decree of October, 1908, merely served to strengthen Vienna in several directions. This represented in nowise a policy of conquest in the style of the World Powers, which were insatiably seeking what they could devour; on the contrary, it was simply a change in the legal form of a title

[1] *Die serbische Frage,* Dr. Wladau Georgewitsch, p. 61.

which had long been recognized by Europe. Indeed, so thoroughly did Austria renounce any policy of force that she surrendered at the same time to Turkey the garrison rights in the Sandjak granted to her by treaty, and publicly abandoned the ambitious plans which no doubt had taken form at times in the imagination of her statesmen.

The effect of the decree of annexation was most unexpected. The reason for this was that Isvolski was unable to obtain London's agreement to the Russian part of the program—the opening of the Dardanelles. For in England the Reval program was no longer considered practicable, owing to the Young Turk Revolution. Following the fall of Abdul Hamid, the hated protagonist of German influence, the more ambitious hope awoke in the minds of British statesmen of again becoming the protector and councillor of a youthful and constitutional Turkey, and, thanks to this position, which carried with it consequences so important for England's world policy (Arabia and the Persian Gulf), the further hope of finally making an end of the German competitor. Thus, as a result of the changed situation, British statesmen found themselves in the painful position, to the astonishment of Isvolski, of being forced to oppose the opening of the Dardanelles, to which in Reval they had been favorable. The effect of the decree of annexation, therefore, was seen not alone in the formally justified protest of Turkey, the anger of Serbia, who saw her secret hopes demolished, and the disappointment of Isvolski, who found himself diplomatically out-manœuvred, but above all in the outburst of English bitterness, which was quite unexpected in Vienna. The London Foreign Office received the notice of the annexation in the most unfriendly manner, and the irresponsible organs of the press let loose the vials of their wrath against the unpardonable wrong inflicted on humanity and international law by this immoral act—all of this with the moral bathos which is always in evidence in England when they dare not mention the real motives. The English Balkan Committee, which had been in touch with all the national revolutionary elements of the Balkans, now incited the Turks to a trade boycott and to demands for compensation; especially did they stir up the Serbs. It was a cause of astonishment that London was even more Pan-Slavic than Petrograd itself—had it not been England herself, who at the Congress of Berlin made the motion for the Bosnian mandate to Austria (analogous to her own acquisition of Cyprus), and had she not a short while previously turned with ill-concealed horror from the blood-stained dynasty in Bel-

grade? It is known that on the very day of the reception of the Austrian ultimatum, in July, 1914, the British representative in Petrograd said: "Direct British interests in Serbia are nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion."

The secret of this violent opposition of England in the autumn of 1908 was to be sought neither in Serbia nor in any anxiety for the formalities of international law, but in a system of general policy which, seeing defeat for certain of its expectations, set up with cunning calculation aims that gave even greater promise for the future.

This was an opportunity to show Austria-Hungary, who a short while before had refused to be drawn into the British plans of isolating Germany, what a state faithful to the *Dreibund* would have to expect from across the Channel. It was an opportunity to pour balm upon the wounds of the new Russian Entente ally, to whom, contrary to desire, it had been necessary to refuse the promised compensation, and at the same time to deflect the anger of this ally (in view of Isvolski's character this was not difficult) against Austria-Hungary, who had been the winner in the game. By offering generous diplomatic help to Russia, it was possible to prevent the new friend from entertaining doubts as to the power of the Entente. By making the proposal for an international conference and by inciting in the most violent manner the press of the friendly countries, the British Foreign Office could not fail either to frighten Austria-Hungary into yielding or at least to prove to Russia the indispensability of the Entente. Finally, by arousing a strong Pan-Slavic movement from Moscow to Belgrade there was prospect of confining Russia henceforth to her "proper field of labor," a consummation which London had sought for some time. In this manner it was possible, in any event, for England to turn Isvolski's unfortunate little game into a remunerative speculation along big lines.

For a moment it appeared as if the action would be a success. Soon the whole Slavic world was in flames. For a long time French publicists had sought to arouse the slumbering forces in this region, but it was England who provided the latter with the opportunity for their first political demonstration before the eyes of the world. The Serbians, to whom King Edward's ambitious policy suddenly gave a foothold such as they had never had in all their history, challenged their neighbor in the most provocative manner; they quickly accustomed themselves to the idea that the historical rôle of an Eastern

Piedmont was reserved for them, and eagerly took up the catchword coined by France that Austria-Hungary must suffer the fate of an "Eastern Switzerland." Indeed, for the first time the political lines of attack of Austria-Hungary's enemies were seen to extend into the heart of the Dual Monarchy, where individual politicians whose stock in trade was "nationality" stood ready to coöperate. At all points, in the diplomatic struggle of the winter 1908-09, forces were for the first time aroused which in the years preceding the World War constantly grew more threatening and finally became a factor in its outbreak.

The fact that England's portentous policy at this time failed of its aim was primarily due to the much greater strength of the bond between Germany and Austria-Hungary than of that holding the Entente together. The German Imperial Chancellor after the decree of annexation, the date of which had not been known to him beforehand, immediately informed Vienna that it might feel absolute security as to Germany's attitude, in which connection he said: "This is for us a matter of self-evident loyalty." Whoever criticizes the unconditional nature of this approval as being in opposition to the Bismarck tradition in questions of Austria's Balkan policy, forgets that it was no longer a matter of the special local interests of an ally which might be supported or not according to wish, but that vital interests were at stake which, in the new world situation as created by the encircling policy, concerned both parties equally. In a speech in the *Reichstag* in March, 1909, Prince Bülow therefore very properly recalled Bismarck's saying: "A state like Austria-Hungary, if left in the lurch, will be alienated and will feel inclined to offer its hand to the Power which has been the enemy of its untrustworthy friend." An abandonment of Austria-Hungary at this moment would merely have played into the hands of King Edward and completed the isolation of the German Empire.

The fact that Germany was successful in defeating the action of England and Russia through her firm support of Austria was due in part to two considerations. She succeeded temporarily in relieving the Morocco crisis, which had continued after the Algeciras Conference, and in persuading the French, who were no doubt fully informed of Russia's lack of military preparation, to maintain an attitude of more or less reserve in the Bosnian crisis. The Franco-German Declaration of February 8, 1909, had as its formal basis the Algeciras agreement and the renewed French recognition of the independence and integrity of the Sultanate. France merely promised to place

no obstacle in the way of Germany's commercial and industrial interests in Morocco, while Germany acknowledged that France, as Morocco's neighbor, was called upon to uphold peace and order for the sake of special political interests. The inequality of the respective promises is self-evident. Nevertheless, the attempt was more or less successful in this crisis to bring about a lessening of the tension with France, without the sacrifice of our real interests. Russia, as we have said, despite all her brave words, which were blindly swallowed in Belgrade, was not ready in a military way. German diplomacy, by the declaration of its unconditional support of Austria-Hungary, made the retreat easy for Russia; at the same time it discovered the manner in which the Great Powers might formally check the wild eagerness of Serbia's preparations—for which several of them were responsible. On March 31, 1909, Serbia, who was forced to acquiesce in Europe's decision, on the advice of the Great Powers, pledged herself by a formal declaration to abandon her unfriendly attitude toward Austria-Hungary and to live once more on the footing of neighborliness with that state. It was reserved for the future to show whether the spirits of evil could be exorcized in this manner.

The first test of strength of the Entente resulted, therefore, in a defeat, since uniform and coherent diplomatic and military leadership was lacking. For those who staged the game this may have served merely as a warning to make good that which was lacking. In England it was decided to await an opportunity with an officially smiling face. In a speech on March 30, 1909, Grey laid down the guiding lines for the future. Two causes for conflict, he said, between England and Germany must be avoided. One was England's attempt to isolate Germany; this would never be submitted to by a nation of the strength and power of Germany. The other was the attempt of any one Power to dictate the policy of the Continent; this England would never permit. The first of the alternatives directly admitted the existence of something which the English newspapers had hitherto characterized as a German *idée fixe,* and placed a check on the diplomatic measure of isolation. The second alternative, on which the emphasis was placed, expressed in cautious form a denunciation of that which it was customary to style, plainly enough for the ears of Paris and Petrograd, the danger of a German hegemony. It was a question only of selecting a new formula, not a new policy.

In England the conclusion was reached that the Entente agreements did not furnish a satisfactory weapon of defense,

and the question arose whether England's own military strength should not be strengthened. There began a period of those paroxysms of panic which occasionally sweep over the island, or, rather, which are artificially created for the sake of a political purpose. Although the panic outwardly found expression in ridiculous outbursts of fear of Zeppelins, German spies and waiters, there was behind it a more serious movement. The French had constantly called attention to England's lack of military preparations. The agitation for universal military service, long carried on by Lord Roberts, now began to find a stronger response. The spectre of a German invasion was used to make the unfamiliar idea palatable. The French jingoes admitted to each other, with tongue in cheek, that the leaders of the agitation themselves did not believe in the possibility of such an invasion, and calmed the French nation by the information that as a matter of fact something more important was at stake—namely, an expeditionary army, which, in a certain eventuality, was to fight by the side of the French on the Continent.[1] The British press took up the French argument that England's military weakness robbed the Entente of its value, and that in case of war an auxiliary army must be sent to Belgium.[2] A strong Continental army was already regarded merely as the logical consequence of England's new Continental policy, and unhesitatingly on each side of the Channel Belgium was fixed on as the scene of its activity!

At the same time there began an active naval propaganda. The Cabinet itself went so far as to make the assertion (later acknowledged to be wrong) that the German fleet, despite official German figures, was being more rapidly developed than was provided for and publicly proclaimed in its program; if the government indulged in a juggling with figures, the opposition went to the length of shrieking that the German fleet of dreadnaughts was on the point of outstripping the British. The anxiety in England was, to a certain degree, even communicated to the Americans. After an authority such as Admiral Mahan gave expression, in the summer of 1909, to the fear that some day the German fleet would disregard the Monroe Doctrine, numberless British writers encouraged this distrust and saw

[1] See *De la paix de Francfort á la conférence d'Algésiras*, Mévil, p. 314.

[2] "Germany and the Entente: A Letter from Berlin," by Robert Crozier Long, *Fortnightly Review*, October, 1909, p. 747: "The logical complement of our new Continental policy is a numerous conscript army. That this is no arbitrary deduction is shown by the remarks of a writer in the *Temps* some months ago that England's military weakness deprived the Entente of meaning, and by the statement lately made by General Hippolyte Langlois that in case of war it would be necessary for England to land troops in Belgium to assist France."

with satisfaction that with the beginning of the twentieth century in American eyes Germany, not Great Britain, was "the enemy." They were perfectly well aware that a German menace to the Monroe Doctrine belonged to the same class of frivolous inventions as the statement of the British press in Japan that the Californian land laws (which exclude Japanese from acquiring land) were due to the intrigues of German-Americans!

As far as the influence of the British press extended in the world, a beginning was now made, with finely organized skill, to sow the seed which in the summer of 1914 sprang up to such a bloody harvest. The more widely spread international cultural connections of England and France were everywhere systematically utilized for an unscrupulous campaign against Germany. It will be one of the future problems of history to determine the rôle played by this press, by the group of newspapers owned by Lord Northcliffe, with its train of dependent organs throughout the provinces and the whole English colonial empire, by the Reuter Bureau and by the Associated Press, by the *Temps* and the *Matin,* in preparing anti-German sentiment. In the following years this machine functioned so regularly and unfailingly that it is incorrect to speak of statesmanship being stampeded by public opinion; rather a deliberate political design is obvious which, operating from above downward, grows with a latent energy of immeasurable effect. The exaggerations of the German press have been described as counterbalancing those of the foreign press, and the admission has been made by us that sins have been committed by both sides—who can check the political passions of irresponsible persons! In this comparison, however, it must never be forgotten that the thoroughly decentralized German press, as every one knows who is familiar with international press conditions, is not to be likened to the corresponding forces of our enemies; its lack of territorial, capitalistic and party unity precludes a like uniformity and coöperation; it does not give the keynote to the orchestra but represents merely a many-voiced chorus that accompanies and interprets the events; its anti-English representatives up to the time of war were without influence either on the government or on wide circles of the population. And finally, one of its pronounced peculiarities is that, thanks to its structure, it has remained free of those capitalistic influences that have played a shocking part in the imperialistic propaganda of other countries.

Even temporary agitation may produce lasting impressions.

The psychological effects of the English panic on the French mind increased from year to year, and even the agreement with Germany in 1909 did not serve as a check to this tendency. The Franco-Russian alliance had formerly perhaps caused greater outbursts of joy on the occasion of fraternal banquets, but in the nature of things this had been confined in the main to the upper stratum of the ruling classes, and had not brought the two nations into closer touch. Now, however, regardless of the formally loose bond of the Entente, two civilized peoples had been drawn close together, and public opinion on both sides was brought into mutual and intensifying contact. The spirit of *revanche,* which for the last ten or fifteen years had played only a diplomatic rôle in the Russian alliance, saw now, with deep satisfaction, on the other side of the Channel an entire nation the victim of similar elemental feelings of hatred and of fear.

Furthermore, the military agreements of the two countries, despite the elastic character of the Entente, in the nature of things led to a spirit of closer coöperation than was the case with the Russian alliance: after agreeing in regard to the essentials, the theater and the plan of war, the military representatives drew into constantly closer touch. General French began his studies on the Belgian terrain as early as 1910. The secret English war hand-books of Belgium [1]—which are the most systematic work of the General Staff of a Great Power regarding a neighboring neutral country of which we know and which were printed in the years 1912-1913—are the result of his exhaustive preparatory studies, of which the Belgian government could not possibly have remained in ignorance. How far the coöperation between England and France in working out a common Belgian plan of campaign had gone was shown shortly afterward when the press of the two countries most bitterly attacked a Dutch bill (at the beginning of 1911) for coast defense, proposing the fortification of Flushing. The English took the position that such a fortification—which was fully within the right of Dutch sovereignty—was entirely unpermissible, since it might hinder the English from efficiently protecting Belgian neutrality against possible German aggression; they would fain have forbidden the Dutch, in protecting their neutrality, from making use of those means by which they might keep foreign armies and fleets away from their territory. The press heightened the comedy by denouncing German pressure as the

[1] *Belgium, Road and River Reports,* prepared by the General Staff, London. Vol. I (1912), Vol. II (1913), Vol. III (1914).

cause of this fortification and then denouncing the alleged German desire to conquer Holland as a danger for the future. So strong was this indignation that the conclusion was inevitable that the fortifying of Flushing interfered with the military plans of the two nations.[1] The combinations worked out by the General Staffs were apt in the end, through mutual incitement, to become a menace to peace; the military factors, left quite free of parliamentary control, contrary to all English traditions, were at liberty to develop, until finally they could not fail to react with determining force on the plans of the statesmen.

Whoever follows this encircling scheme of diplomacy and press, accompanied by military and naval preparation, finds himself at the moment of the death of King Edward, its spiritual originator (May, 1910), face to face with the question: Does all this not simply mean preparation for the great war, and was that which the world is to-day experiencing not deliberately planned long ago? Despite the temptation to answer this question affirmatively, it must not be forgotten that at least the English aim of isolating Germany might have been attained by peaceful methods. According to the opinion of well-informed men as regards the intentions of the King, it is possible that he himself would have preferred such a solution. His object would have been attained if Germany had been crippled by bloodless means, if her slightest action had been frustrated and her treaties disrupted or weakened, her chances for the future ruined, and Germany herself, through constant pressure, forced to discontinue the increase of her navy and to become such an unimportant member of the world system of states as the English calculations demanded. King Edward's aim would have been reached had the German Empire, at the same time that the distribution of the world among the giant states went triumphantly forward, encountered protest and ill-will at every step beyond its narrowest bounds; had its efforts at self-expression, which, in view of the increase of its population and of its sources of energy urged toward outward activity, been consistently denounced as unpermissible or as an inexcusable menace to the world, *while another state that had become innocuous, with a stationary population, was left free to expand at will.*

[1] The Belgian Minister, Baron Greindl, in his report of November 23, 1911, says: "The idea of a flanking movement from the North undoubtedly forms part of the combinations of the *Entente cordiale.* If that were not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have caused such an outcry in Paris and London. It was not even concealed there why it was desired that the Scheldt should remain without protection. The purpose was to be able without hindrance to throw an English garrison into Antwerp, that is to say, in our territory to create a base of operation for an offensive, in which we were to be compelled to partake, in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia."

Such a world-political restriction might attain an apparent success, but it carried with it the danger of driving the encircled state to desperate reaction. For such an event England had planned as a last resort, if necessary, to visit as a preventive measure on the German Empire the fate once prepared for the Spanish, Dutch and French commercial Powers. This method does not lead to war as the only solution, but it may finally render it inevitable—especially when the forces of which it makes use (French *revanche* and Russian offensive) get out of hand and blindly pursue their own ends. Such was the fateful inheritance left behind by King Edward. It cannot be stated that he desired the World War, but without his interference this war would never have come about.

The dangers were not to be obviated by relaxation of the tension at one point. German statesmen, who in February, 1909, had sought an understanding with France, now tried to follow up this idea of removing causes of friction throughout the world, by a similar move towards Russia. They returned to the policy which in the eighties had avoided a break with Petrograd, had rendered possible in the nineties a friendly relationship with the Dual Alliance, and had maintained during the Japanese War a benevolent neutrality. The new Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, and the head of the Russian government, Sassonov, reached an agreement in November, 1910, to the effect "that neither of the two governments would enter into an alliance which might be aimed against the other." Especially did they declare their mutual interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans and in the Near East, and reached an understanding in regard to the Persian question, which had been settled in 1907 only on a one-sided basis. In return for Germany's recognition of Russia's position in Persia, Russia definitely abandoned her opposition to the Bagdad Railway, to which, it was agreed, certain connections should be made.

These events which, from the standpoint of the peace of the world, might have indicated a desirable alleviation, were regarded in the camp of the Triple Entente with mixed feelings. Although nothing was further from Russia's thoughts than a "re-insurance agreement," and although an official declaration to this effect was immediately made, London and Paris felt that the Entente had been weakened. It may be that all the Russian statesmen were aiming at was, by concessions on a minor point, to purchase Germany's moral support in other cases of dispute, or merely to gain time temporarily until ready for

war. It may also be that Russia wished to give warning that another course was open to her, both to her old ally (who in the previous year had not satisfied all her demands but had made an independent agreement with Germany) and to her new partner in the Entente, following the re-formation of the Cabinet and the demise of King Edward. At all events, the practical indirect result of the Potsdam Agreement was, both in England and in France, to create, after the first dissatisfaction, a greater desire to advance Russia's policies or to take the lead themselves wherever possible at other points. Matters had already gone so far that every diminution in the effort to isolate Germany at one point resulted in an increased activity at others, the final effect being an intensifying of the whole situation. While certain Englishmen began to consider an analogous Anglo-German agreement, the old advocates of Germany's isolation were puzzled what to think of Sir Edward Grey, who no longer had the clever King behind him.[1] A well-informed critic such as Garvin declared that in matters like the Bagdad Railway, which was a vital question for England more than for any other Great Power, the Triple Entente had ceased to exist. Even less did the French hide their disappointment, and they mourned with even sharper grief the English King, whom they missed; they were disturbed by the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Polish border, and they wondered reproachfully whether for the sake of *revanche* they should not have placed themselves much more unreservedly at the disposal of their Russian ally.

Instead of its disorganization, a firmer consolidation of the Entente was therefore demanded, energetic action abroad instead of restraint—regardless of the danger that the incipient relaxation of the world situation might again yield to an imperilling of peace. "It is high time," wrote the *Temps* in March, 1911, "that an end be put to the unsatisfactory condition of the Entente by actual coöperation." At this very time, after an interregnum of six years, the energetic Delcassé had returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Marine, and before long he had again imposed his views on the weaker characters in the ministry. The group formed by the *Temps* and the *Comité du Maroc* began to promulgate a new Morocco program, which promised a marked diversion towards foreign questions. Eng-

[1] Thus H. H. Johnston, in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1910, remarks with regard to what he considers the necessary "adjustment of the political relations between the British and German Empires": "If such an end could be attained without too great a sacrifice of vital British interests, it is the end above all others which should be immediately and unflaggingly pursued by British statesmen."

lish coöperation was certain from the start, and for the purpose of mutual encouragement, the press again began the popular game of question and answer in regard to the nature of the Franco-English agreements, resulting on both sides in unwitting revelations and in the creation of a spirit of recklessness.

The manner in which England bolstered up France's expected action in Morocco by an enthusiastic speech of Sir Edward Grey on March 13, 1911, on world peace and by an unrestricted treaty of arbitration with America, will always be a source of wonder. To be sure, there were reasons of a world-political and domestic-political nature for this speech, but the theatric reception which was given to it proved that an unmistakable application in the field of foreign politics outweighed all other considerations. Grey's journalistic confidant, Spender, felt that he might venture to revive the meaningless saying of Napoleon in an up-to-date form: "The British Empire is Peace." Impetuously he stretched both hands toward America, and quieted the French, who were somewhat disturbed by this "world peace," by saying that the German military spirit had in reality received a body blow by this speech and that the life of the nations was to be governed by a new principle which was to replace the old "blood-and-iron" policy. The culmination lay in the question: "Now that England has held out the olive branch to the nations, is there any justification for an addition to the present German naval program?" The statesman whom Spender praised for never having been a sentimentalist thought thus to solve all problems with a peace speech; even at the last minute before the World War he once more produced arguments of this kind, which are probably a peculiarity of his mentality.

The immediate effect of the speech, after the German Imperial Chancellor had replied with a manly declaration of our point of view, was to give the signal for the renewal of the publicity campaign for the encircling of Germany, in which, by the coöperation of harmless friends of peace in all countries, the cannons of pacifism were turned against us. While the giant states prepared anew for the partition of the world, they sought to persuade the Germans to adopt, as the English Opposition sarcastically remarked, a "change in the rules of the game," and because the state which had been systematically isolated for seven years did not begin to disarm, it was outlawed as the disturber of the peace of the world. It thus became steadily clearer that a threat against Germany was concealed in Grey's confused dreams of peace, and the absolute dependence of the political and non-political brains in America

on English arguments was revealed, although not for the last time. Even he who does not regard the policy of the Liberal Cabinet as pure Machiavellism but takes into consideration its traditional mode of expression and the restrictions that regard for others imposes upon it, cannot escape the suspicions that Grey desired under all circumstances to uphold the action of France in Morocco against the expected German protest and to denounce this, when it should come, as a disturbance of the peace of the world. For precisely during these weeks (April 11, 1911), the British minister secretly gave his consent to the advance of the French on Fez.

The situation in the Morocco question had long since become untenable. In the course of the last five years the Algeciras Act had been more and more nullified, as the result of internal anarchy and even more through France's "readiness to help."[1] That which was proclaimed as the "peaceful penetration" of Morocco proved to be, even in English opinion, a system of financial strangling, of brutal reprisals, of continuous intrigues and provocations, which increased until the idlest excuses were regarded as justifying the French advance on Fez. On the other hand, the Franco-German negotiations of 1909, which had at least provided security for Germany's trade interests and an economic coöperation in Africa, had resulted in failure in December, 1910, and had altogether ceased. This was entirely owing to France, as well-known French writers afterward admitted.[2] This failure was due in great part to the frequent cabinet changes and the alliance of politicians with capitalistic interests in Paris; a decisive factor, however, was the feeling of self-confidence, carefully nursed in London, that the French aims might be realized, if need be, without regard for Germany and without offering compensation. Since Delcassé's return to power, there was a determination to risk the march on Fez with British support; once safely in Fez, the French would see to it that military necessity and the well-seasoned game of creating "incidents" should make it impossible for them to leave; a complete occupation of the capital was, of course, the natural prelude to the declaration of the protectorate. This was an attempt to rob the German Empire of the remnant of the compensation agreed upon, through the pressure brought to bear by the general political situation and by means of a political method in which one seemingly innocent step necessitated the next.

[1] *Morocco in Diplomacy*, Morel (London, 1912), p. 40: "Torn . . . across and reduced to waste paper."

[2] E.g., *Le coup d'Agadir*, Albin.

That was the culminating act of the policy begun in April, 1904—a policy which, according to the opinion of an Englishman, aimed to make the state which was in reality threatened appear in the light of the warlike aggressor, unless it submitted to humiliating exclusion.[1]

German diplomats had given warning after warning, with increasing earnestness, of the results which would follow if the Algeciras Act were to be nullified in this manner and if the signatory Powers should again obtain freedom of action. As a deaf ear continued to be turned to these warnings, Germany decided to speak more plainly. On July 1, 1911, the gunboat *Panther* was sent to Agadir, for the protection of German interests in South Morocco, which were threatened by disturbances. According to the intention of Secretary of State von Kiderlen-Wächter, the measure was for no other purpose than to show our unwillingness to leave our well-established interests unprotected; it was, as later characterized by the Frenchman, Marcel Sembat, also an indication of the desire "for a chat," for the purpose of carrying to a conclusion the interrupted negotiations—naturally with but two participants, as they had been started in the year 1909. Germany's object in the negotiations, as the French were officially informed by von Kiderlen at the very start, was not the occupation of South Morocco, since recognition of the French position had now become unavoidable, but the acquisition of a compensation elsewhere. Only in case this was not to be obtained, would it become necessary in the nature of things to revive Germany's claims in Morocco.

It is worthy of note that resentment at the demonstration at Agadir was not so strong in Paris, where they were doubtless conscious of their own sins of omission, as it was in London. While Sir Edward Grey had never been willing to admit that the march on Fez, which he had approved, had created a "new situation," he now proclaimed, filled as he was with distrust of the German explanations, that a "new situation" had been created. On July 4, before France had yet spoken, he took a definite stand, declaring that England would recognize no agreement brought about without her coöperation. Hastily, France's second sprang between the principals, before the duel had begun, in order to bring about a result in accordance with her own

[1] *Morocco in Diplomacy,* Morel, p. 127: "Had Germany wanted war, her course was clearly indicated, and it has been one of the most shameful features of the persistent misleading of the British public in favor of a diplomacy immoral from its inception, that Germany, the provoked party, has been represented, both in the crisis of 1905 and in the crisis of 1911—crises entirely brought about by that diplomacy—as working for war."

wishes. The point of danger during the succeeding negotiations was from the start neither Berlin nor Paris, but London.

Grey's act became more peremptory at the very moment when, in the Franco-German negotiations, the question was taken up as to the extent of compensation in the French Congo. Begun by an article in *The Times* of July 20 of unusual importance and from an unusual source, it culminated in the speech of Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on July 21. *The Times* accused Germany of demanding a compensation such as England had received in Egypt, and went to the length of saying that no British government could agree to this, even if a French government should be found ready to accept it. While the discussion was concerned with the extent of boundary changes in the French Congo, *The Times* poured oil on the flames by making the charge that Germany was making "a claim for absolute European predominance." This well-calculated catchword, which we shall encounter up to the moment of the outbreak of the war, revealed the fundamental political antagonism which had determined all of England's actions for a decade. In his next measures, however, Grey, according to his English critic,[1] adopted the arguments of *The Times* in a manner which would have been befitting a French minister. Even in England curiosity was expressed as to the motive of his action.

Contrary to the agreement, he was constantly kept informed from Paris regarding the progress of the negotiations between the two countries; if he received false information from Paris (through the underground channels which connected the French party of action with the British Embassy), this was the fault of the French; but if he gave more credence to this information than to the official German declarations, that was his own fault. Even without this, he was, however, quite clear as to what he wanted. He desired, even without formal admission of England to the negotiations, to force Germany's compensation to be made as small as possible, in the interest of France, and to bring about such a balance of the scales that in any event Germany would be worsted. If the Entente was to issue with greater strength from this final settlement in regard to Morocco, he would have to stand by its uncompromising partisans in Paris and prevent at any price the party advocating relaxation of the strain between France and Germany from gaining political power. This could be brought about

[1] *Morocco in Diplomacy*, Morel, p. 170: "He could not surely have been more emphatic in defense of a purely French interest, had he been the servant of the French Republic, instead of a servant of the British Empire."

only by provoking Germany and encouraging France—creating at the same time, it is true, war possibilities which could hardly have arisen from the Franco-German negotiations alone.

Stripped of all the accretions of diplomatic misunderstandings and dissensions, this was the significance of the speech which Grey caused the Radical member of the Cabinet, Lloyd George, to make on July 22; the Foreign Minister went so far in his autocratic policy as to inform only the Premier, Asquith, regarding the import of this step. The speech was an undisguised threat to Germany of English readiness for war, a sounding of the alarm which quickly brought the Franco-German negotiations to a critical stage. At the same time England made ready, in the effort further to strengthen France morally, to take those military and naval measures necessary in emergencies. It is interesting in this connection to see from some of the existing documents to what point the long-standing plans for the inclusion of Belgium in the sphere of military action had been developed. In August the English planned, in case of the outbreak of war, a landing in the Belgian town of Zeebrügge, even in the event that Belgium did not previously ask for help; when the Belgian general, later informed of this plan, modestly called attention to the necessity of an agreement on the part of his government, he received the cool reply that in any case (*en tout état de cause*) the English would have entered the country. Lord Roberts, who spoke from knowledge if any one was in the position to do so, likewise admitted with military frankness that the British expeditionary army was held ready "to embark for Flanders to do its share in maintaining the balance of power in Europe." England was prepared to march, even without an appeal for her help and without formally taking notice of Belgian neutrality, not for the sake of protecting the latter or on account of possible international obligations, but solely and alone for the "European balance of power." This meant, in the language which she had used for seven years, that she desired to turn the scale under all conditions in France's favor and against Germany, for the sake of her own political aims. She desired thus, from a military standpoint, to do precisely the same thing for which in the year 1914, with her customary moral abhorrence, she publicly blamed the threatened state which forestalled her.

The result of this sword-rattling policy was that the field of negotiations was much narrowed and the extent of the German compensation greatly limited. The peaceful restraint of Germany alone made this solution possible.

English interference had a double after-effect, even after the final settlement on the basis of the Morocco-Congo Agreement had been reached. From this time on in the French nation the conviction took root that England's armed support might be counted upon unconditionally in case of necessity, even beyond the measure of her obligation. Although persons of independent thought may have recognized with dismay the fact that for a decade France had become absolutely subservient to England's political ambitions, the *revanche* instinct had become irresistible in ever-widening circles of the population. Even the modest compensation which Germany had enforced caused furious indignation; the legend of the German plans of attack, which had not even existed against France when isolated after 1871, was the basis for widespread excitement, and the nation began to concern itself with the fate of Alsace-Lorraine in ever more provocative manner. The boasted *esprit nouveau,* sustained by a feeling of superiority on account of the possession of the new weapon, the aeroplane, and excited by constantly occurring incidents, began to speak openly of the "hour" which was at last approaching. A French writer expressed the "new feeling" by saying: "The agreement of 1911 is either the prelude to a genuine understanding between Germany and France, or the prelude to a war."

It may have appeared to many at this time that the tension would relieve itself in an immediate threat of war. The great lines of historical development, however, are never straight, but cross and recross each other in unaccountable manner. Thus the last phase before the World War saw a relaxation of tension at precisely the most dangerous point. But at the same time forces which had been loosed by the policy of England as here exposed, steered independently and brutally toward objects which were to be attained only by war, and these forces succeeded in surpressing all the elements working for peace, and finally in uniting new and old antagonisms to bring on the World War against the Central Powers.

V. THE LAST PHASE

Anglo-German Attempts at Disarmament. Offensive of Pan-Slavism and Revanche. 1912-1914

Just as an abatement of tension with Russia had followed the crisis of 1908-09, there now followed on the diplomatic struggle of the summer and autumn of 1911, which had caused

an upheaval of the deeps, the attempt or the "bluff" at an Anglo-German relaxation. The impulse for the movement came from England. A doubt had arisen in the minds of the English as to whether they had not perhaps bent the bow too far in the last crisis and avoided the danger by the narrowest margin. An independent politician like Lord Rosebery openly attacked a political system which, with its *ententes,* assumed obligations that, under certain and by no means unlikely conditions, might compel England to enter upon a gigantic war. Such a system, he said, was in its uncertainty even more dangerous than one of open alliances, which possessed the advantage of limiting and defining. Among publicists and journalists the number of those increased who attacked the dangerous development which the agreement of 1904 had undergone and demanded parliamentary control of its increasingly offensive character.[1]

It was openly admitted that England had not acted loyally toward Germany in the Morocco question, and the warning was given that the continuation of this policy meant lending England's support to French *revanche.*[2] There was an increase in the number of such protestants in the Liberal Party, which was at the helm, and in financial and industrial circles, with their influential organs, *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Economist,* and among the Radicals, the Irish and workers. Even the *Novoye Vremya* on occasion during the following years spoke with petulance of the majority of the ministerial party, which, it said, had come under the influence of the pacifists and the Germano-philes. The Cabinet therefore saw itself compelled to do something in order to satisfy its own followers. It was all the more ready to do this since, after the settlement of its Morocco obligations, it possessed a freer hand as to France. Perhaps in the inner circles of the party the course of events in the last crisis had shaken faith in the mistaken belief as to Germany's unconditional desire for war.

The government, therefore, sent one of its most noted members to negotiate with German statesmen. Lord Haldane, who

[1] *Morocco in Diplomacy,* Morel, p. 198: "There was unwarrantable, unsanctioned transmutation of a strictly limited agreement with France into an instrument of aggression against the Power which challenged France's infringement both of that Power's interests and rights under its own treaty with Morocco, and under the Algeciras Act. Parliament should place beyond doubt or question that this nationally unauthorized transmutation must cease."—The *Daily News* says the Treaty of 1904 had gradually developed into an "agreement by England in the interest of France to oppose Germany diplomatically at all times and in all places, and should the event arise, by force of arms."

[2] *Morocco in Diplomacy,* Morel, p. 196: "We have not treated Germany fairly, and Germany has a legitimate grievance against us on that score." On page 199 he warns the English against a situation "whereby it might become to-morrow the agent of some ephemeral French Government or other bent upon war with Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine."

was in Berlin from the 8th to the 11th of February, 1912, was one of those in the inner circle who was informed from the start of the secret obligations toward France. In the last crisis he had advocated energetic action. But at the same time, less insular in his outlook, he possessed a sympathetic understanding for German philosophy and for all that which beyond the Channel is to-day trodden under foot as German *Kultur*. Had he not even, although himself the creator of the unfortunate territorial army, striven to make his compatriots see that Scharnhorst and Clausewitz, Moltke and Roon would not have been possible without the great thinkers of Germany? His personality was admirably adapted either to mediation or to double-dealing. He discussed with the leaders of Germany all those points where the interests of the two countries met, in order to discover a basis for *rapprochement*. As the Englishman made no secret of the fact that his country would not quietly acquiesce in an attack by Germany on France (the ancient legend carefully nourished by the French *revanche* politicians), the Imperial Chancellor gave the most solemn assurance that Germany would never wage an offensive war against France, but would draw the sword only under provocation. On the contrary, he emphasized the fact that a loyal understanding between Germany and England would in all probability obviate the danger of a European war. All causes for possible conflict, he said, would be smothered in the seed by the weight of such a union.

On the English side there had been partial abandonment of King Edward's position that there were no frictions, that only rivalry existed. Certain frictions of this kind were acknowledged, and England declared herself ready to remove them. With sincerity and genuine desire for peace, the German government seized the hand held out to it. Time alone could show whether a relaxation of the tension at one point would produce a general effect.

That Russia had already taken advantage of the Anglo-German tension in order secretly to prepare a new offensive in the Balkans did not promise well. On February 29, 1912, soon after Haldane's visit to Berlin, there was formed, under Russian auspices, the Balkan League, which had been in the making since the beginning of the Turco-Italian War and which aimed at the dismemberment of European Turkey. It undertook to regard the attempt of any Great Power (Austria-Hungary or Italy) to interfere, even provisionally, as a *casus belli*. It has never been disputed that the League was aimed at Austria-Hungary from the start. The Pan-Slavic tendencies, which

had been merely an ideologic disguising of Russia's unbridled policy of force, now took possession of the whole press, of the intellectuals and the various parties in the Duma, and finally of the representatives of the official government. Seeking to clear the way toward Constantinople of all obstacles—the traditional goal of Russia's ambition—the upholders of these ideas no longer shrank from accepting the destruction of Austria-Hungary as the indispensable preliminary to their program.

A policy of offense, however, which aimed at the destruction of a Great Power, indicated the most fateful overturning of all genuine political balance, a revolutionizing of the *status quo* in Europe, compared to which all other peace-destroying aims, even that of the *revanche,* were only child's play. And yet publicists, who had long accustomed themselves to understand by the "maintenance of the balance of power" the isolation of Germany, do not hesitate to justify this Pan-Slavic ambition in the name of European balance of power, which would otherwise have fallen a victim to German hegemony!

If one surveys from these two points of view the ensuing development of the whole European situation, the impression is gained of two main currents crossing each other; it seems as if the tangle of action and reaction could no longer as hitherto be grouped under a simple exclusive formula. The policy of the Imperial government was to seek in every manner possible a relaxation of the tension at the one point where this appeared possible, and where in the last analysis the decision would come; on this account it avoided to the degree of self-sacrifice giving at any point cause for distrust, but it was impossible longer to remain blind to the fact that the fateful tendencies of the new offensive were spreading faster than those making for an abatement of the tension, and that they threatened our vital interests with destruction. Germany found herself forced to oppose Russia's threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary, unless she desired to lose her one faithful ally and to see the Dual Monarchy suffer internal disruption. If she permitted this, her own isolation would be complete and courage given to all her enemies for a final crushing blow. In this last stage of the policy of isolation, in which the German Empire was forced definitely on the defensive, it was characteristic that the English statesmen were no longer openly at the helm as previously. Rather had Russian Pan-Slavism, as the real heir of King Edward, for the sake of other aims than the world policy of England, taken over his activities in the making of world history. Hence, even if London did not approve of all the methods and

plans of her Entente ally, it could afford to await the development of affairs with reserve—indeed it could at the same time lend its support to the experiment of a military abatement. After having regulated the clock of the universe anew, there was no longer cause for concern as to the striking of the hours.

It can cause no astonishment that the German government had not allowed itself to be caught by the formula of an understanding which Grey had conceived and Haldane brought to Germany, but which had no practical meaning.[1] It need not, however, be assumed that the negotiations which were carried on in London during the ensuing years were from the start only a blind to conceal a contrary policy. Events showed that as regards the future delimitation of the spheres in Central Africa, as well as in the questions which were bound up with the continuation of the Bagdad Railway, an understanding was by no means impossible. Even the more delicate question of a possible reduction of naval preparations was discussed now with more success than in 1909. The British public was quieter in thought than in previous years, and certain perspicacious publicists even recognized the fact that a strong German fleet need not of necessity possess an offensive character, since the vital need of maintaining great open markets in the world made the possession of a corresponding naval power indispensable for the German Empire.[2] Distrust, it is true, was more pronounced in the official head of the navy; neither the personality nor the manner of expression of Mr. Churchill was calculated, in view of his mocking reference to the "German luxury fleet," to render easy for the Imperial government renunciation of so vital a sovereign right as the autonomous determination of its necessary armament. Nevertheless, there was a certain gain even in this field, as on both sides the maintenance of a relative strength of the two fleets in a ratio of 16 to 10 was declared to be possible and satisfactory.

If, meanwhile, France had been crowded somewhat into the background by the two principal opponents of the Central Powers, it was nevertheless of tremendous importance what form her obligations toward the two members of the Entente would take. It was a prelude to the Balkan War pregnant with con-

[1] The formula reads: "The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between themselves, England declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Germany. Aggression upon Germany forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England now is a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."

[2] *Morocco in Diplomacy*, Morel, p. 212: "This she can attain only by the possession of a fleet which will make the strongest Power hesitate either to attack her or to ignore her."

sequences that the Premier, Poincaré, on the occasion of his visit to Petrograd in August, 1912, obligated himself to advocate the renewal of the three-year military service period. The Russian statesmen had based their demand for this on the likelihood of serious complications in the "Austrian question"; the fact was recalled that at the time of the formation of the Dual Alliance the three-year period of service had been in effect, and the final argument was used that otherwise a pro-German party would gain power and endanger the Alliance. The Pan-Slavic offensive, clear as to the course which it desired to pursue, imposed upon its ally an almost intolerable increase of military burdens. Only for the sake of the hopes which had from the start bound the French *revanche* to the Dual Alliance, did the French politicians, under the continuous pressure of diplomatic and military extortion, submit to the inevitable.[1] Poincaré, who shortly afterward was elected to the presidency of the Republic, lent his name to this program; and even if the French were successful in gaining in return certain military concessions from Russia, nevertheless this system of mutual obligations could not fail in the end still further to increase the tension in the atmosphere in France and Russia. At all events, it was this obligation of France, undertaken before the Balkan War, and the outcome of the war itself which forced the German government in the spring of 1913 to draw up an extensive military program. Such was the causal and chronological sequence of events.

At the same time England drew closer the bond with France. The fact that she had another iron in the fire made it all the more impossible for her to dispense with her Entente ally, who followed the negotiations with Germany with unconcealed distrust. In the summer of 1912 Britain sought, at first by harsh compulsory measures, to prevent Italy from renewing the *Dreibund* in order to render that country subservient to her own interests in the Mediterranean. As the attempt proved a failure, the concentration of the entire French fleet in the Mediterranean was provided for by a naval convention in September, 1912, England, for her part, logically undertaking the protection of the northern coast of France. With justice, a French senator, Chautemps, remarked in regard to this agreement that it was based on the principle of the division of labor: "We surrender to England and to Russia the responsibility for the

[1] See the revelations in *Gil Blas* of May 25, 1913, and the confession of the Minister of Finance, Dumont, in the French Chamber. Of this confession the *Manchester Guardian* of May 31, 1913, said: "The French Government has been blackmailed by Russia."

safety of our west coast, as well as the protection of our colonies against an enemy occupation." And although England resisted the continuous efforts of the chauvinist press to induce her also to adopt the system of universal military service, nevertheless with this naval convention she assumed an increased moral responsibility on land as well as on the sea. It was strictly logical that, following the outbreak of the Balkan War, the extent of the general political obligations should, at France's instigation, be finally set down in writing.

This was done in the exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon on November 22, 1912. These documents, which were evidently formulated by Grey, proceeded on the assumption that the previous "consultations" between the naval and military experts of the two countries did not restrict the freedom of decision of the two governments in question. But as it might become essential, in certain eventualities, for each government to know whether it could depend upon the armed assistance of the other, the proper course to be pursued was formulated by Grey in the following words:

"I agree that in case either Government has grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or any move that threatens the general peace, it shall immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments are acting together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they are prepared to take in common. If these measures involve participation in the action, the plans of the General Staffs should at once be taken into consideration and the Government is then to decide what effect is to be given to them."

The exchange of notes sounds harmless and without binding force; it was from the start designed as an *ostensible* document for consumption by the British public and by the world in general. It was an agreement which contained the obligation for action in certain eventualities, but it was so worded that Grey could deny in Parliament its binding force, and even at the last moment declare himself "to be free from engagement." In this document it was not so much a question of the wording as of the permanence of feeling of its originators, who were able at will to bring about the eventualities in question, or to prevent them. As a matter of fact, the government of parliamentary England had surrendered the power of decision into the hands of its foreign minister and of its military and naval experts in a manner never done in monarchical Germany. It was from that time just as much bound morally as if it had signed a formal treaty, for, to quote Grey's words, it had

pledged "England's honor." On July 30, 1914, the French ambassador demanded the redemption of the pledge by recalling this exchange of letters.

Even in time of peace, the agreement, knowledge of which had quickly spread beyond the inner circle, could not fail to have a most encouraging effect on French sentiment; its mere existence was a menace to peace. The worst feature of all was that the far-reaching pledge viewed the essentially general condition of an "unprovoked attack." For if Russia were one day to assume the offensive against Austria-Hungary, thereby giving effect to Germany's obligations as an ally of the latter country, France also would be drawn into the war. Russia was thus placed at the point of control, and was able to set in motion this whole series of mutually interdependent obligations. Further, she was from now on sure of England's moral support, which was the final factor in the situation; the moment she saw fit to press the button, the agreements of the general staffs of France, England and Belgium came into force.

Thus the Balkan War began at a time when the tendencies aiming at the isolation of the Central Powers were increasing in strength, and the course of the struggle served still further to heighten them. The weakening of European Turkey, the inciting of Pan-Slavic greed, the overweening outburst of Serbian megalomania, and especially the preparation for a future attack on Austria-Hungary—these were the results of that which the Triple Entente triumphantly proclaimed as its victory. It was found, to be sure, that the Russian offensive had not realized all its ambitions. The mad drive of the Slavs toward the Adriatic had for the last time brought Austria-Hungary and Italy together in united action in Albania, after the renewal of the *Dreibund* during the war. The Czar had set himself up as chief advocate of the Slavic cause and spoken to the Slavic peoples in so commanding, and for Austria-Hungary, with half her population Slavic, so inadmissible, a manner that Napoleon himself, as protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, could not have spoken more authoritatively; but he had been able neither to prevent the war between the Serbs and Bulgars nor to force his way to the Adriatic. Although the decision in March, 1913, in the Winter Palace in Petrograd, was for peace, the world owed this not to a real desire for peace, but solely to the realization by those in power in Russia that they were not yet ready. Therefore the war against Austria-Hungary was postponed, but most unwillingly and with bitterness. The unbridled recrudescence of the Pan-Slavic propaganda was due to

this disappointment, as were also the unheard-of provocations of Austria-Hungary by the press. It became constantly more unlikely that the Czar and Sassonov would be able again to stem so powerful a current.

Louder than had been the case for a generation, came the echo from France, where the burden of the three-year period of service, which had been forced on the country by the Russian ally, was creating an intolerable situation, for which, however, the wicked German neighbor was made responsible. Every incident on the border line (as the landing of the Zeppelin in Lunéville and the insults offered to Germans in Nancy) brought clearly to view that there slumbered in the French national soul an elementary hatred of all that which, in impotent longing for revenge, was styled German barbarism. There was now at last no hesitancy shown in unrestrainedly proclaiming this and in treating in the more serious newspapers the "Alsace-Lorraine question" in a more provocative manner than at any time since 1871.

The primary cause of the encircling policy, however—the antagonism between Germany and France—had during the Balkan War been crowded into the background more than at any time in a decade. The influence toward compromise exercised by Germany during this crisis had not remained unnoticed among the leaders of England; and while they for their part urged moderation in Petrograd, the world beheld the astonishing spectacle of the two rivals working together in the same field as guardians of the world peace. British statesmen assured every one who would listen that they were now convinced of the peaceful character of Germany's policy. In the summer of 1913, the celebration of the twenty-fifth year of the reign of Emperor William gave an opportunity to the German nation and to wide circles throughout the world gratefully to recall the services of the German Kaiser in preserving the world's peace in more than one crisis. The commentaries of the British press at that time were couched in a tone which had nothing in common with the spiteful utterance of the French and which gave no hint of the outbreaks of which it proved itself capable a year later. The colonial negotiations, therefore, from the summer of 1913 on followed a course constantly more promising. It must not, however, on that account be thought that German statesmen shut their eyes to the unchanging fundamental tendency of British policies. When at the height of the Balkan crisis the secret Franco-English agreement of November, 1912, became known, it was declared with evident anxiety in an official German re-

port: "The net is constantly being drawn closer in which French diplomacy has succeeded in entrapping England." It was herein prophetically remarked of the dangerous game played by the British government that: "The constant encouragement which it gives directly and indirectly to French chauvinism may one day lead to a catastrophe, in which British and French soldiers will pay with their blood on French battlefields for England's policy of isolation. The seed which King Edward sowed is bearing fruit."

This was made certain by Russia's offensive policy, which after a short pause was more energetically renewed. Viewed from the outside, it seemed almost to have crowded into the background the antagonism between England and Germany, and Russian statesmen now turned their attention with equal force to the two Central Powers, which they recognized as an inseparable obstacle in their path. The plan for the renewal of the Balkan League, for which the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade was the most ardent worker, was based on the assumption of the annihilation of one Great Power. The Pan-Slavic press even declared that it was true that the Balkan question was not yet settled, but that the Austrian question had become more important: "A catastrophic liquidation of Austria's crimes, which have piled up for centuries, is imminent." [1]

After the fall of European Turkey had been brought about, attention began to be turned to Asiatic Turkey and to the undermining of German influence there, although it was realized in Petrograd that this action likewise was bound to lead to war. The Russian protest against the sweeping powers of General Liman von Sanders in Constantinople in January, 1914, was the crucial point of the final diplomatic test of strength, and cast illuminating light on the whole European situation. The fate of Asiatic Turkey, which the German Empire desired to maintain intact, was the real question at issue. That the German commission was not without precedent is proved by the corresponding British naval commission, whose labors, assuming that they were sincere, were bound to contribute to insuring Turkey's possession of Constantinople and of the key to the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, Russia, urged on by French influence, attacked only the German commission; and if she was partially successful in her effort, this was due to the support which she unexpectedly received from England. The solution of the riddle can only be that from the start England considered the naval commission as a mere blind.

[1] *Novoye Vremya*, February 13, 1914.

In Petrograd these discussions led to still more violent threats of war: "Russia desires peace, but is prepared for war," wrote the *Bourse Gazette* on March 13, 1914. "The Russian army, which has always been victorious, will entirely forget the defensive idea to which it has had to resign itself in the most recent period of our history." [1]

The military and financial coöperation with France had entered since the autumn on a stage more and more inimical to peace. After Joffre in August, 1913, had come to the fore as the future generalissimo, arrangements had been made during the succeeding months for a new billion-franc loan, the purpose of which was the building of a network of strategic railways in Poland that were to render possible a Russian offensive against Germany. We saw a little while ago how tempting was the prospect for the French money lenders; the assurance was constantly given that the building of the railroad and the payment by installment would go hand in hand. The alliance of French capital and Russian politics for better or for worse which had come about of recent years, had for a long time been an instrument in the policy of isolation; it had now become a weapon for an attack in the immediate future, and every one knew what was really meant when the *Temps* revealed the purpose of this last loan with the mysterious words: "All parties must unite harmoniously in preparing for ultimate success." It was openly admitted even in official Russian publications that the country was preparing against Germany, and although the completion of the railways was not to be expected under two or three years, the outbreak of war was destined to show how far the immediate preparations for war had advanced since the beginning of the year.

In addition, other motives increased more and more the military impetus in wider circles of society. The antagonism of the nations was increased by the economic rivalry, which had been the basic cause of enmity between Germany and Great Britain. The belief, which was shared by such men as Prince Trubetzkoi and Prince Kotchubey, that the Germans had driven Russia into the war with Japan and then made use of their neighbor's necessity to extort a favorable commercial treaty for themselves, had spread gradually throughout the circles of Russian politicians and economists. When economic writers began now to urge timely preparation, in view of these experiences, for the renewal of the commercial treaties in 1917, this

[1] *Petersburger Boersenzeitung*, March 13, 1914. The article is said to have been inspired by the Minister of War, Suchomlinov.

was understood by leading men to mean that Russia must assume so powerful a military and diplomatic position for this event (which coincided in point of time with the completion of the Russian measures of military preparation) that the country would be able to free itself from the humiliating condition of a commercial tributary. When Sassonov ventured in the Duma to make use of this historical and economic argument, it was clear to the whole world that he had unconditionally capitulated to the anti-German elements. The commercial argument was brought into connection with the general tendencies of Russia's Balkan policy. A man like the historian, P. von Mitrofanoff, who by no means belonged to the Pan-Slavists, declared openly:

"The impetus toward the South is a historical, political and economic necessity, and any state which opposes this movement is by that very fact an enemy. . . . It has become clear to the Russians that if conditions remain as they now are, the way to Constantinople leads through Berlin. Vienna is in reality a secondary question."

The insatiable desire for expansion of the vast eastern empire created a willingness to sweep aside all of the opposing Great Powers. Although England's diplomatic game had originally aimed to turn the thoughts only of Russia's ruling class into this new channel, the antipathy to the Germans, which is historically and psychologically explicable and which makes the Slav more deeply conscious of racial antagonisms than ourselves, gained uninterruptedly in strength in all strata of the population. A nationalistic feeling which was increasing in self-consciousness, a species of new-fashioned Russian patriotism which shaped its far-reaching plans by antagonism toward Germany, expressed and sated itself through this antipathy. "The dislike of the Germans," remarked the same objective observer, "is in everybody's mind and on everybody's tongue, and seldom has public opinion been so uniform." Every competent judge prophesied that in case of war Russia would not have to reckon with the outbreak of a revolution, as at the time of the unpopular Japanese War, but that a war against Germany would be exceedingly popular in the army and in the Duma, in society and among intellectuals—indeed, even among the masses of the people.

If one seeks to apportion responsibility as regards public opinion in these last months before the World War, in which, as in a final taking of the breath for a coming struggle, there was an extreme mental tension, one is astonished by the growing similarity in the threatening language of the leading organs of

the Triple Entente; they had adapted their varied rôles to each other for this purpose in a remarkable manner; and they were, moreover, bound together by invisible golden cords (not to speak of the lower forms of financial dependence), from *The Times,* which received for its Russian edition a disproportionate subvention, down to *Le Temps,* which another Parisian paper characterized as the "authoritative organ of passive obedience to all the demands of Monsieur Isvolski." All of the allies now made use of the same language, which each one understood even though it added its own individual interpretation. We have seen how for years England concealed her general policy aimed throughout the world at Germany under the formula of "the European balance of power"; when *Le Temps* spoke of the necessity of "reestablishing the European equilibrium," every one understood that this was a question of Alsace-Lorraine; for Russia, however, the European balance of power meant nothing less than liberty to destroy Austria-Hungary and Asiatic Turkey, and to clear away every important obstacle which stood in her path. Thus, even before the war, by a similar political terminology, it was customary to accuse the inherently powerful German Empire of being destructive of peace; while waxing strong without war, it had no desire to change the *status quo* of the world at any point. The finishing touch in the hemming in of Germany was furnished by the accusation brought against the state which was encircled and thrown upon the defensive, of striving for an intolerable hegemony in Europe.

In this situation, which was constantly becoming more portentous, the effort was made in Petrograd and Paris to change the various *ententes* into a definite alliance; if only in view of the possibility of a successful outcome of the Anglo-German negotiations, a closer and more regular union by treaty was thought preferable to the previous elastic bond. Following the customary prelude from irresponsible sources, advantage was taken of the holiday spirit called forth by the visit of King George in Paris on April 21, 1914, to urge the formation of an Anglo-French alliance. Grey, who for the first time visited the Continent, resisted the insistent urging of Minister Delcassé and Ambassador Isvolski. He still remained an advocate of the "free hand," since by binding his country in this manner he would have encountered opposition in the Cabinet and especially in his own party. But he was experienced enough in the art of arousing hopes to be able to console the disappointed French with the possibility of a Cabinet change (since the Unionists were not bound by precedents) and with the suggestion that in

the methodical coöperation of the members of the Entente they already possessed what was tantamount to a formal alliance. He promised to develop this coöperation into a kind of organic institution under his presidency in London.

Grey went even a step further. When the proposition was made for an Anglo-Russian naval convention, he announced his approval and obtained the decision of the Cabinet to enter into the necessary negotiations. More interesting than the customary technical discussions of the naval staffs, which were to follow the model of the Franco-Russian naval convention, is the political view, according to which the Russian originators of the plan demanded that England neutralize as great a portion of the German fleet as possible in the Baltic. By this means the overwhelming superiority of the German fleet over the Russian would be nullified, and perhaps a Russian landing in Pomerania rendered possible. In this field, the British government could perform an important service by sending, before the commencement of actual war operations, a great number of merchant ships to the Baltic ports, in order that the lack of Russian transport ships might be made good. The negotiations, the basis of which soon became known to the German government, were carried forward so successfully that as early as the end of May the nations concerned let as much regarding them filter through as was needed for putting the public into the right state of mind. The general political importance of these plans cannot be too highly estimated. They show the logical and deliberate course of offensive diplomacy in Petrograd, which at this very time led the press to discuss with ever new variation "Russia's undisputed claim to Asiatic Turkey," as well as the subject of Austria-Hungary's approaching catastrophe. It seemed nearer than ever before to its goal of enlisting the naval power of England in its service against the powerful ally of the Dual Monarchy and of Turkey.

The negotiations prove further the essentially offensive character of Grey's policy. He may perhaps still have maintained a "free hand," as in December, 1905, and not consciously have pursued a course inevitably leading to war, as was the case with Russia; but by consistently enlarging the system of "peace guarantees"—that is to say of constricting Germany by close connections with states entertaining offensive intentions, with whose aims he was familiar—he was tying the hands of his own country ever more tightly. He thus clung to the course which he had followed since the beginning of his ministry, and his conduct in Parliament on June 11, 1914, continued to be consistent,

when he was forced to meet the questionings of his thoroughly alarmed party colleagues. He referred to a ministerial declaration of the previous year that no secret understandings existed which might restrict or hinder the government and Parliament in their freedom to decide whether England should take part in a future war; nor were there, he said, at this time any negotiations either under way or in prospect which made this declaration less true. This statement was as true formally as it was essentially based upon a shameless falsehood. Grey and his nearest friends in the Cabinet were fully aware of the significance of allying the first Naval Power in the world with the uncontrollable desire for war of its political partners.

It was England alone who was now able at will to open or close the gates of the Temple of Janus. So well informed an observer as Theodor Schiemann constantly gave utterance to the warning in these weeks that as soon as Paris and Petrograd should have made sure of England's support an early European war was to be expected as a most probable result. The decision of Grey and Asquith undoubtedly was due in part to the fact that their political party, which had long been fundamentally disrupted, was in the Ulster question driving the country toward the verge of civil war and the army toward mutiny. The consideration that the Liberal Cabinet was likely soon to be displaced by that of the much more resolute opposition party could not fail to act as an encouragement on Grey, who had long been following the foreign policy of the Conservatives, much more than that of the Liberals. On the other hand, the government had become so dependent on the opposition that it strove to avoid giving it cause to criticize the country's foreign policy. French internal politics, with their bitterly uncompromising struggles of cliques, in which no one dared to give voice to the unexpressed thought of all: "War or peace with Germany?" had long since reacted in a fateful manner on the foreign policy; it became apparent at this time that in England, too, the difficulties resulting from internal differences tended to turn the scale against peace.

Grey's policy appears in a light all the more ambiguous when, with the greatest possible increase of the obligations which he had undertaken *against* Germany, the probability had become stronger of an agreement *with* Germany. As the result of tireless negotiations, the Anglo-German agreement came formally into existence in the course of the summer. It regulated the commercial future of the Portuguese colonies in East and West Africa, by dividing them into an English and a German sphere

of interest; at the same time it brought about a settlement satisfactory to both parties, concerning the final configuration of the Bagdad Railway, and a compromise as to conflicting interests which had hitherto been the cause of estrangement. If Sir Edward Grey's ultimate aim had really been an understanding with Germany, the above agreement would have given proof that such an agreement was possible if sincerely desired; but if the agreement was—as soon proved to be the case—only a make-believe concession to that part of the English public which desired peace with Germany, it was sure to give way under a general and heavy strain. At all events, it was the will of destiny that the British Empire be brought face to face in its full significance with the question of its future relation to Germany, undisturbed by local differences. When the government followed up the naval visit to Kronstadt by that to Kiel, it apparently continued symbolically to keep both irons in the fire. In truth, however, Grey proceeded till the end along the course of those of whom Lady Macbeth says:

"They would not play false, and yet would wrongly win."

At this moment Russia's Balkan policy, which von Hartwig directed in Belgrade, produced its bloody harvest. On June 28, 1914, the heir to the crowns of Austria and Hungary was murdered in Sarajevo.

CHAPTER II

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG

ONLY he who is thoroughly familiar with events preliminary to and leading up to the war is in a position to form an objective picture of the outbreak of hostilities. Without this insight into these preliminary events, no one, approaching the happenings of the final week, would be able under any circumstances to open the door that leads to understanding.

The real questions at the root of this desperate struggle are not touched upon in the official blue and white books, and the superficial observer might easily gain the impression that a technical discussion between a few individual diplomats had led, in a single week, through misunderstanding, awkwardness and malevolence, to the greatest war in the world's history. Among diplomats one now hears *ad nauseam* such harmless expressions as "European balance of power," "national honor," "human civilization" and "anxiety for the peace of the world," with which we had become familiar enough before the war; but they are merely blinds intended to conceal the great motive forces of history and a movement which had long been consciously under way.

The blue books, too, though not without value as historical sources, are at the same time political briefs of the various governments. The apparently so copious material is, in reality, very incomplete. Each state has selected those documents which seem to it useful in sustaining its special pleading; hence, a comparatively greater unrestraint in making public her papers is shown by England, who was for a relatively long time not directly concerned in the questions at issue and who would seem to have occupied toward them the position of watchful mediator.

The material of the blue books is not alone incomplete as a whole, but the individual documents are frequently abbreviated, and at times even demonstrably falsified.[1] English history since

[1] The English falsification is easily recognized even by the ordinary reader. No. 105 of the Blue Book contains a letter written by Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Bertie at Paris, dated July 30th. Added are three annexes, the correspondence between Grey and Cambon of November 22-23, 1912, and a report concerning military preparations and boundary violations by Germany, which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to Ambassador Cambon at

the time of Lord Palmerston offers many examples of unscrupulous castration and twisting of official despatches. In the present blue book, also, one falsification can be proved with absolute certainty, despite later futile efforts to suppress the damaging evidence. An important fact is that this falsification concerns the reasons why England was obliged to, and why eventually she did, render assistance—precisely in this connection did Grey have need of supplementary feats of editorial legerdemain. This forgery led in turn to the futile attempt in the French yellow book (which at more than one point reveals for those familiar with previous centuries the well-known sprightly unreliability of French diplomatic reports[1]) to bring about agreement with the English statements, by means of an equally awkward falsification.[2]

London. The third annex, which is of importance in this connection, in the first edition of the Blue Book is dated "July 31, 1914." In the second edition this date, which cannot be reconciled with that of Grey's letter, is omitted! But that is not all. In the first edition this report—in the English translation of the Blue Book—begins with the words: "The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers yesterday (Friday)." But since Friday was the 31st of July, the date of the document ought to have been the first of August. Consequently the word "Friday," which gave things away, was likewise eliminated in the second edition. If, however, annex three is of July 31st, or even of August 1st (which would be more consonant with its military contents), it is impossible that it should have been enclosed in a letter of Grey's of July 30th. But since the letter refers to annex three ("he gave me a paper of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done"), it must have been falsified either as regards the date or as regards the contents, at least to the extent of the quoted sentence, which was probably interpolated later on. That calls all the events recited in No. 105 into question, and since we have now become thoroughly suspicious, we begin to understand why the British Minister should have done something so unusual in diplomatic routine and at the same time so superfluous as to pick out and send by special messenger to his representative in Paris the correspondence of November, 1912, which was long since known there, and the military report which he asserted he had just received from Paris through Ambassador Cambon. The reason for this falsification is that the government felt a belated need of presenting somewhere in the Blue Book the obligations undertaken in November, 1912, in neat juxtaposition with a military document which proved the actuality of the "menaces" which the former documents had foreseen.

[1] The most typical example is a compilation from diplomatic and consular reports, dated July 30, 1913, which aims to prove that recently sentiment in Germany had taken a turn opposed to peace justifying France's policy to a large degree. In this collective report, which can hardly lay claim to being considered as an authentic source of historical evidence, we find the following sentences: "If it is true that the Emperor is discussed, and that the Chancellor is unpopular, Mr. von Kiderlen was the most hated man in Germany. But he is beginning to be less badly thought of, for he is making people understand that he is going to have his revenge." Mr. von Kiderlen-Wächter died December, 1912! Thus the collective report was compiled, not on July 30, 1913, but precipitately and with consequent lack of truthfulness in the autumn of 1914. Further incongruities in Mr. Cambon's reports have been laid bare in the *North German Gazette* of December 21, 1914.

[2] The letter addressed to Mr. Cambon by Mr. Viviani, dated July 30th (Yellow Book No. 106), gives part of the information, contained in annex three, of No. 105, of the Blue Book, and which consequently cannot have come into being before July 31st, or rather August 1st. It can be proved that this letter, too, is a fabrication, made up from various reports dating from different periods. The purpose was to secure credence for annex three, No. 105, of the British Blue Book.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that in the blue books one is able to follow from day to day only the *visible* course of the negotiations, conferences and efforts at mediation, as these were undertaken, continued and again interrupted. The *invisible* impulses in the course of affairs find expression only in isolated instances in this mass of diplomatic documents—a word or a hint which assures a friend of readiness to help in case of need, encouraging him to action, which may be far more decisive than any official effort at mediation. The reader must not, therefore, allow himself to be diverted by occurrences in the foreground, but must endeavor to penetrate beneath the surface and to interpret the various events in the spirit of the war's entire preliminary history and of the personages engaged. Only in that case do the decisive turning-points and the controlling features of this vast game stand out in clear perspective.

The authors, accomplices and abettors in the murder of the Arch-Ducal heir apparent intended the deed as a decisive event, which was to result in the desired disruption of Austria-Hungary and in changing the face of Europe. The date deliberately chosen for the crime was the five hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the Battle of the Amsel Field, following which a Serbian, Milos Obilicz, had stabbed the victorious Sultan Murad. It was planned that the new "hereditary enemy" should receive a mortal wound on this day, which was celebrated as the "independence day" of the Serbian nation for the first time in 1914, with provocative speeches in favor of the "enslaved brothers." The more the strong personality of Franz Ferdinand appeared to guarantee the future of the Dual Monarchy, the more important did it seem to Servian jingoes to remove this future obstacle by murderous means. Employment of such means is constantly met with in the history of the Serbian nation and crown throughout the nineteenth century. The outbursts of joy following the deed showed what Serbia believed to have been accomplished. The criminally exaggerated nationalistic feeling of the Serbs, among the official and military circles of whom knowledge of and coöperation in the crime was widespread, is to be held mainly responsible, not the subordinate tools in its commission. It was the plan of the murderers to take advantage of the dangerous tension of the political atmosphere of the summer of 1914, intensified as it was by the clamor regarding Russian preparedness, in order to make sure, in the general confusion, of reaping the fruits of their deed. The important question now was as to what lengths in protecting the

culprits and the Serbian state the Russian abettors, who had been directly concerned in creating this chauvinistic sentiment, were ready to go, as well as those European politicians who for years, through their trifling with the possible dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, had been indirectly concerned in bringing about the situation.

The moral guilt of the Serbian government was increased by its behavior after the deed. No spontaneous effort was made by it to proceed against the conspirators on Serbian soil by means of its own agents, although so many signs pointed toward Belgrade; even less did it attempt at the last moment in Vienna to free itself from connection with the movement which it had brought about. The solemn obligations undertaken by it on March 31, 1909, had been entirely forgotten. On the contrary, so certain did the government feel of the continuation of the backing it had hitherto enjoyed that it permitted the press of the country to discuss day by day the impotence and the dissolution of the neighboring Monarchy; the official governmental publication even went so far as to declare that the internal conditions in Austria-Hungary had been the sole cause of the crime. So hopelessly obsessed was Serbia by her delusion of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary that she either thought that country incapable of any vigorous action or else saw no reason for fear in braving it.

It was inevitable that the deeply injured state, which had so long patiently borne Serbia's threats, should at last be aroused. To countenance this aggression meant to endanger not alone its prestige, but its very existence. One needs only to ask how long Russia would have quietly submitted to a similar agitation in Sweden or Rumania, looking to the separation of Finland or Bessarabia; or how long the United States would have suffered a continued deliberate disturbance of the peace by Mexico. Would not both of these states, if a similar agitation, backed up by a third Great Power, had led to an attack on their official head, have sought satisfaction and security by armed force and without asking permission of any one? In self-defense, Austria-Hungary saw herself compelled, now or never, to put a check upon these forces which were aiming at her destruction, even at the risk of arousing Russia to bring to bear the full weight of her offensive strength.

The German Imperial Government, which before the 23rd of July was informed only in a general way of Austria-Hungary's views and intentions, had expressed its entire agreement. "With all our heart," says the White Book in this connection, "we

were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Monarchy would meet with our approval." We did not close our eyes to the fact that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, and the bringing of the whole of Slavdom under the Russian scepter, would render the position of the German race in Middle Europe untenable, and that in this crisis an isolated and morally weakened Austria would lose for us her full value as an ally. Hence, Germany left an entirely free hand to her ally in proceeding against Serbia, without taking part in the preparations or knowing beforehand the details of the ultimatum. As had previously been the case more than once, the Central Powers, which were the ones really threatened, saw themselves, in view of the constantly increasing number of their enemies, forced to action, though it is wrong to represent the steps they took as a diplomatic offensive. Only a superficial reader of the Blue Books will allow himself to be misled by the impression that, as far as appearances go, it was Austria-Hungary, who in the week from July 23 to August 1, by making demands, took the diplomatic offensive, and that the German Empire became her accomplice through its approval of Austria-Hungary's procedure; it must not be forgotten for a moment that the offensive character of the Triple Entente and of the Pan-Slavic movement, which aimed at the destruction of Austria-Hungary, had long since forced the Central Powers into a defensive position.

The demands which Austria-Hungary made on Serbia on July 23, with the setting of a time limit, were characterized by our enemies as excessive, and intolerable for a sovereign state —especially was the demand that Austrian judges participate in the investigation of the crime said to be without precedent. As a matter of fact, there is no lack of precedent in modern history in cases which the nature of the provocation and the stage of civilization of the offending state made such a step necessary. No doubt Austria-Hungary intended it as a lesson for Serbia when she sought to enforce the fulfilment of the disgracefully disregarded promises which this state had made in 1909. From the start, however, she gave definite guarantees to the Great Powers in regard to the scope of her contemplated action by declaring that she would not violate Serbia's territorial rights, but would recognize the integrity and independence of the country; there was no question of a "permanent" impairment of Serbia's sovereignty. Austria-Hungary did not aim at a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans, but

claimed merely the right of taking, in her discretion, the necessary preventative measures for the protection of her vital interests, which were seriously threatened by the undermining activity of the Serbian agitators. Accordingly, Germany took the stand that this purely Austro-Serbian conflict must remain localized; following the declaration of the Central Powers that they were striving for such a localization of the quarrel, the French and British governments promised their good offices in the same effort. As long as the conflict remained localized, the peace of the world was assured. But as soon as Russia or any other Power seized on an incident of such character in order to interfere, there could be no doubt as to what action was to be expected from the Triple Entente in the immediate future.

Events immediately proved that the leaders of Russian Pan-Slavism were not to be deterred even by the murder of the Archduke, but were ready to deny all the monarchic traditions of their own history rather than to surrender the criminals and abandon their hopes of Serbia. This state, as the nucleus of their Balkan policy, was indispensable to their offensive. A word from Petrograd would have sufficed to bring the Serbs to reason before the ultimatum—this word was not spoken by the state which, in the summer of 1913, had assumed to be the arbiter of the Slavic world. The offensive tendencies of a policy of force, which was not to be turned aside from its aims by the danger of the most serious complications, continued to gain in strength. When, a fortnight after the murder in Sarajevo, further disclosures regarding the Anglo-Russian naval convention percolated through to the public, a Russian newspaper cried triumphantly: "We are now able, thanks to the support of the British fleet and to our now completely prepared army, to demand that Berlin put an end to that political system which is in keeping neither with our dignity nor with our international position." The word of 1870, *"archiprêt,"* uttered at this moment could not fail to act as an incitement to Belgrade. Russia was determined from the start to permit the enforcement of Austria's demands under no circumstances. The same minister who found nothing to say publicly in condemnation of the Serbian crime characterized Austria's demands as "provocative and immoral," and attributed to them, despite the Monarchy's positive promises, the intention to devour and crush Serbia; later the Czar also could see nothing but a "disgraceful" war against a small country. Thus, like Germany's wish to localize the conflict, Russia's determination to

intervene at any price against Austria's punitive procedure was beyond question. With this intention, Russia continued quietly her military preparations.

A decisive factor in such a policy was from the start the question as to how far Russia could reckon on her Entente associates. Only in case of the latter's unreserved support would there be no further obstacles to overcome. Sassonov would have preferred immediately to mobilize the Triple Entente and to have had the mutual obligations of the contracting states become operative at once; he therefore proposed to the French and British Ambassadors a declaration of solidarity, with hypocritical justification that only a common attitude of firmness could prevent a war. While the French Ambassador unreservedly adopted the Russian proposal, the British representative showed himself at first much more reserved, in which position he was later sustained by Grey, and he let it be understood that his country did not desire war on account of the Serbian question. All the more emphatically did Sassonov declare that "the general European question" was involved in this Serbian question, and that on this account England could not efface herself; he admitted at this early date (July 24) that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out, and that an Imperial Council would decide the question the following day.[1] From this first moment on, with full realization of her action, Russia used the question of the European balance of power as a goad, and offered her military resources in solving it.

Everything depended upon whether England would follow along this path. For, although France had apparently already taken up her position, it was nevertheless to be expected that she would make her final decision dependent on England's attitude. The country in which the policy of isolating Germany had originated was now to speak the decisive word.

In England's later official statement credit was claimed for the earnestness of the country's efforts for peace. It is not to be denied that Grey undertook a series of efforts at mediation, but it is not merely a question as to good intentions, but rather as to what practical value these efforts had and what was their real aim: the preservation of the world's peace under conditions which would have been honorable for all concerned, or a one-sided diplomatic success for the Entente, which would have been decisive for the whole future. His point of departure was shown by the fact that he characterized the Austrian demands as intolerable and the German position as to localizing the conflict as a mere

[1] British Blue Book No. 6.

phrase [1]; by unreservedly refusing to advise moderation in Petrograd,[2] he betrayed a growing sympathy with all the arguments of the Russian interpretation. On July 15, Sassonov, disappointed at England's reserve, telegraphed to London: "In the event of the situation becoming more critical, possibly leading to concerted action by the Great Powers, we count upon England's readiness to place herself unreservedly by the side of Russia and France for the purpose of upholding the European balance of power, for the preservation of which she has always stood and which in the event of an Austrian triumph would undoubtedly be disturbed." [3] By means of this catchword, calculated to appeal to the English mind, he sought to befog the issue in dispute, which England found an awkward one. Grey, however, allowed the Russian appeal concerning the European balance of power to influence him with increasing weight. The British Ambassador in Petrograd, who personally did not belong to the extremists, ventured, without doubt in agreement with his instructions, on the same day to formulate the views of his government as regards the real nature of its mediation, to the effect that "England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once." [4] These words should be placed as the motto at the head of all later efforts at mediation by British statesmanship. They show that Grey differed only as to method from the Russian advocates of extreme action, but that he did not shrink from the end to be obtained.

His proposal to increase the twenty-four hour time limit of the ultimatum was of importance only as a demonstration; in case of success, Russia, who was ready for intervention, would merely have gained a further start in her military preparations.

Events moved too fast for the proposal. Serbia's reply on the afternoon of July 25th indicated only an apparent readiness to meet Austria half-way: in reality, she rejected all those demands of Austria the carrying out of which would have meant energetic action by the government against the intrigues of Serbian subjects aimed at Austria. Hence Austria was compelled to reject such an answer [5] from a state which, five years before, had vainly promised to mend its ways, and to break off diplomatic relations, according to her threat. That Serbia was in no doubt as to the

[1] Introduction to Blue Book, p. V.
[2] Blue Book No. 11; Orange Book No. 20.
[3] Orange Book No. 17.
[4] Blue Book No. 17.
[5] Italy also disapproved of the Serbian note. See Yellow Book No. 72.

reception of her reply is shown by the fact that she had started to mobilize even before sending the note. On the same date (July 25th) Russia ordered the mobilization of the military districts adjoining Austria-Hungary. The conflict thereby entered on its second stage.

Grey now considered it advisable to formulate a proposal for mediation. On the evening of July 26th, after receiving Russia's approval, he suggested to the French, German and Italian governments to authorize their ambassadors in London to meet in conference for the purpose of considering a peaceful solution. This suggestion was unacceptable to Austria-Hungary for the reason that it indirectly recognized Russia as a Power interested in the Serbo-Austrian conflict, and that it would have brought before the "areopagus of the Powers" this affair of a state which from every point of view had been most severely provoked. Only he who is familiar with the extent of the mutual obligations of the Entente Powers and with the thorough-going organization of their London headquarters in the summer of 1914 is in a position to realize what rôle would have been played at this conference by Russia's two confederates—not to speak of Italy. During its course Russia might have continued her preparations, while Germany would have been forced to promise not to mobilize. Finally, no unprejudiced person will claim that the man who was ready at the favorable moment to metamorphose himself into an ally of Russia was the ideal neutral leader of negotiations, conducted under the pressure of Russian mobilization.[1] The longer one considers the proposal for mediation, the clearer does it become that it was calculated to gain at least a diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers. It is, therefore, not surprising that the German government, while declaring itself ready, in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, to undertake mediation jointly with the other Great Powers, pronounced it to be impossible "to call her ally in the latter's dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal."[2] Instead of this, in order to compose the misunderstanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Germany assumed the initiative by suggesting direct negotiations between these two Powers, as the most hopeful measure for a peaceful solution, and succeeded in gaining England's adherence to the idea of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, in place of the conference plan.[3]

The efforts of German diplomacy were directed toward pre-

[1] Orange Book No. 22.
[2] White Book, 3, No. 14; Blue Book No. 46.
[3] Blue Book No. 67.

venting a tragic outcome through simultaneous warning and peaceful explanations. On July 26th, Germany had called attention in Petrograd to the inevitable results of the first step on the path of mobilization: "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures, which must consist in mobilizing the army. But mobilization means war. As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, our mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war." [1] Consonant with this, Paris was informed that only the localizing of the conflict would prevent untold dangers, but at the same time that Germany's intentions in regard to France were purely peaceful. Every suggestion, however, for united efforts toward peace was rejected by Paris with deep distrust. France could not make up her mind to undertake in Petrograd a step similar to that of Germany in Vienna; the slightest move in this direction, it was feared, would prove compromising in the eyes of Russia, and it was considered necessary by intentionally colorless newspaper declarations to avoid even the faintest suspicion of a "solidarity with Germany which might be wrongfully interpreted." [2] Paris preferred, with folded arms and without initiative, to watch the fateful course of events.

Meanwhile, the Russian government strove to convince the leading British statesmen that the Central Powers' apparent unwillingness to yield was due only to the widespread delusion in Germany and Austria that England would remain neutral under all circumstances. Only by destroying this delusion—that is to say, by an unmistakable *rapprochement* with the Dual Alliance —could England exorcise this danger, it was claimed. The readiness with which Grey adopted this suggestion is worthy of notice. While on the one hand, in disregard of the suggestions of his own ambassador in Petrograd, he made no effort to exercise a moderating influence on Russia and thereby to contribute to the success of the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, on the other hand he made a series of moves which according to his belief were, perhaps, calculated to moderate an assumed desire for war on Germany's part, but the practical significance of which was a one-sided pressure on Germany and Austria and which by unmistakable statements regarding England's possible attitude encouraged both Petrograd and Paris to more energetic action. Whether his movements were directed by deliberate calculation or were due to mental astigmatism, united with insu-

[1] White Book.
[2] Yellow Book No. 62.

perable prejudices, is a question that will be answered differently according to one's psychology.

The very first step showed that Russia's suggestion had been heeded—that England must definitely indicate her position. Grey declared to the German Ambassador on July 27th that if Germany assisted Austria, because she could not afford calmly to see her ally crushed, other issues might bring other Powers in, and the war would be the greatest ever known.[1] This meant nothing less than that England would oppose the defeat of France or (as this had never been Germany's object) that she would conceivably under this pretext enter into a European war. This comforting information was immediately communicated to the French.[2] At the same time military measures were announced. To Russia's plaint that a false impression existed in the minds of German statesmen as to England's future attitude, Grey made answer: "This impression will be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave." In this underhanded manner, he wished it to be understood that his reference must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised,[3] but he told the Russians clearly what they wished to know. For, as a matter of fact, this military measure was ordered on July 23rd by Churchill, secretly and on his own initiative; the new feature was that the Cabinet decided on the evening of July 27th to publish it. If the desire was thereby to intimidate Germany the inevitable result was still further to stiffen the resistance of France and Russia. This was the sense in which the measure was regarded and discussed by the French. "Great Britain's attitude is becoming firmer," a French diplomat informs Paris with satisfaction. The Reuter Bureau was even more frank than Grey desired, when it informed the world that the British decision "greatly encouraged Russia."

It may be that Grey's step was meant as a bluff, was intended to create the impression of readiness to strike, but was not an indication of a real intention to do so. As has been justly remarked, there is a dangerous element in such a step; by the use of bluff a government may venture too far and then no longer be able to find a justifiable excuse for retreat. The danger is greatly increased when this bluffing is carried on by more than one, and each word of encouragement is eagerly seized upon by

[1] Blue Book No. 46.
[2] Yellow Book No. 63.
[3] Blue Book No. 47; Yellow Book No. 66.

the other party to the game and passed along in exaggerated form. Therein lay Grey's tremendous responsibility. A method which, with such measures and with such coadjutors, aimed at a decisive success for the Entente could not fail, despite all fair-sounding efforts at mediation, to aid in bringing about the war, instead of preventing it.

On the afternoon of July 29th, after Austria had declared war on Serbia, Grey once more made use of his method, in a more emphatic manner. He informed Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, that as long as the crisis was restricted to the issues at present actually in question, England had no thought of interfering. But if Germany became involved, and then France, the conflict might take on such proportions that all European interests would be at stake. The Ambassador, he said, must not be misled by the friendly tone of the conversation into thinking that England, in such an event, would stand aside. In case British interests required England to intervene, she would do so at once, and the decision would be speedily taken.[1] At first blush it might be held that even this warning, which was really tantamount to a threat, was only meant to act as a damper on Germany's dreaded thirst for war. But a few hours before, Grey had informed the French Ambassador, Cambon, that he intended to speak thus to Prince Lichnowsky. He had thereby in advance transformed the peaceful effect of his words in the minds of the Entente allies into an action tending toward a warlike solution and increasing the warlike sentiment.

In this notable conversation with Cambon, Grey had emphasized the fact that England did not wish to be drawn into an Austro-Serbian, nor even into an Austro-Russian conflict. England did not want to take a hand, he said, in a struggle between Teutons and Slavs for the supremacy in the Balkans. But if Germany, and in turn France, became involved, they had not yet made up their minds what they would do. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not her own, but in which, in keeping with her alliance, honor and interest obliged her to engage. England would then be free from engagements, and would have to decide what action British interests required of her. Cambon understood the conversation so well that in repeating it he summed up the train of thought somewhat more definitely in this way: should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved so that the question came to concern the hegemony of Europe, England would then decide

[1] Blue Book No. 86.

what it was necessary for her to do.[1] The cue had been uttered which was understood by the two men who had so often made use of it. Only apparently was it a question of two separate contingencies—of one in which England would abstain, and of a second in which she would intervene. Grey was fully aware that the first case, as the result of the Austro-German and of the Franco-Russian treaty obligations, would with automatic swiftness bring the second in its train. But he deliberately set in motion the machinery of the Triple Entente, in order to force Germany and Austria-Hungary to retreat along the whole line. He still avoided definitely binding himself, but he foresaw that the immediate result would be, if Germany did not retreat, to bring about a situation by means of which he hoped to be able to stampede the whole Cabinet to the most extreme measures.

The die had been cast. The very next day Cambon demanded that the bill of the provisional agreement contained in the letters of November, 1912, be honored; and when certain of English support, the French government, on the 30th of July, gave Petrograd the assurance of unconditional armed assistance, which it had hitherto withheld. The result was the removal from Russia's path of the final obstacles in the way of a definite decision for war.

While England unmistakably drew closer in this manner to the Dual Alliance, and while the Russian preparations were no longer limited to mobilization on the Austrian boundary, but were already extending into the military districts bordering on Germany, the latter country, despite the more difficult conditions, was with increased energy pursuing its efforts for peace. Immediately following the return from his northern voyage, the Emperor threw the whole weight of his personal authority and of his well-known love of peace into the balance. He recognized, of course, the difficult position of the Czar, but nevertheless he appealed to him, in a telegram on the evening of July 28th, in the name of their common interests and their long-standing friendship. Above all, however, did he assure the Czar that he would use his entire influence "to induce Austria-Hungary to seek a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia."[2] Accordingly, the Imperial Chancellor informed the British Ambassador on the same evening that he was making every effort, both at Vienna and Petrograd, to persuade the two governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way[3]

[1] Blue Book No. 87.
[2] White Book, Exhibit 20.
[3] Blue Book No. 71.

—that is to say, to bring about a renewal of the direct negotiations which had been suspended since Austria's declaration of war on Serbia.

The course was difficult, but not without prospect of success. The reply of the Czar spoke, it is true, of his indignation at the declaration of war by Austria and of the improbability of his being able to continue to resist the pressure, but he nevertheless accepted the offer of the German Emperor: "At this solemn moment I beg you earnestly to help me." On the other side, likewise, the effort to induce the Austrian ally to renew the negotiations was successful.

The measures subsequently taken by the Imperial German government showed that for the sake of preserving the peace of the world Berlin was ready to go even beyond the position taken on July 23rd regarding the Austro-Serbian conflict. In a note sent to Vienna, on July 29th, it was admitted that Austria-Hungary, in view of her previous experiences, could not be satisfied, despite a certain readiness on Serbia's part, without receiving positive guarantees for the fulfilment of her demands; but the attempt was made to suggest, in the event of war, a limit to Austria's action, which should have quieted all uneasiness on the part of Russia. Since Austria, according to her previous declaration, sought no territorial increase in Serbia, the note argued, presumably the sole aim of the future military operation would be to obtain such guarantees. If this was correct, Germany advised Austria to issue a public declaration to this effect, in order to avoid all misunderstanding. The Imperial Chancellor was justified in saying to the British Ambassador, Goschen, that the fact that he had gone so far must be regarded in England as proof of his earnest desire for peace.[1] As he remarked on another occasion, he was sparing no energy in the effort to urge Vienna to moderation.[2] During the same twenty-four hours, while Grey was giving uninterrupted and dangerous encouragement to his allies, the Imperial German government was continuing in Vienna its efforts toward mediation; in such a manner, indeed, that the Imperial Chancellor could characterize it in his speech of August 4th as "going to the limit consonant with our relation as an ally." [3]

After Austria-Hungary had decided, on the evening of July 30th, to take Germany's advice, the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd were resumed. The possibility of maintaining

[1] Blue Book, No. 75.
[2] Blue Book, No. 107.
[3] Blue Book, No. 103, 104.

peace was thus again opened up at the eleventh hour, through the intervention of the German Emperor and the compliance of our ally. We know from these last negotiations that Austria-Hungary declared her readiness to respect the sovereignty of Serbia and the integrity of her territory, and further that Germany was prepared to become surety for this pledge. We know, too, of a renewed suggestion by Grey that Austria-Hungary should cease her military advance after the occupation of Belgrade and the surrounding territory, and should accept the mediation of the four Powers between herself and Russia; this proposal also was supported in Vienna by the German government.

But all hopes of peace were shattered by Russia with a single blow. Sassonov, in the negotiations with Austria-Hungary, resumed on the evening of July 30, increased his demands—working hand in hand with England!—in such a manner that it would have meant the complete surrender of the Monarchy.[1] Nor was this all: a few hours later, while Vienna was still considering her reply, Russia suddenly, with a fateful decision, burned all her bridges behind her. The certainty gained from a series of actions on the part of British diplomacy that in case of war the aid of France and England might be reckoned on, caused Russia to decide against peace. That this consideration was a decisive factor in the change of front is shown by the report of the Belgian Minister in Petrograd, an acceptable witness, even in the eyes of our enemies; this report, written on July 31, pitilessly exposed the chain of cause and effect so carefully concealed by Grey. It acknowledges that "Germany has striven here, as she has in Vienna, to find a way to avoid a general conflict." It offers this revelation: "England let it be understood at first that she would

[1] It is remarkable that the tone of the formula originally chosen by Sassonov (Orange Book No. 60) was, "at the demand of the British Ambassador" (Yellow Book No. 113), made considerably sharper, as may be seen here:

ORANGE BOOK	YELLOW BOOK
"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian Question has assumed the character of a European question, declares her willingness to exclude from her ultimatum the points which threaten the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia binds herself to cease her military preparations."	"If Austria agrees to stay the advance of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian dispute has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers shall examine the satisfaction which Serbia might give to the Austro-Hungarian Government without affecting her sovereign rights and independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude."

This interference on the part of England with the formula is bound to arouse grave doubts as to the love of peace of the British policy. Sassonov had every reason to thank Grey "for the friendly and firm tone" which he has adopted in the *pourparlers* with Germany and Austria (Orange Book No. 69).

not permit herself to be drawn into a conflict. To-day, however, Petrograd is convinced—indeed, assurance has been given—that England will uphold France. This support is a very strong factor in the problem, and has served in great measure to help the war party obtain the upper hand."

The Russian war party, therefore, decreed complete mobilization, which was to set the world afire. Without being threatened in a military way, either by Austria-Hungary[1] or by the German Empire,[2] it took the step the unavoidable consequences of which on the German side were as clear to the Czar's government as they must have been to the other members of the Entente,[3] who claimed to be so greatly concerned for peace. The insatiable Asiatic lust for war herewith broke bounds, the lust which in recent years had been strengthened by the secret and open encouragement of the Western Powers, and which now, without asking its promoters, brutally throttled the final efforts at diplomatic mediation. The responsibility for the plot rests with more than one state in the camp of our enemies; the responsibility for the deed must be borne by Russia alone, who, in the words of Helfferich, at this moment became the incendiary in a peaceful world.[4]

What followed were merely inevitable consequences, which developed with automatic speed and which at only one point were subjected to what seemed a voluntary decision.

Through Russia's general mobilization, the moment had come for Germany when she saw herself forced to meet with the greatest possible promptness the probability of a war on two fronts; every hour in which she passively permitted the concen-

[1] Russia could not possibly have seen a threat in Austria's partial mobilization against Serbia. The Russian assertion in the *communiqué* of August 2nd (Orange Book No. 77), that at the same time (July 31st) reports had been received of a general mobilization by Austria, does not accord with the facts.

[2] That the alleged German preparations, which are said to have necessitated the Russian mobilization, are contrary to facts, is evident, as that argument was used only in relation to other Powers, but was not used by the Czar or his advisors in their negotiations with the German Emperor or the German diplomats. In connection with the Russian mobilization, see the German White Book, and the report of July 31st of Baron De l'Escaille, the Belgian Minister at Petrograd.

[3] On July 27th, Secretary of State von Jagow informed the British Ambassador that "if Russia mobilized only in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so, too, and the Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization" (Blue Book No. 43). Similarly the French Ambassador reported that Mr. von Jagow had "pointed out that if Russia mobilized, Germany would be obliged to mobilize as well, that we also would be forced to do so, and that the struggle would be almost inevitable" (Yellow Book No. 67).

[4] It is significant that the introduction to the British Blue Book suppresses the fact of the Russian general mobilization, and then says in the last paragraph: "At this moment, on Friday the 31st, Germany *suddenly* dispatched an ultimatum to Russia demanding that she should countermand her mobilization within twelve hours."

tration of millions of men on her unprotected eastern border would have been an inexcusable imperilling of the Empire. Hence, on July 31st, at midnight, the Russian government was informed that, on account of Russia's general mobilization of her army and navy, Germany had proclaimed a state of impending war, which would be followed by mobilization if Russia did not stop her military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and notify Germany to that effect. As the time limit set in this ultimatum passed without a reply from Russia, on the afternoon of August 1st, at 5 o'clock, the Emperor ordered mobilization of the entire German army and of the Imperial fleet; on the same afternoon, before the formal declaration of war had been received in Petrograd, Russian troops had already passed the border and begun hostilities.

Simultaneously with the ultimatum to Russia, the demand was made on the French government to declare within eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral. As we have seen, France from the very beginning had taken sides in the secret diplomatic game, but as regards the outside world had hitherto held herself in reserve. That under all circumstances she would stand by her Russian ally was known in Berlin, even without the malicious words attributed to Ambassador Jules Cambon: "We are not Italians." And not less clearly had it been made manifest that all political initiative and decision in Paris was limited to waiting for the cue to be given by Petrograd, and especially by London. Hence, the evasive reply from Paris, which meant war but was so couched as to force the German government to make the declaration, was not unexpected.

While war was started by Russia on the Continent, it remained still a question whether England would immediately take part. The apparent uncertainty could not last long. In this last diplomatic game Grey's only anxiety was to find a suitable cause for war which would act so irresistibly on the decision in the Cabinet and afterward in Parliament and in the public mind that no protest of the peace elements could make way against it. On the other hand, it was the task of German diplomacy to deprive this enemy set on war of every excuse which might justify the war before the country; nay, more, it had to make every effort to render the decision of the Cabinet difficult, if not indeed impossible, and if everything else failed, to force the enemy at least to confess the true reason for the war.

With this thought in mind, the Imperial Chancellor had already, on July 29th, before the final crisis, started to sound England in the event that Russia's ruthless desire for war should ren-

der a Continental conflict unavoidable. Since he was clearly aware, from England's policy during recent years and from Grey's most recent asseverations, that at the root of England's political calculation was the determination to prevent at any cost a diminution of France's power, he informed the British Ambassador that Germany was prepared, provided English neutrality was certain, to give every assurance to the British government that even in the event of a victory she aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France.[1] Reviewing the negotiations for disarmament during recent years, he was able to give expression to the conviction that, as the aim of his policy during his chancellorship had constantly been the relaxation of tension between Germany and England, he now had in mind an agreement of neutrality between the two Powers. To such an extent, then, was the German Empire ready to tie its hands in the final undesired struggle against French *revanche* that it renounced in advance all possible gain from the conflict—the same German Empire of which the French Prime Minister had declared in the sitting of the Chamber of December 23, 1914, that it had for more than forty years tirelessly pursued the aim of destroying France in order to subjugate the world. Thus far were we ready to go in meeting that Power of whose share in the outbreak of the threatening world conflagration we were fully cognizant.

On the next day the offer was rejected unconditionally. Grey's reply characterized any such stipulation as that proposed as unacceptable. France, he said, even without loss of territory in Europe, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy. The proposal was evidently so unwelcome to Grey that he characterized such a "bargain" with Germany, at the expense of France, as a disgrace from which the good name of England would never recover. With justice, Helfferich declares that Grey considered himself merely as the ally of France whom Germany sought to seduce. The fact that he expressly reserved freedom to act as circumstances might require blinded no one; this was the formula which, in the case of France and Russia, indicated probable assistance, but as regards Germany, hostile intervention. It is with this in mind that the close of his reply is to be interpreted, if it is to be properly appreciated. He says that if the peace of Europe could be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement by which Germany could be assured that no aggressive or hostile

[1] Blue Book No. 85.

policy would be pursued against her by the Triple Entente. This final verbal arabesque was the ultimate achievement which the leader for ten years in the policy of isolating Germany was able to produce in the cause of the world's peace. The fact that he declared the idea of a general *rapprochement* as practicable only after the passing of the crisis—an idea hitherto rejected as "utopian"—showed how vitally important he considered this crisis to be. Only the diplomatic defeat, as striven for by him, of the Central Powers, resulting in their permanent disability for an independent policy, would have represented for him the crowning of the work and would have opened up for the world the outlook into a hitherto impossible new era.

Meanwhile, following the start of the Russian mobilization and the German ultimatum, the current of events swept so swiftly and irresistibly onward that Grey, in his bewilderment, was no longer able to check it, even had he desired to lay hold of the possibility of peace. As soon as German mobilization, the consequences of which for France he naturally realized, became imminent, he determined to place the long-deliberated question before Germany and France: Did they intend to respect the neutrality of Belgium? The French government had already become anxious. Grey was forced to admit that the Cabinet had not yet reached a decision, and that this question of neutrality would be, "I could not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude." Cambon, however, was insistent: "Will you help us?" Grey's reply was evasive—he was not yet able publicly to assume a formal obligation. Pathetically Cambon reminded him of 1870: it was not in England's interest, he said, that France should be humiliated by Germany. In that event England, he declared, would be in a very much weakened position in regard to Germany. In the year 1870 England had committed a sad mistake by permitting a great increase in Germany's strength—was she going to repeat this mistake?

The question of Belgian neutrality gave to Grey the long-sought-for excuse for war which he needed to stampede the Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion, and which the British press and that of the world have since then discussed *ad infinitum,* with appeals to international law and to humanity.

That this excuse for war was only a subterfuge is proved by several indisputable facts. In anticipation of Grey's designs, on August 1st, before it had finally declared itself, the German government demanded of him whether England would obligate herself to remain neutral in case Germany promised not to vio-

late Belgium's neutrality. Grey, however, refused to give such a promise, by which, if he had really been concerned for Belgium, he might have saved the unhappy country from its fate.[1] Grey was thereby prevented beforehand from playing the trump of Belgian neutrality—he considered it permissible, however, to keep this inquiry from the knowledge of the Cabinet and Parliament. Indeed, he even went further. Following Grey's refusal, Prince Lichnowsky urged him at least to formulate the possible conditions for England's neutrality, the Ambassador himself increasing the offer of July 29th by proposing a guarantee on the part of Germany of the integrity of France and of the French colonies. This offer also Grey withheld from the Cabinet, as all negotiations on this basis would have defeated his pre-determined action. Such conduct is to be explained only by a fixed determination for war.

As a matter of fact, Grey had completely bound England's hands, in the interest of France, even before he was justified in assuming Belgian neutrality to be threatened. On the afternoon of the same 1st of August he gave the French Ambassador, who had become anxiously insistent, reason to expect a promise which he was able formally to make to him the very next morning. In the Cabinet meeting on the morning of August 2nd—that in which he withheld the German offers and inquiries!—he caused a resolution to be passed which authorized him (with the customary formal reservations) to inform Cambon that if the German fleet were to come through the North Sea or into the English Channel, with the purpose of hostile attacks against the French coast or French shipping, the British fleet would lend France its full support.[2] This far-reaching promise was nothing less than a positive undertaking to go to war against Germany,[3] an obligation which was the inevitable result of the spirit of the Franco-English naval convention. The obligation, however, was assumed before the inquiry as regards the passage of German troops had been made in Brussels on the evening (at seven o'clock) of the 2nd of August. This offers positive proof, in addition to the negative proof, that the question of Belgium's neutrality was not the deciding factor—but that, rather, the British fleet, in the period from the 2nd to the 4th of August, independently of the question of neutrality and before a decision regarding it had been reached, would have forcibly prevented a German attack on the north coast of France, thus beginning the

[1] Blue Book No. 123.
[2] Blue Book No. 148; Yellow Book No. 137.
[3] Yellow Book, No. 143.

war on its own account. In possession of this statement France gave the above-mentioned evasive reply to the German ultimatum, which led to the declaration of war.

The leading imperialistic group of the government, which was determined on war, needed this Belgian excuse in order to overcome the opposition of a strong party in the Cabinet opposed to the war. Nor at the crucial moment did this argument prove sufficient for a small minority represented by such men as Lord Morley, John Burns and Trevelyan. The majority, however, was determined to disregard an even stronger resistance in their own party, and in extreme case of need to form a coalition ministry for the World War with the Conservative opposition, whose manner of political thought was based on force alone and who unconditionally supported the government and urged forward even more violently. With this means at their disposal, says Shaw, "Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith let loose the lion."

The real impelling motive of English statesmenship, whose diplomatic exponent Grey was at this moment, must be sought at another point—in the basic conception of the whole policy of isolation. Whoever has followed the significance and the interconnection of events in the preliminary history of the war will not be surprised to see that the systematic preparation and the tenacious clinging to an idea could have as a final result only the completed deed. When in the course of the war the burdens and sacrifices mounted, contrary to England's expectation, to a point where Belgian neutrality no longer seemed sufficient as a decisive war motive for a healthy national egoism, the political heads of the nation held it to be wiser to discard a fictitious motive which was fundamentally un-English and to call things by their true names. In a leading article in *The Times,* of March 9, 1915, this admission was made with a ruthless frankness which cannot surprise the initiated: "We do not set up to be international Don Quixotes, ready at all times to redress wrongs which do us no hurt. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor and interest would have united us with France." Soon thereafter Lord Haldane, the one-time pro-German decoy of the Cabinet, indulged in this observation: "Belgium touched our honor, France our sentiment and interest. If we consider the theory of world conquest underlying the successful German movement in favor of a war of attack, it seems to me that it would have been madness to sit still with folded hands while Germany was sweeping aside the obstacles on the Continent to an attack on the British Empire." He also implies the fact (of which Grey's declaration gives documentary proof) that Eng-

land would have determined to take part in the world war even without the passage of Germany through Belgium.

It is not, however, the whole truth to say that England entered the war on France's account. By a promise of neutrality, the English might have gained Germany's assurance that France's territorial integrity would not be disturbed. It was not a sign of diplomatic weakness on the part of Germany, but a well-calculated move to force her enemies to disclose their last card, when, with knowledge of the naval convention and the promise of August 2nd, she took an additional step and declared herself ready to guarantee not to disturb the north coast of France, French shipping and French colonies. Truly the buckler which the ruler of the seas would have set up before her ally was strong and high enough to protect her colleague in the Entente against every danger. But this was not sufficient—there was a greater interest at stake.

Concealed under the negative purpose of preventing the weakening of France at any price, there existed the positive desire of causing Germany's enfeeblement through a coalition of Powers which could never again be reproduced. There was, on the one hand, the well-weighed belief, which Ambassador de Bunsen incautiously admitted, that Germany and Austria-Hungary would probably be strong enough to defeat France and Russia, and that only the decided and immediate intervention of England could render the opposite result certain. On the other hand, there existed the not unfounded fear that, if this opportunity were not seized, the Entente allies would be permanently estranged and would turn away from England—there would thus be nothing left for the English state than to be friendly with Germany and to resign itself to that country's claim to existence. That was the very situation which England had for years striven to prevent, and which now at the last moment she would not accept. This policy had been unconditionally adopted in favor of France, and although England was aware that she was thereby also electing in favor of the Russian offensive against the Central Powers, she had at all times sought so to play the game that at the moment of a great crisis Germany would have to face all three Powers.

The leading men of the country which, thanks to its insular situation, had risen to a dominant position by taking skillful advantage of the conjuncture of events, could not resist the temptation at this apparently favorable moment to establish the supremacy of their own land on the ruins of Germany's world-embracing efforts. Only by taking full advantage of this oppor-

tunity could they hope to put the dangerous German rival in trade and industry, on the sea and in the colonies, out of the running for a long time, or perhaps even forever. That the instinct of trade rivalry had, unseen, gained in strength, was proved by the action of British journalism after the outbreak of the war, when it set out to incite the whole world to an attack on German markets, and indulged in dreams of leveling every German foundry to the ground. Thus the basic guiding idea of the policy of isolation finally came dominantly to the fore, for the first time since its conception by King Edward. It lies concealed behind the manner in which Grey, with less certain hand than usual, in the final week threw the weight of his state against every serious chance of peace and finally decisively in favor of war.

The self-deception of Grey is the fundamental error of the policy of isolation. It was not even his most serious mistake when he made the cold-blooded statement in Parliament that participation in the war would not cost the English much more than would neutrality—this *argumentum ad hominem,* aimed to render calculation as regards the war plausible to the commercial mind of his compatriots, shows, at all events, that in this man the inhibitions which would have led him to prevent the war were but feebly developed. His fundamental weaknesses lie much deeper. He was haunted by the unfounded fear of the world supremacy of Germany, which had so long been denounced as Napoleonic that the world had come to believe in it. He was misled by the fatal undervaluation of the strength of Austria-Hungary and by the mistaken belief in the possibility of economically starving and cutting off Germany. Just as he overestimated the anti-German arguments in their entirety, as these were circulated in the camp of the Triple Entente, so he underestimated the internal powers of his enemy—the ethical and spiritual, the military and technical, the economic and financial reserve forces of a nation which was able and determined to continue its upward course without offensive and in peace.

CHAPTER III

BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY

PROFESSOR WALTHER SCHOENBORN, OF HEIDELBERG

DURING the war, no single charge has been more effective in arousing public opinion against Germany than that which has been exploited in hostile as well as neutral countries—that we committed an arbitrary breach of international law in violating Belgium's neutrality. A glance at the war literature published in neutral countries shows that no accusation has had more lasting success, though those who have raised their voices the loudest have gradually been driven, through the publication by the German government of documents found in the Brussels archives, from the offensive to the defensive, and this defensive attitude is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.[1]

An examination of this charge and of the grounds on which it is based, as well as of the points which serve as a vindication for Germany, must be confined to an investigation of the legal aspect of the subject, since the accusation does not concern itself with the question whether Germany's action was politically wise or expedient, but whether it was admissible under the law of nations.

The speech which the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, made before the *Reichstag,* on August 4, 1914, is generally selected by Germany's opponents as a con-

[1] For a characteristic example of the type referred to, see *La Belgique Neutre et Loyale,* by Professor Emil Waxweiler, Lausanne, 1915, of which an American edition, entitled *Belgium: Neutral and Loyal,* was published in New York, 1915. Passages taken at random from the book go to show that Mr. Waxweiler touches but lightly on the dangerous points of the German publications, meeting them with fictitious arguments, or passing them over in silence, thus disclosing the inherent weakness of his position. It is regrettable that his skill in the use of material already well known is greater than his conscientiousness. He quotes (p. 91)—from No. 85 of the British Blue Book—the Imperial Chancellor's statement to Sir E. Goshen on July 29th concerning Belgium: "It will depend on the action of France what operations Germany may be forced to undertake in Belgium, but after the war Belgium will maintain her integrity, if she does not take sides against Germany"; and (p. 92) he says: "On July 29th, Germany confessed that thereafter the fate of the little nation that she has guaranteed would be at the mercy of military operations." Note that the statement of the Imperial Chancellor said clearly that France's action would decide Germany's attitude! Again (p. 154) Mr. Waxweiler states that "one date dominates all these allegations," and says: "It was on July 29th that the Imperial Chancellor, in his conversation with the British Ambassador at Berlin, announced for the first time that, in the event of a conflict with France, Germany would only respect the integrity of Belgium if she did not resist the free passage of German troops across her territory." It is statements of this sort that force one to regard with the utmost caution all the new material adduced by Mr. Waxweiler.

venient starting-point for their campaign. It is true that in connection with the entry into Belgium the Chancellor speaks of a breach of international law; but before being interpreted against Germany, as is generally done, the words of the Imperial Chancellor deserve closer investigation. The pertinent sentences read as follows:

"Gentlemen, we are now forced to defend ourselves; and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is contrary to the principles of international law. It is true the French government declared in Brussels its intention to respect Belgium's neutrality as long as its opponents would do so. We know, however, that France stood ready to invade the country. France could wait, but we could not. A French attack on our flank on the Lower Rhine might have had fatal consequences for us. Consequently we were forced to disregard the legitimate protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. The wrong—I speak quite candidly—which we are now committing we shall endeavor to make good as soon as we have attained our military goal. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for what he holds most dear, can think only as to how he can hew his way out!"

And further:

"We have assured the British government that as long as England remains neutral our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we shall not encroach upon the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. I repeat this assurance here before the whole world. . . ."

Naturally, these words can be correctly understood and appreciated only if the general situation at the time they were uttered is taken into consideration. Spoken in an hour in which the fate of the German Empire hung in the balance, and forming part of a vital political statement by the government to a political gathering, they were not intended as, nor could they be, an objective and carefully considered theoretical verdict regarding the legal aspect of Germany's procedure. They represent rather an integral part of a political action. The object of this action, and consequently the real meaning of the words so promptly and eagerly turned against Germany, were subsequently made clear in another equally important announcement of the Imperial

Chancellor, which must be considered in conjunction with his initial speech, in order that the latter be clearly understood. In the second war session of the *Reichstag,* on December 2, 1914, the Imperial Chancellor declared:

"The neutrality of Belgium, which England pretended to protect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock on the evening of the 2nd of August we informed Brussels that the French plan of campaign, which was known to us, compelled us, for reasons of self-preservation, to march through Belgium; but as early as the afternoon of that very day—the 2nd of August—that is to say, before anything was known or could be known in London of our action in Brussels, England had assured France of her unconditional support, in the event of the German fleet attacking the French coast. Not a word was said of the neutrality of Belgium. This fact is established by Sir Edward Grey's statement, made in the House of Commons on the 3rd of August, but which, owing to the difficulty in telegraphic communication, had not come to my knowledge *in extenso* on the 4th of August. It is furthermore confirmed by the Blue Book of the British government itself. How, then, can England claim to have drawn her sword because we had violated Belgium's neutrality? And how could the British statesmen, who were perfectly cognizant of the past, speak about Belgian neutrality at all? When, on the 4th of August, I spoke of the wrong we were committing by marching into Belgium, it was not yet certain whether the Belgian government would not in the hour of need decide to save the country and withdraw to Antwerp under protest. You remember, that at the request of our military administration, after the capture of Liège, I made a fresh proposal to the Belgian government to this effect. For military reasons it was imperative on August 4th to maintain the possibility of such a development at all costs. Even at that time there were many indications of the Belgian government's guilt, though positive written proofs were not then at my disposal. But the English statesmen were perfectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which were found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by me, establish how and to what extent Belgium had relinquished her neutrality to England. Two facts are now made quite clear to the world: When our troops entered Belgian territory during the night of the 3rd to the 4th of August, they were in the confines of a state which had long since riddled its own neutrality. The other fact is that England did

not declare war on us for the sake of Belgium's neutrality, which she had helped to undermine, but because she believed she would be able, with the help of two great Continental military powers, to crush us. . . ."

With this, the real meaning of the Imperial Chancellor's declarations of August 4th is clearly explained. The German government at that time still hoped to accomplish the march through Belgium without meeting serious armed resistance. In order to make it easy for Belgium to adopt an attitude conforming with these expectations, the German government did not assume the position that its troops were entitled to march through by virtue of a legal right, but admitted that it committed thereby a legal infringement. The German government might have spoken differently; but, in the first place, documentary proofs of the previous breaches of Belgium's neutrality were lacking at the time, and, in the second place, it was not only France but also England that was seriously compromised by them. On the afternoon of August 4, however, England's attitude toward Germany had not been publicly decided on; there was, perhaps, still hope of preventing her from participating in the war. It was known that England was deeply interested in the integrity of Belgium; or, to express it more precisely, she was apprehensive of Germany establishing herself permanently on Belgium's North Sea coast. If now, the Imperial Chancellor, in an open session of the *Reichstag,* expressly declared the entry into Belgium as wrong, the strongest guaranty conceivable was thereby given to the world that Belgium would later on be completely evacuated. On the other hand, a public reference made by Germany at this moment of Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, through secret agreements with France and England, would have compelled the German government forthwith to declare Belgium an enemy and opponent, thus leaving no choice to England.

For purposes of this investigation, it follows that the words of the Imperial Chancellor, spoken on August 4, 1914, cannot be taken as an estimate of the question in its relationship to international law.

I

The German entry into Belgium has been characterized as a breach of international law from two points of view:

1. Germany is claimed to have expressly recognized by treaty the permanent neutrality of Belgium, and to have violated this treaty obligation by her invasion.

2. By the mere fact of being a neutral state—that is to say, by not being a participant in the war—Belgium, it is maintained, had the right to forbid any belligerent from trespassing on her territory; indeed, according to objective principles of international law, she is not supposed even to have been in a position to permit a belligerent either to enter or march through her territory. On the contrary, she is assumed to have been under the obligation of preventing such action.

Some have combined these two points of view by identifying the rights and duties of a permanently neutral state in war-time with those of a state which simply happens to be neutral in a particular war. This is correct as regards the inadmissibility of other states encroaching on the territory of the neutral state; but in other respects the rights and duties of the permanently neutral, or neutralized state, are more comprehensive, as is commonly recognized in theory and practice (see below).

The neutralization and the resulting permanent neutrality of Belgium was legally based up to the present on the treaties of April 19, 1839. By virtue of these, at the termination of her war of independence against Holland, which was incited by France in order to further her schemes of expansion, Belgium was formally recognized by Holland. The recognition of Belgium by the Great Powers, viz., France, Austria, England, Prussia and Russia, was expressly renewed, and the provisions of the Dutch-Belgian Treaty were placed under the guaranty of the Great Powers. The permanent neutrality of Belgium was expressed in the following terms (Art. VII, of the main treaty between Belgium and Holland):

"La Belgique, dans les limites indiquées aux Articles 1, 2, et 4, formera un État indépendent et perpetuellement neutre. Elle sera tenue d'observer cette même neutralité envers tous les autres États" (Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles 1, 2, and 4, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states).

The guaranty given by the five Great Powers (Holland is not included here) is expressed in the following words:

"[The five Great Powers] . . . déclarent que les articles ci-annexés et formant la teneur du Traité conclu en ce jour entre S. M. le roi des Belges et S. M. le roi des Pays Bas, grand-duc de Luxembourg, sont considérés comme ayant la même force et valeur que s'ils étaient textuellement insérés dans le présent Acte, et qu'ils se trouvent ainsi placés sous la guarantie de Leurs-dites Majestés" ([The five Great Powers] . . . declare that the Article hereunto annexed and forming the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of Belgium and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand

Duke of Luxembourg, are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that they are thus placed under the guaranty of their said Majesties). (See Sec. III, 3.)[1]

The second point—viz., the inviolability of the territory of any neutral state—is covered by the provisions of the fifth Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of October 18, 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, more particularly by Articles 1, 2, 5, par. 1, and Article 10 of that Convention. The original French text of the same reads as follows:

"Article 1. Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable.
"Article 2. Il est interdit aux belligérants de faire passer à travers le territoire d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois soit de munitions, soit d'approvisionnements.
"Article 5. (Section 1.) Une Puissance neutre ne doit tolérer sur son territoire aucun des actes visés par les articles 2 à 4.
"Article 10. Ne peut être considéré comme un acte hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, même par la force, les atteintes à sa neutralité."
["Article 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.
"Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.
"Article 5. (Par. 1.) A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in articles 2 and 4 to occur on its territory.
"Article 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act."][2]

The Belgians themselves, as well as the English, have based their charges mainly on the treaties of 1839, while the stipulations of the Hague Convention have been frequently quoted by the American friends of Belgium, particularly by Mr. Roosevelt. In this, Mr. Roosevelt and the other supporters of the same view labor under a misconception of the legal position. It is true that in principle the Hague Convention applies to every Treaty Power, but only in case it is actually neutral in a given

[1] Article I of the Treaty concluded by the Five Great Powers with Belgium. A corresponding provision is contained in Article II of the Treaty of the Great Powers with the Netherlands.

[2] Up to the present time, this convention has not been ratified either by Great Britain or Serbia. It stipulates in Article XX that "the provisions of the present Convention do not apply, except as between contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention." But Germany would not derive from that fact, justification for declaring the Convention as not binding, if for no other reason than that England—until the evening of August 4th—was not yet a participant in the war; and for the further reason that the quoted stipulations are in effect nothing more than the legal customs existing, and held to be lawful, before the Hague Conference.

war. The moment such a state itself becomes a participant in the war it is evident that the Convention ceases to be applicable to it and that the laws of war come into force instead. Now, whether or not a state is to remain neutral in a war does not by any means depend exclusively on its own will; generally speaking, a state can wage war against another state at any time, when it believes that its interests demand such action. The law of nations does not in any way prohibit this, just as there are no international rules as to when a war is "legally permissible" and when not.

The Boer Republics had no desire whatsoever for war in 1899; they would certainly have preferred to remain "neutral" —viz., in this case immune from attack. A state can perhaps prevent its troops from going to war, and thereby avoid a sanguinary decision by battle, as was done by Bulgaria as regards Rumania in the second Balkan War; but in behalf of its own interests it cannot, in face of the determination of another state to begin hostilities, prevent the advent of a state of war, with all its effects as regards international law.[1] Public opinion and general moral sentiment may or may not in a given case approve of involving in a war a state which wishes to remain officially neutral, for the time being or altogether. The legal position is always the same according to international law (with the exception of one special case). The eminent Swiss professor of international law, Max Huber, is quite right when he says, in reference to using neutral territory for warlike operations, to compelling a neutral to participate in a war, or to the abandonment of his neutrality by the neutral himself:

"The decision as to such an action—which regularly results in involving the neutral state in the war—is always determined by the compelling interest of the state, or, what amounts to the same thing, by military necessity. The decision as to whether such a necessity exists, however, can no more be determined by law than the necessity as to war or peace. The law connects certain legal effects—those of the rules of war—with the infraction of the rules of peace, but these effects are the same whether such a necessity existed or not." [2]

The Hague Convention, concerning neutrality, determines only the duties of belligerents towards the neutral states, and *vice versa,* consequently also the actions on the part of the one or the other, which constitute a breach of neutrality, and which, as long as the neutrality continues, are not permissible and under given

[1] See *International Law,* by Westlake, Vol. II, 2d edition, p. 2.
[2] See *Zeitschrift für Volkerrecht,* Vol. VII, p. 357 ff.

circumstances not legally compatible with it. On the other hand, the Convention cannot, nor is it intended that it should, give legal guarantee against the termination—even though one-sided—of the neutrality of a state. Such a general guarantee would not be possible, as international law stands to-day, because it would amount to a prohibition of war.

Huber, therefore, correctly defines "the question whether neutrality is to exist or not," as one "of a purely strategic and political nature," with the single exception of the case "that active and passive neutrality is from the beginning guaranteed (permanent neutrality and neutralization)."

In the ultimatum of August 2, 1914 (Belgian Gray Book No. 20), the German government in unmistakable manner threatened Belgium with war in case of resistance to the passage of the German troops. By the presentation of the ultimatum Belgium was already, at least conditionally, "involved in the war." As soon as that condition arose the fifth Hague Convention automatically ceased to apply to Belgium, and disregard of its provisions did not signify a breach of international law, provided that "involving Belgium in the war" was in itself legally permissible. According to the above, however, such an "involving" is *de jure* left to the free determination of each belligerent, provided he is not bound by any special treaty, or, in other words, provided he has not previously recognized the permanent neutrality of the state in question. The legal question therefore culminates in one point: Was Germany legally bound by the treaty of neutralization; was she in the present case under a legal obligation to respect the *permanent* neutrality of Belgium, or was she not? If she was not, then the Hague Convention was no longer a legal obstacle to the German action; whereas, in the former case, it would be applicable in determining the duties of Germany and Belgium.

Only if Germany, in August, 1914, was legally bound to respect the neutralization treaty, was her action towards Belgium a breach of international law.[1] But even in such a case, though entitled to take up arms in self-defense, Belgium would

[1] See *America and the World War*, by Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1915, p. 112 ff. Mr. Roosevelt's belief that the United States, after ascertaining that the facts were as represented, should intervene against Germany, on account of the violation of the Hague Convention in regard to Belgium, is therefore without any legal justification in so far as the fifth Hague Convention is concerned, if only for the reasons given in the text. In common with all the other signatory Powers, the United States only "ratified" the Hague Conventions—that is to say, they recognized the Conventions as binding in their own relations towards the other signatory Powers, but they did not "guarantee" the conventions, or bind themselves to enforce their stipulations in the relations between other signatory Powers. "International law," therefore, does not support Mr. Roosevelt's attitude.

have had to observe the rules of international law concerning the conduct of war. Germany was fully justified in proceeding with reprisals against the lawless resistance of the Belgian population, which had no regard for the precepts of the laws of war.[1]

II

The German government has always recognized the validity, in principle, of the neutralization agreements. Serious doubts have been raised, however, in scientific circles in regard to two points: First, was Germany even outwardly and formally bound by the treaties of 1839? A great number of scholars, including conscientious and impartial neutrals, have expressed doubts on this point. For, in the first place, it was not the German Empire—which has only existed as such since 1871—nor the North German Confederation, which only came into being in 1867—that entered into an obligation in 1839, but Prussia, which was in fact juridically and historically a totally different legal entity.

Futhermore, an event that took place in 1870 makes the prevailing opinion at that time as regards the binding force of the treaties of 1839 seem highly doubtful. After the outbreak of the Franco-German War, in order to safeguard Belgium's neutrality, England concluded with the North German Confederacy and with France identical treaties, which provided for a possible alliance on the part of England with either one of the belligerents, for the sole purpose of protecting Belgium's neutrality, in case the other should violate it. Why, one asks, was such a special treaty necessary if the binding force of the old treaties was beyond doubt? Nevertheless, the formal validity of the latter also for Germany must be acknowledged. It is quite true that when a federal state is founded, the treaties previously entered into by its individual members do not forthwith, *ipso jure,* apply to the federacy itself: A state can, in principle, only be bound in its international relations by its own free will. But, as far as is known, the Imperial German government never dis-

[1] In this connection Mr. Roosevelt seems to labor under a strange misconception, according to his statement in *The Outlook* of September 23, 1914, p. 175, and further statements in his book, *America and the World War,* to which reference has already been made. He either gives a totally wrong interpretation to the term "hostile act," as used in Article X of the Fifth Hague Convention, and to the article itself, which cannot exclude the opening of hostilities against a State that has remained neutral; or else he fails to recognize that the German reprisals in Belgium were not directed against the military resistance of Belgium as a State, but merely against the unlawful methods employed by the Belgian population in their resistance.

puted that the neutralization treaties of 1839 were binding on Germany; on the contrary, as late as April, 1913, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, referred to these treaties in the Budget Commission of the *Reichstag* as existing and as valid also for Germany (cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 12, appendix); nor has the German government during the course of the war ever denied the formal validity of the treaties. Belgium's history makes the material security which the neutralization of 1839 was able to give to the new state appear highly questionable, especially in view of France's annexation schemes (cf. section III, 3); and the conclusion by England of the double treaty of 1870, which was chiefly brought about through Bismarck's revelations concerning the like intentions of Napoleon III, certainly does not give proof of confidence on the part of Great Britain in the binding power and efficacy of the old treaties. Nevertheless, the double treaty does not in its wording imply an annulment of the old treaties; on the contrary, not only is the view perfectly plausible that the treaties of 1870 were only to provide for effectual application of the old treaties in a special case, without being in any way prejudicial to their future efficacy, with all the resulting consequences, but the correctness of this view is also clearly proved by the concluding clause of Art. 3 of the double treaty, which provides that, after the expiration of the new treaty: ". . . the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839." Although this article attributes to the treaties of 1839 only the same effectiveness which they had previously possessed, no unbiassed judge can fail to see that we have here an express acknowledgment of the old treaties, also by the North German Confederation.

The second point of dispute seems to have more weight. Is not the neutralization of a state such as Belgium, situated as it is in the midst of great military Powers, preposterous in itself, and does not permanent neutrality impose inherently contradictory duties on such a state? Much can certainly be said in favor of this point of view. For example, the (armed) neutral state is prohibited from waging an offensive war, but it is directly obliged vigorously to protect its neutrality, even by means of a defensive war; the distinction, however, between an offensive and defensive war is in reality sometimes very slight. Truly, it is in the last analysis absurd to place a state of the second or third order, which is not protected by geographical conditions,

under the obligation to resist violation of its territory by a Great Power, if need be by means of war—that is to say, to endanger its existence as a state; whereas, every other state is legally entitled to decide whether or not it will oppose such violation by force of arms. Guaranty treaties with third states do not offer any real equivalent for this.

But juridically this argument does not seem convincing. The permanent neutralization of states has formed part of the recognized principles of international law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and despite certain discouraging experiences in other cases, precisely Belgium's permanent neutrality was, until the present war, regularly regarded both in (official) practice and in theory as a reality; even in recent years it supplied the chief arguments in the dispute concerning the admissibility of fortifying Flushing; the jurist cannot very well ignore this. Perhaps the present war will change general conceptions as to the feasibility and practicability of the artificial neutralization of a state; but to-day an examination of the legal position from the standpoint of international law must still take into account the conceptions which have prevailed until now.

III

Through its spokesman, the Imperial Chancellor, as well as through repeated pronouncements of von Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Imperial German government characterized at the start the German entry into Belgium as an act of urgent necessity. Likewise, the ultimatum to Belgium, on the 2nd of August, 1914, was based on the same conception: The march through Belgian territory was absolutely imperative in the interest of self-preservation by the German Empire; only in this way did it seem possible to resist successfully the efforts of Germany's enemies to crush her. The government regretted the necessity of encroaching formally on the rights of a third state (viz., Belgium) and promised all possible indemnification.

The legal standpoint of the German government can perhaps be best elucidated by a parallel taken from domestic law: A forester, who is attacked by a poacher, sees an armed companion of the latter stealthily approaching under cover of another man's house, and on the point of entering it for the purpose of obtaining a favorable aim; the forester thereupon bursts open the door and enters the house himself, in order to take the second poacher by surprise and overpower him. The action of the for-

ester is permissible, but he must compensate the owner of the house for the damage he has done.

Two questions arise in this connection: First, was the German Empire really in a position of urgent necessity? Second, if such necessity existed, was Germany thereby justified according to international law in violating the old neutralization treaties? Both contentions have been disputed by our enemies, but both are sound.

For it was Germany that was attacked—the proof of this is to be found in the history of the events antecedent to the war. The annihilation of Germany, or at the very least the destruction of her world-position, was the undisputed object of her opponents at the time of and after the outbreak of war. This would have been known to Germany, even if the ludicrous desires and schemes of her opponents for the partition and mutilation of her territory had not been so naïvely disclosed in their official and private utterances during the first months of the war. Germany was in a most difficult strategic position from the very beginning: involved in a war on two fronts with two of the most powerful military Powers of Europe, which had in recent years made tremendous preparations for war; deprived of her freedom of action at sea owing to England's highly threatening attitude even in the last days of July; and in the beginning, furthermore, forced to rely mainly on her own military resources because it was no longer possible to hope for armed assistance from Italy, and because her ally, Austria, also immediately involved in a war on two fronts, could employ only a part of her forces against Russia, whose army alone was estimated to be numerically equal to the combined forces of the Central Powers, while the French troops available at the very beginning of the war were undoubtedly not very far inferior in number to the German army. There was but one advantage on Germany's side to counterbalance all this: the prospect that the great numerical superiority of her enemies could be effectively developed only after the lapse of more or less time, whereas the rapidity of the German mobilization was regarded as unparalleled, or at any rate as considerably superior to that of Russia. It was, indeed, as Mr. von Jagow said, a question "of life and death" for Germany, to take advantage of this superiority so as to overthrow, perhaps, one opponent before the other could deal a dangerous blow. A delay of only a few weeks meant that the danger of being crushed by superior numbers would become a probability.

There was, in addition, the following decisive consideration: The Belgian frontier was Germany's Achilles heel, the spot

where she was exposed to a mortal hurt, since there were practically no obstacles along this front in the way of an army seeking to invade the Rhenish industrial districts, which are the centre of strength of Germany at war; there was no ring of fortresses comparable, for instance, to the northern fortresses of France, to delay the advance of the enemy. The full significance of this situation was naturally appreciated by the French military authorities, and they were prepared to take advantage of it. Strong French forces—as the German government was reliably informed—stood ready to march along the Belgian section of the Meuse, that is to say, along the Givet-Namur line.[1] Even with the best of intentions, the Belgian government could not have prevented France, with her superior numbers, from using Belgium as the base for her attack on Germany.[2] It is true that on August 1st the French government had assured Belgium that it would respect the latter's neutrality; but at the same time it expressly reserved full liberty of action for itself in the event that Belgium's neutrality should "not be respected" by another Power.[3] What, however, do the words, "not be respected," signify? They amount to reserving the right of asserting at any time, and of acting on the strength of such assertion, that the fact that a German patrol had by mistake strayed onto Belgian soil, or that a German aviator had flown over some projection of Belgian territory, constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality by Germany.

[1] The correctness of the information which the German government received concerning this is confirmed by: 1, numerous statements of reliable witnesses, who testified to the presence of French officers and soldiers on Belgian territory before the delivery of the German ultimatum to Belgium (these statements have been published in America, in Richard Grasshoff's *The Tragedy of Belgium*, New York, 1915, p. 23 ff); 2, the seizure of French mobilization maps of sections of Belgian and Dutch territories, which were tied in packets, and according to the inscriptions, were to be opened only in the event of mobilization; 3, the fact that the Belgian government was officially advised by France as early as July 31st of the massing of French troops on the Belgian frontier (see Gray Book, No. 9); 4, the fact that on August 3rd, at the very latest, France officially offered the Belgian government the support of five French army corps (see Blue Book, No. 151).

[2] According to the report of April 23, 1912, made by the English Military Attaché in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, in the crisis of 1911 England had intended, with exactly the same justification, to land her troops in Belgium even without the consent of the Belgian government.

[3] The text of the declaration of the French Ambassador reads: "In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French government, in order to insure its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude" (Gray Book, No. 15). As to the worth of this and a previous English declaration bearing on the same matter, see also "Common Sense About the War," by G. Bernard Shaw, in *The New Statesman*, November 14, 1914, p. 28: "The apparent moral superiority of the pledge given by France and England to respect Belgian neutrality is illusory in face of the facts that France and England stood to gain enormously, and the Germans to lose correspondingly, by confining the attack on France to the heavily fortified Franco-German frontier, and that as France and England knew they would be invited by the Belgians to enter Belgium if the Germans invaded it, the neutrality of Belgium had, as far as they were concerned, no real existence."

If France had really wished to adhere strictly to the neutrality treaties, she should have said: "We shall respect Belgian neutrality, until Belgium calls on us or violates her own neutrality." But, as it was worded, the French declaration did not in fact offer the slightest security either to the Belgian or to the German government. Nevertheless, it satisfied the Belgian as well as the British government. The French reply was officially known to the German government. But the latter knew more; it knew that on August 1st Sir Edward Grey had not only positively refused to pledge England's neutrality in the impending war on the basis of Germany's far-reaching concessions, but had also refused for his part to name any definite conditions on which England might engage to remain neutral. In express terms he had declared that a German promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality was not sufficient as a condition for England to remain neutral.[1] The fundamental difference is very striking between this attitude and that of England in 1870, when she concluded a provisional alliance with each of the belligerents based on the contingency that one of them violate Belgium's neutrality. On the present occasion the violation of Belgium's neutrality was to serve England only as a pretext for war. The German government had, therefore, to reckon with the probability of England's intervention in the war on land and sea.[2] That this would entail the attempt to break through into northwest Germany through Belgian territory was practically certain. The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, was perfectly right when, in his report to his government, of December 23, 1911, he wrote concerning the probable development of an Anglo-Franco-German war: "A British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would at once force its way into our country from the northwest; that would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately. . . ." To guard against this contingency was of vital importance to Germany. But the strong military force requisite to cover the German flank on the lower Rhine would, in the opinion of our opponents, have been condemned at the start to inactivity in a merely defensive position along the Belgian frontier; whereas their absence would have at the same time considerably weakened the German offensive in the west. France and England could,

[1] Blue Book, No. 123. At the same time this disproves the charge that Germany "would have entered Belgium in any case."

[2] The correspondence of November 22 and 23, 1912, between Sir Edward Grey and Minister Cambon, which had long been known in Berlin, provided for joint operation of the armies based on the plans of the General Staffs.

therefore, afford to await the deployment of the tremendous Russian army, and then execute a decisive thrust through Belgium. To have refrained from taking the offensive and making use of Belgian territory would in itself in all probability have been disastrous for Germany; in view of the added necessity of keeping a large force of troops in readiness on the Belgian frontier to prevent a French and English invasion from that quarter, such tactics would have been simply suicidal.

After carefully considering all these points, no unbiassed judge will deny that Germany was in a position of extreme necessity. But could the violation of the neutralization treaties be justified by this necessity, according to the principles of international law? Most certainly. Agreements can be binding for a state only so long as their observance does not jeopardize the very foundations of its existence. International law can never impose on a state the duty of committing suicide. Such, however, would have been the consequence here. A further observance of the neutralization treaties of 1839 was incompatible with the vital interests of Germany; consequently the treaties ceased to have any binding force for her. This principle has not only been acted upon by statesmen of all times and nations—how else would the breaking of "perpetual" peace treaties by new wars ever have been legally admissible?—but it has also been recognized by scholars in Germany, as well as by those in foreign countries which are to-day neutral or hostile.[1] It will be necessary to quote only a few examples of the many concurrent opinions. Thus, in a verdict of the Supreme Court of the United State, Justice Curtis stated in 1908: ". . . while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence." And with especial reference to the German action toward Belgium, even Roosevelt admits in his far from pro-German article in *The Outlook* (September 23, 1914, page 172) that, "When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, from whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself from death and to perpetuate its life." The Swiss professor of international law, Max Huber, has formulated the guiding principle in the clearest terms:

"Just as certain legal obligations cease in common law when

[1] This recalls Gladstone's famous statement concerning the question of the binding force of a guarantee treaty, which Sir Edward Grey quoted in his speech of August 3, 1914 (Blue Book, p. 93).

they result in unreasonable restrictions for the contracting party (as, for instance, in cases of self-defense, of extreme necessity, of excessive civil obligations from a legal contract), just so must it be assumed in international law, and in this case with greater justification because of the peculiar nature of a state, that when the fulfillment of a duty is incompatible with the latter's existence, independence, vital interests and moral integrity, this duty becomes null and void, because it cannot be presumed that a state intended to bind itself for such a contingency when entering the obligation." [1] In conclusion, we quote the statement of Lawrence, the eminent English professor of international law: "Extreme necessity will justify a temporary violation of neutral territory." [2]

Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified in the forum of international law. But to justify her action Germany does not need to have recourse to the plea of extreme necessity, in recognizing the existence of which subjective factors always play a certain part; for long before the German ultimatum was issued, the Belgian government had already violated her own neutrality obligations most seriously to Germany's disadvantage, and thereby herself torn down the barriers raised by the treaty and given Germany the right to defend herself by all means.

IV

It is a recognized fact that the neutralization of a state entails on it important duties. Its actions are much less free than those of an "accidentally neutral" state—that is to say, a state which does not wish to participate in a given war. What it may do, what it is forbidden and what it is obliged to do is disputed in detail. This much, however, is certain: The permanently neutralized state is obliged to abstain from all action which might possibly result in drawing it into a war waged by others. It may, of course, make war to protect its own neutrality, when this is directly threatened by a third party, but under no circumstances is it at liberty to participate in an offensive campaign carried on by others. Furthermore, it must in times of peace avoid all actions which might possibly, in the event of war, force such participation upon it. No one has formulated these obligations more precisely than the English professor, L. Oppenheim, of Cambridge, in his book on *International Law*, I, Sec. 95, p. 147:

"A neutralized state is a state whose independence and integ-

[1] See *Zeitschrift für Volkerrecht*, Vol. VII, p. 363 ff.
[2] See *Principles of International Law*, by Thomas Joseph Lawrence, London, 1910, p. 609.

rity are for all the future guaranteed by an international convention of the Powers, under the condition that such state binds itself never to take up arms against any other state except for defense against attack, *and never to enter into such international obligations as could indirectly drag it into war.* The reason why a state asks or consents to become neutralized is that it is a weak state and does not want an active part in international politics, being exclusively devoted to peaceable developments of welfare."

Accordingly, the permanently neutralized state of Belgium should not have engaged in any autonomous policy (*Machtpolitik*); even the acquisition of the large Congo Colony was, from this point of view, open to question, because it changed the whole basis of the Belgian state and involved it in difficult political problems. In any case, it should not have become a party to an aggressive political combination. In doing so it grossly violated its special obligations and gave to all the guarantors of its permanent neutrality (including the German Empire) the right to interfere in any manner, even by war, if that should be necessary in view of their menaced interests.

The Belgian government, nevertheless, did violate these obligations. Numerous discoveries, especially in the Brussels archives, placed material in the hands of the German government which furnished documentary proof of an understanding between the Belgian and British governments, plainly not in conformity with Belgium's duty to preserve permanent neutrality. The evidence, it is true—as is easy to understand—is not yet complete. It is clear that those negotiations had to be carried on with the strictest secrecy, since cognizance of them would have called forth an immediate protest on the part of Germany. Therefore, even in its hurried flight from Brussels, the Belgian government had to find time to destroy the most compromising documents, or to carry them off. It is also possible that there was not very much written material in existence; at any rate, it is in conformity with English methods of recent years, when putting important political agreements into writing, to do so in the vaguest possible form. Grey was doubtless quite aware, without the example set by Napoleon III and Cavour, that an attack against a third state may also be arranged by word of mouth. In regard to the question of military coöperation, however, a written agreement could hardly be dispensed with, and in this respect the material discovered is by far the most voluminous; a comprehensive examination leaves no room for doubt on any legally important point.[1]

[1] The most important documents have been collected in the publication,

About the middle of January, 1906, military arrangements were undertaken (on English initiative!) between the British Military Attaché in Brussels, Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarne, which regulated in every detail a coöperation of the British and Belgian forces in case of war. They covered all such matters as the number of troops to be used by both sides; the transportation of the British forces oversea; the places of disembarkation and the provisioning base; the participation of the British army in the advantages provided in the Belgian regulations concerning military requisitions in war; arrangements for the providing of interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, and special copies of some of the Belgian army regulations which were to be translated into English, etc.[1] Of special interest was the fact that the British troops, which were to be landed in Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg—that is to say, on French territory —were to be transported by means of Belgian rolling-stock. The participation of France was, therefore, provided for from the very first. A much later document—viz., a record of an interview between the British Military Attaché, Lieut.-Colonel Bridges, and the head of the Belgian General Staff, General Jungbluth, on April 23, 1912[2]—proves the continuation of the military agreement; the only change made was that the number of men in the British landing corps had been somewhat increased. In a very extensive report, dated December 23, 1911, which also fell into German hands, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, warned his government in vain against tying itself to one side of the great European combinations of Powers—viz., the *Entente cordiale*—and pointed out that it was placing itself practically at the mercy of this combination, although a menace to Belgian neutrality and independence was just as likely to come from that side as from Germany.[3] He writes: "The idea of an enveloping movement from the north

Die belgische Neutralität, Berlin, 1914. See also *The Case of Belgium*, by Dr. Bernard Dernburg, New York, 1915.

[1] According to his own statement, General Ducarne "insisted as emphatically as possible" on certain demands, which disproves the English claim of the "academic" character of the conversations. Certainly Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston's statement would seem to prove that the British Ambassador and General Staff must have been aware of the true nature of the "conversations." In further proof it is well to recall that the cover of General Ducarne's report bears the inscription, "Conventions anglo-belges."

[2] The correctness of the date has not been disputed by the Belgians.

[3] That Baron Greindl did not refer here to a merely hypothetical "assumption," as M. Waxweiler apparently would have one believe (*Belgium: Neutral and Loyal*, American Edition, p. 191), but to a very real danger, is proved by his reference to the "disclosures of Colonel Barnardiston, which are just as perfidious as they are naïve"; to the "hue and cry in Paris and London" over the fortification of Flushing, and to the disclosures of Captain Faber.

(i.e., against Germany) is without doubt one of the combinations of the *Entente cordiale.*" The Belgian government continued the military understanding with England, without attempting to make any similar overtures to Germany. It had simply chosen between the two groups of European Powers, and England took good care that Belgium should not fail her in the great undertaking she had in view.

The following is of especial importance in this connection: In the fall of the year 1914, German troops came into possession of secret military manuals concerning Belgian roads and rivers ("Belgium Road and River Reports, prepared by the General Staff, War Office"), which were published by the British General Staff. There are four volumes, of which Volume I had been printed as early as 1912, Volume II in 1913, Volume III (in two parts) and Volume IV in 1914. These manuals contain the most minute description of the country based on military investigations. Matters of military importance are specially indicated. These volumes contain detailed information concerning the network of roads as regards gradients, bridges, crossings, telephone and telegraph offices, railway stations (giving the length of platforms, barriers, local railways, petroleum tanks, etc.). In the description of towns and villages the manuals always state whether all, or part of the inhabitants, speak French. With the same accuracy the whole course of the Scheldt is described, with all its tributaries, depths, breadths, bridges, supply of boats, etc. There is added: I. A survey of billeting facilities arranged according to communities and villages, with the number of soldiers who can be quartered in each, the means of transportation on hand, and all the other details useful to the commandant of a place. II. A collection of important hints for aviators covering the part of Belgium south of the Charleroi-Namur-Liège line, and also the vicinity of Brussels. No less than 125 "possible" landing-places are accurately described, and it is significant that a considerable number of these are in the immediate vicinity of the Liège forts.[1]

Remarks at the head of the various chapters show that the material for the manuals was obtained by means of special investigations made between 1909 and July, 1914. Any one who carefully peruses one of these manuals will concur in the opinion of the German expert that "without the willing and unreserved support of the Belgian government and military authorities

[1] The following is an illustration from the manual, No. 91: "Five miles out on the east of the Aywaille road, and just north of the Fort d'Embourg, a very good covered landing place on grass could be prepared by the removal of wire fences. It is completely covered from the south by the Fort."

such a task could not have been accomplished. . . . The quartering lists, which treat Belgium as if it were English soil, can only have been provided by the Belgian government. Without doubt, official Belgian material was used for this purpose. It was adapted for English use, or in many instances simply translated into English."[1] After what is known of the detailed Anglo-Belgian negotiations of 1906, this can scarcely come as a surprise. These secret English military manuals prove perhaps more strikingly than anything else that in military matters Belgium had surrendered unconditionally to the English.

Considering how matters stood, it is not surprising that in the offices of the British headquarters for espionage in Brussels a whole packet of blank requisition forms was found, on which the British Embassy in Brussels had certified, with the imprint of its official seal, that the English spy, Dale Long, resident in Belgium, was a member of the British General Staff, and was authorized to make requisitions in Belgium. Nor was it surprising to find in the possession of Grant-Watson, the British Secretary of Legation in Brussels, on his arrest, documents dated 1913 and 1914, containing information of the most intimate kind concerning the Belgian mobilization, and the defense of Antwerp, and even a handwritten memorandum on a report of the Belgian Gendarmery relative to the French mobilization measures of July 27th.[2] Of still more peculiar interest was the news given by an unsuspecting English lady, in a letter dated July 30, 1914, to a German acquaintance: "My son has left us to-day in order to join Sir John French's Staff in Belgium" (cf. *Süddeutsche Monatshefte,* April, 1915, p. 96).

In the face of the overwhelming amount of evidence, the existence of the military arrangements between England and Belgium[3]

[1] M. Waxweiler attempts (*Belgium: Neutral and Loyal,* American Edition, p. 198) to minimize the significance of these embarrassing manuals by tracing them back to espionage. While it would have been possible to obtain many of the single points of information by successful espionage, the overwhelming amount of material prepared, collected and elaborated in the manuals unquestionably proves the correctness of the German contentions.

[2] Among these papers were orders, issued in the form of a circular, to the higher Belgian commanders, with the fac simile signature of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff; and a record of a meeting of the "Commission for the Provisioning Base of Antwerp," held on May 27, 1913.

[3] Less detailed information is available at the present time in relation to the corresponding agreement between Belgium and France, but that there was an agreement is evident from the existence of the pact with England which is contingent on it. Besides the detailed information already given, the following points are worthy of note: 1, the inspection of the Belgian fortresses on the Meuse by the French Minister of War, General Picquart, and officers of the French General Staff in 1913, which was openly mentioned in Belgian newspapers (see Nelte, *Zeitschrift für Volkerrecht,* Vol. VIII, p. 749); 2, the fact that several French cavalry regiments were instructed to concentrate on Belgian territory in case of mobilization, which was known to the Belgian General Staff as late as 1913 (see Josson, *Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van*

has been only partly, and then but feebly, disputed by the English and Belgians, some of whom ascribed to them a purely "academic" character. Others attempt to vindicate them by asserting that the arrangements were of a purely defensive nature, solely intended for the protection of Belgium against the anticipated German attack. This plea appears to have made an impression on many fair-minded people in neutral countries, especially in Switzerland; and yet, in face of the above-mentioned facts, it seems almost grotesque, if the spirit and not merely the letter of the neutrality treaties is taken into consideration. Theoretically speaking, it is perfectly correct that a permanently neutral state also may enter into an alliance for the sole purpose of its own defense. But in the case under discussion was it in reality such an alliance? If a small or secondary state, on the basis of an agreement with a Great Power that stands in allied relationship to another Great Power (a neighbor of the secondary state), gives its ally such exact information concerning all its military forces, resources, places of defense—in short, concerning everything of military importance in its own territory—then the first Great Power is actually placed in the position of military dictatorship over the secondary state. The secondary state is no longer in a position successfully to oppose the Great Power, and the far stronger Great Power can at any time threaten it with certain destruction and use it, with or without its consent, as a base of attack against its own opponents.

The name and purpose officially given to such agreements cease to be of great consequence. The secondary state has practically surrendered its liberty of action, and the Great Power is free to use it for any plans of aggression it may cherish. The smaller state is an accurately appraised factor to be made use of in the military calculations of the Great Power; it is, in fact, no more than its "vassal." The Great Power may declare over and over again that only in the event of an "attack" on the smaller ally will it enter the latter's territory; in war such an attack can always be claimed to have been made. Besides, English history teaches us that when British interests are threatened, and especially in the case of a life-and-death struggle of the country, irksome treaties and stipulations of international law are for England worth only the paper they are written on—her action

Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913), Breda, 1913, p. 860); 3, the sworn statements of French prisoners that strong forces of French troops (among them the following regiments: the 5th, 21st, 28th and 30th dragoons; the 3rd and 6th cuirassiers; the 3rd and 8th hussars; and a part of the 40th Field Artillery Regiment) had entered Belgium before the presentation of the German ultimatum and had been hospitably received there (see Grasshoff, *The Tragedy of Belgium*, p. 23 ff.).

against Malta, Denmark, Egypt and the Boer Republics, as well as her newest "legal" maxims of naval warfare, speak plainly enough. How England had decided to proceed, especially in regard to Belgium, is shown by the statements made by the British Military Attaché Bridges to the Belgian General Jungbluth, in the above-mentioned interview of April 23, 1912, according to which the British government "during recent events" (the crisis of 1911) had resolved on landing forces in Belgium, even if the latter failed to call for assistance; and in reply to Jungbluth's objection, that to such action Belgium's consent would have been necessary, Bridges stated that he was aware of this; but that as Belgium was not in a position to prevent the Germans from marching through, England would have landed her troops in Belgium in any event.[1] In reply to this, Jungbluth merely stated that Belgium was perfectly well able to prevent the passage of the Germans. The Belgian government did not direct any official question to London concerning this point (at least not according to Mr. Waxweiler's account); but a year subsequent to this, Sir Edward Grey, apparently half-spontaneously, gave a reassuring explanation, which he confirmed in a letter dated April 7, 1913.[2] Asquith and Grey also declared in Parliament in 1913 and 1914 that there were, in the event of the outbreak of a war between European Powers, no unpublished agreements which would tie the hands of or restrict the government, or Parliament, in their decision whether Great Britain should participate in the war or not. This declaration may have pacified all who were ignorant of the correspondence between Grey and Cambon in November, 1912, with its reference to the plans of the General Staff of the two countries.

The conception of a defensive alliance certainly does not require such military intimacy as the Anglo-Belgian: Austria and Italy, although united by the defensive alliance of the *Dreibund,* had not given one another such extensive military information. Belgium was, however, according to international law, in duty bound to observe an attitude of reserve toward the *Entente cordiale.* An ordinary state may, at its own risk, join a Great Power or group of Great Powers, even in the most intimate

[1] ". . . L'Angleterre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause." Whether Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges was officially authorized to make these statements is of no importance; of decisive importance, however, is his official knowledge of British intentions—intentions which were confirmed by the disclosures of Captain Faber and of Field Marshal Lord Roberts.

[2] This letter is printed in M. Waxweiler's book, *Belgium: Neutral and Loyal* p. 196 ff. The salient point is Sir Edward Grey's statement: "I said that I was sure that this government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium and I did not believe that any British government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it."

manner; but for the permanently neutralized state to do so would be an abuse of its duties, according to international law. Would a statesman of Switzerland, which is really neutral, seriously contend to-day that Belgium had done her duty toward Germany before the war *"d'observer cette même neutralité envers tous les autres États?"* What would England and France have said to a similar Belgo-German "military intimacy"?

It is not true that Germany "would have marched through Belgium in any case," and that as a result the one-sided and in its effect practically unconditional adherence to the *Entente cordiale* offered Belgium the only possible means of salvation and security: the English Blue Book itself proves conclusively that Germany arrived at a final decision only after Grey had refused to give an assurance as to England's neutrality in the coming war, even in the event that Germany should bind herself to respect Belgium's neutrality.[1]

It is impossible that the Belgian government should have deceived itself as to the fact that it had joined forces with an aggressive group of Powers; for, through the *Entente cordiale*, England was drawn into the sphere of influence of the policy of revenge, which had never been abandoned by France; whereas, on the other hand, Germany was without ambitions in Europe, and was at the same time in the way of satisfying her requirements for future colonial expansion by means of friendly agreements with England.

The attitude (not yet known in all its details) of the Belgian government before the war, is perhaps politically and psychologically comprehensible, nor is this the place for moral dialectics; but what cannot be maintained is that Belgium scrupulously fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the law of nations, and that in the face of this the German invasion was a disgraceful breach of international law. Where are the confidential negotiations and agreements between Belgium and Germany which correspond to those between Belgium and England? If this entire problem, which is preeminently of a political nature, is meas-

[1] A careful study of the course of the negotiations makes it difficult to avoid the impression that, from about July 31st on, Sir Edward Grey deliberately tried to provoke Germany to violate Belgium's neutrality, in order to have to present to the world a morally effective pretext for the war. That the violation of Belgium's neutrality was not the deciding factor for the leading men of England is proved: 1, by Sir Edward Grey's promise to France on August 2; 2, by Mr. Bonar Law's open letter of the same date, in which he demanded that England go to the assistance of France and Russia, and did not even mention Belgium; 3, by the open statements of the English labor leader, J. Ramsay MacDonald, among others, that if France had similarly violated Belgium's neutrality, England would never have drawn the sword; 4, by the surprisingly frank statements of the London *Times* and of Lord Haldane.

ured by the standards of international law, it is clear that it was Belgium herself, who, from within, broke down the protecting rampart which treaty and international law had erected around her territory—leaving only a "paper" wall standing—and replaced it by military agreements with one of the two groups of the European Great Powers. In this way, Belgium had herself cleared the way for a policy of selfish interest. Belgium's attitude necessarily strengthened the position of the *Entente cordiale,* both from a military and political point of view; and Germany, as the enemy of the coalition, could, in the event of war, regard the matter only from a practical point of view, and ask herself whether she should leave a sure advantage in the hands of her enemies to make use of at their discretion, or attempt to wrest Belgium from the hostile combination by pacific or forcible means.

The question, however, is asked by many: Did Germany, in the early part of August, 1914, know of the secret agreements between Belgium and England? From a legal point of view, this is not the decisive point; juristically, the important consideration is rather the objective state of affairs. The crucial point is whether Belgium could in truth still claim consistently to have fulfilled her obligations of neutrality towards Germany. The German Imperial Chancellor meanwhile replied in the *Reichstag* on December 2, 1914:

"At that time there were already many indications of the guilt of the Belgian government. Positive written proofs were not then at my disposal. . . ."

As the remarks of the Military Attaché Bridges had in part come to the knowledge of a number of people, and as Belgium was (according to Waxweiler, on p. 200) "the chosen land for spies of every nationality," it may be taken for granted, even without the statement of the Imperial Chancellor, that it was out of the question for the German government to have been in complete ignorance. The German government knew of an impending French advance along the Belgian frontier—the German ultimatum to Belgium refers to this—and it also knew, without doubt, that Belgium had not deemed it necessary to adopt adequate military precautions against such an advance; indeed, this has not been seriously contended by the Belgians. How differently in comparison did Switzerland act after the outbreak of the war!

But apparently Germany still hoped, by means of speedy action, to be able to prevent Belgium from taking an active part in the war, and did not, therefore, on account of the country's

understanding with the *Entente cordiale,* treat it from the beginning as the ally of the latter; on the contrary, the effort was first made, by asking merely for free passage of German troops, in a sense simply to crowd Belgium aside.

Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified from the point of view of international law, also for the reason that Belgium had previously violated her obligations of neutrality in a way menacing to Germany and favoring the *Entente cordiale.*

Least of all are those entitled to inveigh against Germany for breaking the law of nations whose mischievous plans were thwarted by the rapidity of Germany's action; to them apply Hamlet's words:

> "For 'tis the sport, to have the engineer
> Hoist with his own petard."

BOOK V

THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

KULTUR POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

"Nur eine auch nach aussen hin starke Nation bewahrt den Geist in sich, aus dem auch alle Segnungen im Innern strömen."[1]
W. VON HUMBOLDT.

THE Germans are a brave people, a faithful people and a stupid people, so that they need harsh proofs. . . . I am reminded of what I once heard a genial and humane Irish officer say concerning a proposal to treat with the leaders of a Zulu rebellion: 'Kill them all,' he said, 'it's the only thing they understand.' "

Thus writes an Oxford professor, who bears the memorable name of Walter Raleigh, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets entitled "Might is Right." That is—so he asserts, and thousands of his countrymen reëcho this assertion all over the world—the accursed motto of the Germans, as it was likewise the principle of the buffaloes in North America, until the hunters came and shot them down. *The Times* calls us *hostes generis humani* (enemies of humankind). No pope has ever pronounced more terrible anathemas against heretics than England, cultured England, has against us. We ask indignantly why our opponents are not content to send the huge armies and fleets of four Great Powers and the levies of almost all races against us and our allies and to fight out this war of great political and national interests in the manner of other similar wars in the world's history? But if England had her way, we should be outlawed by the whole civilized world, and every German who now helps to defend his home and country would see the eyes of his fellow creatures bent upon him in reproof and contempt, because his nation has committed a crime against mankind. From the depths of the hatred against us, from the cold cruelty, that, dagger-like, thrusts at our entrails, we draw the conclusion that our enemies wish to crush us politically to the utmost conceivable degree. And from that again do we draw the further conclusion that we

[1] "Only an outwardly strong nation retains that spirit from which all inner blessings flow."

must exert the last remnant of our strength to maintain our existence as a nation. Our power of resistance will become stronger—a fact which our enemies seem to overlook—not weaker, at the sight of their hate-distorted faces. But we can step before the judgment-seat of mankind, to which they appeal, with a clear conscience. While our conscience, at all times, must be our chief and most severe judge, we know very well that there is also a verdict of history, before whose tribunal we have to justify our actions. It will be pronounced when the passions of this struggle have died away. Only future generations, not our contemporaries, can pronounce it. Nor do we acknowledge our neutral contemporaries, to whom this book is addressed, as our judges in the strict sense of the word, because they also are swayed by sympathies and antipathies, and have not as yet the freedom of mind necessary to pass an historical judgment. They are, however, before all others, fitted to prepare the way for an impartial verdict. We do not beg, we demand and claim as our due from them, a fair hearing of our cause, and the will to consider and to understand our reasons.

There is a desire to designate this war as a war of *Kultur,* nay, even as a religious war.[1] Ideas are to be combated. The "spirit" of our *Kultur,* our politics, and our militarism is conjured up, and the wildest and strangest invectives are hurled against it. Not alone our leading statesmen are made responsible. It is plain that the entire German nation is firm as a rock in their support, and from this fact the conclusion is drawn that the poison of a false doctrine, hostile to civilization, has spread through the veins of our people and infected them. Our entire modern history is searched for the cause of this, to prove to the world that amongst all the other highly respectable and innocent nations there is one which is a criminal and a sinner. Let us hear these accusations, as far as possible, in the words of the accusers.

There are, or rather there were, two Germanies, a good one and a bad one.[2] The good Germany was the Germany of Goethe and Kant, who was the apostle of eternal peace, and this good Germany had become great without the protection of might. The bad Germany, on the other hand, emanated from the conqueror state of Frederick the Great. Power was his aim, force and cunning were his aids, and treaties were respected by him only so long as they served his purposes. (How deplorable was

[1] See *The Prussian Hath Said in His Heart,* by Cecil Chesterton, pamphlet, London, 1915, p. 5.

[2] See *Britain's Case Against Germany,* by Ramsay Muir, Chapter III, "The Two Germanies."

it, then, must the believer in this theory immediately interpose, that the England of the elder Pitt made an alliance with Frederick and utilized his victories in order to conquer Canada.) The chasm between the two Germanies, it is said, had already begun to be bridged by the Prussia of 1813, which strove for nobler ends than mere power. But the reactionary period after 1815 reopened it. The ideals of intellectual Germany had been maintained by the cosmopolitan professors, who did not regard the end and aim of the state as one of power, but as one of right and liberty. Their cultural standard, it is claimed, was higher than that of the state of to-day, which aims only at power, and which has asserted itself, thanks to Bismarck's work and Treitschke's teachings.

This present-ray state is ruled by the all-governing doctrine, that the state is power, that nothing is of such value in life as the state, that it is therefore justified in using every means to secure its power, and that war is a moral necessity. These teachings of Treitschke, with their "colossal immorality," [1] had poisoned the soul of the German people. The other poisoner of the nation was Nietzsche, who had, it is true, not preached state-worship, but the worship of might.[2] Under the influence of these two men, the notorious book of General von Bernhardi was written, which demanded the cynical war of aggression against England. He and his countrymen were intoxicated with the idea of establishing a world dominion, and at the same time of forcing German *Kultur* upon the rest of mankind by the sword, as Mohammed had once tried to do. But what was this German *Kultur* to-day, and what conception did the Germans have of civilization at all at present? Almost all Germans believed that their civilization had reached the highest point ever attained by mankind, that they had nothing to learn from other nations, but could teach them everything.[3] They had in mind only that exclusive *Kultur* which had developed in the limited sphere of one nation and was maintained by the sword. *Kultur* was, however, a matter of intellect; it grew by means of intellect, and was defended by it. *Kultur,* when associated with might, ceased to be *Kultur,* and became might, pure and simple.[4] Experience taught, so Bishop Welldon declared at a teachers' congress in London, that when Germans had employed the word *Kultur* during recent years, it did not signify science, education,

[1] See *Treitschke and the Great War,* by Joseph McCabe, p. 287.
[2] Besides the above-quoted works, see also *Nietzsche and Treitschke,* by Ernest Barker, Oxford Pamphlets.
[3] *Britain's Case Against Germany,* by Ramsay Muir, p. 132.
[4] *Nietzsche and Treitschke,* by Barker, Oxford Pamphlets, p. 27.

art, and literature—or at least only in a secondary sense.[1] "German *Kultur* is organized efficiency on the largest scale." The immediate result was state-worship, for the state, and the state alone, was the organ of "national efficiency." The individual actually sacrificed all he had and all he was worth to the state; his highest duty was self-sacrifice for the state. Thus it came about, strangely enough, that education in Germany was valued not from the ethical, but from the material and physical point of view, not as a means of civilization, refinement and sympathy, but as a means of conquest.

Without doubt, if this picture of modern politics and civilization were correct, the whole world ought to rise in flaming indignation, and help the English, French and Russians to quell the spirit of barbarism that is menacing it. But strange reminiscences arise when we contemplate the various colors of this picture and the palette from which they were taken. "Efficiency" is a favorite word of the English; it is a product of English soil. The following has not been said by a German, but by a Swede:

"The profound moral aphorism: 'Nothing succeeds like success' . . . is held in reverence by the English from the peer down to the longshoreman. Wealth and social power are the objects of the success to which it refers. . . . For higher cultural attainments, such as esthetics, science, philosophy, and non-conventional moral talents, English democracy does not show the slightest appreciation. Fresh acquisitions in the sphere of psychic life do not, generally speaking, pertain to the success which succeeds in the England of to-day." [2]

And what Bishop Welldon says of the material and physical character of our education must be met with a smile. "The simplicity of the English soul," says Steffen, "is equivalent in far too high a degree to a devotion to coarse, material work, purely physical activity, athletic feats, and recklessness." [3] We are of the opinion that other features of the portrait drawn fit us less than they fit the English. The narrow-minded and arrogant belief in the unsurpassable excellence of their own *Kultur,* whose function it is to teach, not to learn, is more prevalent and longer established amongst the English than with us; we shall show that an unscrupulous policy of power has existed in England for centuries in practice, if not in theory. Some portraits by subjective painters are really self-portraits, and therefore we

[1] The London *Times* of January 5, 1915.
[2] *England als Weltmacht und Kulturstaat,* by G. F. Steffen, 1902, I, 59.
[3] Ibid., II, 182.

say also in the words of Goethe of the picture presented of us at this time: "Thou'rt like the spirit thou comprehendest, not like me!"

We shall resist the temptation to return like for like. We cannot, however, refrain from pointing out some unpleasant traits of English character. They are manifest enough, yet the task of understanding the entire *Kultur* of a foreign people correctly, and of classifying the profusion of forces and tendencies existing in it, is in itself a most difficult task—almost impossible while enmity and passion prevail and find expression in a life-and-death struggle like the one raging at present. But we have every right to an attentive hearing when we defend ourselves against the distortions and misrepresentations of our opinions and ideals. We are said to have conceptions as to the relations of *Kultur,* state and policy of power which are inhuman. Let us explain what the true state of affairs is with us. We will cite those opinions held by the best men of our nation and which, we believe, also enjoy the widest circulation among our educated classes. Extreme and radical views are no more lacking amongst us than in other nations. We do not wish to ignore them here, but we shall put them in their proper place and reduce their importance to the proper measure.

This must be done first of all with regard to the three men who are alleged to be the chief teachers and representatives of the modern German spirit: Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardi. Their influence among us is now being exaggerated abroad to a ludicrous degree. We do, indeed, venerate in Treitschke the great, pure and powerful man whose personal integrity even our adversaries dare not doubt, the ardent German patriot, the divinely inspired artist, who, with deep love and in glowing colors, conjures up before our eyes the men and conditions of our past. But we have never been blind to his one-sidedness and impetuosity. Our modern German historical writers follow in Ranke's footsteps, not in Treitschke's. They share, it is true, Treitschke's strong interest in the historico-political problems of the recent past, but consciously strive for Ranke's impartiality and objectivity towards other nations, and they correct at every step the misrepresentations and exaggerations in Treitschke's historical pictures. How differently do we, for instance, regard to-day the Confederation of the Rhine, South German Liberalism, and Frederick William III of Prussia, whom Treitschke eulogized. It is just as great a mistake to characterize his political doctrines as domineering in essence. Correctly

understood, they are not in the least brutal.[1] They are, indeed, often blunt and one-sided. For the rest, they originated in a period which we have already outgrown. His judgment was moulded in the experiences attendant upon our achievement of national union and he sought to discover, above all, what advanced or hampered this union. Our political judgment of to-day is in many respects more liberal and milder.

Nietzsche, who did not feel himself to be a German but a European, has influenced not only Germany, but the whole of Europe, and has been received here as well as there with both enthusiastic applause and pronounced opposition. The opponents of Nietzsche's ethics in Germany are much more numerous and influential than the adherents. The tree he planted has borne both good and evil fruit. He has seduced unstable and weak characters to megalomania and moral anarchy, but he has also strengthened the power of moral judgment by his pitiless criticism of all conventional sanctimoniousness. This may render him worthy of hatred by those modern Englishmen who cultivate the ideal of virtue of the outwardly correct Pharisee.

General von Bernhardi cannot be mentioned in the same breath with Treitschke and Nietzsche. Neither intellectually nor in influence does he approach them. He is a distinguished writer on military matters, who thought it his duty to enlighten the German nation concerning its position and its task among the World Powers, and concerning the dangers with which England's envy and ill-will threatened it. He has together with this expounded various teachings on war of which we do not approve, but which need not be taken amiss from a frank and straightforward soldier. We in Germany were highly astonished when we heard that his book, that is as yet little known among us, was held abroad to be the classical expression of our views. Just as little is it permissible to see in it the convictions of our leading statesmen. He shows his own dissatisfaction with the latter plainly enough. The tremendous edition of the English translation now in circulation in America is a dishonest means of exciting animosity against us. We vigorously protest against the attempt to make the German government and the German people responsible for the opinion of this general. "There are militarists and jingoes in every country," says Gilbert Murray, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets.[2] "Our own have often been bad enough." We shall hear of them again.

Let us now investigate the reproaches made against our ideals

[1] That is shown in the sober essay by Arthur T. Hadley on "The Political Teachings of Treitschke," in the *Yale Review* of January, 1915.

[2] *How Can War Ever Be Right?* p. 18.

of *Kultur* and state. It is said that we overrate the importance for *Kultur* of the state, and particularly the importance of the great and powerful state. We overlook the fact that the civilization of Athens and Florence was far superior to that of the more powerful nations with which they were in touch politically. We do not overlook this fact by any means. Our science strives eagerly to illustrate the wonderful intellectual power and the high state of civilization of these municipalities, and our German travellers study the beauty of Greek and Florentine art perhaps with more earnestness and devotion than the herds of English tourists who are driven through the museums by their guides and who disturb the reverential silence. But can the *Kultur* of these city-states be understood at all without the strong political impulses that animated them? Did not Athens at the time of Pericles pursue an imperialistic policy, and is it an accident that Machiavelli was a Florentine and a contemporary of Leonardo? The heads of Bramante in the Brera in Milan and of Castagno in Florence illustrate the ideal of *virtù* which Machiavelli set up—the ideal of political and martial heroism. The various expressions of life of the cultural and the civic community must not be regarded separately; they exist under a perpetual interchange of reciprocal influence, the full extent of which can be divined by its various symptoms rather than clearly recognized. It is true that the Germany of the eighteenth century is a remarkable instance of the development of a high national culture in a nation politically powerless, rent by strife and on the whole a stranger to statecraft. That is the example of which we are now continually reminded by our enemies, to bring home to us that we would do better to seek our greatness in intellect rather than in power. But do they by any chance set us a good example? Are they ready to sacrifice even an iota of their power and unity to serve *Kultur?* They desire to retain the one just as much as the other, and we do not think any the worse of them for it, for they may be justly proud of their national *Kultur,* which has blossomed in the storms of mighty struggles. Through Shakespeare's historical dramas sweeps the wind that dispersed the Armada, and the century of Louis XIV, which brought such bitter misery to our people, gave to French intellect its incomparable clearness, elegance, and suppleness, and moreover the sovereign courage to dictate to the world not only the laws of taste, but also the laws of the state and civic society in the "declaration of human and civic rights." We have, it is true, like England, refused to acknowledge the universal validity of these French laws for civilization and politics, but we are not

blind to the greatness of these national conceptions. And it is quite clear to us that England, as well as France, by the early foundation of their national and political union and power, have created a firm basis for their civilization that has given to them, and furthered, their aristocratic assurance, steadiness, self-reliance and perfection of form. To-day we are painfully aware of these advantages of our adversaries, because they are turned as weapons against us. The hollow phrases, commonplaces, and half-truths which they hurl against us, have a mundane polish and style and a sovereign confidence of victory, by which they make a much stronger impression on the rest of the world than our more homely arguments.

The defects in our *Kultur* have their origin in great part in the fact that we did not attain to political union, power and self-consciousness until very late. Our people were so long obliged to live in narrow, straitened, and poor circumstances that we still feel the effects to-day. But we are proud that the genius of our nation, relying only on its own strength, has worked its way up out of this constriction without the aid and support of a great political life. We cheerfully agree with our adversaries that *Kultur* does not originate only in the state and does not have to rely exclusively on the alliance with political power. When Klopstock, Winckelmann, and Lessing began their careers they followed the innate and powerful impulses of their souls, without knowing or feeling anything of state and power. It is inherent in the nature of true *Kultur,* that it springs spontaneously and independently, again and again, from the various impulses and needs of the human mind, and that art, science and religion each lay down their own laws for themselves and resent as tyranny every law imposed by other forces. Yet they are independent only in what they strive for; the strength which inspires their efforts has its root in the community, and in this again all the faculties and institutions of the political, social, economic and intellectual life work together. Any one who is unable to grasp clearly this co-existence of dependence and independence in the various branches of historical life will never understand the true relationship of *Kultur* and state to one another.

The aim of genuine *Kultur* is not to be a single province of human life; it must permeate life completely, including the state itself, which it must raise to be a valuable cultural factor. And, conversely, the true state is aware that its power is, in the last analysis, founded on a spiritual basis. It cannot regulate the working of the spirit; it cannot and should not by forcible means impress *Kultur,* which it needs for the completion of its

power, into its service. *Kultur* must help the state voluntarily, and it can and will do so because its own needs impel it thereto, and because it will receive valuable gifts in return from the state. Therefore it is in the long run an unnatural and unhealthy condition, if one great branch of national life flourishes while the other withers. Of course, we must beware of setting up hard and fast rules. It is absolutely false to declare that masterpieces of the mind can be produced only in a great and powerful national state, or that great military victories and triumphs of a nation will necessarily promote the progress of intellectual culture. Where *Kultur* lacks fertile soil of its own, no sunshine of political power and greatness will help it. And yet even a little of such sunshine can be infinitely valuable to it. Nor was it lacking in the first beginnings of our German literature of the eighteenth century.

"The first real and higher essence of life," Goethe tells us in his *Dichtung und Wahrheit,* "was infused into German poetry through Frederick the Great and the events of the Seven Years' War. All national poetry must be shallow, or become so, if it is not based on the most human of foundations, the deeds of the nations and of their leaders when both stand united for *one* man."

And Ranke, whom Muir contrasts with Treitschke as "the apostle of unbiassed history," says the same thing:

"This much, however, is certain, that no other phenomenon contributed so much to the self-reliance which accompanied this soaring of our great spirits as the life and fame of Frederick the Great. A nation must needs feel self-reliant and independent if it is to develop unhampered, and literature has never flourished without being prepared for by the great events of history."

The unintentional and involuntary service rendered by Frederick the Great's policy of might to German intellectual life was not requited at the time; the latter did not place itself at the disposal of state interests, but followed its own paths, which led toward the highest idealism of mankind. In this cosmopolitan manner of thought of our great poets, we of to-day do not by any means see, as foreign nations seem to assume, any aberration from or infidelity to the nation, but a great historical necessity. With the aid of that cosmopolitan thought, the German intellect freed itself from the pettiness of the social and political conditions of the time, and gained the strength for a complete and unconditional solution of certain problems of life. The state of national disunion brought with it the one advantage, that many centers and seats of culture were formed, and the develop-

ment of individual diversity was furthered. Small states, like great ones, may be beneficial to the promotion of *Kultur,* but all such effects are indissolubly connected with time and place and distinct phases of development. Our adversaries of to-day play with the idea that it would be a service to German *Kultur* if Germany were reduced to her former state of political impotence and harmlessness. They apparently believe that the German bird sings best when it is imprisoned in a cage, but they would open their eyes wide with astonishment if the same method were to be prescribed for them. The cosmopolitan *Kultur* of Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt was a glorious but transitory flowering—and the fruit which resulted from it was the German *Kultur* of the nineteenth century, with its national tendency, which has helped to build up the German Empire. Our adversaries, who play off the good Germany against the bad, the unpolitical against the military Germany, have not the faintest idea how closely and intimately these two Germanies are united nor how necessary was the progress from one stage to the other. Toward the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century was the period when German *Kultur* began to turn toward the state for the sake of its own completion.

The fundamental ideas of German idealism had already led to a higher evaluation of the state and the nation in which the individuals were living, and German idealism laid stress on the worth of the individual as a unique source of human beauty and strength. A further step was soon taken, and it was recognized that states and nations were also great historical individualities. It was seen that one state had this, the other that, character, and each was found justifiable, because it had grown individually and according to its own laws of development.

The Romanticist Novalis was an enthusiastic admirer of the Prussian military state of his time—and that, be it noted, was before 1806! He called the state the embodiment of all activity, and he made the daring statement: "All *Kultur* emanates, together with the state, from the given conditions." We modern Germans believe that this goes too far, and exaggerates the value of the state for *Kultur.* If we were to make use of this ingenious sentence of the greatest dreamer among the German Romanticists, the venerable Bishop Welldon would lift up his hands in horror at our fanatical admiration of the Moloch which is called State. We will, however, disclose to him the secret that the enthusiastic veneration of the state on the part of the German Romanticists at that time was largely drawn from English

sources. The reflections of Burke, on the French Revolution, wherein he glorifies the state as the union of all that is beautiful, good and divine in man, had a deep influence on German national feeling.

When this began to develop in the first decade of the nineteenth century, it was not alone esthetic but also ethical motives that turned German idealism toward the state. The moral law of the categorical imperative, which the state set up, demanded action and work, and devotion to the common weal. Fichte, in sublime manner, taught a philosophy of action which was destined to found a new ideal state. And just at that time misfortune overtook Germany and the old Prussian state crumbled to dust. What Germany had to suffer under Napoleon's scourge still vibrates in our hearts to-day and strengthens our will to do all in our power to prevent the return of such misfortune. But more vivid even than the memory of shame and humiliation in our minds, is the memory of the truly wonderful alliance of the German spirit with the Prussian state which was concluded for the salvation and regeneration of Prussia and Germany. The Prussian state of 1813, rejuvenated by liberal and humanitarian ideals, probably still enjoys the esteem of our adversaries. They do not know it well, however, if they believe that it was more modest and unselfish in its policy of power than the Prussia and Germany of Bismarck. The Prussian statesmen who represented Prussia at the Congress of Vienna were not more modest than their honorable colleagues in Europe, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Alexander I, who were so well able to look after the aggrandizement of their states. Precisely those Prussian statesmen who were most deeply imbued with the thoughts of Fichte and Kant demanded most vigorously at this period the annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and Fichte himself, in 1813, wished that the King of Prussia would become the enforcer of German nationalism (*"Zwingherr zur Deutschheit"*).

We must, therefore, establish the fact that the doctrine of the "two Germanies" which is at present being expounded in England is not correct. It is incorrect that the "tame" Germany of 1800 was swallowed up by the "savage" Germany of Bismarck. On the contrary, the "tame" Germany very early showed a most serious inclination toward the "savage" Germany and entered into a voluntary and happy union with it. Certain remnants of the cosmopolitan idealism of the eighteenth century remained alive in the *Kultur* and the political views of the educated classes in Germany for a long time, until they were swept away by the work and teachings of Bismarck. Let us regard

these boldly, without shrinking. Not as embittered accusers, but as calm and just judges, and historians, let us regard more closely that terrible phantom of the "policy of power" (*Machtpolitik*) with which Bismarck's name has been coupled. How can one drag Bismarck to the prisoners' dock without at the same time subjecting the policy of all the other great modern Powers to just as severe examination? We seem to be dreaming when we hear the English (of all people precisely the English!) now declare that Bismarck and his successors in Germany pursued an especially relentless and unscrupulous policy of power. What else have they themselves done for centuries? By force and lawlessness, the commercial privileges of the Hansa were crushed by England during Queen Elizabeth's reign. With brutal force England fell upon Holland in the seventeenth century, violated Danish neutrality, and in 1807 captured the defenseless Danish fleet.

"The various countries and peoples of the earth," recently said the Norwegian, Knut Hamsun, "have not gone to England and asked to be taken over by her. The connection between these countries and the mother-country is *the result of force.*" [1] Was the England of the nineteenth century milder and more moderate? By what right did she keep Egypt? By what right did Jameson break the peace in South Africa in 1896 and start on his filibustering raid, to the great satisfaction of the widest circles of English society? And truly not love of right, but *auri sacra fames,* incited the English to suppress the liberty of the Boers. "No doubt," says Mr. Egerton, "in the making of the British Empire, as in other human transactions, things have happened that one may wish might have happened otherwise." [2] If he had only honestly and conscientiously disclosed the full extent of these "things." Others of his Anglo-Saxon countrymen were more honest prior to the war. No less a person than Lord Roberts said: "How was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire—war and conquest." And in the book, "The Day of the Saxon," by the American, Homer Lea, we read: "The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of fact. . . . In just such a manner has the British Empire been made up from the fragments of four great maritime Powers, the satrapies of petty potentates and the wilderness of nameless savages."

[1] In the newspaper *Tidns Tegn,* January, 1915.
[2] *Is the British Empire the Result of Wholesale Robbery?* 1914 (Oxford Pamphlets).

In this war, in which England poses as the guardian of international law, she tramples upon it when it suits her interest to do so and when she hopes to escape with impunity. She oppresses Egypt and violates the treaties regarding the Suez Canal; contrary to the tenets of international law, she sinks a German auxiliary cruiser in the neutral port of Rio del Oro, on August 29th, for which act the *New York World,* of January 11, 1915, takes her to task, saying: "To keep certain supplies out of Germany England has terrorized innocent neutral commerce. To use her great sea power against an enemy with the utmost effect, she has not scrupled even by caprice to bring disaster upon a friend. When remonstrated with, she pleads necessity, which in war knows neither friends nor law." The Brazilian paper, *Tribuna,* of December 4, 1914, asks: "Are we an English protectorate?" and states that a Brazilian ship sailing from one Brazilian port to another was stopped and searched by a British man-of-war in Brazilian waters.

Cunning and force the English declare to be the chief features of the modern German policy of power. The greatest and most effective cunning that a policy of power can employ is to conceal its claws and, as Machiavelli says, "appear all pity, all faith, all humanity, all honesty, all piety." And the worst and most disgusting form of force that an unscrupulous policy of power can use is that of violating the truth. In this kind of cunning and in this kind of force England is simply unmatched. There are, indeed, as we have seen, honest Englishmen who despise hypocrisy, but the official British policy and the British people will not relinquish it. England uses it with more art even than Machiavelli advises. Machiavelli was still naïve enough to assume that the prince who lies and dissembles in public would be conscious of his lies in his heart of hearts. The average Englishman, however, has done away with even this ethical impediment to his hypocrisy, which now and then might cause inconvenient stings of conscience. He raises in his soul an air-tight partition between the sphere of his will and the sphere of his emotions. He *believes* in his humanity, whilst he *acts* like a beast of prey. He is told that this is infamous hypocrisy. He hears these voices, but either he ignores them totally, because he firmly believes in his virtue, or he meets the accusation with a slight concession and thus quickly salves his conscience.

"Sometimes," says Muir, significantly, "England has played the hypocrite. But hypocrisy is the tribute paid to virtue, and except when it is the lie in the soul, it is preferable to the kind of truth which the Great King (Frederick II) cultivated; for at

least it recognizes the claims of a standard of conduct higher than that of the jungle."[1] These words prove that the lie has become indeed "the lie in the soul" with the English.

The charge, however, that the Prusso-German policy of power of Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Treitschke knows no higher law than that of the jungle, we reject absolutely. It is a verdict inspired by hatred, animosity and historical short-sightedness, and not by just, humane and historical understanding. All three of these were men of high morality; they were grim enemies of base egotism and were animated by the high ideal to live and die for their country. But this ideal, we are told, was false, exaggerated, inhuman, because its consequences and application in the policy of power are inhuman. It was *not* inhuman, for it emanated from a strict, truthful and courageous conception of life and its moral duties. Everything now depends on understanding this point correctly, for the most serious of the accusations against us revolve about it. The answer which German statesmen and thinkers of modern times are wont to give to the question of the relation between politics and morals, we must make clear and justify.

The laws of morality, charity and of the sacredness of treaties are eternal and inviolable, but the duty of the statesman to look after the present and future welfare and safety of the state and the nation entrusted to his guidance is also sacred and inviolable. What, then, if a conflict between these duties should arise? Or are conflicts between moral duties not possible? Only shallow-minded people, or fanatics estranged from the world, or contemptible hypocrites can deny this possibility. Every true tragedy teaches us the awful fact that our moral life cannot be regulated like clockwork, that the purest striving after good may lead to painful issues and terrible conflicts. In the life of nations conflicts between private morality and the interest of the state are simply unavoidable, and are as old as history itself. Historical experience, as well as our own conscience, teaches us with overwhelming force that the statesman can, in such a case, act only according to the maxim: *Salus populi suprema lex esto.* This was the idea which Bismarck meant to convey in his maxim that "political egotism is the only sane foundation of a great state." The British statesmen, who have created the great British World Empire by force and cunning, may also refer to this principle in justifying their stand. We are very well able, with our historical understanding, to put ourselves in their place and sympathize with the weight of obligations to their people

[1] *Britain's Case Against Germany,* Ramsay Muir, p. 76.

under which they acted. One glance into our historical literature on England, from Ranke's masterpieces to the works of Marcks, Michael, Stählin and others, shows that we are able and willing to write the history of the formation of the British Empire without hate and malice, with calm understanding, even with admiration. We by no means maintain that the British Empire is solely the "result of wholesale robbery," although a good deal of robbery has taken place. But there are bounds to the policy of power and state egotism which must not be overstepped, and where the justification of an unavoidable conflict of duties ceases to hold good.

These bounds consist in this: that a state must not seek to acquire more power than is necessary for its absolute security and the free development of its national energies. It is clear that these bounds do not form a mathematical line, that the judgment of the actors and that of posterity may vary as to whether they are being overstepped in a particular case or not. But there are brutal and obvious transgressions as to which no doubt ought to exist in historical judgment. We take it to be a particularly brutal transgression, for instance, that the English put an end to the liberty of the Boer states, which presented no danger to them, for the sake of acquiring gold fields which were to increase England's vast wealth still more. And the *sacro egoismo* of the Italians became blasphemy at that moment when, without urgent cause, they fell upon their allies, in order to rob and strangle them. Bismarck's history may be searched in vain for similar outrages of the policy of power. He wanted to put an end to the unbearable misery of the *Bundestag* under which Prussia and Germany were suffering, and to found a strong national state secure in its existence—no more and no less. There can be no goal more sacred and just for a great and cultured nation to strive for. If hypocrites abroad reproach him for having relentlessly used force and cunning to attain this goal, we demand of them to investigate with equal severity the actions of the liberal statesman Cavour, who had to accomplish the same task for his people. It will be found that Cavour was just as high-handed and cunning, and in some measures even more relentless and revolutionary than Bismarck. After his object was achieved, Bismarck declared Germany to be "satiated," and warned himself and his successors against every "abuse of the acquired power." He warned especially against the ways "in which the first and second French Empires, in a continuous policy of war and prestige-seeking, had brought about their own

downfall."[1] He differentiated most carefully between a sound policy of interest and an aggressive policy of prestige, and this differentiation we Germans have thoroughly assimilated. *Machtpolitik,* in the German sense, has nothing in common with a policy of prestige, lusting for war. It wishes to be sensible and measured in its aims, but if it cannot be done otherwise, will strive for these aims with all possible energy, and will stake the full strength of the nation on their accomplishment.

One of these aims for which we are now fighting, Bismarck bequeathed to us. It is of a thoroughly defensive nature. It is the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as an independent Great Power. For this aim, as he says, in his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen,* a German statesman may, if need be, draw the sword with a quiet conscience. We have acted accordingly, and so would any other state have acted in our place. It is one of the worst perversions of the truth of which our adversaries are guilty, to have misrepresented Austria's self-defense, when she was in bitter extremity, against the subterraneous intrigues of Pan-Slavism and of the Greater-Serbia agitators, as a war of wanton aggression against a small nation. This small nation was in truth as dangerous to Austria as a submarine is to a battleship—and Russia hastened to its aid, not to protect a small nation, but to cut her way to Constantinople with the sword. Whoever cannot appreciate the position of relentless and pressing extremity in which Austria and Germany were placed, is unable to judge historical events objectively and scientifically.

The contention will be maintained abroad that Serbia and Russia had natural and justifiable interests to defend. Although we are of the opinion that they violently exaggerated these interests and overstepped the bounds of a sound policy of power, we at once admit that this question is open to discussion and that a Russian or Serbian may judge of it differently than we do. We could also imagine that a disinterested foreigner might be of the opinion that this was an unavoidable collision arising from the depths of the imperative national state-interests of the two parties concerned. Similar judgments have already been passed on many of the great wars in history, but even in such a case the question must always be asked whether a greater desire for expansion did not exist on the one side than on the other. We do not doubt that the judgment of posterity will be that Russia and Serbia wished to weaken, if not to ruin, Austria; and that Austria and Germany were *forced* to defend themselves.

Perhaps future ages will say that the collision between Ger-

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen,* Chap. 26.

many and England was also absolutely unavoidable, because on both sides ambitions were fostered which could be decided only by the sword. Treitschke believed in a future settlement of accounts between England and Germany, not because he wished to replace the British world-empire with a German world-empire, but because he foresaw that England would oppose her superior power to Germany's just and moderate claims.[1] He was quite right in his opinion that England, swayed by her instincts of world monarchy would not like to see any Power rise, even if it represented no more than a potential danger to her at some future time. Had France and not Germany been victorious in 1870-71, France would have become, or rather have remained, England's arch-enemy.

As early as 1877 Salisbury declared Germany to be England's most dangerous future enemy,[2] and a whole school of English publicists have endeavored since the nineties to plant this idea in the heart of the British people. We mention Boulger, who has now with triumphant satisfaction collected his anti-German articles written since 1898 in the book entitled *England's Arch-Enemy*. We refer the reader to the statements of the English jingoes and militarists which the honest pacifist Norman Angell presents in an instructive chapter of his book, *Prussianism and Its Destruction* (Chapter III, *The Prussian Within Our Midst*). We recall Professor Cramb's lectures on Germany and England, delivered in 1913, in which he seeks, not without ingenuity, and at the same time with determined energy, to prepare the British people for the struggle against Germany. More bluntly than he, Emil Reich states in his book, *Germany's Swelled Head,* first published in 1907, that the antagonism between Germany and England was of exactly the same kind as that between Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage and England and France in former times. "The Germans," he says, "are bound to strive for more expansion, for imperialism. They are *simply bound to do so.*" From that he draws the conclusion: "If Germany wants to attack England, *England ought to attack her long before.*" He openly and unhesitatingly advocated the most ruthless preventive war against Germany.

What else has the much-reviled Bernhardi done than to maintain the right of the statesman, "under certain circumstances to begin at an opportune moment a war which is deemed neces-

[1] "The unreasonableness which lies in every attempt at world dominion finds its revenge in the fact that the imperishable idea of nationality is manifested in the various states with a certain degree of one-sidedness" (Treitschke, *Politik*, Vol. II, p. 527).

[2] *England's Arch-Enemy*, D. C. Boulger, London, 1914, p. 10.

sary"? It does not meet with our approval that the general has laid down this doctrine. If it is embodied in the political catechism of a government and of a nation, it can easily lead to a weakening of the feeling of serious moral responsibility and to a frivolous breach of peace. Of course situations may arise in which the danger of war is so indubitable and manifest that one may feel forced to strike the first blow so as not to be overpowered. But whoever advocates preventive war in theory, induces in practice an abuse of the *ultima ratio*. The case is similar to that of the right of revolution. When the French National Assembly of 1789 included the right of *résistance à l'oppression* in the general and civil rights of man, the great Irishman, Burke, proved with overwhelming arguments that it thereby destroyed the innermost foundation of political life. And yet he recognized at the same time that chaotic upheavals and elemental hurricanes might occur in the life of a state, when it was imperative to do what the welfare of the whole state, and not what formal right, demanded.

Bismarck flatly repudiated the doctrine of a preventive war, and our present Imperial Chancellor has emphatically expressed the same opinion. The aim of our policy with respect to England was to avoid war with her, if this could possibly be done with honor. Why should the Anglo-German antagonism not have subsided in time, in the same way as the Anglo-Russian antagonism, which twenty to thirty years ago often hovered on the verge of war and yet invariably calmed down again? Negotiations were being carried on between us and England shortly before the war, concerning an adjustment of our trans-maritime spheres of interest, which were near a settlement entirely satisfactory to us, and which awoke in us the pleasant hope that England no longer intended to suppress with brutal force the natural and legitimate growth of our industries, our commerce, our colonial requirements and our fleet. The wish of our government was also the wish of our people. This fact, indeed, is now recognized here and there in England:

"Such is the German national ambition—to become a world-power, by peaceful methods, if possible, but to become a world-power! That the bulk of the German people prefers peaceful methods is the most obvious truism ever stated."[1]

But—so this author continues—it is not the masses who decide, but the militarists, whose exponent is General von Bernhardi. This opinion is refuted by the history of events leading

[1] *The Nations of the War.* Ed. by L. G. Redmond-Howard. London, 1914. Vol. III, "Germany and the German People," p. 107 ff.

up to the war and by the unanimous instinctive conviction of the whole nation that this war has been forced upon us, that it is a defensive war in the highest sense. Only with such a conviction was it possible for our pacifist Social Democrats to rally round the colors to a man. We do not deny that it is part of our policy of power to carry on with the greatest energy possible a war that has been forced upon us. Ought we to have waited patiently till the English and French entered Belgium, took possession of our unprotected Rhenish provinces and our arms factories in Westphalia, and attacked our main armies in the flank? We were firmly convinced, and we have been confirmed in that conviction by the documents found later, that this danger actually threatened us.

It is mere pharisaism to reproach us for our march into Belgium. One needs only to put one's self in our place in order fully to realize what adversaries were about to attack us, what terrible dangers were menacing our very existence and our future; it will be easy to understand that we preferred to violate a European treaty which, as was discovered later on, had already been violated by the Belgian government and by England and France. It is vile calumny to ascribe to us the brutal maxim that Might is Right. If we fostered it and lived up to it, we should act not only brutally, but also foolishly and short-sightedly, for without respect for the sacredness of treaties no nation can prosper.[1] But there is also a sacred right of self-defense, in the execution of which that unavoidable conflict of duties arises when one must act according to the principle of *salus populi suprema lex.*

That is the spirit of German policy of power and of our conception of it. We do not think nor act more harshly or more arbitrarily than others—but we do think more straightforwardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a difference between our way of thinking and theirs which should long since have been apparent to any student of the historical and political literature of Germany and of other countries. It was Ranke who taught us to honor truth and to regard states as living personalities, animated by vital impulses and desire for power; they are all proud, covetous of honor, and egotistical, but no one of them is like the other. They are individualities, each resting on "special principles of existence," which develop in the course of centuries, as the result of all the political and cultural,

[1] "A state which would on principle hold loyalty and faith in contempt would be constantly menaced by enemies and would, therefore, not be able to attain its object of becoming a physical power" (H. von Treitschke, *Politik*, II, p. 544).

material and intellectual forces and characteristics of the particular nation. It is unavoidable, he teaches us furthermore, that these individualities of exuberant strength should, when they move and stretch, come into conflict with each other, now in peaceful competition, now in trials of strength by war. That is the judgment of historical realism which accepts the policies of states as they are, not as they might be according to humanitarian ideals. This truth-loving, sober realism of ours has often been taken much amiss in other countries; the Englishman especially, who is accustomed to hide his ruthless policy of power behind the deceptive mask of humanitarian ideals, is indignant when we show him the true face of things. The British do not direct their attacks against Ranke, but against Treitschke; they overlook the fact that Treitschke expressed only with more passion and pathos what Ranke had previously said. Ranke added another thought that has perhaps borne more fruit on German soil than on that of other countries. He taught us to comprehend the meaning and logic of a great *Machtpolitik*. He said:

"The history of the world is not that chaotic working at cross-purposes, pell-mell strife and haphazard succession of nations which it seems to be at first sight. . . . What we see in process of development are forces, spiritual, life-giving, creative forces, individual lives themselves, moral units of energy. . . . They blossom forth, fill the world, manifest themselves in the most multifarious forms, war with one another, restrict and overpower one another. In their mutual influence upon each other, in their sequence, in their existence, their disappearance, in their resuscitation to a continually increasing potency, higher significance and greater extent, lies the secret of the history of the world."

Regarded from this lofty point of view the egotism of states and nations takes on a different significance. It becomes the means for the development of all the latent forces in mankind. The history of the world is the development of state individualities, and the *moral* energies inherent in them decide whether they flourish or perish. The present war exhibits tremendous moral energies on both sides. On both sides one ought to regard this spectacle of utmost exertion of power from that high viewpoint, which, setting aside hatred and animosity, strives to understand the value and result of this universal energy. This energy gives us the assurance that none of the adversaries will entirely crush the other, and that the wealth of individuality in which the world of to-day abounds will not be diminished. It is the most stupid of all the calumnies directed against us to say that we

intended to found a world-dominion like that of the Romans, and to force our *Kultur* on the conquered nations. Our historical convictions and our cultural ideals are based on the conception of a multifarious co-existence of free, strong states, nations and systems of *Kultur*. We fully agree with that sentence in the declaration of the French universities which runs as follows: "The French Universities continue to believe that civilization is not the work of one single people, but of all the peoples, that the intellectual and moral riches of mankind are created by the natural variety and the necessary independence of the qualities and gifts of all the nations." Not the French mind, but the German mind, has been the first to grasp this great truth. It originated in the days of Herder, Fichte and the German Romanticists. "Only as each nation," says Fichte, addressing the German nation, "when left to itself develops and moulds itself according to its individual traits, does the deity appear in the national mirror."

Into this mirror we of to-day look with the same faith and the same emotion as the Germans of a hundred years ago. The great artists and poets of other countries know quite well that nowhere outside their native countries are they received more joyously and more gratefully than in Germany, and that especially the *Kultur* of the smaller nations, whose suppression we are said to plan, excites our deep interest, as our reception of the works of Ibsen and Maeterlinck, not to mention others, amply proves. We have occasionally gone even somewhat too far in our preference for foreign literature, and this has now and again caused a reaction of national sentiment which has not always expressed itself with great taste. Every great people nowadays has its nationalistic extravagances; arrogant and exclusive admiration of their own *Kultur* is not wanting either in England or in France. Every nation possesses the natural and justifiable wish to assert the worth and the ideals of its own *Kultur* and to diffuse them in the world, because only free competition and the influence of all varieties of national *Kultur* upon one another can produce that all-embracing feeling for world and humanity, which must lie like gossamer over the atmosphere of our struggles.

We want to receive and give at the same time; we also want to think and act at the same time, and enrich the one process by the other, without violating any one's right of property. *Kultur* is certainly a servant of the state, and the state is a servant of *Kultur,* but both *Kultur* and the state have also an inner life of their own, which is not absorbed by the service of the other. We do not think for a moment of selling our independent cul-

tural needs and the inner freedom of our mind to the state, when we freely devote our service to it. Our ideals embrace both personal liberty and devotion to the whole. This combination is one which our enemies cannot and will not understand. And yet, only he who really endeavors to understand it can form a just opinion of what is called our "militarism," almost the worst charge raised against us.

The historical origin of our army is far too little known in other countries. It is a far too one-sided view to trace it back to the old Prussian army of Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, with its iron discipline and the aristocratic *esprit de corps* of its officers. The character of the Prussian army was greatly changed during the period of reform after 1807 by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen, the disciples of German idealism and Kantian ethics. They made laws that breathed the spirit of respect for human dignity, and which were to make service in the army a moral duty for all and an act of the highest patriotism. They introduced compulsory military service in order to make Prussia—at that time the smallest and most exposed of all the Great Powers—strong by means of the spirit and the utmost exertion of all the moral energies of the nation. This idea has retained its full vigor and vitality up to the present hour. "Kant was quite right," a soldier wrote us from the front; "and in every private of our glorious popular army there is, unconsciously to himself, a good deal of Kantian ethics to be found." Since these ethics, which have emanated from our intellectual *Kultur,* have become an inner link in our national army, our militarism has become part and parcel of our *Kultur.*

It is comprehensible that this spirit of devoted national idealism and personal enthusiasm of the individual stands out more clearly, more brilliantly, more splendidly in time of war than in time of peace. The barracks and drill grounds in time of peace give but a one-sided picture of our army. This schooling in peace is severe, monotonous and dry, nor can it be otherwise because its purpose is to bring discipline and technical training to the highest degree of perfection. It is also harsh at times, and it were better if many a word used on the barrack-ground had been left unsaid. Cases of maltreatment occur which we deplore. They are perhaps just as frequent in other armies, but the foreign press, inspired by information from England and France, has for years been in the habit of exaggerating every case of maltreatment that occurs in our country, and of systematically depicting our army system as contemptible. We are working hard in our country to put a stop to such isolated cases

of maltreatment, and our most intelligent officers have the matter at heart. When General von Moltke recently read the letter of a Greek physician, in which the latter referred to cases of maltreatment in the German army in time of peace, he wrote: "Unfortunately it is not to be denied that deplorable excesses committed by some brutal individuals have occurred. I hope it will be one of the salutary consequences of the war that the Germans will have learnt to respect the human being in every one whether equal or subordinate, and that such deplorable acts will entirely disappear from the army."

The tendency of modern development will undoubtedly do away with this remnant of past ages. There is no better testimony of the spirit that animates our army, even in time of peace, than the love for and pride in his old regiment which lives in every soldier who has served. He cherishes the memory of it during his whole life. A vast number of veterans' societies, in which the former soldiers meet on a friendly social footing, are scattered throughout Germany. If a regiment which is garrisoned in a small town celebrates a jubilee, it is a popular festival for all the inhabitants as well.

The popular nature of our army is by no means inconsistent with the peculiar *esprit de corps* of our officers. Some harsh traits may cling to the latter body which might be dispensed with as a remnant of by-gone times, but in its inmost nature it is sound and indispensable. It provides the army with leaders of uniform moral views, strict integrity, unselfish devotion to king and country, and a chivalrous conception of life. It is one of those corporate counterpoises to the too great individualisation and "atomisation" of modern *Kultur*. It is desirable and necessary, not only in the army, and has often had to be created elsewhere, with great difficulty, by the coöperative association of men belonging to the same profession. In the army it is the immediate result of natural and vital development. The strict line of demarcation between officers and men is adhered to for reasons of military expediency, not of arrogance. It is the mildest of the conceivable and possible means of maintaining the discipline and subordination absolutely necessary in an army. In armies where such a line of demarcation is wanting, punishments are more frequent and more severe than with us. Our soldier knows that it separates him from his superior only outwardly, not inwardly. On the battlefield and in the trenches *one* spirit of devotion, of mutual hearty confidence, and of heroism, animates leader and soldier in peril and death. Any one who has seen the relations between officers and men at the front will cease to regard our

militarism as a mechanical drill of obedient menials. He will find warm human feeling, human faith, and human greatness at every step.

Foreigners will perhaps reply to this: What you describe as the spirit of your militarism is the expression of certain national peculiarities, not all of which are congenial to us, but which we must not begrudge you, as you will not part with them. But your militarism has become an international danger because it has encroached on civil life, because it has militarized all your people outwardly and inwardly to such a degree that they must seek an outlet in foreign conquest. This view is that of enemies who realize they have to deal with a dangerous and strong adversary, who is not to be beaten by a levy of troops from all parts of the world. But were we not obliged to be prepared for such a levy, since England had begun to regard with hostile envy our growing economic prosperity and our fleet created for the protection of this prosperity? Were we not in former times always in an unusually dangerous and cramped position between the great military Powers, France and Russia?[1] Can we forget what we have suffered through our former defenselessness since the days of the Thirty Years' War? It is nothing else but stern necessity that forces us to develop a maximum of military power. It is the only safe guarantee of our independence.

Why is the accusation not directed against France, who exacts still more from her population than we, who was the first to begin and to cause the competition in armaments between the great European states by the increase of her army in 1886, and who has always kept it alive by her policy of revenge? Why is not Russia, who has created a vast army for the purposes of her notorious thirst for conquest, also accused? And why is England forgotten, England that has developed the most extreme form of militarism at sea, and who has, against the wish of *all* other nations, successfully stood for the maintenance of its most inhuman theory, viz., the right of capture at sea? Compared to the right of capture at sea, all the little harshnesses of Prussian militarism are insignificant. England is now reaping what she has sown. Our submarines, sinking her merchant vessels, are forced to act on the principle: *A corsaire, corsaire et demi.*

We have a right to be deeply embittered by the malevolent calumnies of our adversaries, but we will not close this chapter,

[1] This fact is now recognized by impartial foreigners. The former Dutch Prime Minister, Van Houten, says: "Germany has until the present day been the victim of French militarism in that until 1870 France's efforts were always directed with success at preventing Germany from attaining complete development of power through unity. France was always supported in these efforts by Russia" (*Das Grössere Deutschland*, Dresden, February, 1915).

which is to assist neutral nations to understand our motives and opinions, with words of hatred and bitterness. Great civilized nations that are at war with each other, dishonor themselves if they regard their adversaries solely with the eye of hate, and do infinite harm to mankind if they seek to cut off the roots of freedom and independence. There is great difference in the aims which we pursue in the war and those of our adversaries. We do not for a moment think of dictating in future to our French, English, and Russian adversaries the extent of the armaments which they consider necessary for the maintenance of their honor and independence. Our own bitter experience in the days of Napoleon I has taught us what such an encroachment upon the autonomy of a Great Power means. It is the worst attack imaginable against national liberty. And yet our adversaries, who insist on liberty with such fervor, revel in the idea not only of depriving us of our colonies and our border-territories, but also of rendering us permanently impotent from a military point of view, just as the Philistines rendered Samson powerless.

Such extravagant desires emanate from a spirit of policy of power, with which we have nothing in common. The expedient of rendering the adversary permanently defenseless originated in the armory of the world-monarchy. The Romans and Napoleon I made use of it. But the trend of modern European history, which is directly opposed to that of ancient history, does not lead to a world-monarchy, but to the full, rich life of strong nations which do not brook any attempt at world domination. Absolute sovereignty at sea is also a species of world domination which cannot be tolerated and must collapse sooner or later. England is fighting against the spirit of modern development when she attempts to uphold by force her claim to be sole mistress of the seas. The position of England as a World Power and as a civilized nation, which we honor and recognize, will not suffer if the principle of the balance of power, which she has hitherto sought to confine to Europe, is extended to the ocean and to the whole world. Then only will every nation have the breathing space it requires. The day will come when Germany's decision to take up the defensive war against England and to fight for the freedom of the seas will be acclaimed by all.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

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TO speak of the war and international law involves three questions: What has been the aim of international law in this war? How far has it stood the test? What is going to become of it? Its past, its present, its future—this we shall deal with briefly from the German point of view.[1]

International law, especially the law of war, which concerns us here, is the fruit of centuries of labor. Particularly during the last decade has its development been pronounced and promising. All civilized nations, Germany as well as her present opponents, have helped to build it up. Czar Nicholas II, in his peace manifesto, suggested the First Hague Peace Conference, and the terms "Declaration of Paris" and "Declaration of London" preserve and honor the memory of the services rendered by France and England. We were proud of what had been accomplished. Statesmen and scholars spoke of international law as of one of the highest achievements of modern civilization; we felt justified in regarding as a blessing to mankind the fact that the mutual relations of states were no longer to be determined by the arbitrary dictates of force, but by fixed rights and duties. We found, therefore, in the attitude of an individual state towards international law, in the manner in which it respected and observed the law's commands, an important criterion of its civilization, of its worth as a civilized state. Indeed, we only regarded that state as civilized which adapted itself to the rules of international law.

Herewith is by no means implied, however, that this is the final and most important standard by which to judge the conduct of a state in its relation to the outside world. Legal precepts are not the highest laws governing human life; they establish merely a minimum of obligations, and within the limit thus drawn, other forces, above all moral forces, should be active. Just as an individual in his private life may keep within the

[1] The following essay was finished early in March, 1915, and makes use of such facts only as had by that time become known. The fundamental view has remained unchanged.

bounds of the law and may yet act basely and contemptibly, so likewise may the state. In the life of states, too, there are moral obligations, obligations of honor and decency. To be lacking in gratitude, to break faith, even where no written alliance exists, to desert a friend in the hour of need or to betray him, to attack the defenseless in a treacherous manner, to sacrifice high possessions of mankind to petty personal gains: all this may not be a violation of international law, but it is much worse—it brands the state before the highest tribunal, the tribunal of moral conscience. The view is sometimes encountered, it is true, and it is not a novel one, that for the state there are no moral obligations; that besides the legal tenets, a state is bound only by the law which its own advantage prescribes; indeed, the opposite view is almost scornfully derided as being out of touch with the world of reality. This standpoint is justified only if the binding force of moral norms is denied also for the individual; but if it is recognized for the individual, the logical conclusion is inevitable that moral norms exist equally for the state. We need not decide here whether, and to what extent, the moral laws governing a state differ from those which concern the individual. The reproach of being out of touch with the world applies, in reality, to this negative doctrine. It is blind to the palpable existence of a public conscience. One example is sufficient. The question whether or not a state may go to war is not a question of international law. A state does not act against international law by going to war, even without the shadow of a reason, unless bound by special treaties not to do so. Yet perhaps nothing at the outbreak of a war occupies public opinion so much as the question which state is responsible for the war. This question lies exclusively in the sphere of morals; it is asked whether a state was morally justified in declaring war, or whether its motives were base and reprehensible. How heavily the weight of this moral judgment is felt is proved in every war by the fact that each party to the conflict does his utmost to prove his own innocence and the enemy's guilt; it is moral condemnation which the state shuns, even though it may not have violated any tenet of law.

A state, therefore, has by no means reached the highest point when it can say only that it is observing the provisions of international law. Yet even this we used to look upon as something of an achievement. We thought our possession in international law important, and we hoped to attain much through its medium—it was to contribute towards the realization of

high ideals of humanity. But finer distinctions must be made at this point.

Everywhere in international law it is a question only of the duties and rights of states in their relations to each other. These duties and rights are of twofold origin. On the one hand, they are laid down in abstract legal rules, based on the development of legal custom and treaties. Even though only a number of states—not all of them—may have taken part in the creation of these rules, they may yet be termed "general international law," for they arise from general considerations, applying equally to all individual states, and should, therefore, be universally binding. Or else the rights and duties of states rest on a special regulation of interests by treaty between certain states. These two kinds of law are of unequal value. The special regulation is the result of a concrete situation relative to the power and interests of these particular states; the obligations into which the individual state enters in this relation are to the interest of the other state only, and not to the interest of all states in general. Hence such treaty agreements may change, they may cease, new ones may originate, without affecting the interests of the world or universal law. Only those stipulations are within the range of general law, which refer, in the first place, to the genesis of such agreements—that is to say, to the prerequisites of their validity; in the second, to their binding force as long as they hold good; and finally, to the manner in which they may terminate.

The general provisions of international law, however, with which alone we are here concerned, do not aim to serve the particular interest of individual states. They serve higher purposes, viz., the interests of all states, and therefore the interests of all mankind. The state is the legal form in which a nation seeks to realize its ideals of life, it is not an end in itself but a means to this end. The individual state, however, is not alone in the world, there are others beside it. And the ideals which every individual state has to realize, harmonize fortunately to a great extent with those of other states: there are common state interests, on the one hand, and there are interests of mankind, on the other. To serve these is the aim and purpose of general international law.

This international law is based primarily on the fundamental idea of "equality": the individual states, without regard to their size, their position and their resources, are supposed to be equal before international law, to enjoy equal rights. International law thus aims to be a protection for the weaker states; might is not to be greater than right. On this basis, international law

aims at assisting the states in peace time to attain peaceful ends common to them all, which, however, the individual state acting for itself could not attain at all, or only imperfectly. International law furnishes the rules governing the collaboration of the several states for the purpose of attaining these ends, it creates in this respect a "union of interests" (*Zweckverband*) of states.

On war, too, international law strives to exert a regulating influence, though war in itself would seem to break all legal rules. Everlasting peace was not to be hoped for. This dream of noble minds was bound to be shattered by stern reality. The task of international law was, as far as possible, to prevent war, but if it should break out, to humanize it. The object of every war is the overthrow of the adversary; but without prejudice to this object, it can still be restricted in the interest of humanity. The laws of war are throughout a compromise between what is necessary for attaining the object of the war and what humanity demands.

The first aim is to prevent an unnecessary extension of the war beyond the circle of the Powers directly engaged in it. Accordingly, rules concerning the rights and duties of neutrals have been laid down. Similarly, the so-called Congo Act was conceived as a means of excluding a large part of the African colonial possessions of the belligerent states from the theater of war, since it could not fail to be evident to every state that to carry war into the colonies would be detrimental to the common interest of the dominant white race, without in any way affecting the issue of the war. The limitation imposed by the Congo Act would have benefited all European states alike. Germany was ready to adhere to it; but England, disregarding the obligation she had entered into, precipitated hostilities in Africa.

Furthermore, international law aims at limiting the war in regard to the persons engaged. It is the supreme idea of the laws of war that the conflict should be waged solely between the states, through their armies and navies, not by and against individual citizens. Two principles result from this. One is, that individual citizens may not fight against the hostile state unless they belong to the army or navy. A state which tolerates or even encourages the mischief of the "hedge war" (*franctireur* war) grossly offends against this fundamental principle of international law, and necessarily brings immeasurable harm down upon the population. No one can have any doubt whatever that the participation of private individuals in hostilities against a

modern army is without influence on the outcome of the war. The losses that can be inflicted on the enemy are too small to be of consequence, considering the huge size of modern armies; but their inevitable result is that they call forth frightful retribution. For the resulting sufferings and horrors no one can be held legally responsible save the state that tolerates or encourages the participation of its citizens.

The second conclusion is that the state may wage war only against the foreign state itself—that is to say, against the army and navy, not against peaceful individuals. Through the labor of centuries this principle has ripened more and more into the noblest fruit of international law. It has already been realized by the regulations relative to war on land, which provide that life, freedom, honor and property of non-participant citizens must be unconditionally protected, as far as military exigencies permit; plundering is forbidden, and the individual must be indemnified for what is taken from him for military purposes. We were justified in praising this principle as one of the noblest victories of humane sentiment. In naval warfare, it is true, the inviolability of private property, even if it is not to serve for military purposes, has not yet been recognized. At the Hague Conference, Germany, with other great states, declared her readiness to recognize this principle; owing to England's opposition, it came to naught; and thus to the present day right of capture at sea is tolerated by international law. It is the last remnant of a barbarous viewpoint which we had hoped to be able to abolish in a not too-distant future.

On war as it is carried on between the armies and navies international law has sought to impose restrictions. The object of war can be attained even if the cruelties formerly practised are avoided. Proceeding from this idea, the Geneva Convention was concluded, which purposed to ease the lot of the wounded and sick of the armies in the field; this was extended to include naval warfare. Regulations were drawn up for the treatment of prisoners of war which were prompted by the clear and humane consideration that war captivity is not penal custody; the prisoner in serving his state has only done his duty, he has done what the enemy state expects its own citizens to do. The ends of war are sufficiently served if, by being kept in custody, the prisoner is prevented from aiding his country; more than this is not called for.

Finally, international law has endeavored, by a number of separate provisions, to restrict the means of warfare. There are warlike actions which are doubtless injurious to the enemy,

but the advantages of which are out of all proportion to their cruelty; they are therefore forbidden. Included in this category is the prohibition of using bullets which cause unnecessarily cruel wounds (the so-called dum-dum bullets).

This is the substance of the ideas of international law, roughly sketched and considered more with regard to broad outlines than to detailed provisions, which are as yet imperfect and but slowly developing. If merely that which has so far been built up as international law were really observed, war would still be terrible enough; nevertheless, without prejudice to the political purposes involved, it would be more humane, and an infinite amount of suffering would be prevented which has no influence on the issue of the war.

Naturally, however, there was no overlooking the fact that the realization of this hope was uncertain. International law of all existing law is the weakest. Its weakness, to begin with, lies in the nature of its origin. The substance of international law as above described is only slowly developing and growing, the elaboration in detail of the principles is often uncertain and controversial; only in parts has the law as yet assumed definite form. This will be discussed more fully later on. Secondly, its weakness lies in the means of its realization. International law purports to regulate the relations of independent, sovereign states. There is no organized power to enforce its observance, there can be none. Even if an impartial court existed, competent to decide what is right or wrong in a dispute touching international law, and even if the individual states had pledged themselves to appear before this court and to submit to its verdict, there would yet be no means of compelling them to do so. If a belligerent state does not keep within the bounds of international law, if it infringes the law, the injured state has no other means of coercion than such as it can itself enforce. This is what is called reprisals: in international law the principle is unchallenged that a breach of the law may be returned by a breach of the law, that wrong may be answered by wrong. On this point, too, we shall have more to say later on. Nowhere else in the legal sphere does this principle exist. It is explained by the fact that there is no coercion possible against a state.

There are people, not only in Germany, but also abroad, who from this have drawn the conclusion that international law is no true law. This is a mistake. More and more modern science recognizes that compulsion by a superior power is no inherent characteristic of a legal precept. Here is not the place to enlarge on this; it may even be regarded as superfluous, for after

all the question is merely theoretical. In reality no one denies that international law—whether it be true law, or whether it be unworthy of the name—has nevertheless binding force. And because we admit this binding force, we feel in conscience and honor bound to respect it. At the same time adherence to its precepts is a demand of practical wisdom, provided a state is not thinking merely of the advantage of the moment, but is pursuing a far-sighted policy looking towards the future. International law does not aim at the advantage of an individual state, but at that of all states; what it gives to one, it also gives to the other; what it takes from a state in limiting its free scope, it returns in the form of increased protection. The more keenly the moral duty of observing this legal order is felt and the more clearly its benefits are realized, the more secure is international law as a living force.

This, however, implies at the same time a restriction of the validity of international law. Though it is a moral duty to observe international law, that duty may yet cease to exist: all law of nations breaks down in the case of necessity, a necessity from which there is no escape within the bounds of the law. International law is not an end in itself, its aim is to coordinate the existence of the states. The moment the very life of a state is threatened and its existence cannot be saved except by a breach of the law, the inhibitions of the law cease. To adhere to the law in the greatest of danger and not to seize upon the last means of salvation because of an obstruction of international law, would be to commit suicide. The law cannot demand suicide. The question becomes a purely moral one, transcending all legal points of view. No state has ever regarded and treated, or will ever regard and treat, the matter otherwise. This refers in particular, but by no means alone, to treaty obligations which one state has entered into with other states. Such was the position of Germany in relation to Belgium at the outbreak of the war. As is well known, Germany undertook scrupulously to respect the integrity of Belgium, as well as of the French territory on the Continent, and to spare the north coast of France, provided England would undertake to remain neutral. Not only did England reject this proposal, but Sir Edward Grey, in reply to the urgent request of the German ambassador, as to whether he could not give the terms on which England would remain neutral, replied he must definitely decline to make any promise of neutrality, England must keep her hands free. From this moment Germany could no longer doubt that, besides Russia and France, she would have to face

England in the impending war. Thus arose the emergency in which deliverance could be found only in the violation of Belgium's neutrality. The action of Germany, who only demanded free passage through Belgium, was therefore justified, even if we leave out of consideration the fact that Belgium herself had already renounced her privilege as a neutral by grossly violating the duties of her position as such. Concerning this, however, it is unnecessary to say more. The matter is cited only by way of example, not for excuse or apology.

In admitting the plea of necessity, it is true, great care must be exercised. A case of necessity can be pleaded only when the state has really no other means of helping itself than by the breach. If there are other means at hand, a plea of necessity cannot be put forward. That is obvious, and it is equally obvious that needless cruelties, needless fury, needless destruction can never be justified by necessity. Necessity is an excuse only for an action which is required in order to save oneself from danger; the action must be *necessary* for the purpose of self-preservation.

This effect of necessity is not peculiar to international law; it exists in all law. It exists in civil law, as well as in criminal law, it exists even in the law that regulates the constitutional life of a nation—it expresses the limitation of validity inherent in all law. But it is of particular importance in international law. In the clash of interests in private life there is still the state, standing above the individual. Its duty is to watch over the general interest; it can therefore, in the case of necessity, weigh the conflicting interests and, having weighed them, deny the individual the right of necessity in certain circumstances, just as it can demand the life of the individual—e. g., the life of the soldier in war—realizing that life is not the highest of possessions. But with states it is otherwise. Whether in this case the supreme and most important interests of the state are at stake, whether therefore the state is justified in breaking the law—this the state concerned must decide for itself, since there is no superior court, no superior power. Here the law of necessity fully asserts itself with all its primitive force. The well-known "clause of honor" of the arbitration treaties (under which all disputes involving the vital interests, the honor or the independence of the state are excepted from arbitration) rests on the same idea, which is the source of the law of necessity.

Such discussions border on the ultimate problems of thought. The validity of international law, in the last resort, is rooted in

values of a higher order, whence it derives its strength and, at the same time, its limitation.

Despite all these restrictions, despite the uncertainty of its sources, despite the weakness of its realization, international law has yet one advantage over all other law. It takes precedence of all laws on account of its immense and unique range, addressing, as it does, all states, that is to say the whole of mankind, and striving to reconcile the most stupendous conflicts of interests. Further, it is entitled to precedence on account of the moral elevation, the pure humaneness of the aims which it pursues.

How often has all this been announced at international congresses! With what enthusiasm has it been acclaimed! Particularly in Germany the appreciation of the value of international law was steadily growing, as was only natural in view of the German character, which is fond of cultivating international relations. Just as the Germans endeavor to appropriate the masterpieces of all literatures by translations, just as they have a liking for the study of foreign languages, and as they are perhaps the most travelled of all the peoples of the world, so they have always, often beyond the immediate need, expounded the idea that above the individual states there is a higher community, a community of civilization. The era of peace maintained by us for more than forty-three years, often with difficulty and at the sacrifice of our pride, has witnessed in Germany an enormous increase in the work of promoting international relations in all spheres of life—economy, sociology, science, art, religion—and in particular of law, in the province of which, as history shows, a large part of the intellectual energy of Germany for centuries has been occupied. The endeavors to consolidate private law, to create a "world law," have been the subject in Germany of theoretical research and practical advancement; the great attempts to find by scientific methods uniform principles of international private law for all nations of the earth, have in the last century emanated chiefly from Germany; and Germany has joyfully assisted in the Hague discussions concerning a consolidation by treaty of this department of law, hand in hand with the other great civilized nations, whose merits we have gladly recognized. Above all, has the law of nations in a growing measure received loving care in Germany, as an almost endless literature on the subject shows.

At each of the numerous universities in the German Empire there are one, or in some cases, several chairs of international law. Again and again, particularly in the last decades, the Fed-

eral governments have insisted that special attention be devoted to the study of international law. Nobody in Germany can be a member of the legal profession or enter the administration of the state without having passed an examination in this subject. And not only with statesmen and scholars has international law found this consideration, but even in the minds of the people at large the consciousness of its value has increased. It is only natural that the masses are not so keenly interested in this branch as in other parts of the law. The greatest and most immediate interest is always claimed by relations of private law, which daily obtrude themselves on the attention; interest is further aroused by penal law in the repression of crime, and by public law through the development of the internal affairs of the state; comparatively seldom does the importance of international law, as affecting the personal relations of individuals, make itself felt in peace time. But unremitting informative work in this regard, too, has gradually awakened and strengthened the recognition by the masses of the importance of international law. This is of the highest value, for law is a live factor only when supported by the consciousness of the whole nation: the activity of statesmen can, in the long run, be only the expression of that which the nation desires.

Such was the condition of international law up to the summer of last year. What a picture do we now behold in the World War! Is it really more than a heap of ruins that we have before us? A disastrous confusion seems to have taken root abroad in the heads of otherwise high-minded men; one is tempted to feel that in certain circles the moral value of international law has not been grasped at all. Breaches of the most established principles of international law have been advocated quite openly in foreign newspapers and speeches. A man like Wells has publicly preached the "*franctireur* war" against Germany in its most appalling form; Clémenceau has demanded a treatment of the wounded Germans in France which would be a violation of all international law. However, words are not deeds. Let us dismiss these overheated outbursts, and look only at the facts. There also a sad picture of devastation is revealed. It is not our task here to enumerate in detail all the offences against the rules of international law committed by our enemies, still less to defend Germany against the charges made against her by the foreign press, and even by foreign governments. There would be nothing gained in doing so, unless complete evidence in support of and against the charges were given,

and that is not possible here; besides, it has already been sufficiently done in other works (see especially *Der Weltkrieg und das Völkerrecht,* by Müller, Berlin, 1915). We shall here try only to find certain leading principles by which matters can be judged, and we shall make use of specific cases only by way of example.

All violations of international law are divisible into two great groups: either a rule of international law is broken by action, or its very validity is denied.

To begin with *actual* infringements of the law, in cases where the validity of the law is nevertheless recognized. The infringement of a legal norm by no means implies in itself a denial of the rule's validity; it proves only that the conception of the binding force of the norm is not strong enough to triumph over the motives that prompt to its infringement. When a thief steals, he thereby breaks the law respecting property, but he does not deny its validity, he breaks it *although* he recognizes its validity.

In judging the significance of actual breaches of international law, a distinction must be made, as to whether they are committed by individuals or whether they emanate from the state itself. By breaches of international law by individuals are to be understood acts contrary to international law which are committed by individual soldiers or subordinate officers, or by officials not in a commanding position. In accepting this definition theoretical hair-splitting must be discarded. For, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a violation of international law by an individual, for the rules make the state, not the individual, directly responsible for legal duties. But the state issues to its soldiers and officials injunctions and prohibitions in accordance with international law, and if the individual disobeys these injunctions and prohibitions, he indirectly acts contrary to international law. Breaches of the law by individuals happen everywhere in private and public life; it is easy to understand that the laws of peace have a better chance of being observed than the laws of war. In war there are many circumstances conducive to infringements of the law. The soldier must act promptly, he is often given no time for thought, the circumstances are frequently obscure, and errors are possible. Adding thereto the power of temptation, the heat of passions unchained by war, and the difficulty of drawing the line between what is justified by the necessity of war and what is contrary to law, one will find it easy to understand why transgressions occur. Nor should too great weight be given to an individual act, considering the

enormous number of men employed in war—up to this time mankind had had no experience whatever of the consequences which arise when armies of millions take the field. All these are reasons which permit of attaching minor importance to breaches of international law by individuals, however deplorable and sometimes even atrocious they may be.

That international law is nevertheless recognized as valid, despite its breach by individuals, is shown especially by the fact that the state to which the perpetrator belongs almost always endeavors to deny the breach of the law. It either denies that the alleged infringement happened at all—as, for instance, disclaiming that the Red Cross was fired upon, that the flag of truce was abused, that houses were plundered, non-participant citizens wounded, ill treated, dragged into prison, or killed—or it is claimed that conditions prevailed which divested the deed of an unlawful character—as, again, that an open town which was fired on had been defended, that a truce bearer who was made prisoner had by espionage forfeited protection. The controversy thus shifts into the sphere of facts. There is no impartial tribunal above the states concerned that could ascertain the truth in strict justice, and passions make bad judges. Our government has gone out of its way to ascertain the truth of accusations against our enemies by taking evidence on oath, with absolute calmness and impartiality, in the same manner as crimes committed within the state are investigated, and the result is bad enough. I refer only to the atrocious deeds perpetrated at Orchies, which have been proved and the proofs of which have been published by our Foreign Office.[1] Nor has our government shirked trouble in investigating alleged breaches of law by Germans, whenever the allegations were not, as they usually were, merely sweeping condemnations, but statements of specific single acts, with date and locality clearly indicated.

Following the legal maxim *"ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat"* (proof is incumbent upon the accuser, not the defendant), Germany might have waited till the other side had

[1] This refers to atrocities committed by French *franctireurs* at Orchies, in the Department du Nord, described in an official war telegram as follows: "In the village twenty Germans who had been wounded in the engagement of the previous day were found mutilated in a ghastly manner. Their ears and noses had been cut off and their mouths and the openings left after the removal of their noses, stuffed with sawdust. They had then been left to die from suffocation." The correctness of the report was confirmed by two French clergymen over their signatures, and as further substantiation there exists a report made to the German Emperor by the chief of the field hospital work, Sergeant-General von Schjerning. A punitive expedition was sent by the German forces to Orchies, which was razed to the ground. The case was presented in a very different light in the allied press, which said that the Germans, without provocation, had destroyed the village in a barbarous manner. This took place in the latter part of September, 1914.

disclosed its proof—the French government has not up till now seen fit to publish proofs of the serious charges brought by it—but the German government in the interest of the good reputation of our army has not rested its case there. Unquestionably on the German side, also, regrettable occurrences have taken place. Despite the severe discipline which has always prevailed in the German army and is traditional with the German soldier, it is impossible that among the millions of Germans in the field there should not be some who commit brutal acts. But what our soldiers have been accused of by the enemy has on closer investigation nearly always been found to be pure invention, and the inquiry on our part has been carried through by means of evidence on oath with every assurance of impartiality. Often enough the depositions of the enemy subjects themselves have shown the alleged facts to be pure fabrication. Sometimes they were creations of a fancy heated by war, an imagination grown hysterical; at other times exaggerations of insignificant little incidents passed from mouth to mouth, and sometimes—unfortunately very frequently—intentional malicious calumnies.

For the rest, not a few of the accusations raised in the press against the German army collapse from the legal point of view. It is quite astonishing with what audacity alleged breaches of international law by the German army are judged by people who have not the least notion of international law. Absolutely unquestioned principles are flatly ignored. I shall give just one example, which is, however, a very weighty one. It is recognized by law that an attack on private persons and private property by the troops is justified when committed after an unlawful attack from the opposing side, and when it is made in self-defense, by way of retribution, as punishment, or when imperatively demanded in the interest of the safety of the military movements. In Belgium, German soldiers have been treacherously fired on by persons not in the army, and other treachery has been perpetrated. Thereupon the houses where this took place were burnt down, the inhabitants killed or removed. This has been done and held lawful by all nations in all previous wars. Likewise, it is not unlawful to kill wounded enemies who shoot at the advancing troops from behind. But to speak of such things is to waste one's breath. Amongst those who are at all familiar with international law, with the ideas laid down by it and with the manner in which it has been handled in previous wars, there can be no dispute concerning all these things. Against bad will no explanation, no proof is of avail.

The breaches of law so far mentioned are *prima facie* acts of individuals only. In this connection the Hague Convention respecting war on land expressly stipulates in article 3 that a state is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. But this responsibility can be taken only to mean that the state is liable for them, and is in particular liable to pay compensation (as the article referred to explicitly lays down) for all such acts. It cannot be construed as meaning that the state itself can be charged with every act committed by the individual. It is simply liability of the state for the fault of a third party, not for any fault of its own. *Quidquid delirant Achivi, plectuntur reges.* The more numerous such acts are, and the higher the position of the perpetrators, the more must they be regarded as evidence of the low level of the general moral and legal standard in the army, or the civil service, and consequently in the whole nation. It is proof of a lack of cultural breeding. And in so far as the state has the duty of attending to the necessary education and instruction of the people —since in this respect the state and the people are inseparable— the reproach of an inferior civilization comes home to the state itself.

But there are cases where the state can be regarded as the guilty party, from a legal point of view, in the event of such acts by individuals. What is meant when we speak of the wrong of the state itself as against the wrong of individuals? Acts committed by the state are only acts committed by individuals. But we consider the state itself guilty, whenever the final decision rests with the persons who conduct the state, the highest leaders of its policies and its army, in short, when its masters in the field and in the office, in their position as such, commit the breach of law. For they are the "organs" of the state, their official action is the action of the state itself. Charges made against them, therefore, affect the state directly. And this charge is a serious one. For the grounds of excuse which in the case of the misdeeds of individuals allow of a milder verdict, fail when the wrong is done by the state itself; we are not faced by deeds committed under the impulse of the moment, but by acts coolly preconceived and planned in cold blood. Therefore, they weigh much heavier than deeds of individuals.

A state can become personally guilty in various ways. First, by itself ordering the breach of the law, either in a specific case or by a general order. The individual soldiers or subordinate officials who act in observance of such command can, in this event, be considered only as tools, while the state itself is

the really guilty one. A great number of such commands issued by our adversaries have come to our knowledge; of many of them, which they would certainly have wished might remain secret, the original documents have fallen into our hands. The order of the Chief in Command of the 10th Russian Army, dated December 5, 1914, may serve as an example:

> "The Commander in Chief has enjoined strict observance of the command of Headquarters that in the attack all able-bodied male inhabitants of the age of ten years and upwards are to be driven in front of the troops!!"

Oftener, indirect responsibility of the organs of the state must be assumed: the more frequent the excesses on the part of individuals, the more they cease to be mere exceptions; the longer the state hesitates to punish them, the more justified is the inference that these transgressions are due to orders from those higher in authority. When a large number of Russians taken prisoners were found in possession of material for setting fire to houses, the inference could not fail to be that instructions had been given from higher quarters. So, too, when during the retreat of the Russian army from the Mazurian district and Bukowina, a number of villages which did not lie in the war zone proper were devastated, and when trains were laden with stolen property. Such a train was found when the Russian army was surrounded in the Mazurian winter battle.

The state is also guilty when it fails to prevent future recurrence of unlawful acts of individuals—soldiers or others—by taking appropriate measures; when, in other words, it tolerates their continuance. Granting that the administration in France, England and Russia were taken by surprise and were therefore powerless against the first outbreaks of the people's passion against Germans abroad, it is certain that when these hideous outrages continued they did not prevent them but let events take their course, standing by with folded arms.

Further, the state makes itself an accomplice if, instead of proceeding against outrages committed, it neglects to punish the offenders according to criminal law. As far as we can judge from Germany, our enemies have been sadly remiss in this respect. In London and in Russia, for instance, members of the mobs which at the outbreak of the war committed the most horrible outrages against the lives and property of Germans, if they were brought to trial at all were nearly always acquitted in court. Wherever breaches of international law abroad were punished, public opinion has been openly opposed to it; as, for

instance, the recent mild sentence passed on a mayor in the east of France, who, although a civilian, had fired at a German aviator. Germany may point with pride to the strict justice meted out by her courts. Misdeeds of individual soldiers in the field against subjects of the enemy state have been punished as unrelentingly as if they had been committed against Germans, and German public opinion entirely approves thereof. The proofs of all this lie open to every one.

Finally, complicity of the state must be recognized when it employs troops which it must have known beforehand would not respect the laws and customs of war existing between civilized nations. Out of every corner of the earth our enemies have brought auxiliary troops to the European seat of war; Germany has had to sacrifice her best blood in fighting semi-savages, according to whose standard of civilization every atrocity in war seems natural. It stands to reason that such troops have no conception of or respect for international law, and that they will behave differently from our popular armies in which the flower of the nation is fighting, and where there is hardly a single man who has not had a regular school training. Yet our enemies dare to assert that we are the barbarians! It would be a laughing matter, if it were not so serious.

Still, in all these cases we have only actual breaches of the law on the part of the state, whereas the rule of the law itself remains recognized, its validity is not disputed. This is made evident by the attempt to dispute the facts alleged as constituting the breach of law. Such attempts, in the absence of an impartial court, may be continued, at least for a certain period, with a chance of success, till the facts speak too loudly. In Longwy, close to the Franco-German frontier, a large supply of "dum-dum" bullets, together with other war material, was found. The fact could not be disputed. France, however, denies that these bullets were intended for use in the war, contending that they were intended for manœuvring purposes only. This excuse shows that the prohibition of the use of "dum-dum" bullets itself is recognized as valid. It is difficult, however, to regard this as more than a subterfuge. That England intended "dum-dum" bullets to be used in the war is proved by the sworn statements of two captured British officers on whom such bullets were found.

In other instances the action of the state is admitted, but at the same time the appearance of right is maintained, by advancing legal pretexts which are quite obviously such, and nothing more. The fact that Germans who happened to be abroad

at the outbreak of war were imprisoned in large numbers and kept in concentration camps was against all international law. In order to cloak this, the pretext that these Germans had carried on espionage was made without any grounds for suspicion. Such cases are particularly revolting when judicial procedure is abused in order to lend a semblance of right to a measure contrary to international law. We had such an experience with the French. German army surgeons were convicted of plundering on the most futile pretexts. Fortunately, a technical error in procedure led to a second hearing, which resulted in the acquittal of the accused. Still, the first verdict remains inexcusable. The shooting of distinguished Germans in Morocco amounts to a judicial murder of the worst kind; it is a stain on the honor of French law courts. No sensible person could doubt the unreliability of the native witnesses for the prosecution.

Finally, many quite obvious breaches of law have taken place without any attempt being made to disguise the facts, while the validity of the legal rule which was broken has not been denied at all. Under this classification fall such deeds as the English destruction of the German auxiliary cruiser *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse,* in neutral waters, the British seizure of the hospital ship *Ophelia,* the theft and destruction of mail bound for, and leaving, Germany. These instances could be multiplied indefinitely, as one breach of the law has followed hard upon the other. But enough. We sought only to give examples.

What is of far greater moment is the fact that in this war many breaches of law have occurred under the plea that the rules offended against had no force in international law—rules whose recognition up to that time had been looked upon as absolutely established. It is not a case of denying the facts, but of denying the binding force of the rule contravened. The dispute is confined to the legal sphere, and is therefore more dangerous. It is a greater threat to the future. For while one may always trust that a particular violation of law will not occur again, the denial of the validity of the legal rule itself amounts to an announcement that a similar course will be taken in the future. The fact that a denial of legal norms on so broad a scale is possible at all is due to the nature of the sources of international law.

For centuries the general law of nations has, in substance, been developed by practical usage without conscious law-making —that is, as unwritten law. In the last decades, especially in

the sphere of the law of war, conscious law-making through international agreements has steadily gained ground. In this connection may be mentioned the numerous agreements of the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the new Geneva Convention of 1906 and the Declaration of London of 1909. The formulation of international law in these conventions has been hailed with great satisfaction and often enthusiastically praised. But it has entailed an evil consequence—an inclination to overestimate the conventions. There is a temptation to consider the convention as the sole source of international law and the conventional law as the only existing international law. Both of these assumptions would be erroneous.

Above all, it must never be forgotten that the embodiment of international law in state treaties is not identical with a codification, such as civil law has undergone in France in the *Code Civil,* and in Germany in the *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.* The state treaties do not comprise the whole sphere of the law of war; some important matters are not even touched upon. And even where a matter is regulated, it is in no way a complete and exclusive codification of the recognized law. On the contrary, in both respects, the unwritten law, unless modified by treaty, continues in force by the side of it. This is stated in clear terms in several of the conventions. The Hague convention with respect to war on land in its preamble explicitly states:

> "It has not, however, been found possible at present to agree in regard to regulations covering all the circumstances which arise in practice. On the other hand, the high contracting parties do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders. Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."

To the same effect, only more briefly and therefore more distinctly, in the convention relative to restrictions with regard to the exercise of the right of capture in naval war, the desire is expressed to frame a certain number of rules, "without affecting

the common law now in force in respect to those matters which that law has left unsettled"; and in the convention concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, it is similarly stated: "seeing that even if it is not possible at present to concert measures applicable to all cases which may in practice occur and which are not covered by the present convention —it is, nevertheless, expedient to take into consideration the general principles of the law of nations."

Therefore, all other international law, i. e., law not laid down in the conventions, continues to coexist along with the conventional law. The first leading principle, therefore, is that *the fact that a rule is not mentioned in the conventions does not permit the conclusion that it is not valid law.* Or, in other words, if specific duties are imposed on a state by a convention, that fact is not proof that such duties are the only ones it must observe. Are we to think, e. g., that a neutral state really satisfies the demands of international law, if it merely complies with the duties mentioned by the two Hague Conventions respecting neutrality? What a paltry thing neutrality would be if its meaning were limited to those few meagre stipulations! The law established by agreement must needs be complemented by the law not so established.

However, to be able to recognize this unestablished law is not always easy. It originates from actual practice, which is the expression on the part of the states of that which they hold to be right. This common opinion of what is right, as evidenced in actual practice, is binding on the individual state, because the latter is a member of the community of states. General international law is common law, rooted in a community of states of equal rank; it is not autonomous law resulting from the sway of a dominant state. Precedents in international law are frequently scarce and contradictory; interpretation may be doubtful, since it happens that the law as established by practice is often in dispute. There may even be points on which actual precedents are altogether lacking. Numberless questions of law which the present war has raised have not been settled either by written sources or by previous practice. In such cases we are faced by a gap in the law; but that does not mean that there is a lawless vacuum. The gap must be filled up, and that causes many new uncertainties and possibilities of dispute.

The preamble referred to in the convention respecting the laws and customs of a war on land states very significantly: "The high contracting parties have not had in mind that unforeseen cases should be left to the arbitrary judgment of the

military commanders." That must be amplified to mean that they are not left at all to the will of the individual states, nor to its legislation. When England now attempts to justify the order of her Admiralty to British merchant vessels to fly neutral flags, on the ground that according to British law such misuse of flags is allowed, nothing at all is proved in reference to the question of international law. England cannot by means of a British statute acquire rights against other states. Rather must the gap be filled in the manner customary in the sphere of law, by analogy, and ultimately by falling back on broad legal ideas—in this case on the ultimate basic principles of international law, as they have gradually taken shape in common opinion. Only from these broad principles can the decision in the individual case be derived.

This, too, has found expression in the preamble referred to in the convention concerning war on land. With a view to supplementing the written law, it refers, first, to the established customs, and in the second instance, when such established custom is lacking, to the "principles of the law of nations, as they result from . . . the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." The expression is perhaps not above criticism, but in substance it amounts to what we have said. For instance, the necessary supplement of stipulations concerning the duties of neutrals must be sought in the essential meaning of neutrality itself. To be neutral means to remain impartial, not to favor any of the belligerents. The neutral state is, therefore, in duty bound, in eventualities not expressly mentioned in the conventions, to refrain from doing anything which would amount to taking sides with one of the parties to the war, and not to tolerate anything on the part of the population that would favor the one or the other war-party. Nothing short of this is true neutrality. It is instructive to observe in this war to what varying extent the various neutral states recognize and adhere to these unwritten duties as neutrals.

The unwritten international law has, however, an even greater import. Considered formally, the validity of the written sources of the law can be disputed in the present war. A treaty binds a state only when "ratified" by it. England has not ratified either the London Declaration or the Hague Conventions numbers 5 and 13, which concern the duties of neutrals in naval war or in war on land, nor convention number 10 concerning the adaptation to naval war of the Geneva Convention; while Russia has not ratified convention number 8 relative to contact mines nor number 11 relative to restrictions with regard to

the exercise of the right of capture in naval war. Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey have not ratified any of the conventions of the Second Hague Conference, and Montenegro has even refused to recognize the new Geneva Convention. Formally, therefore, all these conventions are not binding on the state that has not ratified them. Indeed, this non-validity extends even further. All the conventions just cited contain a clause that might be termed the "general participation clause" and which provides that these conventions shall bind the states that have ratified them only in case all belligerent Powers have ratified them. The participation in the war of *one* state that is not a party to the conventions excludes their binding force as regards all the Powers. Only when a convention is nothing but a new formulation of a former one (as, for instance, the convention of 1907 concerning war on land compared to that of 1899, and the new Geneva Convention compared to the old one), is the new convention to be valid, at least between those Powers which have ratified it, even though there may be a Power participating in the war which has only ratified the old and not the new convention. In respect to such a Power, the old convention remains in force. Apart from this important exception, there is no binding force, formally speaking, for any of the belligerents, in any of the above-mentioned conventions, in consequence of the participation in the war by Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. But in so far as the conventions are to be considered as not valid, the unwritten international law retains its force; it is applicable instead of the written law.

In determining this unwritten law, however, the written sources play a prominent part. In fact their formal non-validity is scarcely of importance. For, in large measure, it was not intended by the conventions to make new law, but rather to formulate the existing law, deciding at the same time questions in dispute and adding improvements and completions. This, too, is directly expressed in the preamble to various conventions (The Hague Convention numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, the new Geneva Convention, the Declaration of London). The formal non-validity of a convention is, therefore, no proof that its contents are not valid law, just the same; we may, therefore, add to our first principle this second one: *A rule is not to be considered invalid because it is formulated in a convention which itself is not formally recognized as in force.*

Conversely, it may be said, the various conventions, notwithstanding their formal non-validity, when cautiously employed, lend themselves as sources for determining the law that had ex-

isted apart from them. More than this. The laying down of certain principles of law in the conventions has, even though it may not have imparted formal, binding force, nevertheless gained a decisive influence on, and confirmed public opinion regarding the legal points involved. The written word, even when formally invalid, is nevertheless not without force. The form which has been given in the conventions to legal principles has become part and parcel of the public's legal views and given shape to them. This is evident from the fact that some belligerents have, at least partly, acknowledged the binding force of the conventions. Typical in this respect is the reply of the German government in answer to the protests by the British government concerning alleged breaches by Germany of the convention concerning mines. The reply, while acknowledging that since Russia had not ratified the convention, it was not valid, owing to the "general participation clause," even as between Germany and England, goes on to say: "Nevertheless, the German government of its own free will considers itself as bound by it." In like manner, Germany has observed all the conventions; in particular has she recognized the Declaration of London concerning the laws of naval war as binding through her incorporation of its stipulations in the German "Prize Regulations" (*Prisenordnung*).

In lamentable contrast to this attitude of Germany is that of England, particularly in regard to the Declaration of London, which she has practically demolished. This has been forcibly and clearly set forth in the memorandum of February 4, 1915, which the German government issued, together with her declaration of British waters as a war zone. England announced her readiness to recognize the Declaration of London as a whole, but subsequently, by a number of additional orders, modified the Declaration to such an extent in all essential details that hardly anything of it has been left. Let us now read the "Introductory Stipulation" with which this convention, signed though not ratified by England, opens. It is as follows: "The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law." England has herself thereby acknowledged that the law contained in the convention was valid before the war. Moreover: England herself has previously claimed (in her favor) as valid law a number of the principles laid down in the Declaration of London—that is to say, she has actually applied them as law. For her now to disclaim them is sheer arbitrariness. There have always been disputes as to the

meaning of the term contraband, but the broad interpretation which England gives to it, the elimination of the long recognized distinction between relative and absolute contraband, and the disavowal of the principles concerning blockade by the closing of the North Sea, are, all of them, breaches of law which cannot be excused on the plea of the formal non-validity of the Declaration of London. These are measures undertaken solely with the desire to ruin Germany economically, without considering whether the methods adopted are in harmony with international law or not. That such harmony does not exist, there cannot really be the slightest doubt from a legal point of view.

Finally, even within the law written and recognized as valid, it is indispensable to fall back on general legal principles. The written word, after all, never can be more than a guide toward a correct decision in legal questions. Its bearing must first be ascertained by scientific method, a task which has to be solved in international law in the same manner as in all other branches.

In the first place, the words have to be interpreted, their meaning has to be ascertained. Interpretation of law is governed by settled principles recognized by the jurisprudence of all nations. The letter of the law may not be slavishly adhered to, but at the same time it may not be brushed aside in an arbitrary manner—as is, unfortunately, too often done. If every state were at liberty to read white where black is set down, the written law would be altogether divested of meaning. Its significance would cease. An interpretation that lends another meaning to a clause than the only one which its phraseology renders possible, must be justified by the law in question itself, otherwise it is merely arbitrary. Under the Hague conventions, the bombarding of undefended towns is forbidden. Now, German war vessels have bombarded the town of Libau. Libau is a fortified port. Projectiles which were thrown did not fall within the fortifications, but hit the commercial quarter of the city. In Russia it was said that the rule forbidding the bombardment of undefended towns was thereby violated. Obviously the phrase "undefended town" in this case is given a sense no one had previously contemplated, or could have contemplated. The fortified part and the commercial quarter together constitute the "town," and a town is defended if any part of it is defended.

A particularly remarkable example of the high-handed manner in which England, with France and Russia in her wake, circumvents obvious law by tricks of interpretation, is offered by her treatment of Article 23 (h) of the regulations concerning war on land. Here it is expressly stated that it is forbidden "to

declare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the hostile party." The text is absolutely clear. Nevertheless, England at the outbreak of war issued an order forbidding payments to be made to Germany or Austria-Hungary, and France—here, too, England's docile pupil—has made this prohibition of payment even more stringent. On September 27th, she declared that all contracts concluded since the outbreak of war with a subject of her enemies should *ipso facto* become null and void, and that all contracts previously entered into might, on application by the French debtor, be declared void, provided they had not yet gone into effect. England's action was no surprise. In fact, the prohibition of payment conforms with the provisions of English private law, which has not been able to rid itself of the antiquated idea that the individual citizen of the enemy state is in himself an "alien enemy."

Sir Edward Grey, in 1911, in agreement with the majority of English legal writers, declared, that in the opinion of the British government this rule of the English law had not been eliminated by the stipulation referred to regarding the regulations of war on land; that Article 23 (h) simply provided that the military commanders of occupied enemy territory might not suspend or declare inadmissible in court rights and claims of the inhabitants of that territory. This interpretation is materially incorrect, if for no other reason than because it is not until we come to the third section (Article 42 *et seq.*) that the regulations concerning war on land discuss the rights and duties of the military authorities in occupied enemy territory, while in the second section, in which Article 23 is found, the general aim in view is to bring about a restriction of "the means of injuring the enemy." What fully settles the point is the fact that at the Hague negotiations the German delegates expressly pointed out the broader meaning which they gave to Article 23 (h) (which had been proposed by them), and that no opposition was raised from any quarter. This is recorded in the minutes of the meeting. It was the very purpose of the proposed Article 23 (h) to counteract the existing English law; its aim was to secure respect for an important consequence resulting from the great principle of the law of war, viz., the inviolability of private property. If England held a different view, she should have brought it forward at that time. She should not have agreed to the article and—three years later—have ratified it, with the mental reservation to interpret it in a manner different to that in which it was meant by the other Powers. It is unnecessary

to state how such behavior would be characterized if occurring in other domains of law.[1]

France's proceeding is even worse. That she understood Article 23 (h) in the same manner as Germany, there cannot be the least doubt; practically the whole of her legal literature supports the correct interpretation. Since the war, however, she has simply disavowed her previous legal opinion, and, as the docile pupil of England, adopted English measures—nay, outdone the British themselves. A vassal's loyalty evidently gets the better of legal conscience. The less said about Russian accomplishment the better; it seems that for Russia the bounds of international law have ceased to exist altogether.

On the other hand, the search for what is law must not stop at the ascertainment of the meaning of the written word. Considerations based on the general principles lead to results which should take precedence of the words of the written law. The law-maker—and the state that by conventions creates regulations of international law is on a level with him—by his abstract rules always intends to regulate the real conditions as these are known to him. He is never in a position to foresee the entire manifold variety of cases that may occur in real life. Thus it may easily happen that he lays down a rule that is too general; a case of a peculiar character may arise which falls under the general rule, yet the conclusion may be justified that the law-maker, had he contemplated this case in advance, would have restricted his general rule. The idea which gave rise to that general rule does not apply in this case. And even if the rule at the time it was framed was really applicable in all cases then possible, it may be that after its creation conditions have changed, new facts have arisen and new cases have become possible, which at the time of framing the rule could not have been foreseen, and for which it is now no longer suitable. If in such a case the old rule were to be applied then, in the words of Mephistopheles, reason would become a sham, beneficence a vexation.

In the jurisprudence of all nations it is recognized that in such cases the administration of the law must be at liberty to deviate from the letter; the legal rule remains inapplicable because the supposition for which alone it is intended does not apply. The German commercial code formerly contained special legal rules for the conclusion of contracts between absent parties. Then the telephone was invented. Without hesitation, jurisprudence dealing with the conclusion of contracts by telephone

[1] In this connection see Strupp's treatise in *Zeitschrift für internationales Recht*, 1913, Vol. XXIII, Sec. 2, p. 118 ff.

has treated as inapplicable the principles regulating the conclusion of contract between absent parties, although these principles applied according to the letter. In this sense the old legal maxim holds good: *"Cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa."* New actual conditions may call for new legal regulations; we then assume that the law has a gap, and we fill it in the same manner as we fill any other gap.

This general maxim of jurisprudential procedure is particularly important in the case of the law of war. Technical science and politics may offer surprises which of necessity destroy the framework of the old rules of international law. Who at the time of the framing of the rules on naval warfare thought of the possibilities of submarine warfare as witnessed to-day? Had they been anticipated, special rules would have been made. The old principles of naval warfare cannot in this case be applied without modification, new rules are required. In this connection, the principles of neutrality offer still another example in point: Although in the conventions concerning neutrality it is declared that a neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export of arms and ammunition for the benefit of one or the other of the belligerents, circumstances may be such that this stipulation, despite its general application, can no longer take effect. It is devoid of meaning, unless under existing conditions the delivery of munitions is possible to both parties, for the ultimate essence of neutrality is that the neutral state must not actually favor any party, it must treat both with impartiality. This general principle of impartiality in treatment has therefore found expression in both of the Hague Conventions here in question (Convention No. 5, Article 9; Convention No. 13, Article 9, and Introduction, fifth paragraph).

In the present war Germany and Austria-Hungary are surrounded on almost all sides by belligerent enemies. The geographical position is such that a delivery of munitions from the United States to Germany and Austria-Hungary is actually out of the question. In such a case it is the duty, the *legal* duty, despite the stipulations quoted from the Hague Conventions, to prevent the delivery to our enemies of war-material. That alone conforms with the legal nature of neutrality, and therefore with international law rightly conceived. A contrary procedure is opposed to it. Laws must be interpreted in this true spirit, not by mere verbal arguments—this truth is as old as jurisprudence itself: *"Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem,"* says old Celsus.

And what will now happen? With sorrow we watch this whole spectacle, international law broken and shattered, a lofty possession of human civilization trodden in the dust. We can no longer close our eyes to the fact that international law has not stood the test in this war. If the law relating to war on land, though actually often broken, has to some extent at least remained recognized, the law relating to naval warfare has been almost completely rejected, leaving us face to face with a veritable chaos. This is very significant. The whole international law is a community law; it depends, as was said in the beginning, on the recognition of the fact that the states are *co-ordinated.* This conception had become established on the Continent, between the Continental Powers now at war, as can be seen from the manner in which war is being conducted on land. It is different, however, at sea. England has never actually recognized the other states as standing on a footing of equality with her on the water. If the aim of her policy has always been to let no other naval Power arise, if she has consistently endeavored to be the strongest naval Power, the question involved was here one of actual strength. But in addition she has always regarded herself as the *ruling sea Power* in the sense that in questions of maritime law she considered her will as decisive for all other European Powers.

One is justified in the assumption that the conception has not yet found unreserved acceptance in England, even in theory, that the law relating to naval warfare is the law of a community of states of equal rank, to which every state whether great or small must submit in like manner. Many of her breaches of maritime law may, perhaps, be accounted for by this theoretic backwardness: England does not regard them as breaches of law, because she still innocently adheres to the opinion that international law in maritime matters is, in fact, English law. As a matter of fact her behavior in questions of naval warfare is altogether based on the principle, "Law at sea is only what I recognize as law, no matter what has been before, no matter what my previous practice may have been, and I recognize only that as law which suits my purpose." All disputes concerning international law would, indeed, speedily cease, if all states had but the good sense to recognize this one maxim as absolute: Law at sea is what England decides to be law.

What will now happen? Since international law is externally powerless, in that there is no tribunal which can compel the observance of the law, only one remedy remains to the offended state: it must help itself. It has been previously men-

tioned that everywhere the right of retribution, the right of reprisal, is recognized. Every state that has suffered injury in respect to international law, acts lawfully when it returns one breach of international law by another. But the nature of the reprisals is altogether different in the two groups of breaches of the law which we have distinguished. Where the international law, though broken, is still recognized as valid, a reprisal means only that the injured state returns the injury by a similar injury, or if need be, by a breach of another kind. The state thereby breaks the law itself, but breaks it legally; the act is a permissible one. The state breaks the law because it recognizes the validity of the law which the opponent has violated and because it wishes to assert it. The reprisal is a breach of the law for the sake of protecting the law. Nevertheless, it is to be applied with great caution. It is useful in so far as the hope is justified that by applying the reprisal the enemy will be induced in the future to forbear from further breaches of international law. But it is liable to fail only too easily in its object and to conjure up even worse evil.

According to the principles of international law, a reprisal, because it is a lawful action, does not by any means warrant counter-reprisals. In reality, the danger that a retaliative measure will be reciprocated by a further retaliative measure is obvious; and thus, instead of compelling the opponent to respect international law, the reprisal may bring about an increase in breaches of it. Only in rare instances has Germany resorted to reprisals. When the news concerning the imprisonment of non-combatant German subjects in France proved to be true, the German government by way of retaliation imprisoned the French citizens who happened to be in Germany; she retaliated against the unpardonable confinement by England of German subjects in concentration camps, by imprisoning British subjects in Germany. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the confinement of the French and British subjects in Germany is very lenient; they are deprived of their liberty, but for the rest every hardship is spared them, in striking contradistinction to what—according to unimpeachable reports—was, and still is, the lot of at least some of the unfortunate Germans abroad. It is difficult to restrain one's feeling in thinking of the treatment of German women and children by the English in East Asia, or in remembering how a civilized state like France has dragged off Germans to unhealthy parts of tropical Africa, not to speak of that which is taking place in Russia. On the other hand, Germany has refrained from rendering like for like. On no

occasion has the violation of the Red Cross been reciprocated by any sort of retaliatory measure. The judicial murder of Casablanca could easily have been avenged, since we have a large portion of France in our possession. It has not been done. The respect for international law, the sense of duty which civilization imposes, was powerful enough to drown the call for retaliation.

Things are, however, different when legal rules are repudiated. All law of nations, according to its nature, is mutual, because it aims to regulate the relations of states to one another. As soon, therefore, as one state in its relation to its enemy refuses to acknowledge any longer the validity of a rule of law, such provision ceases to be binding on the enemy, also. That is, indeed, the gist of the "general participation clause," which is contained in nearly all conventions: No belligerent state shall in regard to international law be more favorably situated than its opponent; a rule which is not binding for the one is not binding for the other. All legal rules, therefore, which one party refuses to accept as binding lose their binding force for the opponent also, and if one party puts forward a new legal rule the enemy may do likewise. It must be admitted that international law is a law of weak vitality, in that an individual war-party, if evilly inclined, can render it invalid. Through the English and French prohibition against payments to us, the above-mentioned article of the regulations of war on land ceased to bind Germany: we were then at liberty to reply to this prohibition of payment by an identical one in respect to those states, and we did so—although in a very moderate manner. In Germany the foreign claims are merely suspended, not abolished, and foreign private property, though placed under supervision and administration, has in no instance been illegally confiscated.

England has from the start rendered invalid in its most important provisions the Declaration of London, which according to its own wording must be treated as a whole and cannot be separated. Accordingly, its binding force automatically ceased to exist for Germany, who had at first recognized it. A legal norm cannot bind the one if it does not bind the other. Therefore, Germany was absolutely right when, in imitation of England's methods of carrying on naval warfare, she declared the English coastal waters a war zone. The rights of neutrals were not thereby prejudiced. If a subject of a neutral Power during a war on land ventures upon the battle-field, a bullet may hit him; the belligerent is under no obligation to silence his rifles and artillery because they may strike the subject of a neutral Power.

Nor is Germany responsible if, in the naval war which, after her own manner and with the means at her disposal, she is waging against England, a neutral ship that ventures into the war zone comes to grief. If in a duel a non-participant places himself so that one of the parties has to choose between not fighting or hurting the onlooker, and if this onlooker insists that he must not be hurt, he prevents this duellist from defending himself and thereby actually favors the other party. Is this really to be called neutrality? England not only wishes to damage Germany by her methods of procedure, she also abuses the rights of neutrals in the most barefaced manner. She represents her treatment of Germany as a retributive measure—wrongly so, for Germany had fully observed the Declaration of London, as well as all other maritime laws of war, until their breach by England. But even if she were entitled to retaliate upon Germany—she is not so entitled, as has been said—this would never excuse her violation of the rights of neutrals. She is now going even further: in her latest measures she does not hesitate to discard the old-established rules of the Declaration of Paris, which have enjoyed undisputed validity from the formal point of view. The whole maritime law of war seems to collapse before our eyes.

The procedure of our opponents, which runs counter to international law, entails the danger that through resorting to reprisals and counter-reprisals the evils of the war will grow more and more extensive, that the methods governing it will grow more and more merciless, bloody and ghastly. And even beyond this application of reprisals, there is the further danger that, on account of so many infractions, the rulers of states, armies and navies, and the nations generally, will in the end cease to believe in the sacredness of international law. It must be observed with sorrow that the consciousness of the nations regarding international law as a binding force, a consciousness which was happily growing, is now on the wane. For this reason it is to be feared that each individual state which suffers from the breaches of the law committed by its enemies will, in the end, cease to regard itself as bound by anything, and will consult only its own momentary advantage, with the sword as the sole arbiter. If this once comes to be the case, war will finally turn into a struggle for complete annihilation among the civilized nations.

The loss which this war has caused and is apparently still going to cause to international law is immense. Nevertheless, we do not despair of the future of international law—at least not if, as we hope, Germany be victorious. It will be one of our

chief solicitudes then to see that a new international law is built up on broader and more liberal principles. All international law is founded on the conception of equal rights for all nations. Germany has never aspired to world-dominion, nor will she ever do so in the future; history has taught us, only too clearly, that world-supremacy is a delusive blessing. Germany wants light and air for herself, but she also wants every nation to live and prosper in its own individual way. We are convinced that there is room for all in the world, and that the happiness and well-being of one nation does not stand in the way of another's happiness, but that, on the contrary, it increases it. England, however, cannot free herself of the idea that at sea she is supreme, that there her will alone is paramount. Too long have the peoples of the earth submitted to this. The hour is near, we trust, when they need do so no longer. We are waging this struggle not only for ourselves, for our maintenance as a state, for our existence as a nation, for our share in the culture of humankind, but we are in the last resort fighting it in the interest of all nations. This may not be realized to-day, but the time will come when the war will be looked upon from this point of view. The word of the great Dutchman, that the sea is free, has not up to this time been a truth. It shall become a truth, and this will be due to Germany.

CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF THE WAR

PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

THE English are fond of comparing the war which they and their allies are waging against us to that waged against Napoleon I. They accuse us of purposing to subjugate the Continent to our domination in order to crush and rob England. The requirements of warfare, it is true, make it imperative that we should gain to a certain point the ascendancy over our Continental enemies, in order to grapple with England, and force her to make peace. But that our policy has been guided by this intention for years cannot be accepted by any impartial student of contemporary history. If this had been our purpose, we would have taken advantage of England's dilemma in the Boer War and of that of Russia in the Japanese War to render one or the other of our present adversaries innocuous. We made no attempt to do so. Rather has our policy been to keep peace as long as this was compatible with the honor and vital interests of our people. Our chances for further progress were vastly greater through the development of our forces in peaceful competition with other nations than by a world war, in which all the other Powers except ourselves had a clear and fixed aim in view as the prize of victory. The resemblance of the present war to the Napoleonic conflict consists only in the fact that England has again set her Continental allies against that Power which she at present regards as the chief opponent to her supremacy at sea and in international trade.

It is absurd—in view of the political history of the past twenty years—to speak of Germany's ambition for world dominion as like that of Napoleon I. From our point of view the present crisis resembles rather that which the Prussia of Frederick the Great endured in the Seven Years' War. To-day the German Empire is fighting for its existence as a Great Power just as the Prussian State did at that time. The question for us is whether we shall be able to maintain our position in the ranks of the World Powers, or whether our opponents will succeed in ousting us from that position. Allied with us, Austria-Hungary, too, is defending her existence as a Great Power. The

two Central European Powers are in danger of being crushed by the border countries of our continent. These border countries, favored by greater possibilites of expanding beyond the boundaries of Europe, and united by a community of interests—which is probably only temporary—are endeavoring to cut off the Central Powers from the outside world, and to reduce their strength to such an extent that they would be harmless as competitors in world politics.

We must frustrate this attempt and prevent, if possible, a repetition of similar dangerous crises. Our chief and immediate goal is to overthrow the plans of our enemies, to teach them the necessary respect for our arms on land and sea, to break the iron ring which has paralyzed our world politics for so long with its concentric pressure, and to gain and secure the possibility for free development of our forces and for undisturbed pursuit of our vital interests in the world. We want to maintain our place in the sun. Nor shall we allow ourselves to be ousted from the ranks of World Powers, in spite of our confined position on the Continent. We must endeavor to strengthen our position in such a manner that the dangers now threatening us will be reduced as much as possible. But we are far from entertaining plans of world domination such as are pursued by England and perhaps Russia. The public, it is true, has a rather hazy conception of the meaning of the phrase "World Power." Certain minor German publicists think that a World Power must be boundless in its demands and its ambition for power. That is not the real significance of this term. Such is certainly not the goal of practical German politics. We do not understand by a World Power one which dominates and dictates to the world, nor a new Rome that does not suffer any other Power besides itself to enjoy equal rights. We take the term as meaning a Great Power within the bounds of the new world system of states, a Power of that type which is at once a result and a requirement of the enlarged circumstances of the world. We wish to stand as a World Power next to other World Powers in the future community of states, just as we have stood as a Great Power next to Great Powers in the hitherto existing European state system. It would be contrary to the spirit in which we wage this war were we to lay claim to a supremacy such as England possesses or desires, which threatens the independence of other nations. This British supremacy must be ended, but it must not be transferred from one Power to another. Moreover, there is much to indicate that the world supremacy of *one* Power would be much more unbearable in the

new world system of states than it has been so far in the European state system.

The idea on which our policy is based is, therefore, not that of world domination, but rather that of the balance of power. In this connection we must enter a protest against the way in which this conception has for centuries been falsified by England. That which is understood in England by the European balance of power is nothing more nor less than the principle that the Continental Powers must fight, balance and neutralize one another, so that Britain can establish her maritime and commercial dominance without let or hindrance. Things are no different to-day in this respect than two hundred years ago. This system of the balance of power is, according to England's idea, to be limited to Europe. As a World Power, England does not form an integral part of this system. She lays claim only to control and regulate it. In the future world system of states there is to be, according to England's conception, no balance of power, because this would be incompatible with England's supremacy at sea and in commerce. *European* balance of power is for England only a catchword, a deceptive formula which cloaks her plans of world domination. The real balance of power in the world system of states for which *we* are striving would be based on the premise that England renounce her claims to absolute supremacy at sea.

This will be difficult to accomplish. The economic structure of modern England is so dependent on her supremacy at sea that its abolition might have the most disastrous results. England has become a purely industrial state and has allowed her agriculture to decay; she needs imperatively a regular overseas influx of provisions and raw materials to feed her population and keep her factories going. The safeguarding of these imports is the vital question for the United Kingdom; if in a war they were cut off for more than six weeks, or even seriously interrupted, England would be forced by starvation and unemployment to make peace. Absolute supremacy at sea, therefore, is regarded in England as a condition necessary to the existence of the British state. If you ask what divine or human law apportioned supremacy at sea to the Britons for all times, the Englishman will draw your attention to the conditions just analyzed, with that naïveté with which he confounds his national interests with those of the universe.

Lust for world-dominion has always had a disintegrating effect upon the national structure of states which have yielded to it. The British dependence on sea traffic is a weakness which has been produced by the lust for maritime and commercial

supremacy in the world. Is this weakness of England sufficient reason for the other Powers to tolerate forever her domination at sea? To a certain extent this seemed a passable excuse so long as England's requirements for existence did not come into irreconcilable conflict with those of other great nations. As matters stand in this war, however, England's supremacy at sea is meant not only to safeguard her own national existence, but to starve the German people, nearly seventy million souls. England is carrying on this war primarily not against our army and our fleet, but against our women and children. For us, therefore, the necessity is just as urgent that this British tyranny be abolished. The world may be sure that we are determined to resort to all possible means to defend our life in this war, which has been forced upon us by England. The relentlessness with which we are compelled to carry on the war is solely the fault of England. The solution of the underlying differences would have been very easy. England need only have agreed to what all nations demanded, that the right of capture at sea should be abolished, at least for provisions and raw material. Then the appeal to starvation as an ally in this war would have been impossible. England thought that in this she possessed a powerful weapon which she did not wish to surrender. Perhaps she will learn by experience that this weapon is two-edged and that its use is fraught with dangers which make it appear advisable to relinquish it.

Though the English may cling to the idea which permeates all their political life that to them as God's chosen people is due an especially favored place in the world, they cannot expect us to agree to this conception and bow to its consequences. We hope, too, that the other nations on whom the yoke of British naval supremacy weighs heavily will pull themselves together and cast it off. The British fleet is not only a means of safeguarding British vital interests, but is also a very dangerous weapon which menaces all coasts and is able to subject all non-British shipping to a paralyzing control. England has at all times unscrupulously and arbitrarily twisted and manipulated the laws of naval warfare in the interest of her sole supremacy. She has always infringed on the rights of neutrals in naval warfare in order to damage as much as possible all her competitors—not alone her enemies—in trade and shipping. In the present war the timid protests, made not only by the small naval powers, but even by the United States—protests against the damage to their shipping and against misuse of their flag by England, the mistress of the seas—die timidly away. Has it

really come to such a pass that the world cannot make a stand against England's naval tyranny, and that the old call for freedom of the seas has become only an empty word? We cannot and will not believe this. We have taken up arms against England's domination of the sea and of the world at large, because she is menacing our vital interests by a murderous naval warfare contrary to international law. In answer to England's acts, we are carrying on the war with extreme measures and ruthlessness, not because superior power, but because the knavery and deceit of our enemies and our own consequent necessity force us to do so. But we are far removed from wishing to substitute a German tyranny for that of England. We are fighting for the freedom of the seas and the humane laws of naval warfare formulated in the Declaration of London of 1909, which are in accordance with the conceptions of the rights and laws of all nations, but not with the special interests of England, who prevented the adoption of these laws. We want to supplement the balance of power on land with the balance of power at sea, to create the only permanent and sound foundation for a world system of states.

In this struggle against British supremacy at sea and world dominion we are fighting for the interests of the world's traffic and trade and for an economic and political prerequisite to the state system of the future. If we do not fight this war to the end now, then later on other nations will take it up again.

Even before the war, England had to relinquish the exercise to its full extent of her maritime supremacy; she had to withdraw a great part of the garrisons from her foreign naval stations, concentrating her forces in home waters. That was the effect of German naval armament. It had already visibly benefited other maritime nations. The pressure which England had hitherto exercised in foreign continents was decreasing perceptibly.

The great Dominions—whose demonstrations of sympathy and active aid to the motherland are, after all, of only small politico-military value—are, more and more, tending to complete autonomy. The era of colonial rule in Asia and on the north coast of Africa will, it seems likely, soon come to an end, as that in America and Australia has already done. The former dream of the rule of the world by the white race has been destroyed by the rise of Japan, and who knows how short a time it may be before the slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics," is realized. The rise of Islam must inevitably be a powerful factor in this change of conditions in the world. Only in Central Africa,

among the uncivilized negro peoples, does there seem still to be a great future for colonial activity. That activity must, however, limit itself to promoting welfare and morality rather than engaging in the ruthless exploitation of natural treasures and human forces, with an eye to large and immediate profits, as is the practice, for example, in the Belgian Congo.

The irresistible progress of the littoral countries of the Pacific, which makes them the chief problem of trade and politics of the world, is also fateful for British maritime and world dominion. The present war is speeding this development by giving Japan a valuable opportunity, which will perhaps never recur, to make use of her military superiority over China. Will the United States look on quietly at this dangerous proceeding? Is the profit accruing to a few business men for the delivery of munitions of war to our enemies blinding the United States to the fact that this trade is prolonging the war and increasing Japan's opportunity to strengthen her power? Are American sympathies for England greater than American interests?

But perhaps none of the neutral states has a greater interest in destroying England's naval supremacy than Italy.[1] Nature has predestined Italy to the position of supreme Power in the Mediterranean, but political development has brought it about that to-day the long coast-line of the Apennine peninsula is more a factor of weakness than of strength. England controls, by virtue of her possession of Gibraltar, the western basin of the Mediterranean, by her possession of Malta the eastern, and by that of Egypt the Suez Canal. Once Italy had in the all-powerful British navy a protector against France, who had come threateningly near to her after the occupation of Tunis. The position of Italy was not ideal, but Great Britain offered her a moderate amount of security. Now England has allied herself with France and entrusted her, within certain limits, with the protection of the Mediterranean. What rôle could Italy play by the side of a victorious England and France? Of what use would even Trieste be to her, with a growing Slavonic population all around and a hostile hinterland in the rear? Trieste is indispensable to Austria; in Italy's hands it would become a waste place. It is useless now to recall the *Dreibund,* within the bounds of which Italy satisfactorily promoted her economic and political interests for more than thirty years. We do not know the exact obligations which the *Dreibund* imposed—especially after the renewal in 1912. If, in declaring her neutrality, Italy denied

[1] It is well to recall that this was written early in the year 1915, before Italy had decided to embrace the cause of the Allies.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

the defensive character of the war, she based her declaration on an interpretation which we naturally refuse to share. But behind this explanation are, of course, other reasons to the justice of which we do not, by any means, wish to turn a deaf ear. If, on the other hand, there is now a strong current of public opinion urging her to abandon neutrality and side with the Triple Entente, it is more a mixture of Latin race sentimentality, Irredentist hate of Austria and democratic-republican sympathies that is stirring the national soul, than the sound instinct of political interests. Italy's political interests clearly require a weakening of France and England, her superior rivals in the Mediterranean, and they also require a strengthening of Central Europe. Even in the event of victory, Italy's connection with Republican France would in a country of democratic unrest shake the last remnant of monarchical authority, thereby endangering the course of prudent politics and the very position of power of the country.[1]

Just as Italy is menaced by England and France, so too are the eastern Balkan states—especially Rumania—menaced by Russia. The candid declarations of the Russian ministers and party leaders in the last Duma session (February 9, 1915) leave no room for doubt that Russia not only aims at the opening of the Dardanelles, but at their outright possession, together with Constantinople and the shores of the Black Sea in Asia Minor. But if the Black Sea thus becomes a Russian sea, how could Rumania escape the danger of complete dependence on her domineering neighbor? In what a situation would she be placed economically, since she has no other access to the ocean except by way of the Dardanelles, through which 95 per cent. of her exports pass? Although the numerous influences which are at work in the country to induce Rumania to join the Triple Entente direct the nationalistic desires of the population towards Transylvanian territory, Rumania's real interests point beyond the Pruth; they demand that she join the Central European "block," with its front turned against Russia, whose victory

[1] While this book was going to press Italy's secession from the Triple Alliance to the side of our enemies took place. It is not possible to discuss this fact here and the literature it has produced, because the motives of the Italian government are not easy to determine. Italy's dependence on England evidently has played as important a part in this situation as the sympathies of the radical Irredentists and Free Masons for France. Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty does not in any way justify Italy's action, nor had it been interpreted in this sense in August. It is even more difficult to reconcile Italy's stand with Article IV, which bound Italy to maintain a benevolent neutrality in case she should not think it advisable to join her allies in the war. We feel justified, therefore, in using such terms as breach of faith.

would make Serbia great, but would subject all other Balkan peoples to an insupportable pressure.

The two great imperialistic currents—the British and the Russian—which have joined in this war against the Central European Powers, are *au fond* inimical to each other. If Russia holds the Dardanelles, then England's sovereignty in the Mediterranean, Egypt and the Suez Canal is menaced. It remains to be seen whether England will really permit such a change when it becomes imminent. Her hitherto compliant attitude is probably designed to leave to other Powers the odium of opposition to this plan and to gain Russia's sword by prospects which will not be realized for a long time to come. It is certain, however, that Russia and England would soon be at cross-purposes in Asia. Russian expansion in Asia—which Prince Uchtomski, in his great work on the Oriental journey of the then heir to the throne, written in the early nineties, described as the historical mission of Czardom [1]—involves a natural hostility towards the colonizing island people, who in the Far East are scoring signal successes in bringing the influence of west European culture to bear against the Russians, who feel themselves intellectually akin to the Asiatics. The common victory of the two chief exponents of imperialism would at first spell a sort of partition of the world between them, but the final struggle for world dominion would inevitably and speedily follow.

We are unable to see therein salvation for humanity. We are not only fighting for our own power and independence by trying to stave this off, but for the freedom of all nations. The earth is to be neither Anglo-Saxon nor Muscovite. We do not want world domination by one single nation, but that vigorous coexistence of free nations and states that has hitherto been the foundation of modern *Kultur*. The *Kultur* of the newer nations would be strangled in the octopus coils of a world-dominating England or Russia, as was once the ancient world in the embrace of world-dominating Rome. British imperialism endeavors, as Professor Cramb has put it, to give the dominated races an English soul.[2] That is characteristic of a nation that has never sought to comprehend and adapt itself to the peculiarities of foreign races and nations. The British colonial official is, it is true, able to govern the inhabitants of India, but he does not understand their psychology. English education may be able to impart certain exterior habits of life, but it is not able

[1] *Orientreise S. M. des Kaisers von Russland Nikolaus II als Grossfürst-Thronfolger*, Prince E. Uchtomski, Leipzig, 1899, Vol. II, p. 388 ff.
[2] *Germany and England*, by J. A. Cramb, London, 1914, p. 125.

to dominate and form Oriental thinking and feeling. The Russians seems to understand the soul of the Orient better, but only in so far as the dull uneducated masses are concerned, the masses who need to be ruled along patriarchal-despotic lines. Russians are essentially foreign to the cultural ideals of the Occident and do not understand them. Even to-day Russian imperialism proclaims the principle: *One* God, *one* Czar, *one* Empire. With what religious and nationalistic intolerance and with what barbaric methods this principle is carried out is shown by the treatment of the Ruthenians in East Galicia, whom Russia is trying by violent measures to rob of their nationality and of their old allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church.

These methods are foreign to the German. We have always had a profounder understanding and higher regard for foreign peculiarities. What we regard as the future ideal is a system of World Powers who mutually recognize and respect one another's independence and equality, as was formerly the case with the Great Powers in the European community of states. And by the side of these World Powers we want also the smaller or less powerful and less developed states to be safeguarded in their independent existence, provided they do not, if they are our neighbors, secretly conspire with our enemies against us. We do not share Lord Salisbury's opinion that the big states must grow greater and ever greater and the small states smaller and fewer. If the necessities of world economics and world politics require a unification of greater political areas, we conceive it as a community of interests of free, independent states, not as the establishment of a world empire according to the British or Russian pattern. And we know that, in forming such a community, much care, tact and patience will be needed.

We do not stand for *any sort* of world domination, but for the principle of freedom and equal rights for all the nations of the earth, in so far as they have attained to the necessary stage of civilization. This is in accordance with German nature. It is in this sense that we desire to interpret the much-quoted prophetic words of Emanuel Geibel, one of our noblest poets: *"Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen."* [1] That is the object of German *Weltpolitik;* that is also the object of the war. We are not waging it as the aggressor in order to put an end to an untenable position. We are waging it in defense against a long prepared attack of our neighbors, the object of which is to strike us off the list of the World Powers. We are carrying on the war in order to maintain our position in the rank of

[1] "The spirit of the German race shall heal the sickness of the world."

World Powers, in order to break the yoke of England's sea and world dominion, but not to succeed to England's position as the ruler of the world.

We want to found a new balance of power in the world system of states. That is quite a different thing from what the English understand by *European* balance of power. The false, European balance of power of the English is a deceptive phantasm. It is merely a means to England's world domination. Real balance of power amongst the World Powers excludes absolute domination at sea of any one single Power, and re-establishes the old principle of the freedom of the seas. That it is also of higher ethical value than the English idea of world domination must be clear to every one who perceives a higher ideal in the possibility of free competition of all nations than in the gratification of the national egoism of a single nation, which regards its own welfare as the be-all and the end-all of the history of the world.

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